Miller factors in California

2026(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387 .) The court also recognized that under Miller it was required to consider “evidence relating to mitigating factors attributed to the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense and the attributes attendant with youthful offenders and their lack of maturity and how those youthful attributes may have diminished the justification to impose an LWOP sentence, which is the harshest penalty for people who are juveniles at the time of the commission of the offense.” The court proceeded to thoughtfully and thoroughly analyze the Miller fac

2026(Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1387 .) The court also recognized that under Miller it was required to consider “evidence relating to mitigating factors attributed to the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense and the attributes attendant with youthful offenders and their lack of maturity and how those youthful attributes may have diminished the justification to impose an LWOP sentence, which is the harshest penalty for people who are juveniles at the time of the commission of the offense.” The court proceeded to thoughtfully and thoroughly analyze the Miller fac

2024Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3), mooted constitutional claim under Miller]; Ochoa, supra, at p. 850 [extending mootness principle articulated in People v. Franklin to the defendant’s claim his LWOP sentence was unconstitutional under Miller 24 . in light of Senate Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)]; see Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 212 [“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”].) Harring’s state law challenge to the trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion remains viable,

2024Code, § 3051, subd. (b)(3), mooted constitutional claim under Miller]; Ochoa, supra, at p. 850 [extending mootness principle articulated in People v. Franklin to the defendant’s claim his LWOP sentence was unconstitutional under Miller 24 . in light of Senate Bill No. 394 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)]; see Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 212 [“A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.”].) Harring’s state law challenge to the trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion remains viable,

2025(Kirchner, at p. 1043; see Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 .) Our high court held that section 1170, subdivision (d), does not provide an adequate remedy for Miller error.

2025(Heard at pp. 633–634.) The Heard 3 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” (Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at p. 479 .) 5 court did not think Franklin applied to moot the constitutional issue because section 1170 (d) explicitly uses the phrase “was sentenced.” (Heard, at p. 629.) The court noted the procedure under section 1170 (d) is “a statutory resentencing opportunity, not a cure for Miller error.” (Ibid.) In our recently published opinion, Ortega, supra,

2026(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 271.) After holding that Miller applies to functionally equivalent LWOP sentences like the sentence defendant received when he was first sentenced, the Court concluded that section 3051 “mooted” defendant’s “Miller claim” because defendant is now serving a life sentence that includes a meaningful opportunity for release during his 25th year of incarceration.

2025Indeed, Franklin forecloses the argument. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 279– 280 [operation of § 3051 and other statutes means juvenile homicide offender’s sentence of 50 years to life was neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent and any Miller challenge was moot].) Instead, Thompson argues that the holdings in Heard and Sorto apply here and mandate that he be deemed eligible for section 1170(d) relief.

2022(Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 212-213 [ 193 L.Ed.2d 599, 622 ].) The trial court’s statements during the resentencing hearing surrounding defendant’s postconviction rehabilitative efforts demonstrate the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion in that postconviction rehabilitative conduct is relevant to the Miller analysis.

2022(Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 212-213 [ 193 L.Ed.2d 599, 622 ].) The trial court’s statements during the resentencing hearing surrounding defendant’s postconviction rehabilitative efforts demonstrate the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion in that postconviction rehabilitative conduct is relevant to the Miller analysis.

2021Defendant argued that a “sentence of LWOP under Miller and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [ 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 ] (Graham) is only appropriate if the defendant was beyond redemption, irreparably corrupt, and unfit to ever reenter society.” The People responded that defendant’s cruelty and depravity in the commission of the murders “show[ed] him to be irreparably corrupt and beyond rehabilitation and redemption.” The trial court considered the Miller factors, and observed that the decisional authorities did not completely prohibit sentences of LWOP for juveniles.

2021Defendant argued that a “sentence of LWOP under Miller and Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 [ 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 176 L.Ed. 2d 825 ] (Graham) is only appropriate if the defendant was beyond redemption, irreparably corrupt, and unfit to ever reenter society.” The People responded that defendant’s cruelty and depravity in the commission of the murders “show[ed] him to be irreparably corrupt and beyond rehabilitation and redemption.” The trial court considered the Miller factors, and observed that the decisional authorities did not completely prohibit sentences of LWOP for juveniles.

