Miller factors in Mississippi

2022This Court has “never held that expert testimony is required in a Miller hearing.” Moore, 287 So. 3d at 920 (citing Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 67-71 (Miss. 2018); 10 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 699-703 (Miss. 2013); Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 , 989- 91, 995-1001 (Miss. 2013)).

2022This Court has “never held that expert testimony is required in a Miller hearing.” Moore, 287 So. 3d at 920 (citing Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 67-71 (Miss. 2018); 10 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 699-703 (Miss. 2013); Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 , 989- 91, 995-1001 (Miss. 2013)).

2025Ct. App. 2020) (remanding for new Miller hearing on finding that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of rehabilitation in prison);7 Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 71 (¶24) (Waller, C.J., dissenting).

2022This Court has “never held that expert testimony is required in a Miller hearing.” Moore, 287 So. 3d at 920 (citing Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 67-71 (Miss. 2018); 10 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 699-703 (Miss. 2013); Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 , 989- 91, 995-1001 (Miss. 2013)).

2023However, the relevant statutory section does not say “life imprisonment with parole”; it merely says 8 In the motion he submitted to the circuit court in which he asked that the court re- sentence him to life with eligibility for parole, McDowell presented an unpublished 2014 three-justice Mississippi Supreme Court order in Dycus v. State, No. 2012-M-0204, another post-Miller re-sentencing case that contained dicta about the statute, stating under section 99-19-101, if the jury considered the Miller factors and was unable to reach a decision, “the court shall sentence Dycus to ‘life imprisonme

2022Additionally, even our Supreme Court has recognized that “[a] Miller hearing is a specialized proceeding . . . a judicial intervention.” Cook v. State, 242 So. 3d 865, 877 (¶44) (Miss. 2017).

2026In Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (¶14) (Miss. 2013), our supreme court held that a sentence of life without parole “can be applied constitutionally to juveniles who fail to convince the sentencing authority that Miller considerations are sufficient to prohibit its application.” The circuit court found that while the “Family and Home Environment” factor might weigh in favor of Mhoon’s request for relief, the other four Miller factors did not.

2022This Court has “never held that expert testimony is required in a Miller hearing.” Moore, 287 So. 3d at 920 (citing Chandler v. State, 242 So. 3d 65, 67-71 (Miss. 2018); 10 Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 699-703 (Miss. 2013); Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 , 989- 91, 995-1001 (Miss. 2013)).

2024He insists the opinion did “not contain any language concerning the significant difference between 17 and 14 with respect to Miller analysis.” But it is obvious that, while citing Hudspeth, the language the trial court had actually relied on came from this Court’s opinion in Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 929. 12 Jackson v. Hobbs, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2024He insists the opinion did “not contain any language concerning the significant difference between 17 and 14 with respect to Miller analysis.” But it is obvious that, while citing Hudspeth, the language the trial court had actually relied on came from this Court’s opinion in Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 929. 12 Jackson v. Hobbs, 567 U.S. 460 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.

2023Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . left to the states the responsibility to determine how Miller is to be implemented in state-court proceedings and how to remedy a Miller violation or potential violation.” Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 926 (citing Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211-12). ¶25.

2023Instead, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . left to the states the responsibility to determine how Miller is to be implemented in state-court proceedings and how to remedy a Miller violation or potential violation.” Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 926 (citing Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 211-12). ¶25.

2006Miller, 762 So.2d at 310 (¶ 20). 1.

2006Miller, 762 So.2d at 310 (¶ 20). 1.

2002In Sullivan v. Washington, 768 So.2d 881 (Miss.2000), the Court concluded that sufficient facts were present in the record enabling the Court to employ the five Miller factors and concluded that the two doctors involved, Dr. Meeks and Dr. Sullivan, were immune from tort liability because they were found to be employees of UMMC.

2002The first case applying the Miller test was Sullivan v. Washington, 768 So.2d 881 (Miss.2000), decided only two months later.

2022Lastly, Dampier asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), “makes clear” that Wharton and McGilberry were wrongly decided, because, under Jones, “the remedy for a Miller violation is a new sentencing hearing where ‘the sentencer has discretion to “consider the mitigating qualities of youth” and impose a lesser punishment.’” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476)).

2022Lastly, Dampier asserts that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021), “makes clear” that Wharton and McGilberry were wrongly decided, because, under Jones, “the remedy for a Miller violation is a new sentencing hearing where ‘the sentencer has discretion to “consider the mitigating qualities of youth” and impose a lesser punishment.’” Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1314 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476)).

2021In contending that Wharton created a new legal standard, Dunta ignores two salient points that the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically recognized in that case: (1) “Miller does not ‘require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility,’” Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 926 (¶25) (quoting Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69 (¶15); and (2) “[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has left to the states the responsibility to determine how Miller is to be implemented in state-court proceedings and how to remedy a Miller violation or potential violation.” Id. at 926 (¶24) (quoting Montgo

2021In contending that Wharton created a new legal standard, Dunta ignores two salient points that the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically recognized in that case: (1) “Miller does not ‘require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility,’” Wharton, 298 So. 3d at 926 (¶25) (quoting Chandler, 242 So. 3d at 69 (¶15); and (2) “[t]he [United States] Supreme Court has left to the states the responsibility to determine how Miller is to be implemented in state-court proceedings and how to remedy a Miller violation or potential violation.” Id. at 926 (¶24) (quoting Montgo

2024In Miller, the United States Supreme Court stated that, given “this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon[,]” and that it would be “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ). ¶9.

2024In Miller, the United States Supreme Court stated that, given “this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon[,]” and that it would be “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479-80 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 ). ¶9.

2004We stated, "If the record is not sufficiently developed to determine the employment status of the faculty physician, this Court will reverse and remand so the trial court can apply the Miller test, unrestricted by the limited record before us on appeal." Id. at 798. ¶ 24.

2004We stated, "If the record is not sufficiently developed to determine the employment status of the faculty physician, this Court will reverse and remand so the trial court can apply the Miller test, unrestricted by the limited record before us on appeal." Id. at 798. ¶ 24.

2002Id. at 883.

2002Id. at 883.

2024Contrary to Miller’s claim, the record shows that when the trial court ordered Miller to serve his suspended sentence, the trial court was not altering or amending Miller’s sentence; rather, “it was merely enforcing the sentence originally given.” Anderson v. State, 89 So. 3d 645, 651 (¶14) (Miss.

2021Id. at 778 (¶32).

2020Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). 4 The circuit court entered an agreed order vacating Wells’s original sentence and reinstating the case to the active docket for a new “sentencing hearing.” Our Supreme Court subsequently held “that it is error for our trial courts to vacate a juvenile’s original life- without-parole sentence . . . before conducting a Miller hearing.” Wharton, 2019 WL 6605871 , at *5 (¶29).

2020Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). 4 The circuit court entered an agreed order vacating Wells’s original sentence and reinstating the case to the active docket for a new “sentencing hearing.” Our Supreme Court subsequently held “that it is error for our trial courts to vacate a juvenile’s original life- without-parole sentence . . . before conducting a Miller hearing.” Wharton, 2019 WL 6605871 , at *5 (¶29).