28 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1866–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Webster Oil Co. v. McLean Hotels, Inc.green2 sentences2020“This is done, according to Missouri statutes, by use of the words ‘grant, bargain and sell’ in the granting clause of the deed by which title to real estate is conveyed.” Webster Oil Co., 8 878 S.W.2d at 894 ; see also § 442.420.8 Additionally, the Right of Way was described repeatedly in the 1901 deed as “a strip of land.” “The language ‘strip of land’ is indicative of the conveyance of a fee simple absolute.” Homan v. Hutchison, 817 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). 2012Id. | 1 | 3 |
Franck Bros., Inc. v. Rosegreen2 sentences1964In Franck Bros. v. Rose, Mo.Sup., 301 S.W.2d 806 , the following language was- used to-describe a roadway: “ * * * a roadway, 15 feet wide [through described land] where now located, connecting with Shepard County Road.” In considering the granting clause this Court said, l. c. 811: “The obvious purpose of the clause in question was to give to the owner of Lot 3 a right of ingress and egress, over an existing private road, from said Lot 3 to Shepard County Road.” Much less definite granting clauses than the instant one have been held to refer to a presently existing roadway. 1964In Franck Bros. v. Rose, Mo.Sup., 301 S.W.2d 806 , the following language was used to describe a roadway: "* * * a roadway, 15 feet wide [through described land] where now located, connecting with Shepard County Road." In considering the granting clause this Court said, l. c. 811: "The obvious purpose of the clause in question was to give to the owner of Lot 3 a right of ingress and egress, over an existing private road, from said Lot 3 to Shepard County Road." Much less definite granting clauses than the instant one have been held to refer to a presently existing roadway. | 1 | 2 |
Nigro v. Ashleygreen2 sentences2020We also find that the 1901 deed conveyed the Right of Way for valuable consideration without limitation upon the interest being transferred. “[T]o convey a fee simple title in land to a railroad, two elements must appear: first, the land must be conveyed for valuable consideration, and, second, no limitation on the quantum of the interest conveyed may appear in the deed by which title is transferred.” Nigro v. Ashley, 690 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Mo. App. W.D. 1984); see also Schuermann Enters., Inc. v. St. 2020Although the 1901 deed was titled “Deed of Right of Ways,” “[l]abeling a person’s interest as a ‘railroad right-of-way’ does not mean the holder has but a mere easement.” Nigro, 690 S.W.2d at 418 . | 1 | 1 |
Homan v. Hutchisongreen1 sentence2020“This is done, according to Missouri statutes, by use of the words ‘grant, bargain and sell’ in the granting clause of the deed by which title to real estate is conveyed.” Webster Oil Co., 8 878 S.W.2d at 894 ; see also § 442.420.8 Additionally, the Right of Way was described repeatedly in the 1901 deed as “a strip of land.” “The language ‘strip of land’ is indicative of the conveyance of a fee simple absolute.” Homan v. Hutchison, 817 S.W.2d 944, 949 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Nixon v. Franklingreen1 sentence2003Moreover, Appellants note, the granting clause used the words “grant, bargain and sell,” which represent the vesting of fee simple title, § 442.420; 5 Nixon v. Franklin, 289 S.W.2d 82, 88 (Mo.1956), and the deed also explicitly stated that the title was “subject to” a road “easement.” Robert Jackson Real Estate is particularly instructive on this point. | 1 | 1 |
Tindall v. Tindallgreen2 sentences2002And, with particular reference to the adverb “then,” our high court in Tindall had occasion to consider a conveyance that contained in the granting clause the language “to the said Lusina ‘for and during her natural life, and then to the issue of her body, forever after.’ ” Tindall, 66 S.W. at 1093 . 2002They relate to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not to the time of the vesting of the interest.” Id. at 1094; see also Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632 , 158 S.W. 19, 22 (1913) (the word “then” introducing the phrase designating the remaindermen, “or an equivalent expression, is usually employed in a grant of this kind, and the effect is to denote the time when the remaindermen are to have possession, not to postpone the vesting of their interests.”). | 1 | 1 |
Heady v. Hollmangreen2 sentences2002They relate to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not to the time of the vesting of the interest.” Id. at 1094; see also Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632 , 158 S.W. 19, 22 (1913) (the word “then” introducing the phrase designating the remaindermen, “or an equivalent expression, is usually employed in a grant of this kind, and the effect is to denote the time when the remaindermen are to have possession, not to postpone the vesting of their interests.”). 2002They relate to the time of the enjoyment of the estate, and not to the time of the vesting of the interest.” Id. at 1094; see also Heady v. Hollman, 251 Mo. 632 , 158 S.W. 19, 22 (1913) (the word “then” introducing the phrase designating the remaindermen, “or an equivalent expression, is usually employed in a grant of this kind, and the effect is to denote the time when the remaindermen are to have possession, not to postpone the vesting of their interests.