Miller factors in Connecticut

2026“Determining whether no reasonable fact finder, considering the entire body of evidence as the habeas court did, would find the petitioner guilty is either an application of law to the facts or a mixed question of law and fact to which a plenary standard of review applies.” Id., 805 .

2026“Determining whether no reasonable fact finder, considering the entire body of evidence as the habeas court did, would find the petitioner guilty is either an application of law to the facts or a mixed question of law and fact to which a plenary standard of review applies.” Id., 805 .

2019After analyzing the rele- vant factors enumerated in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), that are to be con- sidered in construing the state constitution and applying the two part framework for adjudicating claims of cruel and unusual punishment, we stated that neither contem- porary standards of decency nor our independent judg- ment compelled us to adopt a rule under the state constitution that would require resentencing to remedy a Miller violation.

2019After analyzing the rele- vant factors enumerated in State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 684–85, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), that are to be con- sidered in construing the state constitution and applying the two part framework for adjudicating claims of cruel and unusual punishment, we stated that neither contem- porary standards of decency nor our independent judg- ment compelled us to adopt a rule under the state constitution that would require resentencing to remedy a Miller violation.

2019E.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017) (punishment including ‘‘realistic and meaningful’’ parole eligibility); Diatchenko v. District Attorney, 466 Mass. 655, 673 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (life imprisonment with possibility of parole after thirty-one years); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 262–63 (Minn. 2014) (life imprisonment with possi- bility of early release after thirty years). 5 Public Policy Nor does Connecticut’s public policy compel a con- clusion that resentencing is the sole remedy for a Miller violation. ‘‘[O]ur legislature . . . has the primary responsibility for form

2019E.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017) (punishment including ‘‘realistic and meaningful’’ parole eligibility); Diatchenko v. District Attorney, 466 Mass. 655, 673 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (life imprisonment with possibility of parole after thirty-one years); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 262–63 (Minn. 2014) (life imprisonment with possi- bility of early release after thirty years). 5 Public Policy Nor does Connecticut’s public policy compel a con- clusion that resentencing is the sole remedy for a Miller violation. ‘‘[O]ur legislature . . . has the primary responsibility for form

2019To the extent that the record supports it, we nonetheless review it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2019To the extent that the record supports it, we nonetheless review it under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).

2019For example, in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 , 370 P.3d 1053 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2016), the Supreme Court of California found parole eligibility under Cal. Penal Code § 3051 (f) (1) to be an adequate remedy for a Miller violation because, amongst other things, the statute directed ‘‘the [b]oard to give great weight to the diminished culpabil- ity of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner . . . [and] contem- plate[d] that information regarding the juvenile offend- er’s characteristics and circ

2019For example, in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 , 370 P.3d 1053 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2016), the Supreme Court of California found parole eligibility under Cal. Penal Code § 3051 (f) (1) to be an adequate remedy for a Miller violation because, amongst other things, the statute directed ‘‘the [b]oard to give great weight to the diminished culpabil- ity of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner . . . [and] contem- plate[d] that information regarding the juvenile offend- er’s characteristics and circ

2019E.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017) (punishment including ‘‘realistic and meaningful’’ parole eligibility); Diatchenko v. District Attorney, 466 Mass. 655, 673 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (life imprisonment with possibility of parole after thirty-one years); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 262–63 (Minn. 2014) (life imprisonment with possi- bility of early release after thirty years). 5 Public Policy Nor does Connecticut’s public policy compel a con- clusion that resentencing is the sole remedy for a Miller violation. ‘‘[O]ur legislature . . . has the primary responsibility for form

2019E.g., State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 102 (Iowa 2017) (punishment including ‘‘realistic and meaningful’’ parole eligibility); Diatchenko v. District Attorney, 466 Mass. 655, 673 , 1 N.E.3d 270 (2013) (life imprisonment with possibility of parole after thirty-one years); State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248 , 262–63 (Minn. 2014) (life imprisonment with possi- bility of early release after thirty years). 5 Public Policy Nor does Connecticut’s public policy compel a con- clusion that resentencing is the sole remedy for a Miller violation. ‘‘[O]ur legislature . . . has the primary responsibility for form

