granting clause in Texas

2023Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 753 (“[O]ur ‘holistic and harmonizing approach’ to construing deeds . . . and similar documents requires us to consider all of the [deed’s] provisions and prohibits us from giving greater weight to the granting clause or to any other particular types of clauses.” (citing Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462–64)).

2020Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. 1998); Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ; Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 ; Citizens Nat’l Bank, 150 S.W.2d at 1006 . 5 The Granting Clause We begin with the Assignment’s granting clause, which appears within the introductory paragraph of Section I and provides: [Neuhoff Oil] does hereby assign, sell and convey unto [Piranha] . . . without warranty or covenant of title, express or implied, subject to the limitations, conditions, reservations and exceptions hereinafter set forth . . . all of [Neuhoff Oil’s] right, title and interest in and to the properties described in Exhibit

2025In Concord, 966 S.W.2d at 460 , the Supreme Court construed a granting clause describing a 1/96 mineral interest as instead conveying a 1/12 interest so as to give effect to a subject-to clause that tied the grant to a 1/12 royalty under existing 1/8 leases.

2020Co., 966 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. 1998); Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 ; Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 ; Citizens Nat’l Bank, 150 S.W.2d at 1006 . 5 The Granting Clause We begin with the Assignment’s granting clause, which appears within the introductory paragraph of Section I and provides: [Neuhoff Oil] does hereby assign, sell and convey unto [Piranha] . . . without warranty or covenant of title, express or implied, subject to the limitations, conditions, reservations and exceptions hereinafter set forth . . . all of [Neuhoff Oil’s] right, title and interest in and to the properties described in Exhibit

2016See Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 463-64 (overruling Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.1984), which had afforded controlling weight to the granting clause over another provision in the conveyance); see also Concord Oil Co., 966 S.W.2d at 460-61 (rejecting invitation “to adopt ‘firm’ or ‘bright-line’ rules for construing mineral and royalty conveyances that contain differing fractions,” because such rules “are arbitrary” and “will not always give effect- to what the conveyance provides as a whole”); id. at 465 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (acknowledging Luckel’s salient holding as a rejection of “mecha

2011Relying on Alford v. Krum, 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984), the lessees initially construed the granting clause as the controlling clause of the grantees' royalty reservation.

2009Bullock v. National Bancshares Corp., 584 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied , 444 U.S. 1016 , 100 S.Ct. 667 , 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980).

2008Bullock v. National Bancshares Corp., 584 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 , 100 S.Ct. 667 , 62 L.Ed.2d 645 (1980).

2020Although the Texas Supreme Court has explained that “in general, the principal function of a subject-to clause in a deed is to protect a grantor against a claim for breach of warranty when some mineral interest is already outstanding,” the Court also recognized “that subject-to clauses are widely used for other purposes.” Wenske, 521 S.W.3d at 796 ; see Cockrell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 299 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. 1956) (noting that “these ‘subject to’ clauses were made not only as protection against her warranty, but also to incorporate the existing oil, gas and mineral leases, etc. into her

2016Griswold, 459 S.W.3d at 717 (citing Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10 , 299 S.W.2d 672, 676 (1956)). 7 The foundation of Goss’s position on appeal is the assertion the “less, save and except herefrom all oil, gas and other minerals . . .” language appearing in the deed under the heading “reservations from and exceptions to conveyance and warranty,” coupled with the “subject to” language in the deed’s granting clause, is a limitation on the Bells’ warranty of title and not a reservation of the minerals to the Bells.

1990Id. 671 S.W.2d at 872 . “[W]hen there is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause prevails over all other provisions.” 2 Id., citing Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.1963); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342 , 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958).

1990Lott v. Lott , 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1963).

2026Co., the Court determined that the deed conveyed a fee simple, not an easement; there, the deed used the term “premises” in a later clause referring to what was being granted: “[t]o have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises unto the said International Railroad Company, or its assigns, forever.” 49 S.W.2d 437, 438, 440 (Tex. 1932); see also Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. 1940) (“Likewise the clause of general warranty has reference to ‘the said premises,’ meaning the land described in the granting clause, and, but for the last paragraph of the deed retain

2026The warranty clause does not limit the intent to grant a fee.”); see also Duhig, 144 S.W.2d at 879 (general warranty referred to “‘the said premises,’ meaning the land described in the granting clause”).

1990Id. 671 S.W.2d at 872 . “[W]hen there is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause prevails over all other provisions.” 2 Id., citing Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.1963); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342 , 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958).

1990Id. 671 S.W.2d at 872 . “[W]hen there is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause prevails over all other provisions.” 2 Id., citing Lott v. Lott, 370 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex.1963); Waters v. Ellis, 158 Tex. 342 , 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (1958).