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hartline v. Hambrickgreen1 sentence1999See also, U.S. v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10 th Cir. en banc 1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 2371 , 144 L.Ed.2d 775 , (court en banc rejected similar argument and found agreement with prosecutor was not against public policy). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sonya Evette Singleton, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Amicus Curiaegreen1 sentence1999See also, U.S. v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10 th Cir. en banc 1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 2371 , 144 L.Ed.2d 775 , (court en banc rejected similar argument and found agreement with prosecutor was not against public policy). | 1 | 1 |
Frank v. Wabash Railroad Companygreen1 sentence1993Frank v. Wabash Railroad Company, 295 S.W.2d 16, 20 [3] (Mo.1956). | 1 | 1 |
City of Columbia v. Baurichtergreen1 sentence1991Columbia v. Baurichter, 729 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Mo.App.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Pike v. Menzgreen1 sentence1985Pike v. Menz, 218 S.W.2d 575, 578 (Mo.1949). | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Carrongreen1 sentence1985In a case tried to the court, the scope of our review is set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo.1976) (en bane). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Fergusongreen2 sentences1967To do so, the subsequent clause must be equally as clear as the granting clause, so that all clauses in the deed can be harmonized.” See also Clark v. Ferguson, 346 Mo. 933 , 144 S.W.2d 116, 118 [6-8]. 1967To do so, the subsequent clause must be equally as clear as the granting clause, so that all clauses in the deed can be harmonized.” See also Clark v. Ferguson, 346 Mo. 933 , 144 S.W.2d 116, 118 [6-8]. | 1 | 1 |
Rosenbloom v. Grossmangreen2 sentences1964Rosenbloom v. Grossman, Mo.Sup., 351 S.W.2d 735, 738, 739 ; Whitelaw v. Rodney, supra. Under the facts of this case we consider that the purpose of the granting claúse was to give the owners of the landlocked farm, their heirs and assigns, a right of ingress and egress over an existing, established private road with a definite course and route between the farm and the public highway. 1964Rosenbloom v. Grossman, Mo.Sup., 351 S.W.2d 735, 738, 739 ; Whitelaw v. Rodney, supra. Under the facts of this case we consider that the purpose of the granting clause was to give the owners of the landlocked farm, their heirs and assigns, a right of ingress and egress over an existing, established private road with a definite course and route between the farm and the public highway. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Utter v. Sidman
green
2 sentences1925The granting clause must control over the habendum and warranty clauses where there is a necessary repugnance between them. [Devlin on Deeds (3 Ed.), sec. 214, p. 309.] In Missouri, the rule is that qualifying words in *372 the habendum, clause will be held to lessen, enlarge, explain or qualify the estate granted, unless there is a necessary repugnance between the grant and the habendum. [Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 .] But where the grant is to certain persons the habendum clause will not be allowed to change the grantees, unless such intention is to be gathered from the instrument as a whol 1913When the nature of the title intended to be conveyed is, by the granting clause or the description of the property, rendered doubtful, the habendum clause of the deed may be considered in arriving at the intent of the parties. [Rines v. Mansfield, 96 Mo. 394 , l. c. 399; Linville v. Greer, 165 Mo. 380 , l. c. 397; Utter v. Sidman, 170 Mo. 284 , l. c. 292.] The habendum in this deed expressly states an intention to convey all the title Mrs. Martin possessed. | 3 | 1909–1925 |
La Near v. Citimortgage, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024But, typically, the intent to convey an indefeasible estate in fee simple “is done by using the words ‘grant, bargain, 3 We also reject the arguments by Appellants that similarly rely on extrinsic evidence in their attempt to show that the Hoenshels intended to convey an easement. 6 and sell’ in the granting clause of the deed.” La Near v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 236 , 241 n.6 (Mo.App. 2012). 2024The problem with Empire’s reliance on “remise, release and forever quit claim” is that “[s]uch words are not sufficient to establish the grantor’s intent to convey indefeasible estate in fee simple.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Sabine v. Leonard
green
1 sentence1988Section 442.430 stated: “Where a grantor, by the terms of his deed, undertakes to convey to the grantee an indefeasible estate in fee simple absolute, and shall not, at the time of such conveyance, have the legal title to the estate sought to be conveyed, but shall afterward acquire it, the legal estate subsequently acquired by him shall immediately pass to the grantee; and such conveyance shall be as effective as though such legal estate had been in the grantor at the time of the conveyance.” In Sabine , the Supreme Court of Missouri said: “We have repeatedly held that [§§ 442.420 and 442.430 | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Bolomey v. Houchins
green
