granting clause in California

1951It seems to us that the attempt to so limit the absolute grant is null and void, because utterly inconsistent with both the granting and habendum clauses of the conveyance.’ ” Likewise in Barnett v. Barnett, 104 Cal. 298, 300 [ 37 P. 1049 ], it is said: “The rule that if the habendum is repugnant to the premises [the granting clause] it is to be disregarded, is only another form of the rule that ‘if several parts of a grant are absolutely irreconcilable the former part prevails.’ (Civ.

1951It seems to us that the attempt to so limit the absolute grant is null and void, because utterly inconsistent with both the granting and habendum clauses of the conveyance.’ ” Likewise in Barnett v. Barnett, 104 Cal. 298, 300 [ 37 P. 1049 ], it is said: “The rule that if the habendum is repugnant to the premises [the granting clause] it is to be disregarded, is only another form of the rule that ‘if several parts of a grant are absolutely irreconcilable the former part prevails.’ (Civ.

1996Code, § 801.) In Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael (1956) 46 Cal.2d 669, 678 [ 298 P.2d 15 ], this court noted “the general rule . . . that ‘in construing contracts and deeds for railroad rights of way such deeds are usually construed as giving a mere right of way, although the terms of the deed would be otherwise apt to convey a fee. [Citations.]”’ 7 (See also Parks v. Gates, supra, 186 Cal. at p. 154 .) This observation reflects the broad view of many jurisdictions “that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed

1971In Quinn , the words were “to be used for railroad purposes only,” a weaker explanation of limitation than is that “for railroad purposes only.” (Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael, 46 Cal.2d 669, 677-678 [ 298 P.2d 15 ]; Parks v. Gates, 186 Cal. 151, 155 [ 199 P. 40 ].) In Rowell , the words “for right of way,” although in the granting clause, were but declaratory of contemplated use, and were outweighed by apt words of outright conveyance of land.

1971(City of Glendora v. Faus, 148 Cal.App.2d 920 [ 307 P.2d 976 ]; Marshall v. Standard Oil Co., 17 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 61 P.2d 520 ].) Although under modern law the common law rule that the granting clause must prevail over the habendum or any later clause is not an absolute and that the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must govern (Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, 125 Cal.App.2d 661, 663 [ 271 P.2d 73 ]), nevertheless, the place in which the limitation appears is an important element, as recognized in the Marshall and City of Glendora cases. 2 *434 Not only does t

1971(City of Glendora v. Faus, 148 Cal.App.2d 920 [ 307 P.2d 976 ]; Marshall v. Standard Oil Co., 17 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 61 P.2d 520 ].) Although under modern law the common law rule that the granting clause must prevail over the habendum or any later clause is not an absolute and that the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must govern (Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, 125 Cal.App.2d 661, 663 [ 271 P.2d 73 ]), nevertheless, the place in which the limitation appears is an important element, as recognized in the Marshall and City of Glendora cases. 2 *434 Not only does t

2023(Ibid.; see California Teachers Assn. v. State of California (1999) 20 Cal.4th 327, 338 [if a certain statute had “no purpose other than to chill the exercise of the right of teachers to demand a hearing before they are dismissed or suspended, we must hold the statute unconstitutional on its face”]; Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 319 [“while the state may impose 19 conditions upon the granting of a privilege, . . . ‘constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result’ ”].) 5 C.

2016Our Supreme Court agreed and stated: “It is too well established to require extensive citation of authority that, while the state may impose conditions upon the granting of a privilege, including restrictions upon the expenditure of funds distributed by it to other governmental bodies [citations], ‘constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result . . . .’ ” (Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 319.) Neither I, nor the majority, have been able to locate any authority that would make any exception to this principle in the case of the home rule doctri

2016(In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 434, fn. 20 ; see Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 136, 139 [Comment to Evidence Code section 1014 represents Legislature’s recognition that psychotherapist-patient relationship’s unique nature requires greater protection than that afforded the physician-patient relationship].) The expanded privilege of Evidence Code section 1014 embodies the Legislature’s intentional legislative balance: “Although it is recognized that the granting of the privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold relevant information, the interests of society wi

1981Although it is recognized that the granting of the privilege may operate in particular cases to withhold relevant information, the interests of society will be better served if psychiatrists are able to assure patients that their confidences will be protected.” (See also In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 431, 434-435, fn. 20 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 829 , 467 P.2d 557 , 44 A.L.R.3d 1 ].) This statutory privilege is to be construed in favor of the patient (id. at p. 437), and, indeed, is in part based upon the constitutional right to privacy (id. at p. 432).

