Miller test in Nebraska

2014CO. 419 Cite as 287 Neb. 419 the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion for sum- mary judgment.

2014CO. 419 Cite as 287 Neb. 419 the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion for sum- mary judgment.

1998Testing the 16-minute videotape against the three prongs of the Miller test, and reminding ourselves that all three prongs must be proved by the State, see U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983), we conclude that Harrold’s videotape is not obscene.

1998Testing the 16-minute videotape against the three prongs of the Miller test, and reminding ourselves that all three prongs must be proved by the State, see U.S. v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1983), we conclude that Harrold’s videotape is not obscene.

1999In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 , 97 S.Ct. 1756 , 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that this portion of the Miller test is more susceptible to appellate review, for the "value" of a work is not determined by reference to *761 contemporary community standards.

1999In Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 , 97 S.Ct. 1756 , 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that this portion of the Miller test is more susceptible to appellate review, for the "value" of a work is not determined by reference to *761 contemporary community standards.

1999This phraseology varies slightly in detail, but not significantly, from the Miller requirement that ‘“the average person, applying contemporary community standards,’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24 .

1999In short, we agree with both the jury and the Court of Appeals that the work lacks serious value, and it fails the third prong of the Miller test. (d) Conclusion We determine that exhibit 2 depicted the type of sexual conduct appropriately regulated by state law, see, Miller v. *851 California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S. Ct. 2607 , 37 L.

2024The court also received Miller’s affidavit, which established that she had lived with the decedent in the resi- dence since its purchase in 2014. - 607 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 316 Nebraska Reports IN RE HESSLER LIVING TRUST Cite as 316 Neb. 600 Subsequently, the court entered an order (apportionment order) granting Miller’s motion for partial summary judgment on the inheritance tax issue and denied the children’s motion.

2024MILLER Cite as 315 Neb. 951 However, because he has new counsel on appeal, Miller can claim ineffective assistance of original trial counsel for alleged failure to present the issue to the district court, and we therefore consider the speedy trial issue in the context of Miller’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2024State v. Warner, 312 Neb. 116 , 977 N.W.2d 904 (2022).

2024State v. Warner, 312 Neb. 116 , 977 N.W.2d 904 (2022).

2023The children essen- tially argue that their appeal from the court’s March 22 order is proper because proceedings were “resolved” after it was 26 Id. at 243, 953 N.W.2d at 538 . 27 See id. 28 Id. at 247 , 953 N.W.2d at 540 . 29 In re Estate of Larson, supra note 9 . 30 Id. 31 See id.

2023The children essen- tially argue that their appeal from the court’s March 22 order is proper because proceedings were “resolved” after it was 26 Id. at 243, 953 N.W.2d at 538 . 27 See id. 28 Id. at 247 , 953 N.W.2d at 540 . 29 In re Estate of Larson, supra note 9 . 30 Id. 31 See id.

2023On November 1, 2022, the district court entered an order denying Miller’s motion for absolute discharge, finding that since Miller had a pending motion for discovery, the “speedy trial -2- clock stopped when the motion was filed.” The court cited State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620 , 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997), where the Nebraska Supreme Court “considered a situation where the defendant filed a pretrial motion but took no action to bring the motion on for a hearing.” The court noted that in Turner, supra, the Supreme Court found that “‘[i]t is not the State’s or the court’s burden to pursue the defendant

2023On November 1, 2022, the district court entered an order denying Miller’s motion for absolute discharge, finding that since Miller had a pending motion for discovery, the “speedy trial -2- clock stopped when the motion was filed.” The court cited State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620 , 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997), where the Nebraska Supreme Court “considered a situation where the defendant filed a pretrial motion but took no action to bring the motion on for a hearing.” The court noted that in Turner, supra, the Supreme Court found that “‘[i]t is not the State’s or the court’s burden to pursue the defendant

2016And according to the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent opinion, “[a] state may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juve- nile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 , 193 L.

2016And according to the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent opinion, “[a] state may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juve- nile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 , 193 L.

2015Ed. 2d 407 (2012). 3 State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 (2014). 4 State v. Castaneda, 287 Neb. 289 , 842 N.W.2d 740 (2014). - 26 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WARE Cite as 292 Neb. 24 commission of the crime for which he was convicted.

2015In its order, the district court noted that Ware had no Miller claim, because he was 18 years of age at the time of the 1 State v. Ware, 219 Neb. 594 , 365 N.W.2d 418 (1985). 2 Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2015In its order, the district court noted that Ware had no Miller claim, because he was 18 years of age at the time of the 1 State v. Ware, 219 Neb. 594 , 365 N.W.2d 418 (1985). 2 Miller v. Alabama, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2015Ed. 2d 407 (2012). 3 State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320 , 842 N.W.2d 716 (2014). 4 State v. Castaneda, 287 Neb. 289 , 842 N.W.2d 740 (2014). - 26 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. WARE Cite as 292 Neb. 24 commission of the crime for which he was convicted.

