10 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Buntinggreen2 sentences2020State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 , 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006). 2020State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915 , 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jason Ephriam Rowlandgreen2 sentences2020State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 , 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015). 1 Because we affirm the district court’s decision based on its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, we need not address Miller’s challenge to the legality of the frisk. 3 The relevant action actually taking place in this case was Officer Anderson’s search for a child following a report that the child’s mother threatened to hang him. 2020State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787 , 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015). 1 Because we affirm the district court’s decision based on its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, we need not address Miller’s challenge to the legality of the frisk. 3 The relevant action actually taking place in this case was Officer Anderson’s search for a child following a report that the child’s mother threatened to hang him. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Granthamgreen2 sentences2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d 2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hillgreen2 sentences2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d 2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d | 1 | 1 |
Doe v. Durtschigreen2 sentences2011The State can be liable for its negligence in managing its employees, but the plaintiff must “present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether those who had the duty to supervise should have reasonably anticipated that those subject to their supervision would commit [a compensable tort].” Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 654 , 931 P.2d 641, 648 (1997); see also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 , 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (1986) (holding that state entities can be liable for negligent supervision). 2011The State can be liable for its negligence in managing its employees, but the plaintiff must “present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether those who had the duty to supervise should have reasonably anticipated that those subject to their supervision would commit [a compensable tort].” Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 654 , 931 P.2d 641, 648 (1997); see also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 , 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (1986) (holding that state entities can be liable for negligent supervision). | 1 | 1 |
Kessler v. Barowskygreen2 sentences2011The State can be liable for its negligence in managing its employees, but the plaintiff must “present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether those who had the duty to supervise should have reasonably anticipated that those subject to their supervision would commit [a compensable tort].” Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 654 , 931 P.2d 641, 648 (1997); see also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 , 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (1986) (holding that state entities can be liable for negligent supervision). 2011The State can be liable for its negligence in managing its employees, but the plaintiff must “present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether those who had the duty to supervise should have reasonably anticipated that those subject to their supervision would commit [a compensable tort].” Kessler v. Barowsky, 129 Idaho 647, 654 , 931 P.2d 641, 648 (1997); see also Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 , 716 P.2d 1238, 1245 (1986) (holding that state entities can be liable for negligent supervision). | 1 | 1 |
Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc.green2 sentences2004In its memorandum opinion denying Dr. Miller’s motion for injunctive relief or mandamus, the district court stated that it views its authority to determine the parties’ respective rights and duties as originating in contract.” The district court relied upon the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 185 W.Va. 59 , 404 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1991), wherein it stated: Utilizing breach of contract principles, most courts explicitly addressing the issue presented here have held, and we hereby hold, that the decision of a private hospital to 2004In its memorandum opinion denying Dr. Miller’s motion for injunctive relief or mandamus, the district court stated that it views its authority to determine the parties’ respective rights and duties as originating in contract.” The district court relied upon the decision of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Mahmoodian v. United Hospital Center, Inc., 185 W.Va. 59 , 404 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1991), wherein it stated: Utilizing breach of contract principles, most courts explicitly addressing the issue presented here have held, and we hereby hold, that the decision of a private hospital to | 1 | 1 |
Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co.green2 sentences1996See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 119 Idaho at 94 , 803 P.2d at 1000 . 1996See Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., 119 Idaho at 94 , 803 P.2d at 1000 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York v. Ferber
green
2 sentences2002Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 . 2002Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Bodenbach
green
1 sentence2025The State further argues, relying on Bodenbach, 165 Idaho at 585–88, 448 P.3d at 1013–16, that the erroneous inclusion of a single word was unlikely to mislead the jury since (1) any error was to an “isolated portion” of the instructions and was cured by other portions of the instructions and (2) there was overwhelming evidence that Regan was “not only . . . a party to each conspiracy,” but she also “initiated and directed them to their successful culmination in the completed crimes.” A review of cases cited by the parties supports Regan’s interpretation of our precedent. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2019Because the Supreme Court has “counsel[ed] against irrevocably sentencing [juveniles] to a lifetime in prison” without consideration of the Miller factors, 567 U.S. at 480 , we conclude that the rationales of Miller and Windom also extend to lengthy fixed sentences that are the functional equivalent of a determinate life sentence, regardless of whether such sentences are characterized as indeterminate life sentences or otherwise. 2019Because the Supreme Court has “counsel[ed] against irrevocably sentencing [juveniles] to a lifetime in prison” without consideration of the Miller factors, 567 U.S. at 480 , we conclude that the rationales of Miller and Windom also extend to lengthy fixed sentences that are the functional equivalent of a determinate life sentence, regardless of whether such sentences are characterized as indeterminate life sentences or otherwise. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Miller
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Norton
green
2 sentences2012In Norton , however, we explained that the reference to the Miller standard in Grantham “did not attempt to change the standard [of review]; rather, it makes clear that where a court gives a curative instruction, the appellate court may consider that factor in determining whether the alleged error is reversible.” Norton, 151 Idaho at 193 , 254 P.3d at 94 . 2012In Norton , however, we explained that the reference to the Miller standard in Grantham “did not attempt to change the standard [of review]; rather, it makes clear that where a court gives a curative instruction, the appellate court may consider that factor in determining whether the alleged error is reversible.” Norton, 151 Idaho at 193 , 254 P.3d at 94 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Greer v. Miller
green
2 sentences2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d 2012For this assertion, the State relies on a footnote in Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 , 767 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102 , 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 , 631 n. 8 (1987), stating that when a curative instruction is given, the defendant may overcome the presumption that the jury followed the instruction only by showing that there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.- We quoted and applied this Miller standard in State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631 , 97 P.3d | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.