25 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1951–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gooding v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Gooding, 529 A.2d at 311 ; see also id. at 306 (stating that such a motion should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just” (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927))). 28 Mr. Edwards’s effort to withdraw his plea. 2023See, e.g., Gooding, 529 A.2d at 311 ; see also id. at 306 (stating that such a motion should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just” (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927))). 28 Mr. Edwards’s effort to withdraw his plea. | 7 | 10 |
Springs v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Presentence motions to withdraw are “regarded more 3 leniently” than post-sentence motions and are “given favorable consideration ‘if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’” White v. United States, 863 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1992)). 2023A presentence motion to withdraw is “regarded more leniently” and should be considered favorably “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” White v. United States, 863 A.2d 839, 841-42 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1992)); Super. | 5 | 5 |
Taylor v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995Appellant moved to withdraw his plea of guilty before sentencing; therefore, the motion is reviewed under a more lenient standard which permits withdrawal “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927), cited in Gooding, supra, 529 A.2d at 306 , and Taylor v. United States, 366 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C.1976) (per curiam). 1987In such cases, a presentence withdrawal motion is regarded much more leniently and should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); see also Taylor v. United States, 366 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C.1976) (per curiam); Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976). | 3 | 4 |
William L. Poole v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997D.C. 71, 75, 250 F.2d 396, 400 (1957)). 1997D.C. 71, 75, 250 F.2d 396, 400 (1957)). | 3 | 3 |
Jordan v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987In such cases, a presentence withdrawal motion is regarded much more leniently and should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); see also Taylor v. United States, 366 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C.1976) (per curiam); Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976). 1987In such cases, a presentence withdrawal motion is regarded much more leniently and should be granted "if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); see also Taylor v. United States, 366 A.2d 444, 447 (D.C.1976) (per curiam); Jordan v. United States, 350 A.2d 735, 737 (D.C.1976). | 3 | 3 |
Kercheval v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Gooding, 529 A.2d at 311 ; see also id. at 306 (stating that such a motion should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just” (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927))). 28 Mr. Edwards’s effort to withdraw his plea. 2003If a motion to withdraw guilty pleas is filed prior to sentencing, 8 the court will permit withdrawal “ ‘if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’ ” Gooding, supra, 529 A.2d at 301 , 306 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). | 2 | 12 |
White v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026Presentence motions to withdraw are “regarded more 3 leniently” than post-sentence motions and are “given favorable consideration ‘if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.’” White v. United States, 863 A.2d 839, 841 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1992)). 2023A presentence motion to withdraw is “regarded more leniently” and should be considered favorably “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” White v. United States, 863 A.2d 839, 841-42 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C. 1992)); Super. | 2 | 2 |
Pettiford v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002When a motion to withdraw is made prior to sentencing, as it was here, the motion should be granted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 2002When a motion to withdraw is made prior to sentencing, as it was here, the motion should be granted "if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Id. (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Binion v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007Menna and Blackledge do not dictate that in this circumstance the defendant must be able to bring a freestanding appeal of the competency determination as though he had never pled guilty. 8 .See Edwards v. United States, 766 A.2d 981 , 988 n. 10 (D.C.2001) (noting that a post- *763 sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under the stringent "manifest injustice” standard rather than under the more liberal "if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just” standard applicable to a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea); Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, 1997Because appellant here moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing, "the motion is reviewed under a more lenient standard which permits withdrawal `if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.'" Id. at 191 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 , 47 S.Ct. 582 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927)). [8] "`Leave to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing should be freely allowed.'" Gooding, supra note 8, 529 A.2d at 306 (quoting Poole v. United States, 102 U.S.App. | 1 | 2 |
Carmichael v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007We have held that “[i]f it appears that a defendant [who has filed a Rule 32(e) motion] ... did not knowingly plead, then 'manifest injustice' warranting withdrawal of the plea will generally be found.” Carmichael, 479 A.2d at 327 . 2004While motions to withdraw a guilty plea which are made after sentencing are subject to the “manifest injustice” standard of 32(e) of the Superior Court Criminal Rules, Morrison v. United States, 579 A.2d 686, 689 (D.C.1990) (quoting Carmichael v. United States, 479 A.2d 325, 327 (D.C.1984)), a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentencing is regarded more leniently and is given favorable consideration “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1992) (quoting Gooding v. United, States, 529 A.2d 301, 306 (D.C.1987 | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Walter I. Joslingreen2 sentences1982Jordan v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 735, 737 (1976); accord, Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 444, 447 (1976); Bettis v. United States, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 190, 195 (1974); United States v. Joslin, supra at 257, 434 F.2d at 531 , and the motion will be granted if "the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). 1982Jordan v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 735, 737 (1976); accord, Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 444, 447 (1976); Bettis v. United States, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 190, 195 (1974); United States v. Joslin, supra at 257, 434 F.2d at 531 , and the motion will be granted if “the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). | 1 | 2 |
Butler v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2015A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e); if, as here, a motion is filed before sentencing, withdrawal will be permitted “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Butler v. United States, 836 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004While motions to withdraw a guilty plea which are made after sentencing are subject to the “manifest injustice” standard of 32(e) of the Superior Court Criminal Rules, Morrison v. United States, 579 A.2d 686, 689 (D.C.1990) (quoting Carmichael v. United States, 479 A.2d 325, 327 (D.C.1984)), a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentencing is regarded more leniently and is given favorable consideration “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Springs v. United States, 614 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1992) (quoting Gooding v. United, States, 529 A.2d 301, 306 (D.C.1987 | 1 | 1 |