2014As other courts have noted, the Miller rule certainly contains a procedural component, because it specifically requires that a sentencer follow a certain process before imposing the sentence of life imprisonment on a juvenile.91 And unlike the holdings in Graham v. Florida92 and Roper v. Simmons,93 the Miller rule does not categorically bar a specific punishment; a State may still constitutionally sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole under Miller. 88 Teague, supra note 20 . 89 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S. Ct. 1473 , 176 L.

2014As other courts have noted, the Miller rule certainly contains a procedural component, because it specifically requires that a sentencer follow a certain process before imposing the sentence of life imprisonment on a juvenile.91 And unlike the holdings in Graham v. Florida92 and Roper v. Simmons,93 the Miller rule does not categorically bar a specific punishment; a State may still constitutionally sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without parole under Miller. 88 Teague, supra note 20 . 89 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S. Ct. 1473 , 176 L.

2014Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 36 See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1995). 37 See Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2010). 38 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 , 128 S. Ct. 2146 , 170 L.

2014Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 36 See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1995). 37 See Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2010). 38 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 , 128 S. Ct. 2146 , 170 L.

2014Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 36 See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1995). 37 See Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2010). 38 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 , 128 S. Ct. 2146 , 170 L.

2014Ed. 2d 811 (1968). 36 See Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, Mo., 64 F.3d 389 (8th Cir. 1995). 37 See Bryant v. Military Department of Mississippi, 597 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 2010). 38 See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 , 128 S. Ct. 2146 , 170 L.

2014In Ragland, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that Jackson’s case was remanded so that Jackson could be given an individualized sentenc- ing hearing and reasoned that “[t]here would have been no reason for the Court to direct such an outcome if it did not view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on col- lateral review.”81 Ragland also noted that the dissent in Miller 77 Ragland, supra note 76 , 836 N.W.2d at 117 , quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A.

2014In Ragland, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that Jackson’s case was remanded so that Jackson could be given an individualized sentenc- ing hearing and reasoned that “[t]here would have been no reason for the Court to direct such an outcome if it did not view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on col- lateral review.”81 Ragland also noted that the dissent in Miller 77 Ragland, supra note 76 , 836 N.W.2d at 117 , quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life-Without-Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A.

2014Collateral Order Doctrine [7-9] The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the final order rule.10 Under the doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a ques- tion of law.11 We have emphasized that the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where the issues presented are purely questions of law.12 [10-12] Qualified immunity provides a shield from liabil- ity for public officials sued under § 1983 in their individual

2014Collateral Order Doctrine [7-9] The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the final order rule.10 Under the doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a ques- tion of law.11 We have emphasized that the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where the issues presented are purely questions of law.12 [10-12] Qualified immunity provides a shield from liabil- ity for public officials sued under § 1983 in their individual

2014We therefore reverse in part the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion for sum- mary judgment. 35 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 , 88 S. Ct. 1731 , 20 L.

2014We therefore reverse in part the district court’s order denying Miller’s motion for sum- mary judgment. 35 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 , 88 S. Ct. 1731 , 20 L.

2014Ed. 2d 284 (2010). 90 Chaidez v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103 , 185 L.

2014Ed. 2d 284 (2010). 90 Chaidez v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1103 , 185 L.

2014Collateral Order Doctrine [7-9] The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the final order rule.10 Under the doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a ques- tion of law.11 We have emphasized that the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where the issues presented are purely questions of law.12 [10-12] Qualified immunity provides a shield from liabil- ity for public officials sued under § 1983 in their individual

2014Collateral Order Doctrine [7-9] The collateral order doctrine is an exception to the final order rule.10 Under the doctrine, the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable, notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment, if the denial of immunity turns on a ques- tion of law.11 We have emphasized that the denial of a claim of qualified immunity is immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine where the issues presented are purely questions of law.12 [10-12] Qualified immunity provides a shield from liabil- ity for public officials sued under § 1983 in their individual

2002The arbitration clause encompassed “ ‘any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement.’ ” Id. at 1520 .

1999State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. 829 , 593 N.W.2d 299 (1999).

1999State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. 829 , 593 N.W.2d 299 (1999).

1998Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).

1998Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).

1997State v. Schoonmaker, 249 Neb. 330 , 543 N.W.2d 194 (1996); State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405 , 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995); State v. Clausen, 247 Neb. 309 , 527 N.W.2d 609 (1995).

1997State v. Schoonmaker, 249 Neb. 330 , 543 N.W.2d 194 (1996); State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405 , 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995); State v. Clausen, 247 Neb. 309 , 527 N.W.2d 609 (1995).