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14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Maresgreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Mares, 335 P.3d at 507 ("We are more persuaded, however, by the analyses of those courts that have concluded that the rule announced in Miller is, despite its procedural aspects, a substantive rule."); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731 ("[T]he Miller rule [is] more substantive than procedural."); Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (concluding that Miller is both procedural and substantive but should be applied retroactively because its procedural aspects are the result of its substantive change in the law); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 (same). | 2 | 2 |
State of Iowa v. Jeffrey K. Raglandgreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Mares, 335 P.3d at 507 ("We are more persuaded, however, by the analyses of those courts that have concluded that the rule announced in Miller is, despite its procedural aspects, a substantive rule."); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731 ("[T]he Miller rule [is] more substantive than procedural."); Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (concluding that Miller is both procedural and substantive but should be applied retroactively because its procedural aspects are the result of its substantive change in the law); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 (same). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Mares, 335 P.3d at 507 ("We are more persuaded, however, by the analyses of those courts that have concluded that the rule announced in Miller is, despite its procedural aspects, a substantive rule."); Mantich, 842 N.W.2d at 731 ("[T]he Miller rule [is] more substantive than procedural."); Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (concluding that Miller is both procedural and substantive but should be applied retroactively because its procedural aspects are the result of its substantive change in the law); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115 (same). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Zubergreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 658 (Wash. 2017) (requiring Miller hearing but concluding that sentencing satisfied Miller); State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 201-02 (N.J. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Moody v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2025See Moody v. People, 159 P.3d 611, 615 (Colo. 2007) (appellate court may affirm on any basis supported by the record). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunlapgreen1 sentence2025In any event, we are bound by Colorado Supreme Court precedent, which has “explicitly rejected this ‘functional equivalent’ argument.” Godinez, ¶¶ 92, 97; see also People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 748 (Colo. 1999) (noting that Colorado courts are “not bound by a federal circuit court’s interpretation of federal constitutional requirements”). 13 ¶ 25 We agree that there has been “an unmistakable progression toward providing more protection for juvenile offenders facing a potential sentence of life behind bars with no realistic opportunity for release.” Lucero, ¶ 47 (Gabriel, J., concurring in th | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramosgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 658 (Wash. 2017) (requiring Miller hearing but concluding that sentencing satisfied Miller); State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 201-02 (N.J. 2017). | 1 | 1 |
Wayne Tc Sellers IV v. The People of the State of Colorado.green2 sentences2025See Sellers v. People, 2024 CO 64, ¶ 36 . 24 applied challenge. 2025See Sellers v. People, 2024 CO 64, ¶ 36 . 24 applied challenge. | 1 | 1 |
Foster ex rel. Foster v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2017Cf. Foster , 6 P.3d at 796 (recognizing that a court's findings on the reasonableness and necessity of costs may be implicit, so long as the court's order does not contain "any unexplained reduction in any cost"). | 1 | 1 |
Lee's Mobile Wash v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2017Indeed, the supreme court in Lee's Mobile Wash relied on the fact that " [t]he extent and nature of [plaintiff]'s brain injury... were hotly disputed at trial" to conclude that the jury reasonably could have determined that the plaintiff's injuries from the accident were only de minimis. 853 P.2d at 1144 (emphasis added). ¶ 18 Furthermore, Miller's claim that defendants' expert "conceded that [his] injuries were not de minimis" is without record support and seemingly inaccurate. | 1 | 1 |
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2015Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 281-82 (2013). 1103 These other courts are part of a growing majority concluding that the Miller rule is substantive. 2015Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 , 1 N.E.3d 270, 281-82 (2013). 1103 These other courts are part of a growing majority concluding that the Miller rule is substantive. | 1 | 1 |
