Miller factors in Illinois

2025The court subsequently found that the defendant’s Miller claim “[did] not require factual development,” as “[a]ll of the facts and circumstances to decide the defendant’s claim *** [were] already in the record.” Id.

2025But our supreme court observed that, in People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 , it “create[d] a very narrow exception to that rule for an as-applied Miller claim for which the record is sufficiently developed for appellate review.” Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , ¶ 32.

2026Where no factual development of the record is necessary to determine 17 No. 1-22-0373 that a Miller violation has occurred, however, the proper remedy is instead “to vacate [the] defendant’s sentence and to remand for a new sentencing hearing.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 45-47 (remanding for resentencing following reversal of the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition alleging a Miller violation).

2026Where no factual development of the record is necessary to determine 17 No. 1-22-0373 that a Miller violation has occurred, however, the proper remedy is instead “to vacate [the] defendant’s sentence and to remand for a new sentencing hearing.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 45-47 (remanding for resentencing following reversal of the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition alleging a Miller violation).

2026See People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 44-45 (defendant who was 18 at time of offense could not assert Miller claim).

2025The as-applied challenge petitioner raises here falls under none of those exceptions. ¶ 44 Notably here, there is a “very narrow exception” to forfeiture “for an as-applied Miller claim for which the record is sufficiently developed for appellate review.” People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 42 ; see People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 44 . ¶ 45 But a Miller claim is not just any claim that mentions that Supreme Court decision.

2021Instead, the court stated that it “consider[ed] all of this information,” even though it would “only comment on a few things.” In seemingly discounting defendant’s youth, the court declared only that it could not “find that there was any provocation or that [the murder] was committed because [defendant] hung around with the wrong crowd or that it was because [defendant] was lonely and abandoned or *** depressed or bullied.” It then recounted the evidence presented at trial and repeatedly emphasized defendant’s actions in the days following the offense, wherein he acted “like nothing happened”

2021Instead, the court stated that it “consider[ed] all of this information,” even though it would “only comment on a few things.” In seemingly discounting defendant’s youth, the court declared only that it could not “find that there was any provocation or that [the murder] was committed because [defendant] hung around with the wrong crowd or that it was because [defendant] was lonely and abandoned or *** depressed or bullied.” It then recounted the evidence presented at trial and repeatedly emphasized defendant’s actions in the days following the offense, wherein he acted “like nothing happened”

2026Defendant cites Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for this proposition and argues that his actions in shooting Strenger evince recklessness and impulsivity, typical characteristics of youth. ¶ 64 Defendant is not explicitly raising a Miller claim, nor could he, as such challenges are not available to defendants over 18 at the time of the offense or those with sentences of 40 years or less.

2026Defendant cites Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), for this proposition and argues that his actions in shooting Strenger evince recklessness and impulsivity, typical characteristics of youth. ¶ 64 Defendant is not explicitly raising a Miller claim, nor could he, as such challenges are not available to defendants over 18 at the time of the offense or those with sentences of 40 years or less.

2024People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). ¶ 35 The so-called Miller factors are as follows: “(1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors an

2024People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). ¶ 35 The so-called Miller factors are as follows: “(1) the juvenile defendant’s chronological age at the time of the offense and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant’s family and home environment; (3) the juvenile defendant’s degree of participation in the homicide and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the juvenile defendant’s incompetence, including his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors an

2025Additionally, while our supreme court had previously found that a “mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime” was the functional equivalent of a mandatory sentence of life without parole for purposes of the Miller analysis (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 ), our supreme court later clarified that a sentence of over 40 years operated as a de facto life sentence, which triggered the protections of Miller (People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 ).

2025Additionally, while our supreme court had previously found that a “mandatory term-of-years sentence that cannot be served in one lifetime” was the functional equivalent of a mandatory sentence of life without parole for purposes of the Miller analysis (People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 9 ), our supreme court later clarified that a sentence of over 40 years operated as a de facto life sentence, which triggered the protections of Miller (People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41 ).

2025The Holman court then clarified that People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 , “creates a very narrow exception to that rule for an as-applied Miller claim for which the record is sufficiently developed for appellate review.” Id.

2025The Holman court then clarified that People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 , “creates a very narrow exception to that rule for an as-applied Miller claim for which the record is sufficiently developed for appellate review.” Id.

