granting clause in Oklahoma

2015Reservations of mineral interests "need not be expressed in the granting clause of the deed, but may be contained in the warranty clause, the habendum, or the redeendum clause, or, as we have said, within the four corners of the instrument." Id.

2015Reservations of mineral interests "need not be expressed in the granting clause of the deed, but may be contained in the warranty clause, the habendum, or the redeendum clause, or, as we have said, within the four corners of the instrument." Id. ¶8 Based on the foregoing, we hold the deed conveying "an undivided one-half (½) interest in and to all of the oil and gas interests and royalties, and any and all other mineral interests which may be owned by Circle F Ranch, Inc.," conveyed one-half (½) of Grantor's one-half (½) mineral interest (or a one-fourth (¼) mineral interest) to Grantee.

1957In the cited case, we held: “The intention of the parties to a conveyance of mineral rights must be deduced from the provisions thereof considered as a whole, and every provision must be construed, if possible, so as to be consistent with every other provision and to give effect to all such provisions.” Under the modern rule, more or less consistently followed by this court since its specific adoption in Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okl. 74 , 17 P.2d 688 , and reiteration in Westcott v. Bozarth, 202 Okl. 149 , 211 P.2d 258 , the granting clause of the instrument in question strongly indicating t

1957In the cited case, we held: “The intention of the parties to a conveyance of mineral rights must be deduced from the provisions thereof considered as a whole, and every provision must be construed, if possible, so as to be consistent with every other provision and to give effect to all such provisions.” Under the modern rule, more or less consistently followed by this court since its specific adoption in Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okl. 74 , 17 P.2d 688 , and reiteration in Westcott v. Bozarth, 202 Okl. 149 , 211 P.2d 258 , the granting clause of the instrument in question strongly indicating t

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1957In the cited case, we held: “The intention of the parties to a conveyance of mineral rights must be deduced from the provisions thereof considered as a whole, and every provision must be construed, if possible, so as to be consistent with every other provision and to give effect to all such provisions.” Under the modern rule, more or less consistently followed by this court since its specific adoption in Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okl. 74 , 17 P.2d 688 , and reiteration in Westcott v. Bozarth, 202 Okl. 149 , 211 P.2d 258 , the granting clause of the instrument in question strongly indicating t

1957In the cited case, we held: “The intention of the parties to a conveyance of mineral rights must be deduced from the provisions thereof considered as a whole, and every provision must be construed, if possible, so as to be consistent with every other provision and to give effect to all such provisions.” Under the modern rule, more or less consistently followed by this court since its specific adoption in Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okl. 74 , 17 P.2d 688 , and reiteration in Westcott v. Bozarth, 202 Okl. 149 , 211 P.2d 258 , the granting clause of the instrument in question strongly indicating t

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1952Jur., Deeds, §237, p. 571, the author states: “In other words, the doctrine which regarded the granting clause, the habendum, and the tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its special function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks to the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grant- or or regard as very material t

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1952Jur., Deeds, §237, p. 571, the author states: “In other words, the doctrine which regarded the granting clause, the habendum, and the tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its special function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks to the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grant- or or regard as very material t

1956While, under the modern rule, the courts, in determining the extent or quantity of the estate conveyed by a particular deed, are limited neither to its granting clause or habendum clause, see the authorities in Colonial Royalties Co. v. Keener, Okl., 266 P.2d 467, 470 ; Higgins v. Oklahoma City, 191 Okl. 16 , 127 P.2d 845 , it is only where the instrument is ambiguous, and there is a direct conflict in the wording of the granting clause and some other repugnant portion of the instrument containing words expressly limiting the estate described in the granting clause, that there is valid ground,

1956We demonstrated in Colonial Royalties Co. v. Keener, supra, that the insertion of such language in a deed, under the rules applied by this court, effectively limits, defines or circumscribes a larger fractional interest appearing in the granting clause.

2015Spane seeks to raise an issue for the first time on appeal-whether article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution "prohibits the granting of immunity to private entities." 6 Spane requests that this Court grant leave to allow her to file a supplemental brief on this issue, which she asserts "is a new issue which surfaced in" Coates v. Fallin, 2013 OK 108 , 316 P.3d 924 , a case decided during the pendency of this appeal.

2015Spane seeks to raise an issue for the first time on appeal-whether article 5, section 51 of the Oklahoma Constitution "prohibits the granting of immunity to private entities." 6 Spane requests that this Court grant leave to allow her to file a supplemental brief on this issue, which she asserts "is a new issue which surfaced in" Coates v. Fallin, 2013 OK 108 , 316 P.3d 924 , a case decided during the pendency of this appeal.

2011Alexander v. Alexander, 1975 OK 101 , 538 P.2d 200 (where court held that a nephew and niece's failure to exercise dominion and control over a joint tenancy account created with the decedent, did not destroy the right of survivorship). [5] Likewise, the inclusion of the *51 term "heretofore" in the Contract's granting clause is not sufficient to defeat the contracting parties' expressed intent.