Maxwell, Ex Parte Terrellgreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 826 N.W.2d at 115–17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 , 701–02 (Miss. 2013) (same); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729–31 (Neb. 2014) (same); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227 , 233–36 (N.H. 2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 , 575–76 (S.C. 2014) (same); State v. Mares, 355 P.3d 487 , 504–08 (Wyo. 2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte Maxwell, 2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 826 N.W.2d at 115–17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278–82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698 , 701–02 (Miss. 2013) (same); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729–31 (Neb. 2014) (same); Petition of State, 103 A.3d 227 , 233–36 (N.H. 2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 , 575–76 (S.C. 2014) (same); State v. Mares, 355 P.3d 487 , 504–08 (Wyo. 2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte Maxwell, | 1 | 1 |
Songster v. Beardgreen2 sentences2015Graham.†Songster v. Beard, 35 F. Supp. 3d 657, 663 (E.D. 2015Graham." Songster v. Beard, 35 F.Supp.3d 657, 663 (E.D.Pa.2014). €{102 In that vein, the Supreme Court itself applied Miller retroactively in its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, which was before the Court on collateral review. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte | 1 | 1 |
Aiken v. Byarsgreen2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte | 1 | 1 |
Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Meridian Service Metropolitan Districtgreen1 sentence2013In Feigin, we applied Wright and Miller's test for determining whether a would-be intervenor's interest is adequately represented. 19 P.3d at 31 ; see also Meridian, 266 P.3d at 407 ; maj. op. 1 12. 127 As we noted in Meridian, Wright and Miller divide the adequacy of representation inquiry into three categories: [1] If the interest of the absentee is not represented at all, or if all existing parties are adverse to the absentee, then there is no adequate representation. [2] On the other hand, if the absentee's interest is identical to that of one of the present parties, or if there is a party | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gagnongreen2 sentences2011The record is replete with evidence that defendant, via computer messages, described explicit sexual conduct to "Trista." Moreover, the content of these communications was obscene. 5 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (in the context of sexual exploitation of children, the Miller test is adjusted in the following respects: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at iss 2011The record is replete with evidence that defendant, via computer messages, described explicit sexual conduct to "Trista." Moreover, the content of these communications was obscene. 5 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (in the context of sexual exploitation of children, the Miller test is adjusted in the following respects: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at iss | 1 | 1 |
Meier v. McCoygreen1 sentence2009Clyneke, 157 P.3d at 1079 (jury instructions must correctly state the law); Meier v. McCoy, 119 P.3d 519, 524 (Colo.App.2004) (same). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hildebrandtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mishkin v. New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Tabron
green
2 sentences2000Defendant nevertheless argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to describe an “ultimate sex act,” as required by the supreme court’s interpretation of the Miller standard in People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149 , 544 P.2d 372 (1976). 2000Defendant nevertheless argues that the statute is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails to describe an “ultimate sex act,” as required by the supreme court’s interpretation of the Miller standard in People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149 , 544 P.2d 372 (1976). | 3 | 1985–2000 |
Feigin v. Alexa Group, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2013In Feigin, we applied Wright and Miller's test for determining whether a would-be intervenor's interest is adequately represented. 19 P.3d at 31 ; see also Meridian, 266 P.3d at 407 ; maj. op. 1 12. 127 As we noted in Meridian, Wright and Miller divide the adequacy of representation inquiry into three categories: [1] If the interest of the absentee is not represented at all, or if all existing parties are adverse to the absentee, then there is no adequate representation. [2] On the other hand, if the absentee's interest is identical to that of one of the present parties, or if there is a party 2011In Feigin, we applied Wright and Miller's test for determining whether a would-be intervenor's interest is adequately represented. 19 P.3d at 31 . | 2 | 2011–2013 |
New York v. Ferber
green
2 sentences2011The record is replete with evidence that defendant, via computer messages, described explicit sexual conduct to "Trista." Moreover, the content of these communications was obscene. 5 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (in the context of sexual exploitation of children, the Miller test is adjusted in the following respects: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at iss 2011The record is replete with evidence that defendant, via computer messages, described explicit sexual conduct to "Trista." Moreover, the content of these communications was obscene. 5 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 , 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (in the context of sexual exploitation of children, the Miller test is adjusted in the following respects: "A trier of fact need not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and the material at iss | 2 | 2000–2011 |