2025The United States Supreme Court expressly stated in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016), that a Miller violation may be remedied “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them[,]” which “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence[.]” Our supreme court - 14 - No. 1-23-0602 in Dorsey cited this portion of the Montgomery decision in analogizing the discretionary parole system to the availability of good conduct cred

2025The United States Supreme Court expressly stated in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016), that a Miller violation may be remedied “by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them[,]” which “ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity—and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence[.]” Our supreme court - 14 - No. 1-23-0602 in Dorsey cited this portion of the Montgomery decision in analogizing the discretionary parole system to the availability of good conduct cred

2026For instance, in Green, this court stated that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21” in finding the “defendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for purposes of a Miller claim.” Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Everett, 2022 IL App (1st) 201169, ¶ 40 (“While our legislature has acknowledged the greater capacity for rehabilitation in young adults *** a clear line is drawn at 21 years of age”); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (“it is a much greater leap to extend [Miller] to a 21-year- old”); see also People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1s

2026For instance, in Green, this court stated that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21” in finding the “defendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for purposes of a Miller claim.” Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Everett, 2022 IL App (1st) 201169, ¶ 40 (“While our legislature has acknowledged the greater capacity for rehabilitation in young adults *** a clear line is drawn at 21 years of age”); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (“it is a much greater leap to extend [Miller] to a 21-year- old”); see also People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1s

2025Accordingly, any concerns defendant may have held about not considering the Miller factors in conjunction with the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement were readily available at the time of the initial filing. ¶ 29 Defendant’s motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition is further precluded by People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 , ¶ 74 and People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 92 .

2025Accordingly, any concerns defendant may have held about not considering the Miller factors in conjunction with the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement were readily available at the time of the initial filing. ¶ 29 Defendant’s motion for leave to file successive postconviction petition is further precluded by People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 , ¶ 74 and People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 92 .

2020People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 108 (where defendant filed his original petition years before Miller, we found that he established cause to raise a Miller claim, since he “certainly could not have raised a claim based on a line of cases that had not even been decided yet”).

2020People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534, ¶ 108 (where defendant filed his original petition years before Miller, we found that he established cause to raise a Miller claim, since he “certainly could not have raised a claim based on a line of cases that had not even been decided yet”).

2020Thus, “any inquiry into the Miller factors is backwards-looking” and requires us to “look at the cold record to determine if the trial court considered such evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 47 . ¶ 81 Our recent decision in People v. Reyes, 2020 IL App (2d) 180237 , is instructive.

2020Thus, “any inquiry into the Miller factors is backwards-looking” and requires us to “look at the cold record to determine if the trial court considered such evidence at the defendant’s original sentencing hearing.” Id. ¶ 47 . ¶ 81 Our recent decision in People v. Reyes, 2020 IL App (2d) 180237 , is instructive.

2020See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 28-29 (2008) (no forfeiture on direct appeal when new rule announced after the appeal was filed); see also People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 268 (2007) (same); People v. Craighead, 2015 IL App (5th) 140468, ¶ 17 (finding the defendant showed cause and prejudice with regard to the Miller claim raised in a successive petition under the Act because Miller applies retroactively). - 11 - No. 1-12-1604 ¶ 37 3.

2020See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 28-29 (2008) (no forfeiture on direct appeal when new rule announced after the appeal was filed); see also People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 268 (2007) (same); People v. Craighead, 2015 IL App (5th) 140468, ¶ 17 (finding the defendant showed cause and prejudice with regard to the Miller claim raised in a successive petition under the Act because Miller applies retroactively). - 11 - No. 1-12-1604 ¶ 37 3.

2026Indeed, our supreme court has long declined to resolve the sentencing claims of emerging adults on a record containing “nothing about how that science applies to the circumstances of [the] case.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38 . ¶ 53 For these reasons, we reject the State’s assertion that trial counsel properly (i) “attempted to secure the lowest possible sentence consistent with the Code of Corrections” (ii) while asking the court to consider the Miller factors.

2026Indeed, our supreme court has long declined to resolve the sentencing claims of emerging adults on a record containing “nothing about how that science applies to the circumstances of [the] case.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38 . ¶ 53 For these reasons, we reject the State’s assertion that trial counsel properly (i) “attempted to secure the lowest possible sentence consistent with the Code of Corrections” (ii) while asking the court to consider the Miller factors.