2 sentences1964Thus, in Bolomey v. Houchins, Mo.App., 227 S.W.2d 752 , the grantor-testator used this language: “the right of way through said tract of land.” In spite of the indefiniténess of this description the St. 1964Thus, in Bolomey v. Houchins, Mo.App., 227 S.W.2d 752 , the grantor-testator used this language: "the right of way through said tract of land." In spite of the indefiniteness of this description the St. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Studdard v. Wells
neutral
2 sentences1938"A `right of way' in its legal and generally accepted meaning in reference to a railroad company's interest in land is a mere easement for railroad purposes in the lands of others." [51 C.J., sec. 203, p. 539.] To support the contention that the right of way deeds here concerned conveyed an indefeasable fee, notwithstanding the language, "as and for a right of way for said railway," defendants cite Section 3106, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 3106, p. 1932), and Studdard v. Wells, 120 Mo. 25 , 25 S.W. 201 ; Morrill v. Wabash, St. 1938"A `right of way' in its legal and generally accepted meaning in reference to a railroad company's interest in land is a mere easement for railroad purposes in the lands of others." [51 C.J., sec. 203, p. 539.] To support the contention that the right of way deeds here concerned conveyed an indefeasable fee, notwithstanding the language, "as and for a right of way for said railway," defendants cite Section 3106, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., sec. 3106, p. 1932), and Studdard v. Wells, 120 Mo. 25 , 25 S.W. 201 ; Morrill v. Wabash, St. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Miller v. Bayless
neutral
2 sentences1915The warranty deed Which the plaintiff contends is a special one, but which the defendant asserts is general, contains in the granting clause thereof that the grantors, the defendant and his wife, “do by these present, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm.” The habendum clause is as follows: “To have and to hold the'premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rig'hts, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, unto the said party of the second part, and unto her heirs and assigns forever; the said Robert Boram and Elizabeth Boram hereby cove 1915The warranty deed Which the plaintiff contends is a special one, but which the defendant asserts is general, contains in the granting clause thereof that the grantors, the defendant and his wife, “do by these present, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm.” The habendum clause is as follows: “To have and to hold the'premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rig'hts, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, unto the said party of the second part, and unto her heirs and assigns forever; the said Robert Boram and Elizabeth Boram hereby cove | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Tracy v. Greffet
neutral
1 sentence1915The warranty deed Which the plaintiff contends is a special one, but which the defendant asserts is general, contains in the granting clause thereof that the grantors, the defendant and his wife, “do by these present, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm.” The habendum clause is as follows: “To have and to hold the'premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rig'hts, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, unto the said party of the second part, and unto her heirs and assigns forever; the said Robert Boram and Elizabeth Boram hereby cove | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Alexander v. Schreiber
neutral
1 sentence1915The warranty deed Which the plaintiff contends is a special one, but which the defendant asserts is general, contains in the granting clause thereof that the grantors, the defendant and his wife, “do by these present, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm.” The habendum clause is as follows: “To have and to hold the'premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rig'hts, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, unto the said party of the second part, and unto her heirs and assigns forever; the said Robert Boram and Elizabeth Boram hereby cove | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Collier v. Gamble ex rel. McCabe
neutral
1 sentence1915The warranty deed Which the plaintiff contends is a special one, but which the defendant asserts is general, contains in the granting clause thereof that the grantors, the defendant and his wife, “do by these present, grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm.” The habendum clause is as follows: “To have and to hold the'premises aforesaid, with all and singular the rig'hts, privileges, appurtenances and immunities thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining, unto the said party of the second part, and unto her heirs and assigns forever; the said Robert Boram and Elizabeth Boram hereby cove | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Carter v. Foster
green