2018The California Supreme Court currently has under review the question whether the record must show an express determination of irreparable corruption before imposing LWOP, or whether it suffices simply to show the trial court gave due consideration to the defendant's youth and attendant characteristics. ( People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656 , review granted Jan. 25, 2017, S239454.) Padilla held "In view of Montgomery [which clarified that Miller set forth a substantive rule], the trial court must assess the *653 Miller factors with an eye to making an express determination whether the ju

2018The California Supreme Court currently has under review the question whether the record must show an express determination of irreparable corruption before imposing LWOP, or whether it suffices simply to show the trial court gave due consideration to the defendant's youth and attendant characteristics. ( People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656 , review granted Jan. 25, 2017, S239454.) Padilla held "In view of Montgomery [which clarified that Miller set forth a substantive rule], the trial court must assess the *653 Miller factors with an eye to making an express determination whether the ju

2025(Franklin, at pp. 268, 276-280, 286; id. at pp. 280-282 [distinguishing § 3051 from § 1170, former subd. (d)(2)].) 17 The court explained that the new law “superseded” the defendant’s sentence so that, notwithstanding his original term of 50 years to life, the defendant was eligible for a parole hearing during his 25th year of incarceration. ( Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 277, 279-280.) It “effected this change by operation of law, with no additional resentencing . . . required.” (Id. at p.279.) Thus, Franklin’s sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP, and his Miller claim was m

2022He contends that as a result of the enactment of section 3051, subdivision (b)(4), Gomez’s sentence is “ ‘neither LWOP nor its functional equivalent’ [and] ‘no Miller claim arises.’ ” We agree that Senate Bill No. 394 rendered Gomez’s constitutional claim moot. “ ‘By simply transforming the affected sentences to life with parole terms, [section 3051] avoid[s] the Miller issues associated with the earlier sentences.’ ” (In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449 , quoting In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1054 .) “By affording [juvenile offenders] a meaningful opportunity for release, the Legisla

2019A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." ( Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Montgomery ).) The Attorney General understates the significance of Franklin 's evidence preservation function in the statutory scheme. **916 The Legislature's intent in enacting sections 3051 and 4801 was " 'to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtai

2019A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." ( Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718 , 736, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 ( Montgomery ).) The Attorney General understates the significance of Franklin 's evidence preservation function in the statutory scheme. **916 The Legislature's intent in enacting sections 3051 and 4801 was " 'to establish a parole eligibility mechanism that provides a person serving a sentence for crimes that he or she committed as a juvenile the opportunity to obtai

2014If a substantial portion of the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the same treatment.” (Ragland, supra, 836 N.W.2d at p. 116 .) Furthermore, Miller held the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of an LWOP sentence upon a juvenile offender unless the sentencing court considers the offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as the offender’s “family and home environment” and “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including t

2014If a substantial portion of the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the same treatment.” (Ragland, supra, 836 N.W.2d at p. 116 .) Furthermore, Miller held the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of an LWOP sentence upon a juvenile offender unless the sentencing court considers the offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as the offender’s “family and home environment” and “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including t

2016Finally, amicus curiae PCJP contends that despite the announced purpose of Senate Bill No. 260, youth offender parole hearings will not, in practice, “afford the juvenile offender a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 266, quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 73) and therefore cannot render moot a Miller challenge to a lengthy mandatory sentence that is functionally equivalent to LWOP.

2016Finally, amicus curiae PCJP contends that despite the announced purpose of Senate Bill No. 260, youth offender parole hearings will not, in practice, “afford the juvenile offender a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ ” (Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 266, quoting Graham, supra, 560 U.S. at p. 73) and therefore cannot render moot a Miller challenge to a lengthy mandatory sentence that is functionally equivalent to LWOP.

2020(Ibid.; People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 673 (Padilla) [“trial court must assess the Miller factors with an eye to making an express determination whether the juvenile offender’s crime reflects permanent incorrigibility arising from irreparable corruption.”].) While the People do not directly address the question underlying our conclusion, Botello identifies two cases potentially at odds with our conclusion.

2020(Ibid.; People v. Padilla (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 656, 673 (Padilla) [“trial court must assess the Miller factors with an eye to making an express determination whether the juvenile offender’s crime reflects permanent incorrigibility arising from irreparable corruption.”].) While the People do not directly address the question underlying our conclusion, Botello identifies two cases potentially at odds with our conclusion.

2013(See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 479 (Dillon); In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 ; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 17.) Relevant factors for youthful offenders include, like the Graham/Miller factors, age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, individual potential, and state of mind.

2012Our resolution of the claims, and the explanation of our disposition, was brief: ―The prior petition was denied on May 25, 1936, and since that time no change in the facts or the law substantially affecting the rights of the petitioner has been disclosed. [¶] The petition is denied.‖ (Id. at p. 735.) The Miller rule is now, and for many years has been, black letter law applicable to habeas corpus petitions in this state: ―It is, of course, the rule that a petition for habeas corpus based on the same grounds as those of a previously denied petition will itself be denied when there has been no c

2017(People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 ; accord, People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; People v. Ross (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157, fn. 8 .) Here, however, Suarez relies on Miller’s rule squarely prohibiting a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender.