2026The Puig Deed employs language traditionally used to create a mineral interest, and the cost-free term in the granting clause distinguishes the royalty interest reserved from a mineral interest that typically bears such costs. 33 See id. (explaining that anti-deduction language does not relieve a royalty valued at the well of postproduction costs “for the simple—and mathematical—reason that there aren’t any postproduction costs to ‘deduct’ when value is determined at the well”); see also Randle, 620 S.W.3d at 393 n.64 (“[N]o-deductions provisions have been construed as surplusage with respect

2023The Texas Supreme Court found it significant that, although the deed’s granting clause did not address the NPRI, the deed contained a subject-to clause providing the grant was “subject to the Reservations from Conveyance and the Exceptions to Conveyance and Warranty.” Id. at 796 .

2026The Puig Deed employs language traditionally used to create a mineral interest, and the cost-free term in the granting clause distinguishes the royalty interest reserved from a mineral interest that typically bears such costs. 33 See id. (explaining that anti-deduction language does not relieve a royalty valued at the well of postproduction costs “for the simple—and mathematical—reason that there aren’t any postproduction costs to ‘deduct’ when value is determined at the well”); see also Randle, 620 S.W.3d at 393 n.64 (“[N]o-deductions provisions have been construed as surplusage with respect

2026The Puig Deed employs language traditionally used to create a mineral interest, and the cost-free term in the granting clause distinguishes the royalty interest reserved from a mineral interest that typically bears such costs. 33 See id. (explaining that anti-deduction language does not relieve a royalty valued at the well of postproduction costs “for the simple—and mathematical—reason that there aren’t any postproduction costs to ‘deduct’ when value is determined at the well”); see also Randle, 620 S.W.3d at 393 n.64 (“[N]o-deductions provisions have been construed as surplusage with respect

2026The Puig Deed employs language traditionally used to create a mineral interest, and the cost-free term in the granting clause distinguishes the royalty interest reserved from a mineral interest that typically bears such costs. 33 See id. (explaining that anti-deduction language does not relieve a royalty valued at the well of postproduction costs “for the simple—and mathematical—reason that there aren’t any postproduction costs to ‘deduct’ when value is determined at the well”); see also Randle, 620 S.W.3d at 393 n.64 (“[N]o-deductions provisions have been construed as surplusage with respect

1996That court held that the reserved interest was a one-sixteenth (1/16th) royalty interest, and, in so doing, focussed specifically on the language in the Deed, subsequent to the granting clause, which, in "plain and definite terms" identified the nature of the interest reserved as a "royalty interest." Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179 , 189 S.W.2d 699, 700 (1945).

2024What typically distinguishes a deed from a quitclaim deed is that “the granting clause in a deed purports to grant and convey the described property, whereas the granting clause in a quitclaim deed only purports to grant and convey whatever ‘right, title, and interest’ the grantor has in that property at the time the instrument is executed and delivered.” Id. at 88–89 (quoting Cook v. Smith, 174 S.W. 1094, 1095 (Tex. 1915); Chicago Title Ins.

2015The facts are strikingly similar to the case at bar, in that the Supreme Court approved both the specific, metes and bounds description and the general blanket descriptions, quoting from Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119 , 174 S.W. 1094, 1095 (1915): “Its manifest purpose was to enlarge both the granting clause of the instrument and the preceding terms of description.

2020The Court acknowledges that Exhibit A is “at least ambiguous, if not completely unenforceable, because it fails to adequately identify the interest assigned, a term that is obviously essential and material to the parties’ agreement.” 10 The Court attempts to reconcile this ambiguity by referring to words in other provisions in the lease, ignoring the directive that the conveyance is described “[only insofar as] set out in Exhibit A.” The Court is correct that our “holistic and harmonizing approach” to deed construction “requires us to consider all of the Assignment’s provisions and prohibits u

2020The Court acknowledges that Exhibit A is “at least ambiguous, if not completely unenforceable, because it fails to adequately identify the interest assigned, a term that is obviously essential and material to the parties’ agreement.” 10 The Court attempts to reconcile this ambiguity by referring to words in other provisions in the lease, ignoring the directive that the conveyance is described “[only insofar as] set out in Exhibit A.” The Court is correct that our “holistic and harmonizing approach” to deed construction “requires us to consider all of the Assignment’s provisions and prohibits u

2020The Court acknowledges that Exhibit A is “at least ambiguous, if not completely unenforceable, because it fails to adequately identify the interest assigned, a term that is obviously essential and material to the parties’ agreement.” 10 The Court attempts to reconcile this ambiguity by referring to words in other provisions in the lease, ignoring the directive that the conveyance is described “[only insofar as] set out in Exhibit A.” The Court is correct that our “holistic and harmonizing approach” to deed construction “requires us to consider all of the Assignment’s provisions and prohibits u

2020See Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016) (“To be enforceable, a contract must address all of its essential and material terms with ‘a reasonable degree of certainty and definiteness.’”) (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. 1955)). 20 But our “holistic and harmonizing approach” to construing deeds and similar documents requires us to consider all of the Assignment’s provisions and prohibits us from giving greater weight to the granting clause or to any other particular types of clauses.