2022We rejected defendant's Miller claim, explaining: “Whether a defendant physically committed the offense is a significant consideration for courts tasked with deciding whether to extend Miller principles to a young adult under the - 21 - No. 1-20-0663 proportionate penalties clause. [Citations.] Here, we cannot overlook defendant's active participation where he invaded the victims’ house with the codefendants, held a gun to Mr. W.’s head to prevent him from interfering while the codefendants robbed and attacked his family and kidnapped his young daughter, and then actively participated in the g

2022See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 38 ; People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46 , Walsh, 2022 IL App (1st) 210786, ¶ 30 (citing People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047 , ¶ 69); People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145, ¶¶ 56, 58 . ¶ 25 Defendant claims that “young adults *** were prevented from advancing a proportionate penalties clause claims *** until 2015, when the Illinois Supreme Court first opened the door for raising an ‘emerging adult’ Miller claim in the post-conviction context.” We disagree.

2023After outlining some of the relevant caselaw pertaining to the Miller line of authority, the circuit court then found that, in Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , our Supreme Court indicated that a defendant may raise an as-applied challenge “pursuant to the Proportionate Penalties Clause if the defendant could demonstrate that the ‘evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development highlighted in Miller’ applied to the fact of his case.” The circuit court found that “the First District has generally held that ‘individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purp

2023After outlining some of the relevant caselaw pertaining to the Miller line of authority, the circuit court then found that, in Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , our Supreme Court indicated that a defendant may raise an as-applied challenge “pursuant to the Proportionate Penalties Clause if the defendant could demonstrate that the ‘evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development highlighted in Miller’ applied to the fact of his case.” The circuit court found that “the First District has generally held that ‘individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purp

2023See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibited the “imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (determining that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review); People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047 , ¶

2023See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (finding that the eighth and fourteenth amendments prohibited the “imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed”); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (finding that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016) (determining that Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review); People v. Horshaw, 2021 IL App (1st) 182047 , ¶

2023See People v. Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687 , ¶ 32 (‘We agree with the Humphrey court limiting Miller-based claims to those young adults aged 18 to 20.’); People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42 (‘[D]efendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for 4 purposes of a Miller claim.’); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (noting that the defendant could not ‘point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years’); People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st) 191145, ¶ 46 (noting that ‘our state’s statutes and caselaw treat

2023See People v. Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687 , ¶ 32 (‘We agree with the Humphrey court limiting Miller-based claims to those young adults aged 18 to 20.’); People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42 (‘[D]efendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for 4 purposes of a Miller claim.’); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (noting that the defendant could not ‘point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years’); People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st) 191145, ¶ 46 (noting that ‘our state’s statutes and caselaw treat

2026Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106 (2021). ¶ 108 The defendant argues that his natural life sentence violates the eighth amendment under Miller and that the resentencing court imposed it without meaningfully considering the Miller factors.

2026Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106 (2021). ¶ 108 The defendant argues that his natural life sentence violates the eighth amendment under Miller and that the resentencing court imposed it without meaningfully considering the Miller factors.

2026In its argument, the State contended that defendant’s constitutional challenges to his sentence were barred by People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶¶ 20-26 , where the supreme court held that the defendant’s fully negotiated guilty plea barred his postconviction Miller claim, even though Miller was not decided until after his plea. ¶ 10 Defendant retained new counsel and, on March 20, 2025, filed a response to the motion to dismiss.

2025The State filed a new motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction pleadings, restating its prior arguments and adding that defendant had waived his Miller claim based on People v. Jones, 2021 IL 126432, ¶¶ 13, 26 , in which our supreme court held that a voluntary guilty plea waives constitutional errors, including eighth amendment violations under Miller.

2021See People v. Harvey, 2019 IL App (1st) 153581, ¶ 13 (holding “that the [sentencing] court’s mere awareness of a defendant’s age and consideration of a PSI does not provide evidence that [it] specifically considered [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”); Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 46 (finding a lack of compliance with Miller where “the circuit court stated that it ‘considered all of the relevant statutory requirements,’ ” but the record did “not indicate that the court considered [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”). ¶ 55 We note that in cases like t

2021See People v. Harvey, 2019 IL App (1st) 153581, ¶ 13 (holding “that the [sentencing] court’s mere awareness of a defendant’s age and consideration of a PSI does not provide evidence that [it] specifically considered [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”); Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 46 (finding a lack of compliance with Miller where “the circuit court stated that it ‘considered all of the relevant statutory requirements,’ ” but the record did “not indicate that the court considered [the] defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics”). ¶ 55 We note that in cases like t