2019The dissent essentially would have us overrule Delgado on this ground.14 The dissent argues further that Delgado is distinguishable on the ground that it ‘‘neither addresses nor answers the different question raised by defendant here, which is whether the availability of parole under P.A. 15-84 cures a constitutional violation that this court [in Casiano] has deemed to be a ‘watershed’ rule—that is, a rule essential to the fundamental fairness of the judicial proceeding, central to an accurate determina- tion of a proportionate sentence, and implicit in the very idea of ordered liberty—as a ma

2019The dissent essentially would have us overrule Delgado on this ground.14 The dissent argues further that Delgado is distinguishable on the ground that it ‘‘neither addresses nor answers the different question raised by defendant here, which is whether the availability of parole under P.A. 15-84 cures a constitutional violation that this court [in Casiano] has deemed to be a ‘watershed’ rule—that is, a rule essential to the fundamental fairness of the judicial proceeding, central to an accurate determina- tion of a proportionate sentence, and implicit in the very idea of ordered liberty—as a ma

2019For example, in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 , 370 P.3d 1053 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2016), the Supreme Court of California found parole eligibility under Cal. Penal Code § 3051 (f) (1) to be an adequate remedy for a Miller violation because, amongst other things, the statute directed ‘‘the [b]oard to give great weight to the diminished culpabil- ity of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner . . . [and] contem- plate[d] that information regarding the juvenile offend- er’s characteristics and circ

2019For example, in People v. Franklin, 63 Cal. 4th 261 , 370 P.3d 1053 , 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496 (2016), the Supreme Court of California found parole eligibility under Cal. Penal Code § 3051 (f) (1) to be an adequate remedy for a Miller violation because, amongst other things, the statute directed ‘‘the [b]oard to give great weight to the diminished culpabil- ity of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner . . . [and] contem- plate[d] that information regarding the juvenile offend- er’s characteristics and circ

2017Wash. September 30, 2016) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with parole was not entitled to relief under Miller ); People v. Cornejo , 3 Cal.App. 5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and no Miller claim arises, and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Haw. 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller

2017Wash. September 30, 2016) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with parole was not entitled to relief under Miller ); People v. Cornejo , 3 Cal.App. 5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and no Miller claim arises, and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Haw. 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller

2017Wash. September 30, 2016) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with parole was not entitled to relief under Miller ); People v. Cornejo , 3 Cal.App. 5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and no Miller claim arises, and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Haw. 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller

2017Wash. September 30, 2016) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with parole was not entitled to relief under Miller ); People v. Cornejo , 3 Cal.App. 5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and no Miller claim arises, and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Haw. 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller

2017Wash. September 30, 2016) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment with parole was not entitled to relief under Miller ); People v. Cornejo , 3 Cal.App. 5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and no Miller claim arises, and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Haw. 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller

2016Cornejo, 3 Cal.App.5th 36 , 67-68, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 (2016) (after legislation afforded defendant opportunity for parole, sentence imposed by trial court was no longer sentence of life without parole or functional equivalent and " 'no Miller claim arises,' " and same rationale applied to both mandatory and discretionary sentences); State v. Tran , 138 Hawai'i 298 , 307, 378 P.3d 1014 (2016) (United States Supreme Court's "statements in Montgomery make clear that Miller does not require individualized sentencing or consideration of the mitigating factors of youth in every case involving a juv

2015See, e.g., Brown v. Hobbs, Docket No. CV-13-1116, 2014 Ark. 267, *3 (2014) (Miller applies only to mandatory life sentences); Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20, 21 (Fla. App. 2014) (affirming juvenile offender’s life sentence with- out possibility of parole for homicide because sentenc- ing court conducted ‘‘ ‘individualized mitigation inquiry’ ’’); Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 387 , 754 S.E.2d 33 (2014) (rejecting Miller challenge on basis that sen- tencing scheme gives court discretion over penalty); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 , 722–23 (Ill.) (holding that mandatory imposition of sentence of

