granting clause in Georgia

1931Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, ‘her heirs and assigns/ and the habendum clause was, ‘to have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike/ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” In that case it was also held that the children in life at the time of the execution of the deed took under the deed.

1931Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, ‘her heirs and assigns/ and the habendum clause was, ‘to have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike/ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” In that case it was also held that the children in life at the time of the execution of the deed took under the deed.

1983No motion was made by the defense that it needed additional time for investigation with reference to the so-called granting of immunity, and we find no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 , supra. We find no *290 reversible error in this complaint. 3.

1980While the case of McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711 ( 132 SE 547 ) (1925) is distinguishable on its facts, its general statement of law that the granting clause of the deed controls other clauses is contrary to the above-mentioned authority and should not be followed.

1980While the case of McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711 ( 132 SE 547 ) (1925) is distinguishable on its facts, its general statement of law that the granting clause of the deed controls other clauses is contrary to the above-mentioned authority and should not be followed.

1951Grant v. Haymes, 164 Ga. 371 ( 138 S. E. 892 ).

1951Grant v. Haymes, 164 Ga. 371 ( 138 S. E. 892 ).

1951Iowa Farm and Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903 ( 241 N. W. 475 ); Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96 ( 153 Atl. 24 ).

1951Iowa Farm and Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903 ( 241 N. W. 475 ); Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96 ( 153 Atl. 24 ).

1951Iowa Farm and Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903 ( 241 N. W. 475 ); Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96 ( 153 Atl. 24 ).

1951Iowa Farm and Credit Corp. v. Halligan, 214 Iowa 903 ( 241 N. W. 475 ); Harman v. Hurst, 160 Md. 96 ( 153 Atl. 24 ).

1934In such a case the appointee holds at the pleasure of the appointing power, although it attempts to fix a definite term; and no formalities such as the preferring of charges or the granting of a hearing to the incumbent are necessary to the lawful exercise of the authority of removal.” Or the decision in City Council of Augusta v. Sweeney, 44 Ga. 463 (9 Am.

1934In Butt v. Jackson, 148 Ga. 672 ( 97 S. E. 854 ), it was held: “A deed executed in 1908, granting certain land to the wife of the grantor and his children by her born and to be born, their heirs and assigns/ upon the expressed consideration of the love and affection the grantor bore to his wife and his children by her, and $500 paid to the grantor, conveyed an absolute fee in common to the wife and her children by the grantor, then in life.” It follows that the court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss on general demurrer based upon the ground that the plaintiff showed no title in hersel

1934In Butt v. Jackson, 148 Ga. 672 ( 97 S. E. 854 ), it was held: “A deed executed in 1908, granting certain land to the wife of the grantor and his children by her born and to be born, their heirs and assigns/ upon the expressed consideration of the love and affection the grantor bore to his wife and his children by her, and $500 paid to the grantor, conveyed an absolute fee in common to the wife and her children by the grantor, then in life.” It follows that the court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss on general demurrer based upon the ground that the plaintiff showed no title in hersel

1934In Powers v. Ga. Fla. Grocery Co., 7 Ga. App. 592 , ( 67 S. E. 685 ), the instrument construed to be a mortgage had the word “mortgage” in the granting clause. 2.

1934In Powers v. Ga. Fla. Grocery Co., 7 Ga. App. 592 , ( 67 S. E. 685 ), the instrument construed to be a mortgage had the word “mortgage” in the granting clause. 2.

1932The first part of the granting clause conveyed an estate in the trees and timber, defeasible upon the failure to remove the same within the time specified (Jones v. Graham, 141 Ga. 60 , 80 S. E. 7 ), while the provision as to “license and privilege” was intended merely to assure such license and privilege for the period stated.

1932The first part of the granting clause conveyed an estate in the trees and timber, defeasible upon the failure to remove the same within the time specified (Jones v. Graham, 141 Ga. 60 , 80 S. E. 7 ), while the provision as to “license and privilege” was intended merely to assure such license and privilege for the period stated.

1931Ewing v. Shropshire, 80 Ga. 374 .

1927Silman, administrator as aforesaid,-in consideration of the sum of,” etc., “has granted, . . and sold, and by these presents does grant, . . sell,” etc., “unto John S. Weatherly for the use, benefit, and advantage in trust for said Bhoda A. Weatherly for life, for her separate use, and on her decease to such child or-children, or the representative of her child or children, the issue of the marriage of the said John S. and Rhoda A., as she may leave in life, . . an undivided half interest in and to a tract of land,” etc. And in the habendum clause is this language: “To have and to hold the abo

1927Silman, administrator as aforesaid,-in consideration of the sum of,” etc., “has granted, . . and sold, and by these presents does grant, . . sell,” etc., “unto John S. Weatherly for the use, benefit, and advantage in trust for said Bhoda A. Weatherly for life, for her separate use, and on her decease to such child or-children, or the representative of her child or children, the issue of the marriage of the said John S. and Rhoda A., as she may leave in life, . . an undivided half interest in and to a tract of land,” etc. And in the habendum clause is this language: “To have and to hold the abo

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1923Co., 129 Ga. 377 ( 58 S. E. 862 ), it was held: “Where the granting clause of a deed set out a grant to a woman, Tier heirs and assigns,’ and the habendum clause was To have and to hold . . unto the said [woman], her heirs and assigns forever, in fee simple, and after her death to such child or children as she may have by [a named man], share and share alike,’ such deed created a life-estate in the woman, with remainder to such children as she might have by the man named.” See also Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107 ( 23 S. E. 392 ); Collinsville Granite Co. v. Phillips, 123 Ga. 830 (51 S. E. 666);

1914Parker v. Smith, 140 Ga. 789 ( 80 S. E. 12 ).

1914Parker v. Smith, 140 Ga. 789 ( 80 S. E. 12 ).

1913An estate upon condition can not be created by deed, except when the terms of the grant will admit of no other reasonable interpretation.” In Webb v. Webb’s Heirs, 29 Ala. 588, 606 , the court said: “The granting clause determines the interest intended to be conveyed, and prevails over the introductory statement.

1902Co. v. Lippman, 110 Ga. 665 , it could not by express contract relieve itself from liability for negligence to a passenger whom it might undertake to transport on one of its freight-trains, and because the agreement that it should be relieved from such liability was the consideration of its having accorded the plaintiff the privilege of riding on freight-trains, the granting of that privilege was not binding upon it, and might be revoked at any time upon proper notice to tbe holder of the ticket.

1901See Vaughn v. State, 88 Ga. 732 ; Boston v. State, 94 Ga. 590 ; Sharp v. State, 111 Ga. 176 ; Knox v. State, 112 Ga. 373 . 9.