People v. New Horizons, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989The 1976 statute, then, substantially adopted *1073 the Miller standard and complied with the holding of Tabron II , requiring the use of a statewide community standard. [4] Four years later, we addressed the constitutionality of the newly enacted Colorado obscenity statute in People v. New Horizons, Inc., 200 Colo. 377 , 616 P.2d 106 (Colo.1980). 1989The 1976 statute, then, substantially adopted *1073 the Miller standard and complied with the holding of Tabron II , requiring the use of a statewide community standard. [4] Four years later, we addressed the constitutionality of the newly enacted Colorado obscenity statute in People v. New Horizons, Inc., 200 Colo. 377 , 616 P.2d 106 (Colo.1980). | 2 | 1985–1989 |
People v. Shreck
green
1 sentence2025Additional Facts ¶ 19 Before trial, Miller objected to the proposed testimony of the prosecution’s cell phone expert, Detective Alfonso Cervera, and moved for an evidentiary hearing under People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001), which the trial court denied. ¶ 20 At trial, the court admitted into evidence the “call detail” records from Miller’s and Leavitt’s respective cell phones and qualified Detective Cervera as an expert in cell site analysis and call record detail over Miller’s objection. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Steele v. Law
green
2 sentences2017Steele , 78 P.3d at 1127 . 2017Peterson v. Tadolini , 97 P.3d 359 , 361 (Colo. App. 2004) (citing Steele , 78 P.3d 1124 ). ¶ 13 The trial court fairly relied on Lee's Mobile Wash and Steele to deny Miller's motion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Peterson v. Tadolini
green
1 sentence2017Peterson v. Tadolini , 97 P.3d 359 , 361 (Colo. App. 2004) (citing Steele , 78 P.3d 1124 ). ¶ 13 The trial court fairly relied on Lee's Mobile Wash and Steele to deny Miller's motion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2015Miller, - U.S. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 . 2015Miller, - U.S. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2471 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Petition of State of New Hampshire
green
2 sentences2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte 2015See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 , 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659 , 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 , 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Miller
green
1 sentence1995The court counseled, however, that on retrial, “any attempt by the prosecution to introduce evidence of uncharged similar transactions should be brought to the trial court’s attention before the fact and outside the presence of the jury in order to allow the trial court to conduct the appropriate inquiry.” Id., (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Tabron
green
2 sentences1989See Hildebrandt, 190 Colo. 167 , 544 P.2d 384 (upholding dismissal of obscenity charges); Menefee, 190 Colo. 163 , 544 P.2d 382 (striking down a municipal ordinance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad for failing to describe with requisite specificity the sexual conduct which cannot be depicted, thereby violating the Miller standard); Tabron II, 190 Colo. 161 , 544 P.2d 380 (in applying the Miller standard, a statewide community standard must be employed). 1989See Hildebrandt, 190 Colo. 167 , 544 P.2d 384 (upholding dismissal of obscenity charges); Menefee, 190 Colo. 163 , 544 P.2d 382 (striking down a municipal ordinance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad for failing to describe with requisite specificity the sexual conduct which cannot be depicted, thereby violating the Miller standard); Tabron II, 190 Colo. 161 , 544 P.2d 380 (in applying the Miller standard, a statewide community standard must be employed). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Menefee v. City and County of Denver
green
2 sentences1989See Hildebrandt, 190 Colo. 167 , 544 P.2d 384 (upholding dismissal of obscenity charges); Menefee, 190 Colo. 163 , 544 P.2d 382 (striking down a municipal ordinance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad for failing to describe with requisite specificity the sexual conduct which cannot be depicted, thereby violating the Miller standard); Tabron II, 190 Colo. 161 , 544 P.2d 380 (in applying the Miller standard, a statewide community standard must be employed). 1989See Hildebrandt, 190 Colo. 167 , 544 P.2d 384 (upholding dismissal of obscenity charges); Menefee, 190 Colo. 163 , 544 P.2d 382 (striking down a municipal ordinance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad for failing to describe with requisite specificity the sexual conduct which cannot be depicted, thereby violating the Miller standard); Tabron II, 190 Colo. 161 , 544 P.2d 380 (in applying the Miller standard, a statewide community standard must be employed). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Jenkins v. Georgia green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Ward v. Illinois green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Miller v. California green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Hamling v. United States green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.