granting clause in South Carolina

2021Elec. & Gas Co. v. Hix, 306 S.C. 173, 176 , 410 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ct. App. 1991) ("At common law[,] an owner in peaceable possession of real property has the right to exclude all others from his property."); Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968) (finding "the granting clause conveyed a fee simple absolute [and] the restrictive words following the description of the property were ineffectual to cut down that estate").

2021Elec. & Gas Co. v. Hix, 306 S.C. 173, 176 , 410 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ct. App. 1991) ("At common law[,] an owner in peaceable possession of real property has the right to exclude all others from his property."); Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968) (finding "the granting clause conveyed a fee simple absolute [and] the restrictive words following the description of the property were ineffectual to cut down that estate").

2021Elec. & Gas Co., 278 S.C. 132, 135 , 293 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1982) ("Where the granting clause in a deed purports to convey a fee simple absolute title, subsequent provisions of the deed cannot diminish that granted or deprive the grantee of the incidents of ownership in the property.").

2021Elec. & Gas Co., 278 S.C. 132, 135 , 293 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1982) ("Where the granting clause in a deed purports to convey a fee simple absolute title, subsequent provisions of the deed cannot diminish that granted or deprive the grantee of the incidents of ownership in the property.").

2016See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the validity of a contractual provision between a transportation provider and the national park service and allowing for the readjustment of franchise fees without modifying the contract); Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F.Supp. 954, 956 (D.S.C. 1979) (determining that South Carolina’s Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act did not apply retroactively to a particular dealership contract); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41-42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (construing a de

2016See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the validity of a contractual provision between a transportation provider and the national park service and allowing for the readjustment of franchise fees without modifying the contract); Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F.Supp. 954, 956 (D.S.C. 1979) (determining that South Carolina’s Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act did not apply retroactively to a particular dealership contract); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41-42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (construing a de

2008We disagree. “[A] complete and absolute estate created in the granting clause cannot be cut down by subsequent provisions in the deed.” Abbeville County v. Knox , 267 S.C. 38, 40 , 225 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1976) (citing Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas , 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968)). “While it is a cardinal rule of deed construction that the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated, this intention cannot stand if it contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy.” Hunt v. Forestry Comm’n , 358 S.C. 564, 571-572 , 595 S.E.2d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 2004); Waybu

2008We disagree. “[A] complete and absolute estate created in the granting clause cannot be cut down by subsequent provisions in the deed.” Abbeville County v. Knox , 267 S.C. 38, 40 , 225 S.E.2d 863, 864 (1976) (citing Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas , 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968)). “While it is a cardinal rule of deed construction that the intention of the grantor must be ascertained and effectuated, this intention cannot stand if it contravenes some well settled rule of law or public policy.” Hunt v. Forestry Comm’n , 358 S.C. 564, 571-572 , 595 S.E.2d 846, 850 (Ct. App. 2004); Waybu

2025However, "[o]nly if the granting clause is deemed 'indefinite,' may the court look to other parts of the deed to ascertain the intent of the grantor." Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 570 , 595 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2004).

2025However, "[o]nly if the granting clause is deemed 'indefinite,' may the court look to other parts of the deed to ascertain the intent of the grantor." Hunt v. Forestry Comm'n, 358 S.C. 564, 570 , 595 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2004).

2004Coast Lumber Corp. v. Langston Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 7, 9 , 122 S.E. 395, 396 (1924) (“A conveyance of real estate not carrying the word ‘heirs’ cannot convey the fee.”); Tarrant, 293 S.C. at 445 , 361 S.E.2d at 345 (finding an indefinite estate was conveyed by the granting clause because of the omission of words of inheritance; and therefore, resort was had to the habendum clause for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the grantors).

2004Coast Lumber Corp. v. Langston Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 7, 9 , 122 S.E. 395, 396 (1924) (“A conveyance of real estate not carrying the word ‘heirs’ cannot convey the fee.”); Tarrant, 293 S.C. at 445 , 361 S.E.2d at 345 (finding an indefinite estate was conveyed by the granting clause because of the omission of words of inheritance; and therefore, resort was had to the habendum clause for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the grantors).

