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78 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 39 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Zubergreen2 sentences2026In Zuber, our Supreme Court extended Miller, holding sentencing courts should evaluate the Miller factors when a juvenile faces "a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole." 227 N.J. at 447 . 2026In Zuber, our Supreme Court extended Miller, holding sentencing courts should evaluate the Miller factors when a juvenile faces "a sentence that is the practical equivalent of life without parole." 227 N.J. at 447 . | 23 | 48 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2026See, e.g., State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 442, 451 (2017) ("we hold that sentencing judges should evaluate the Miller factors at [the time of sentencing] to 'take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 1 In Miller, , the Court articulated five factors to be considered by judges in sentencing juvenile offenders in order to avoid subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment: (1) the juvenile's chronological age and developmental characteristics; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment; (3) the circumstances of the offense and any relevant external 2026See, e.g., State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 442, 451 (2017) ("we hold that sentencing judges should evaluate the Miller factors at [the time of sentencing] to 'take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 1 In Miller, , the Court articulated five factors to be considered by judges in sentencing juvenile offenders in order to avoid subjecting them to cruel and unusual punishment: (1) the juvenile's chronological age and developmental characteristics; (2) the juvenile's family and home environment; (3) the circumstances of the offense and any relevant external | 10 | 37 |
State v. Yarboughred2 sentences2025In considering whether to impose consecutive sentences, the court noted: Zuber instructs the [c]ourt to consider Miller factors along with the factors set forth in . . . [State v.] Yarbough, [ 100 N.J. 627 (1985),] when considering whether to impose multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles which would result in a lengthy prison term, the functional equivalent to life imprisonment without parole, which would take into account how children are different and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing children to a lifetime in prison. 2025It also held that a judge must consider the Miller factors in tandem with the state-law sentencing principles set forth in Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44 , when imposing consecutive sentences upon juvenile offenders. | 5 | 14 |
Graham v. Floridagreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Graham 560 U.S. at 74 (barring sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429 (requiring judges to consider the Miller factors). 2022See, e.g., Graham 560 U.S. at 74 (barring sentences of life without parole for non-homicide offenses); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 429 (requiring judges to consider the Miller factors). | 3 | 3 |
New York v. Ferbergreen2 sentences2025Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). 2025Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2022See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1315-16 (describing the Miller factors as mitigating factors). 2022See Jones, 141 S. Ct. at 1315-16 (describing the Miller factors as mitigating factors). | 2 | 2 |
Mhb v. Htbgreen2 sentences2000The Miller test was applied in M.H.B. v. H.T.B., supra, where, three months following the birth of their third child, K.B., the husband read his wife’s diary and learned that he might not be that child’s natural father. 100 N.J. at 569 , 498 A.2d 775 . 2000The Miller test was applied in M.H.B. v. H.T.B., supra, where, three months following the birth of their third child, K.B., the husband read his wife’s diary and learned that he might not be that child’s natural father. 100 N.J. at 569 , 498 A.2d 775 . | 2 | 2 |
Roper v. Simmonsgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (eliminating the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life imprisonment sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders, but leaving open the possibility of such sentences in homicide cases provided the mitigating effect of the defendant's age is properly considered); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 446-47 (2017) (applying the Miller factors "to a sentence that is A-2581-21 22 the practical equivalent of life without parole"); State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 , 401 (2022) (permitti 2024See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (eliminating the death penalty for juvenile offenders); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012) (prohibiting mandatory life imprisonment sentencing schemes for juvenile offenders, but leaving open the possibility of such sentences in homicide cases provided the mitigating effect of the defendant's age is properly considered); State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 446-47 (2017) (applying the Miller factors "to a sentence that is A-2581-21 22 the practical equivalent of life without parole"); State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359 , 401 (2022) (permitti | 1 | 2 |
Montgomery v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2021Defendant argued that when these decisions are considered together, the central thesis of these cases renders his original life sentence with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility "retroactively illegal and require[s] that he be resentenced." In his memorandum of opinion, Judge Billmeier acknowledged that although 8 A-0382-18 defendant had been released from prison "he is subject to numerous parole conditions, including an inability to vote, restrictions on his ability to change addresses and travel, and the requirement to report to a parole officer as directed." He also recognized that 2021Montgomery v. Alabama, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-36 (2016). | 1 | 2 |