2016See, e.g., Garrett, 299 S.W.2d at 906 (where deed used both the 1/16 fraction and the 1/2 fraction as various times, the court concluded that grantor’s use of a 1/16 fraction was a shorthand expression of the grantor’s intent to convey 1/2 of his 1/8 royalty interest, thereby harmonizing the deed’s use of the conflicting fraction in other provisions in the deed); see also Luckel, 819 S.W.2d at 462 (court applied the “legacy of the l/8th royalty” in determining that the 1/32 fraction used in the granting clause of the deed represented a shorthand way of expressing that grantor intended to conve

2016See Garrett v. Dils Co., 157 Tex. 92 , 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex.1957) (because the granting clause contained a fixed, stated fraction “there would be no doubt as to the interest conveyed .-.. [h]ad other language in the deed not disclosed what the parties understood [the fixed fraction] to mean”).

2017Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986) (citing 1 Thompson on Real Property 51 (1939)). 83 .See King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583 , 192 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1946) ("looking forward from the granting clause and backward from the reservation clause it seems evident that the terms ‘following described land’, 'hereinabove described land’, ‘said land’, and ‘premises’, refer not to the one-half interest actually conveyed,” but instead "refers to the entire land”). 84 .

2015However, in King, this court looked "forward from the granting clause and backward from the reservation clause" to determine the land described. 144 Tex. at 587 , 192 S.W.2d at 263 .

2017Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986) (citing 1 Thompson on Real Property 51 (1939)). 83 .See King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583 , 192 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1946) ("looking forward from the granting clause and backward from the reservation clause it seems evident that the terms ‘following described land’, 'hereinabove described land’, ‘said land’, and ‘premises’, refer not to the one-half interest actually conveyed,” but instead "refers to the entire land”). 84 .

2016The supreme court explained that in Bass , it had “held the granting clause conveyed one-half of the one-eighth royalty because it contained no language limiting the grant to *182 one-half of the interest Bass owned.” Id, “This court then held that the grant of seven-fourteenths of the royalty was subject to the exception of six-fourteenths, leavening [the grantee] with one-fourteenth of the royalty.” Id.

2026Co., 160 S.W.2d 92, 93, 96 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1942, writ ref’d) (holding granting clause conveyed an easement where “right of way” was contained within description of granting clause: “do grant, sell, and convey unto the Gravity Irrigation & Power Company, the following described property, and premises situate in the County of Matagorda, State of Texas, to-wit: . . . 11.25 acres, right-of-way of the eastern lateral across Section X-3, I. & G.N.

2017See Gulf Coast Water Co., 160 S.W.2d at 95 . • The phrase “for a right of way” appears in the granting clause directly in front of phrase “that strip of land,” and at the time the deed was written, the placement of the phrase in the granting clause before the words “that strip of land” would have been understood as limiting the nature of any subsequently described conveyance, Further, specifying that a conveyance was intended to be for a right of way in the granting clause would have trumped any subsequent repugnant recitals in the deed, including the fee simple language in the habendum clause

2023As support for this argument, Lee relies on Veltmann v. Damon, in which a granting clause in a deed conveyed the grantor’s “undivided one-half (1/2) interest” in property subject to a life estate retained by the grantor, but the habendum clause recited that the grantee was to have and to hold all of the property, including the grantor’s spouse’s other undivided one-half interest in the property that was not 30 included in the granting clause. 701 S.W.2d 247 , 247–48 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).

2014By contrast, “if the granting clause conveys a fee title to the property, subsequent recitals, which merely limit the use to which the same may be put, do not restrict the conveyance to an easement.” Stanbery v. Wallace, 45 S.W.2d 198, 199 (Tex.Com.App.1932, holding approved); see also Veltmann v. Damon, 701 S.W.2d 247, 247-48 (Tex.1985) (“It is well-settled that when there is an irreconcilable conflict between clauses of a deed, the granting clause prevails over all other provisions.”).

2021Abest analogizes the Billboard Agreement to the agreement in Vallejo v. Pioneer Oil Company, 744 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam).

1988The Texas Supreme Court in Vallejo v. Pioneer Oil Co., 744 S.W.2d 12 (Tex.1988), reversed our decision and held that since the agreement did not contain a granting clause conferring upon Pioneer a right to possess the premises, the agreement was not a lease.

2026Co., the Court determined that the deed conveyed a fee simple, not an easement; there, the deed used the term “premises” in a later clause referring to what was being granted: “[t]o have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises unto the said International Railroad Company, or its assigns, forever.” 49 S.W.2d 437, 438, 440 (Tex. 1932); see also Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. 1940) (“Likewise the clause of general warranty has reference to ‘the said premises,’ meaning the land described in the granting clause, and, but for the last paragraph of the deed retain

2017Brightwell, 49 S.W.2d at 438 .