2006We recognize “when the estates given in the granting clause and the habendum of a deed are so repugnant to each other as not to be susceptible of any reasonable reconciliation, the granting clause will control and the habendum will be rejected as void.” Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 327 , 70 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1952).

2006We recognize “when the estates given in the granting clause and the habendum of a deed are so repugnant to each other as not to be susceptible of any reasonable reconciliation, the granting clause will control and the habendum will be rejected as void.” Glasgow v. Glasgow, 221 S.C. 322, 327 , 70 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1952).

2006Thus, the court held the easement in that case “in no way-cut down the fee simple estate conveyed” and, therefore, “the reservation of the easement following the description in the deed was not repugnant to the fee simple title conveyed in the granting clause.” Id. at 445-46, 182 S.E.2d at 722 .

2006Thus, the court held the easement in that case “in no way cut down the fee simple estate conveyed” and, therefore, “the reservation of the easement following the description in the deed was not repugnant to the fee simple title conveyed in the granting clause.” Id. at 445-46, 182 S.E.2d at 722 .

2004Wayburn, 270 S.C. at 42 , 239 S.E.2d at 892 ; Bean v. Bean, 253 S.C. 340, 343-44 , 170 S.E.2d 654, 655-56 (1969). *573 The habendum clause of the deed in question reads, “To Have and to Hold all and singular the premises before mentioned unto the said [SCFC] and their successors in office, and assigns forever.” When a habendum clause contains the traditional words of inheritance, it has the effect of enlarging an indefinite granting clause into a fee simple.

1987Bean v. Bean, 253 S. C. 340, 170 S. E. (2d) 654 (1969); County of Abbeville v. Knox, supra. And also, the rule is well established in this state that where an indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause of a deed, resort may be had to the habendum clause for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantors.

1969Chavis v. Chavis, 57 S. C. 173, 35 S. E. 507 ; Zohel v. Little, 120 S. C. 212, 113 S. E. 68 , and Wilson v. Poston, 129 S. C. 345, 123 S. E. 849 .

1932Apparently the grantor then attempted in the habendum to limit the use of the lands so granted to “railroad purposes.” It is well established that, while resort may be had to the habendum for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantor where an incomplete or indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause, “a .complete estate, created in the granting clause, cannot be cut down by super-added words, either in the granting clause or in the habendum.” Wilson v. Poston, 129 S. C., 345, 123 S. E., 849, 851 , and cases cited.

2004McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S.C. 555, 557 , 29 S.E. 403, 403 (1898); see also Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (“It is the rule in this State that where an *571 incomplete or indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause, as for instance where no words of inheritance accompany the grant, or where the granting clause creates a life estate, resort may be had to the habendum for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantor and thus a life estate may be enlarged into a fee simple estate.”); Atl.

2004McMichael v. McMichael, 51 S.C. 555, 557 , 29 S.E. 403, 403 (1898); see also Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (“It is the rule in this State that where an *571 incomplete or indefinite estate is conveyed by the granting clause, as for instance where no words of inheritance accompany the grant, or where the granting clause creates a life estate, resort may be had to the habendum for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the grantor and thus a life estate may be enlarged into a fee simple estate.”); Atl.

1976Restatement of Law, § 35 (1936); See Southern Railway Co. v. Smoak, supra. However, in the present case a fee simple absolute estate was conveyed in the granting clause by the use of clear and plain words of inheritance.

1976Restatement of Law, § 35 (1936); See Southern Railway Co. v. Smoak, supra. However, in the present case a fee simple absolute estate was conveyed in the granting clause by the use of clear and plain words of inheritance.

2021Elec. & Gas Co. v. Hix, 306 S.C. 173, 176 , 410 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ct. App. 1991) ("At common law[,] an owner in peaceable possession of real property has the right to exclude all others from his property."); Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968) (finding "the granting clause conveyed a fee simple absolute [and] the restrictive words following the description of the property were ineffectual to cut down that estate").

2021Elec. & Gas Co. v. Hix, 306 S.C. 173, 176 , 410 S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ct. App. 1991) ("At common law[,] an owner in peaceable possession of real property has the right to exclude all others from his property."); Stylecraft, Inc. v. Thomas, 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 (1968) (finding "the granting clause conveyed a fee simple absolute [and] the restrictive words following the description of the property were ineffectual to cut down that estate").