2015(People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 ; accord, People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; People v. Ross (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1157, fn. 8 .) Here, however, Garcia and Joseph Navarro rely on Miller’s rule flatly forbidding a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile.

2025(Franklin, at p. 277.) Franklin was “not serving an LWOP sentence or its functional equivalent.” (Id. at p. 282; see id. at p. 281 [distinguishing Gutierrez].) In 2017, the court held in In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040 (Kirchner), that section 1170(d) does not provide an adequate remedy for addressing Miller error.

2025The court explained that “as a process designed to revisit lawful sentences of life without parole,” and introduced in the Legislature before Miller, “section 1170(d)(2) limits the availability of resentencing under its terms, and the resentencing inquiry it prescribes does not necessarily account for the full array of Miller factors in the manner that a proper resentencing under Miller would.” (Kirchner, at p. 1043; see id. at pp. 1052–1053.) 7 Effective January 1, 2018, the Legislature amended section 3051 to extend youth offender parole hearings to juveniles sentenced to life without parole

2009In such contexts, referred to in Hernandez, supra, at pages 1385-1386 as “the Miller standard” (see Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 419 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ]), “ ‘[o]bscene matter’ ” generally refers to something “that to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, that, taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (§ 311, subd. (a)(1)).

2009In such contexts, referred to in Hernandez, supra, at pages 1385-1386 as “the Miller standard” (see Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 419 , 93 S.Ct. 2607 ]), “ ‘[o]bscene matter’ ” generally refers to something “that to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards, appeals to the prurient interest, that, taken as a whole, depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and that, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (§ 311, subd. (a)(1)).

2016(People v. Lozano (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137-1138 .) 17 In determining whether to impose LWOP on a juvenile offender, the sentencing court is not required to give more weight to any one of the Miller factors.

2016(People v. Lozano (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137-1138 .) 17 In determining whether to impose LWOP on a juvenile offender, the sentencing court is not required to give more weight to any one of the Miller factors.

2016(Blackwell, supra. 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 182 .) In rejecting the contention under Apprendi . the appellate com! concluded that notwithstanding Montgomery, a determination that a juvenile offender’s crime reflects irreparable corruption “merely ‘encapsulates the [absence] of youth-based mitigation.’ ” (Id. at p. 192.) The appellate court further concluded that the trial court’s assessment of the Miller factors did not contravene the Eighth Amendment, relying primarily on Palafox.

2016(Blackwell, supra. 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 182 .) In rejecting the contention under Apprendi . the appellate com! concluded that notwithstanding Montgomery, a determination that a juvenile offender’s crime reflects irreparable corruption “merely ‘encapsulates the [absence] of youth-based mitigation.’ ” (Id. at p. 192.) The appellate court further concluded that the trial court’s assessment of the Miller factors did not contravene the Eighth Amendment, relying primarily on Palafox.

2020A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” (Montgomery, at p. 736.) Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Montgomery, the Court of Appeal in In re Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418, 438-439 (Berg) held the resentencing procedure in section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) failed to provide an adequate remedy for juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.

2020A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” (Montgomery, at p. 736.) Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Montgomery, the Court of Appeal in In re Berg (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 418, 438-439 (Berg) held the resentencing procedure in section 1170, subdivision (d)(2) failed to provide an adequate remedy for juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences.

2016(Id. at p. 2464; see also Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 136 S.Ct. 718, 735-736 (Montgomery) [ruling that Miller applies retroactively to cases on collateral review].) Seven weeks after Miller was handed down, our Supreme Court in Caballero held that Miller’s rule applied to a determinate term of years if that term was so long that it “falls outside the juvenile offender’s natural life expectancy” and thus amounts to a “de facto” sentence of life without the possibility of parole. ( Caballero, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 265, 268-269.) This line of authority has repeatedly cited three reasons for

2016Based on the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the order appealed from should be reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to reconsider appellant’s original petition for writ of habeas corpus in its entirety, including appellant’s constitutional claims, in light of the authorities discussed, infra. DISCUSSION Governing Law In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that statutes requiring courts to sentence juvenile homicide offenders to LWOP violated the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. ( Miller, supra, 567 U.S. at pp. ___, ___ [132 S.C

2014(In re Alatriste, supra; In re Bonilla, supra.) In our view, 30 this situation distinguishes People v. Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 515 , as well as the other cases relied upon by respondent for the proposition that the trial judge here should be presumed to have considered the Miller factors and exercised his discretion accordingly.

2014(In re Alatriste, supra; In re Bonilla, supra.) In our view, 30 this situation distinguishes People v. Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 515 , as well as the other cases relied upon by respondent for the proposition that the trial judge here should be presumed to have considered the Miller factors and exercised his discretion accordingly.