State v. De Santisgreen2 sentences1986In State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462 (1974) the court discarded the Memoirs test and adopted the Miller test. 1986In State v. DeSantis, 65 N.J. 462 (1974) the court discarded the Memoirs test and adopted the Miller test. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Joseph M. Jaffe (072259)green2 sentences2025In addition, the court noted defendant was to be sentenced as he stood before the court at resentencing, State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014), and entitled to the benefit of mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), defendant was under twenty-six years A-2804-22 11 old at the time of the commission of the offenses, which was enacted in 2020. 2025In addition, the court noted defendant was to be sentenced as he stood before the court at resentencing, State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J. 114, 116 (2014), and entitled to the benefit of mitigating factor fourteen, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14), defendant was under twenty-six years A-2804-22 11 old at the time of the commission of the offenses, which was enacted in 2020. | 1 | 1 |
Stanley v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2024And even if the statutory definitions had incorporated the three prongs of the Miller standard, by criminalizing mere possession of obscene material, they would infringe “an adult’s right to view and possess obscene material in the privacy of their home.” Id. at 233, 235-36 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1969)). 2024And even if the statutory definitions had incorporated the three prongs of the Miller standard, by criminalizing mere possession of obscene material, they would infringe “an adult’s right to view and possess obscene material in the privacy of their home.” Id. at 233, 235-36 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560-61 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rothgreen2 sentences2024The court must make findings on the relevant statutory factors based on "competent, reasonably credible evidence[,]'' ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)), and then "balance the relevant aggravating factors and 13 Our decision to vacate Benjamin's sentence and remand for resentencing shall not be interpreted as expressing an opinion of the aggregate sentence imposed by the court. 2024The court must make findings on the relevant statutory factors based on "competent, reasonably credible evidence[,]'' ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363 (1984)), and then "balance the relevant aggravating factors and 13 Our decision to vacate Benjamin's sentence and remand for resentencing shall not be interpreted as expressing an opinion of the aggregate sentence imposed by the court. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beltrangreen2 sentences2022See State v. Beltran, 229 N.J. 151 (2017). 2022See State v. Beltran, 229 N.J. 151 (2017). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bassgreen2 sentences2021Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2021) (finding the Miller factors inapplicable to a sentence with a thirty-year parole bar imposed on a sixteen-year old murderer); State v. Bass, 457 N.J. 2021Super. __, __ (App. Div. 2021) (finding the Miller factors inapplicable to a sentence with a thirty-year parole bar imposed on a sixteen-year old murderer); State v. Bass, 457 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Besler v. BOARD OF EDUC. OF W. WINDSORgreen1 sentence2021See Besler, 201 N.J. at 565-66 . | 1 | 1 |
DeNike v. Cupogreen1 sentence2021See ibid. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kirby Lenihan (071497)green2 sentences2021See State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 265 (2014). 2021See State v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 265 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
State v. William A. Case, Jr. (072688)green2 sentences2021He also asserts that the court failed to properly consider and assess the Yarbough criteria. 28 A-3859-18 We note that "critical to the sentencing process and appellate review is the need for the sentencing court to explain clearly why an aggravating or mitigating factor presented by the parties was found or rejected and how the factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 66 (2014). 2021He also asserts that the court failed to properly consider and assess the Yarbough criteria. 28 A-3859-18 We note that "critical to the sentencing process and appellate review is the need for the sentencing court to explain clearly why an aggravating or mitigating factor presented by the parties was found or rejected and how the factors were balanced to arrive at the sentence." State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 66 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Trantinogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dalzielgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kellyred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Careygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sugargreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DeLucagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DePianogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bass
neutral
2 sentences2020Super. 1, 13-14 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 364 (2019), we held that a life sentence with a thirty-five-year parole- bar was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the Miller factors when it imposed his sentence. 2020Super. 1, 13-14 (App. Div. 2018), certif. denied, 238 N.J. 364 (2019), we held that a life sentence with a thirty-five-year parole- bar was not the functional equivalent of a life sentence, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under Zuber, even though the sentencing court had not considered the Miller factors when it imposed his sentence. | 6 | 2020–2021 |
State v. Comer
neutral
2 sentences2020State v. Comer, 226 N.J. 205 (2016). 2020State v. Comer, 226 N.J. 205 (2016). | 3 | 2017–2020 |
Dunphy v. Gregor
green
2 sentences2000Because “our judicial system has long acknowledged that ‘courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships’ and have adjusted the rights and duties of parties in relation to that reality,” V.C. v. M.J.B., supra, 163 N.J. at 233 , 748 A.2d 539 (Long, J., concurring) (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 111 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994)), this court holds that in addition to representation and reliance, the Miller test may be satisfied when there is “passive” interference with an unknown, biological father’s ability to support a child, where the following f 2000Because “our judicial system has long acknowledged that ‘courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships’ and have adjusted the rights and duties of parties in relation to that reality,” V.C. v. M.J.B., supra, 163 N.J. at 233 , 748 A.2d 539 (Long, J., concurring) (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 111 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994)), this court holds that in addition to representation and reliance, the Miller test may be satisfied when there is “passive” interference with an unknown, biological father’s ability to support a child, where the following f | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Miller v. Miller