2011Alexander v. Alexander, 1975 OK 101 , 538 P.2d 200 (where court held that a nephew and niece's failure to exercise dominion and control over a joint tenancy account created with the decedent, did not destroy the right of survivorship). [5] Likewise, the inclusion of the *51 term "heretofore" in the Contract's granting clause is not sufficient to defeat the contracting parties' expressed intent.

2011Toma, 2007 OK 52, ¶ 11 , 163 P.3d at 544 .

2011Toma, 2007 OK 52, ¶ 11 , 163 P.3d at 544 .

1975Briggs v. Waggoner, Okl., 375 P.2d 896 (1962).

1971Briggs v. Waggoner, Okl., 375 P.2d 896 (1962).

1952Jur., Deeds, §237, p. 571, the author states: “In other words, the doctrine which regarded the granting clause, the habendum, and the tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its special function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks to the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grant- or or regard as very material t

1952Jur., Deeds, §237, p. 571, the author states: “In other words, the doctrine which regarded the granting clause, the habendum, and the tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its special function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks to the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grant- or or regard as very material t

1952Mosier v. Momsen, 13 Okla. 41 , 74 P. 905 .

1952Mosier v. Momsen, 13 Okla. 41 , 74 P. 905 .

1947See Lowery v. Westheimer, 58 Okla. 560 , 160 P. 496 ; Barnard v. West, 99 Okla. 127 , 225 P. 977 ; Smart v. Bassler, 101 Okla. 39 , 223 P. 352 ; Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okla. 74 , 17 P. 2d 688 ; Wilson v. Olsen, 167 Okla. 527 , 30 P. 2d 710 ; Trumbla v. State, 191 Okla. 119 , 126 P. 2d 1015 ; Hampton v. Kessler, 193 Okla. 619 , 145 P. 2d 955 .

1947See Lowery v. Westheimer, 58 Okla. 560 , 160 P. 496 ; Barnard v. West, 99 Okla. 127 , 225 P. 977 ; Smart v. Bassler, 101 Okla. 39 , 223 P. 352 ; Breidenthal v. Grooms, 161 Okla. 74 , 17 P. 2d 688 ; Wilson v. Olsen, 167 Okla. 527 , 30 P. 2d 710 ; Trumbla v. State, 191 Okla. 119 , 126 P. 2d 1015 ; Hampton v. Kessler, 193 Okla. 619 , 145 P. 2d 955 .

1942Smart v. Bassler, 101 Okla. 39 , 223 P. 352 ; Baker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249 , 167 P. 468 .

1932In Barker v. Campbell-Ratliff Land Co., 64 Okla. 249 , 167 F. 468 , it is said: “Another cardinal rule of construction is that the grant must be construed to effect the plain intention of the grantor,- and if that intention is plain it controls regardless of inconsistent clauses, which are to be reconciled by the intent deduced from the entire instrument [where it is plain from the entire instrument that more is intended to be conveyed than that. stated in the granting clause such effect, will be given].” Ramey v. Stephney, 70 Okla. 87 , 173 P. 72 .

2007Cassina v. Jones, 1959 OK 117, ¶ 6 , 340 P.2d 482, 483 .

2007Cassina v. Jones, 1959 OK 117, ¶ 6 , 340 P.2d 482, 483 .

1988See, e.g.: Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Co., 179 Okl. 561 , 66 P.2d 1069 (1937); West v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Okl.App., 536 P.2d 393 (1975); Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, Okl., 495 P.2d 108 (1972).

1988See, e.g.: Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Co., 179 Okl. 561 , 66 P.2d 1069 (1937); West v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., Okl.App., 536 P.2d 393 (1975); Panhandle Cooperative Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, Okl., 495 P.2d 108 (1972).

1988Cruzan v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Company, 303 P.2d 313 (Okl.1956).

1988Cruzan, supra. The deed under examination in this case is not ambiguous within the four comers of the instrument.

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1987On appeal the temporary Court of Appeals held the rule applicable is that generally an exception in the habendum clause of a deed is an exception or reservation from the warranty and not from the grant expressed in the granting clause, unless there are express words which clearly show the intent of the grantor to create an exception from the grant or a reservation of some interest in the grantor, and not merely a limitation in the warranty citing Schnelle v. McClure, 330 P.2d 598 (Okl.1958), Whitman v. Harrison, 327 P.2d 680 (Okl.1958), Jennings v. Amerada Petroleum Corporation, 179 Okl. 561 ,

1985The court followed the holding in McVicker v. Horn, Robinson and Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 , 71 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1958) which provided marketing is not necessary for production in an oil and gas lease. 3 .

1985The court followed the holding in McVicker v. Horn, Robinson and Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 , 71 A.L.R.2d 1211 (1958) which provided marketing is not necessary for production in an oil and gas lease. 3 .

1983The court spoke of the foreign service exception which is joined with the “other than federal service” exception with the disjunctive in Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, at 740 , 741: “Granting defendant official immunity would not only make 10 U.S.C. § 1089 (f) superfluous, it would also contravene one of Congress' aims in enacting section 1089(f) in its present form.

1980First National *1155 Bank and Trust Company of Tulsa v. Price, supra. In Lahman v. Bassel, Okl., 373 P.2d 245 , the deed, following the description, contained the following recitation: “Except One Half of all mineral rights which belongs equally One Half to S. E.