1 sentence1914Another well-known rule for construing instruments that are susceptible of more than one meahing is the construction which is placed upon such instru ments by the immediate parties thereto. [Carter v. Foster, 145 Mo. 383 ; Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 251 Mo. 693 , l. c. 706.] It is apparent that Charles U. Warne, the ancestor of the parties to this action, understood that the deed of the trustee conveyed a vested remainder to all of his children, because his will, after bequeathing to his children one dollar each without naming them, uses this language: “their interest in the home farm of one hu | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Schmidt v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1914We cite only one case. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. l. c. 79 et seq.] From one discern all. (2) But running parallel with a line of cases on all-fours with the Murphy case, supra, is another line of railroad negligence cases announcing this proposition: Granting defendant’s, negligence in outlook, signals, slacking or stopping, yet where the injured party who is sui juris negligently moves from a place of safety to a place of danger so close before the engine or car that by ordinary care his injury cannot be averted, then there is no room for the play of the humanity doctrine: contra, the doct | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1914We cite only one case. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. l. c. 79 et seq.] From one discern all. (2) But running parallel with a line of cases on all-fours with the Murphy case, supra, is another line of railroad negligence cases announcing this proposition: Granting defendant’s, negligence in outlook, signals, slacking or stopping, yet where the injured party who is sui juris negligently moves from a place of safety to a place of danger so close before the engine or car that by ordinary care his injury cannot be averted, then there is no room for the play of the humanity doctrine: contra, the doct | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Stotler v. Chicago & Alton Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1914We cite only one case. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. l. c. 79 et seq.] From one discern all. (2) But running parallel with a line of cases on all-fours with the Murphy case, supra, is another line of railroad negligence cases announcing this proposition: Granting defendant’s, negligence in outlook, signals, slacking or stopping, yet where the injured party who is sui juris negligently moves from a place of safety to a place of danger so close before the engine or car that by ordinary care his injury cannot be averted, then there is no room for the play of the humanity doctrine: contra, the doct | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| McGee v. Wabash Railroad green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Bennett v. Terminal Railroad neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Burge v. Wabash Railroad
green
1 sentence1914We cite only one case. [Murphy v. Railroad, 228 Mo. l. c. 79 et seq.] From one discern all. (2) But running parallel with a line of cases on all-fours with the Murphy case, supra, is another line of railroad negligence cases announcing this proposition: Granting defendant’s, negligence in outlook, signals, slacking or stopping, yet where the injured party who is sui juris negligently moves from a place of safety to a place of danger so close before the engine or car that by ordinary care his injury cannot be averted, then there is no room for the play of the humanity doctrine: contra, the doct | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Laun v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad neutral | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Rollison v. Wabash Railroad green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Blumenthal v. Blumenthal
green
1 sentence1914Another well-known rule for construing instruments that are susceptible of more than one meahing is the construction which is placed upon such instru ments by the immediate parties thereto. [Carter v. Foster, 145 Mo. 383 ; Blumenthal v. Blumenthal, 251 Mo. 693 , l. c. 706.] It is apparent that Charles U. Warne, the ancestor of the parties to this action, understood that the deed of the trustee conveyed a vested remainder to all of his children, because his will, after bequeathing to his children one dollar each without naming them, uses this language: “their interest in the home farm of one hu | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Rines v. Mansfield green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Linville v. Greer neutral | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Hunter v. Patterson neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Hall v. French neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Chew v. Kellar neutral | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Lehndorf v. Cope green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Hart v. Leete neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Harrison v. McReynolds green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Wilson v. Frost green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Chew v. Keller green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Flesh v. Lindsay neutral | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Murphy v. Gabbert green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
| Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad v. Frowein neutral | 1 | 1901–1901 |
| City of Kansas v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad neutral | 1 | 1883–1883 |
| Platt v. . Lott green | 1 | 1866–1866 |
| Wilkes & Fontaine v. Ferris green | 1 | 1866–1866 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.