2015See, e.g., Brown v. Hobbs, Docket No. CV-13-1116, 2014 Ark. 267, *3 (2014) (Miller applies only to mandatory life sentences); Lane v. State, 151 So. 3d 20, 21 (Fla. App. 2014) (affirming juvenile offender’s life sentence with- out possibility of parole for homicide because sentenc- ing court conducted ‘‘ ‘individualized mitigation inquiry’ ’’); Foster v. State, 294 Ga. 383, 387 , 754 S.E.2d 33 (2014) (rejecting Miller challenge on basis that sen- tencing scheme gives court discretion over penalty); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 , 722–23 (Ill.) (holding that mandatory imposition of sentence of

2026Although the petitioner concedes that “[o]ur Supreme Court’s holding in State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 [ 215 A.3d 1154 ] (2019), makes clear that parole eligibility provides an appropriate remedy for a Miller violation,” he nevertheless contends that his eligibility for parole was incorrectly calculated from his July 12, 2004 sentencing date, rather than from his August 19, 1999 arrest and arraignment date.

2026Although the petitioner concedes that “[o]ur Supreme Court’s holding in State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 [ 215 A.3d 1154 ] (2019), makes clear that parole eligibility provides an appropriate remedy for a Miller violation,” he nevertheless contends that his eligibility for parole was incorrectly calculated from his July 12, 2004 sentencing date, rather than from his August 19, 1999 arrest and arraignment date.

2022The United States Supreme Court addressed the retro- active effect of Miller in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S. Ct. 718 , 193 L.

2022The United States Supreme Court addressed the retro- active effect of Miller in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 , 136 S. Ct. 718 , 193 L.

2022Thereafter, the trial court stayed its order, pending the resolution of the appeals in State v. Boyd, 323 Conn. 816 , 151 A.3d 355 (2016), and State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801 , 151 A.3d 345 (2016).

2022Thereafter, the trial court stayed its order, pending the resolution of the appeals in State v. Boyd, 323 Conn. 816 , 151 A.3d 355 (2016), and State v. Delgado, 323 Conn. 801 , 151 A.3d 345 (2016).

2019I'm going to apply the Miller factors." During its colloquy, the court also indicated that it was "not here to argue the correctness of the wisdom of the cases that got us all here, [ Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , Montgomery v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ], and the state of Connecticut versus [the defendant].

2019I'm going to apply the Miller factors." During its colloquy, the court also indicated that it was "not here to argue the correctness of the wisdom of the cases that got us all here, [ Roper v. Simmons , 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), Miller v. Alabama , supra, 567 U.S. at 460 , 132 S.Ct. 2455 , Montgomery v. Louisiana , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ], and the state of Connecticut versus [the defendant].

2019"Because a license to practice law is a vested property interest, an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to due process of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 235 Conn. 693 , 705, 669 A.2d 1202 (1996) ; see also Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick , 226 Conn. 299 , 306, 627 A.2d 901 (1993) ("[a] license to practice law is a property interest that cannot be suspended without due process").

2019"Because a license to practice law is a vested property interest, an attorney subject to discipline is entitled to due process of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 235 Conn. 693 , 705, 669 A.2d 1202 (1996) ; see also Statewide Grievance Committee v. Botwick , 226 Conn. 299 , 306, 627 A.2d 901 (1993) ("[a] license to practice law is a property interest that cannot be suspended without due process").

2019The defendant's contention that the so-called "anchoring effect" prevented the sentencing court from approaching resentencing with a fully open mind in order to fully consider the Miller factors is nothing more than the product of speculation and conjecture. 4 See State v. Montini , 52 Conn. App. 682 , 695, 730 A.2d 76 (explaining that "[v]ague and unverified assertions of opinion, speculation and conjecture cannot support a motion to recuse" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 909 , 733 A.2d 227 (1999).

2019The defendant's contention that the so-called "anchoring effect" prevented the sentencing court from approaching resentencing with a fully open mind in order to fully consider the Miller factors is nothing more than the product of speculation and conjecture. 4 See State v. Montini , 52 Conn. App. 682 , 695, 730 A.2d 76 (explaining that "[v]ague and unverified assertions of opinion, speculation and conjecture cannot support a motion to recuse" [internal quotation marks omitted] ), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 909 , 733 A.2d 227 (1999).

2019Today, four short years later, we accept just such a miscarriage of justice visited on the defendant, William McCleese, and the majority justifies the result as if Casiano, and another case decided a few months ear- lier, State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 , 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 1361 , 194 L.