2026For instance, in Green, this court stated that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21” in finding the “defendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for purposes of a Miller claim.” Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Everett, 2022 IL App (1st) 201169, ¶ 40 (“While our legislature has acknowledged the greater capacity for rehabilitation in young adults *** a clear line is drawn at 21 years of age”); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (“it is a much greater leap to extend [Miller] to a 21-year- old”); see also People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1s

2026For instance, in Green, this court stated that “the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21” in finding the “defendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for purposes of a Miller claim.” Id. ¶ 42; see also People v. Everett, 2022 IL App (1st) 201169, ¶ 40 (“While our legislature has acknowledged the greater capacity for rehabilitation in young adults *** a clear line is drawn at 21 years of age”); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (“it is a much greater leap to extend [Miller] to a 21-year- old”); see also People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1s

2021Consistent with the directives of Holman, 2017 IL 120665 , and applying the analysis we used in Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043 , I would review the sentencing record that we have and find that there was no constitutional violation in the imposition of Ruiz’s sentence. ¶ 79 The majority finds that Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , opens the Illinois Constitution for a Miller challenge by way of collateral attack.

2021Consistent with the directives of Holman, 2017 IL 120665 , and applying the analysis we used in Croft, 2018 IL App (1st) 150043 , I would review the sentencing record that we have and find that there was no constitutional violation in the imposition of Ruiz’s sentence. ¶ 79 The majority finds that Harris, 2018 IL 121932 , opens the Illinois Constitution for a Miller challenge by way of collateral attack.

2021Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 . 2 The impact of the dissent in this case would be to require trial courts to consider the Miller factors in all cases involving young adult defendants even without any evidence or argument from the defendant that Miller applies.

2021Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212 . 2 The impact of the dissent in this case would be to require trial courts to consider the Miller factors in all cases involving young adult defendants even without any evidence or argument from the defendant that Miller applies.

2023See People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 ; People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628 ; 16 No. 1-20-1176 People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362 ; People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705 ; People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145 ; People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738 ; People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534 . ¶ 46 Defendant relies extensively on People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 , for support and asserts that Savage is analogous to the present case.

2022We rejected defendant's Miller claim, explaining: “Whether a defendant physically committed the offense is a significant consideration for courts tasked with deciding whether to extend Miller principles to a young adult under the - 21 - No. 1-20-0663 proportionate penalties clause. [Citations.] Here, we cannot overlook defendant's active participation where he invaded the victims’ house with the codefendants, held a gun to Mr. W.’s head to prevent him from interfering while the codefendants robbed and attacked his family and kidnapped his young daughter, and then actively participated in the g

2026Any such extension of Miller “should be made by our legislature or our highest court.” People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶ 27 . ¶ 39 We also reject defendant’s argument that the circuit court violated his right to due process in dismissing his eighth amendment Miller claim.

2023See People v. Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687 , ¶ 32 (‘We agree with the Humphrey court limiting Miller-based claims to those young adults aged 18 to 20.’); People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42 (‘[D]efendant was 21 years old at the time of the offense, and therefore was an adult for 4 purposes of a Miller claim.’); People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶ 35 (noting that the defendant could not ‘point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years’); People v. Glinsey, 2021 IL App (1st) 191145, ¶ 46 (noting that ‘our state’s statutes and caselaw treat

2023See People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541 ; People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628 ; 16 No. 1-20-1176 People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362 ; People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705 ; People v. Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145 ; People v. Daniels, 2020 IL App (1st) 171738 ; People v. Carrasquillo, 2020 IL App (1st) 180534 . ¶ 46 Defendant relies extensively on People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 , for support and asserts that Savage is analogous to the present case.

2022We rejected defendant's Miller claim, explaining: “Whether a defendant physically committed the offense is a significant consideration for courts tasked with deciding whether to extend Miller principles to a young adult under the - 21 - No. 1-20-0663 proportionate penalties clause. [Citations.] Here, we cannot overlook defendant's active participation where he invaded the victims’ house with the codefendants, held a gun to Mr. W.’s head to prevent him from interfering while the codefendants robbed and attacked his family and kidnapped his young daughter, and then actively participated in the g