2019See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (holding an issue is not preserved when the trial court does not explicitly rule on a question and the appellant fails to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the judgment on that ground).

2019See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (holding an issue is not preserved when the trial court does not explicitly rule on a question and the appellant fails to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the judgment on that ground).

2019See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (holding an issue is not preserved when the trial court does not explicitly rule on a question and the appellant fails to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the judgment on that ground).

2019See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76 , 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial [court] to be preserved for appellate review."); Noisette v. Ismail, 304 S.C. 56, 58 , 403 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1991) (holding an issue is not preserved when the trial court does not explicitly rule on a question and the appellant fails to make a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion to alter or amend the judgment on that ground).

2016See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the validity of a contractual provision between a transportation provider and the national park service and allowing for the readjustment of franchise fees without modifying the contract); Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F.Supp. 954, 956 (D.S.C. 1979) (determining that South Carolina’s Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act did not apply retroactively to a particular dealership contract); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41-42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (construing a de

2016See Fort Sumter Tours, Inc. v. Babbitt, 66 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (4th Cir. 1995) (addressing the validity of a contractual provision between a transportation provider and the national park service and allowing for the readjustment of franchise fees without modifying the contract); Easterby-Thackston, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 477 F.Supp. 954, 956 (D.S.C. 1979) (determining that South Carolina’s Regulation of Manufacturers, Distributors, and Dealers Act did not apply retroactively to a particular dealership contract); Wayburn v. Smith, 270 S.C. 38, 41-42 , 239 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1977) (construing a de

2012Ass'n, Inc., 393 S.C. 65, 71 , 710 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their execution."); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4 , 498 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the r

2012Ass'n, Inc., 393 S.C. 65, 71 , 710 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their execution."); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4 , 498 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the r

2012Ass'n, Inc., 393 S.C. 65, 71 , 710 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their execution."); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4 , 498 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the r

2012Ass'n, Inc., 393 S.C. 65, 71 , 710 S.E.2d 90, 93 (Ct. App. 2011) ("Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning attributed to them at the time of their execution."); Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4 , 498 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1998) ("The court may not limit a restriction in a deed, nor, on the other hand, will a restriction be enlarged or extended by construction or implication beyond the clear meaning of its terms even to accomplish what it may be thought the parties would have desired had a situation which later developed been foreseen by them at the time when the r

2012See id., 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 ("In a long and unbroken line of decisions this court has approved the rule that where the granting clause in a deed purports to convey title in fee simple absolute that estate may not be cut down by subsequent words in the same instrument."); Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 166 , 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006) (noting courts should strictly construe restrictive covenants, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of the property); Matsell v. Crowfield Plantation Cmty. Servs.

2012See id., 250 S.C. 495, 498 , 159 S.E.2d 46, 47 ("In a long and unbroken line of decisions this court has approved the rule that where the granting clause in a deed purports to convey title in fee simple absolute that estate may not be cut down by subsequent words in the same instrument."); Hardy v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 166 , 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006) (noting courts should strictly construe restrictive covenants, with all doubts resolved in favor of the free use of the property); Matsell v. Crowfield Plantation Cmty. Servs.

2008The South Carolina Court of Appeals “will not undertake to overthrow a rule of property so long established.” Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 102 , 106 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1959); Hunt , 358 S.C. at 571-572 , 595 S.E.2d at 850 . “This rule of construction must be adhered to even if it runs contrary to the express intentions of the grantor.” Hunt , 358 S.C. at 572 , 595 S.E.2d at 850 ; Stylecraft, 250 S.C. at 497 , 159 S.E.2d at 47 .

2008The South Carolina Court of Appeals “will not undertake to overthrow a rule of property so long established.” Purvis v. McElveen, 234 S.C. 94, 102 , 106 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1959); Hunt , 358 S.C. at 571-572 , 595 S.E.2d at 850 . “This rule of construction must be adhered to even if it runs contrary to the express intentions of the grantor.” Hunt , 358 S.C. at 572 , 595 S.E.2d at 850 ; Stylecraft, 250 S.C. at 497 , 159 S.E.2d at 47 .