green
2 sentences2000Although the Miller case involved a stepparent situation, a broader reading of the case indicates that it applies where there is one natural parent and the other “while absent, may still be available.” Miller, supra at 166 , 478 A.2d 351 . 2000Although the Miller case involved a stepparent situation, a broader reading of the case indicates that it applies where there is one natural parent and the other “while absent, may still be available.” Miller, supra at 166 , 478 A.2d 351 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Vc v. Mjb
green
2 sentences2000Because “our judicial system has long acknowledged that ‘courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships’ and have adjusted the rights and duties of parties in relation to that reality,” V.C. v. M.J.B., supra, 163 N.J. at 233 , 748 A.2d 539 (Long, J., concurring) (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 111 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994)), this court holds that in addition to representation and reliance, the Miller test may be satisfied when there is “passive” interference with an unknown, biological father’s ability to support a child, where the following f 2000Because “our judicial system has long acknowledged that ‘courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships’ and have adjusted the rights and duties of parties in relation to that reality,” V.C. v. M.J.B., supra, 163 N.J. at 233 , 748 A.2d 539 (Long, J., concurring) (quoting Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 111 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994)), this court holds that in addition to representation and reliance, the Miller test may be satisfied when there is “passive” interference with an unknown, biological father’s ability to support a child, where the following f | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. J.R.
green
2 sentences2025Zuber "requires judges to evaluate the Miller factors before sentencing juveniles to a lengthy term of parole ineligibility." Ibid. 2025Zuber "requires judges to evaluate the Miller factors before sentencing juveniles to a lengthy term of parole ineligibility." Ibid. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 282 . 2025Id. at 282 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Reinaldo Fuentes (070729)
green
2 sentences2024We therefore deem it appropriate to vacate Benjamin's sentence A-2056-20 83 and remand for resentencing at which the court shall include in its analysis its findings as to the Miller factors and an explanation as to the effect of those findings on its determination of Benjamin's sentence.13 Dralle contends that the court did not probably consider his youth as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14).14 In imposing sentence, the court must "identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)'s . . . aggravating factors and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)'s . . . mitigating factors apply." Fuentes, 217 N.J 2024We therefore deem it appropriate to vacate Benjamin's sentence A-2056-20 83 and remand for resentencing at which the court shall include in its analysis its findings as to the Miller factors and an explanation as to the effect of those findings on its determination of Benjamin's sentence.13 Dralle contends that the court did not probably consider his youth as a mitigating factor under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(14).14 In imposing sentence, the court must "identify whether any of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)'s . . . aggravating factors and N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)'s . . . mitigating factors apply." Fuentes, 217 N.J | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State of New Jersey v. Keith Drake
green
2 sentences2022When a petition is filed, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to review the defendant's sentence and "consider the Miller factors—including factors that could not be fully considered decades earlier, like whether the defendant still fails to appreciate risks and consequences, and whether he [or A-1547-19 9 she] has matured or been rehabilitated."2 Ibid. (slip op. at 53). 2022When a petition is filed, the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing to review the defendant's sentence and "consider the Miller factors—including factors that could not be fully considered decades earlier, like whether the defendant still fails to appreciate risks and consequences, and whether he [or A-1547-19 9 she] has matured or been rehabilitated."2 Ibid. (slip op. at 53). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Petro-Lubricant Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. Adelman neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare
green
2 sentences2020First, the state law must be 3 Both the motion judge and NYSA-ILA rest this issue on the determination of the court in Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Health, 247 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd on other ground by Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005). 2020First, the state law must be 3 Both the motion judge and NYSA-ILA rest this issue on the determination of the court in Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Health, 247 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd on other ground by Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Jean Levine, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. United Healthcare Corporation (Dc Nj 01-Cv-04964)
green
2 sentences2020First, the state law must be 3 Both the motion judge and NYSA-ILA rest this issue on the determination of the court in Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Health, 247 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd on other ground by Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005). 2020First, the state law must be 3 Both the motion judge and NYSA-ILA rest this issue on the determination of the court in Carducci v. Aetna U.S. Health, 247 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D.N.J. 2003), rev'd on other ground by Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| United States v. Payner green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Miller green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Miller v. California green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.