Bettis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982Jordan v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 735, 737 (1976); accord, Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 444, 447 (1976); Bettis v. United States, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 190, 195 (1974); United States v. Joslin, supra at 257, 434 F.2d at 531 , and the motion will be granted if "the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). 1982Jordan v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 735, 737 (1976); accord, Taylor v. United States, D.C.App., 366 A.2d 444, 447 (1976); Bettis v. United States, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 190, 195 (1974); United States v. Joslin, supra at 257, 434 F.2d at 531 , and the motion will be granted if “the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 , 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 , 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927). | 1 | 1 |
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commissiongreen2 sentences1981See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S.Ct. 279, 283 , 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Dobbs v. Neverson, D.C. 1981See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S.Ct. 279, 283 , 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Dobbs v. Neverson, D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Frankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ahmadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leichtfussgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. J. Frank Hancockgreen1 sentence1975See also United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 253 , 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) [“ . . . it is settled that this motion. [for disclosure of the government’s trial witnesses] was addressed to the discretion of the trial court. . . . ”]; United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 987 , 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 , 92 S.Ct. 81 , 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971) [“Apart from the Con-gressionally created exception in capital case | 1 | 1 |
cluster 299357green1 sentence1975See also United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 253 , 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) [“ . . . it is settled that this motion. [for disclosure of the government’s trial witnesses] was addressed to the discretion of the trial court. . . . ”]; United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 987 , 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 , 92 S.Ct. 81 , 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971) [“Apart from the Con-gressionally created exception in capital case | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Richard H. Murphygreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Blackburn Jacksongreen1 sentence1975Ill.1974) (Memorandum Opinion per Marshall, J.), aff'd on this ground, 508 F.2d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moceri, 359 F.Supp. 431, 434-45 (N.D.Ohio 1973); United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186, 191 (M.D.Pa.1971); United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F.Supp. 723, 732 (N.D.Ill. 1971); United States v. frank, 23 F.R.D. 145, 146 (D.D.C.1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Higdon v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Mocerigreen1 sentence1975Ill.1974) (Memorandum Opinion per Marshall, J.), aff'd on this ground, 508 F.2d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moceri, 359 F.Supp. 431, 434-45 (N.D.Ohio 1973); United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186, 191 (M.D.Pa.1971); United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F.Supp. 723, 732 (N.D.Ill. 1971); United States v. frank, 23 F.R.D. 145, 146 (D.D.C.1959). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kadrmas v. Sauvageau
green
2 sentences2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Edwards v. United States
green
1 sentence2007Menna and Blackledge do not dictate that in this circumstance the defendant must be able to bring a freestanding appeal of the competency determination as though he had never pled guilty. 8 .See Edwards v. United States, 766 A.2d 981 , 988 n. 10 (D.C.2001) (noting that a post- *763 sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed under the stringent "manifest injustice” standard rather than under the more liberal "if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just” standard applicable to a pre-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea); Binion v. United States, 658 A.2d 187, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Pierce v. United States
green
1 sentence2000A motion to withdraw a guilty plea made before sentence is regarded more leniently and should be given favorable consideration “if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Pierce, 705 A.2d at 1092 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dobbs v. Neverson
green
1 sentence1981See Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 , 31 S.Ct. 279, 283 , 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Dobbs v. Neverson, D.C.App., 393 A.2d 147 , 155 n.14 (1978). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Durante v. United States
green
1 sentence1976The Supreme Court observed: “The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” (Id. at 224, 47 S.Ct. at 583 : citations omitted.) Kercheval , as appellant points out, has been read as calling for a somewhat receptive attitude toward motions to withdraw guilty pleas if filed before sentencing. 4 Durante v. United States, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 321 (1973); Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270 , 272 F.2d 499 (1959); United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
John A. Gearhart v. United States
green
1 sentence1976The Supreme Court observed: “The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” (Id. at 224, 47 S.Ct. at 583 : citations omitted.) Kercheval , as appellant points out, has been read as calling for a somewhat receptive attitude toward motions to withdraw guilty pleas if filed before sentencing. 4 Durante v. United States, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 321 (1973); Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270 , 272 F.2d 499 (1959); United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Leonard Young
green
1 sentence1976The Supreme Court observed: “The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” (Id. at 224, 47 S.Ct. at 583 : citations omitted.) Kercheval , as appellant points out, has been read as calling for a somewhat receptive attitude toward motions to withdraw guilty pleas if filed before sentencing. 4 Durante v. United States, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 321 (1973); Gearhart v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 270 , 272 F.2d 499 (1959); United States v. Young, 424 F.2d 1276 (3 | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Electronic Components for Industry Co. v. Electronic Communications, Inc.
green
1 sentence1975See also United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 253 , 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) [“ . . . it is settled that this motion. [for disclosure of the government’s trial witnesses] was addressed to the discretion of the trial court. . . . ”]; United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 987 , 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 , 92 S.Ct. 81 , 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971) [“Apart from the Con-gressionally created exception in capital case | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lopez v. United States
green
1 sentence1975See also United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 253 , 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) [“ . . . it is settled that this motion. [for disclosure of the government’s trial witnesses] was addressed to the discretion of the trial court. . . . ”]; United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 987 , 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 , 92 S.Ct. 81 , 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971) [“Apart from the Con-gressionally created exception in capital case | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Huffman v. Moore green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State Ex Rel. Lyon v. State Warehouse Commission
green
1 sentence1975See also United States v. Murphy, 480 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 912 , 94 S.Ct. 253 , 38 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973) [“ . . . it is settled that this motion. [for disclosure of the government’s trial witnesses] was addressed to the discretion of the trial court. . . . ”]; United States v. Cole, 449 F.2d 194, 198 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 931 , 92 S.Ct. 987 , 30 L.Ed.2d 806 (1972); United States v. Hancock, 441 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 , 92 S.Ct. 81 , 30 L.Ed.2d 63 (1971) [“Apart from the Con-gressionally created exception in capital case | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Bergen v. United States green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.