Miller defendant in Arkansas

2022We affirm the denial of Rule 37 postconviction relief. 2 Elliott’s argument regarding the similarly situated Miller defendants appears to be a broad application of this court’s holding in Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, at 6 , 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 , in which we stated, “It would be patently unfair to decline to [grant a new sentencing hearing to juvenile offenders sentenced to an unconstitutional mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole by the State of Arkansas] for other prisoners who are similarly situated.” 3 The Miller Court requires that the sentencing body “take into

2022We affirm the denial of Rule 37 postconviction relief. 2 Elliott’s argument regarding the similarly situated Miller defendants appears to be a broad application of this court’s holding in Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, at 6 , 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 , in which we stated, “It would be patently unfair to decline to [grant a new sentencing hearing to juvenile offenders sentenced to an unconstitutional mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole by the State of Arkansas] for other prisoners who are similarly situated.” 3 The Miller Court requires that the sentencing body “take into

2019Id., 426 S.W.3d 906 .3 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller and this court’s decision in Jackson on remand, Scherrer petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit 3 After Jackson obtained relief, other “Miller defendants” sought resentencing.

2019Id., 426 S.W.3d 906 .3 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller and this court’s decision in Jackson on remand, Scherrer petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit 3 After Jackson obtained relief, other “Miller defendants” sought resentencing.

2014Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447 , 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002).

2014Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447 , 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002).

2022We affirm the denial of Rule 37 postconviction relief. 2 Elliott’s argument regarding the similarly situated Miller defendants appears to be a broad application of this court’s holding in Kelley v. Gordon, 2015 Ark. 277, at 6 , 465 S.W.3d 842, 846 , in which we stated, “It would be patently unfair to decline to [grant a new sentencing hearing to juvenile offenders sentenced to an unconstitutional mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole by the State of Arkansas] for other prisoners who are similarly situated.” 3 The Miller Court requires that the sentencing body “take into

2022The result 1 Kuntrell Jackson’s convictions were affirmed by this court, Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87 , 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004), and the denial of his petition for habeas relief, see Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 , 378 S.W.3d 103 , ultimately went before the Supreme Court in Miller. 11 would be that, if two people had been killed during the robbery in Jackson’s case, he would be subject to a greater punishment—sixty years’ imprisonment before reaching parole eligibility as opposed to thirty years’ imprisonment for the seventeen-year-old—without having any of the Miller factors presented to th

2022The result 1 Kuntrell Jackson’s convictions were affirmed by this court, Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87 , 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004), and the denial of his petition for habeas relief, see Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 , 378 S.W.3d 103 , ultimately went before the Supreme Court in Miller. 11 would be that, if two people had been killed during the robbery in Jackson’s case, he would be subject to a greater punishment—sixty years’ imprisonment before reaching parole eligibility as opposed to thirty years’ imprisonment for the seventeen-year-old—without having any of the Miller factors presented to th

2022The result 1 Kuntrell Jackson’s convictions were affirmed by this court, Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87 , 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004), and the denial of his petition for habeas relief, see Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 , 378 S.W.3d 103 , ultimately went before the Supreme Court in Miller. 11 would be that, if two people had been killed during the robbery in Jackson’s case, he would be subject to a greater punishment—sixty years’ imprisonment before reaching parole eligibility as opposed to thirty years’ imprisonment for the seventeen-year-old—without having any of the Miller factors presented to th

2022The result 1 Kuntrell Jackson’s convictions were affirmed by this court, Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87 , 194 S.W.3d 757 (2004), and the denial of his petition for habeas relief, see Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49 , 378 S.W.3d 103 , ultimately went before the Supreme Court in Miller. 11 would be that, if two people had been killed during the robbery in Jackson’s case, he would be subject to a greater punishment—sixty years’ imprisonment before reaching parole eligibility as opposed to thirty years’ imprisonment for the seventeen-year-old—without having any of the Miller factors presented to th

2021“The ‘foundation 3 stone’ for Miller’s analysis was this Court’s line of precedent holding certain punishments disproportionate when applied to juveniles.” Id. at 206 .

2021Recently, we affirmed the sentence of a Miller defendant in Ventry v. State, 2021 Ark. 96 .

2020Eversole claims that in Brinker v. Forrest City School District No. 7, 342 Ark. 646 , 29 S.W.3d 740 (2000), the supreme court rejected the appellee’s argument that the abstract was deficient because the appellee did not cite a specific deficiency and did not offer a supplemental abstract.

2020Eversole claims that in Brinker v. Forrest City School District No. 7, 342 Ark. 646 , 29 S.W.3d 740 (2000), the supreme court rejected the appellee’s argument that the abstract was deficient because the appellee did not cite a specific deficiency and did not offer a supplemental abstract.

2019The Miller test requires a fact-intensive inquiry on a case-by-case basis, and because the text(s) in question are not part of the record before us, it is impossible for us to determine whether the solicitation speech in question "depict[ed] or describe[d], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." Miller , 413 U.S. at 24 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 .

2019The Miller test requires a fact-intensive inquiry on a case-by-case basis, and because the text(s) in question are not part of the record before us, it is impossible for us to determine whether the solicitation speech in question "depict[ed] or describe[d], in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law." Miller , 413 U.S. at 24 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2019See, e.g. , Howell , 2019 Ark. 59 , 567 S.W.3d 842 ; Ray v. State , 2019 Ark. 46 , 567 S.W.3d 63 ; Segerstrom v. State , 2019 Ark. 36 , 566 S.W.3d 466 ; Robinson v. State , 2018 Ark. 353 , 563 S.W.3d 530 .

2016The issues Bunch raised regarding his classification as a first offender concerned his eligibility for parole, and, as already noted, those issues are not ones cognizable in proceedings for the writ. 6 Cite as 2016 Ark. 58 habitual offender, his sentence imposed by the judgment as amended fell within the statutory range for the offense.

2016The issues Bunch raised regarding his classification as a first offender concerned his eligibility for parole, and, as already noted, those issues are not ones cognizable in proceedings for the writ. 6 Cite as 2016 Ark. 58 habitual offender, his sentence imposed by the judgment as amended fell within the statutory range for the offense.

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2015Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). 1 In the present case, the State argues in its first point on appeal that the circuit court erred by ruling that Miller is applicable retroactively because (1) it is not retroactive under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); (2) neither Miller nor Jackson v. Norris, 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 , implies that the Miller rule is retroactive; (3) Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 , 125 S.Ct. 1183 , 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), do not make Miller ret

2010Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. 478 , 348 S.W.3d 553 .

2010Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. 478 , 348 S.W.3d 553 .

2010We do note, however, that "[a] jury is not required to find a mitigating circumstance just because the defendant puts before the jury some evidence that could serve as the basis for finding the mitigating circumstance." Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 115 , 251 S.W.3d 290, 298 (2007) (quoting Bowen, 322 Ark. at 497 , 911 S.W.2d at 561 ).

2010We do note, however, that "[a] jury is not required to find a mitigating circumstance just because the defendant puts before the jury some evidence that could serve as the basis for finding the mitigating circumstance." Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 115 , 251 S.W.3d 290, 298 (2007) (quoting Bowen, 322 Ark. at 497 , 911 S.W.2d at 561 ).

2007Strong v. State, 370 Ark. 87 , 257 S.W.3d 80 (2007) (per curiam).

2007Strong v. State, 370 Ark. 87 , 257 S.W.3d 80 (2007) (per curiam).

1989As Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court observed, a factual determination that material is obscene is so perplexing that "as long as the MILLER test remains in effect `one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so'." JENKINS v. GEORGIA, 418 U.S. 153 , 164-65 (1974).

1989As Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court observed, a factual determination that material is obscene is so perplexing that "as long as the MILLER test remains in effect `one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so'." JENKINS v. GEORGIA, 418 U.S. 153 , 164-65 (1974).