1996Code, § 801.) In Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael (1956) 46 Cal.2d 669, 678 [ 298 P.2d 15 ], this court noted “the general rule . . . that ‘in construing contracts and deeds for railroad rights of way such deeds are usually construed as giving a mere right of way, although the terms of the deed would be otherwise apt to convey a fee. [Citations.]”’ 7 (See also Parks v. Gates, supra, 186 Cal. at p. 154 .) This observation reflects the broad view of many jurisdictions “that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed

1996Code, § 801.) In Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael (1956) 46 Cal.2d 669, 678 [ 298 P.2d 15 ], this court noted “the general rule . . . that ‘in construing contracts and deeds for railroad rights of way such deeds are usually construed as giving a mere right of way, although the terms of the deed would be otherwise apt to convey a fee. [Citations.]”’ 7 (See also Parks v. Gates, supra, 186 Cal. at p. 154 .) This observation reflects the broad view of many jurisdictions “that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed

1991(Boyer v. Murphy (1927) 202 Cal. 23, 30 [ 259 P. 38 ].) Here the condition appended to the habendum clause does indeed modify the grant, making it a fee simple subject to condition subsequent rather than a fee simple absolute.

1991(Boyer v. Murphy (1927) 202 Cal. 23, 30 [ 259 P. 38 ].) Here the condition appended to the habendum clause does indeed modify the grant, making it a fee simple subject to condition subsequent rather than a fee simple absolute.

1971(City of Glendora v. Faus, 148 Cal.App.2d 920 [ 307 P.2d 976 ]; Marshall v. Standard Oil Co., 17 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 61 P.2d 520 ].) Although under modern law the common law rule that the granting clause must prevail over the habendum or any later clause is not an absolute and that the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must govern (Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, 125 Cal.App.2d 661, 663 [ 271 P.2d 73 ]), nevertheless, the place in which the limitation appears is an important element, as recognized in the Marshall and City of Glendora cases. 2 *434 Not only does t

1971(City of Glendora v. Faus, 148 Cal.App.2d 920 [ 307 P.2d 976 ]; Marshall v. Standard Oil Co., 17 Cal.App.2d 19 [ 61 P.2d 520 ].) Although under modern law the common law rule that the granting clause must prevail over the habendum or any later clause is not an absolute and that the intention of the parties, as gathered from the whole instrument, must govern (Basin Oil Co. v. City of Inglewood, 125 Cal.App.2d 661, 663 [ 271 P.2d 73 ]), nevertheless, the place in which the limitation appears is an important element, as recognized in the Marshall and City of Glendora cases. 2 *434 Not only does t

1978Thus, in People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ], the court observed: “Because the granting of a hearing automatically vacates the opinion of the Court of Appeal [citations], we do not ordinarily discuss the reasoning of that opinion.

1978Thus, in People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ], the court observed: “Because the granting of a hearing automatically vacates the opinion of the Court of Appeal [citations], we do not ordinarily discuss the reasoning of that opinion.

1975In view of the Supreme Court’s statement that questions are raised “which have not been decided in this state” (citing D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 24-27 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]), an attempt by this court to resolve those questions might well delay finality of this court’s determination of the merits of this case by requiring the granting of a hearing in the Supreme Court.

1975In view of the Supreme Court’s statement that questions are raised “which have not been decided in this state” (citing D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 24-27 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 786 , 520 P.2d 10 ]), an attempt by this court to resolve those questions might well delay finality of this court’s determination of the merits of this case by requiring the granting of a hearing in the Supreme Court.

1974Although the cases have held that substantial evidence must support the award of a variance in order to insure that such legislative requirements have been satisfied [8] (see, e.g., Siller v. Board of Supervisors (1962) 58 Cal.2d 479, 482 [ 25 Cal. Rptr. 73 , 375 P.2d 41 ]; Bradbeer v. England (1951) 104 Cal. App.2d 704, 707 [ 232 P.2d 308 ]), they have failed to clarify whether the administrative agency must always set forth findings and have not illuminated the proper relationship between the evidence, findings, and ultimate agency action. [9] One of the first decisions to emphasize the impo

1974Although the cases have held that substantial evidence must support the award of a variance in order to insure that such legislative requirements have been satisfied [8] (see, e.g., Siller v. Board of Supervisors (1962) 58 Cal.2d 479, 482 [ 25 Cal. Rptr. 73 , 375 P.2d 41 ]; Bradbeer v. England (1951) 104 Cal. App.2d 704, 707 [ 232 P.2d 308 ]), they have failed to clarify whether the administrative agency must always set forth findings and have not illuminated the proper relationship between the evidence, findings, and ultimate agency action. [9] One of the first decisions to emphasize the impo

2021Furthermore, we find nothing in the record showing the prosecutor’s “‘intemperate behavior . . . sufficiently egregious that it infect[ed] the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent [juvenile court findings] a denial of due process,’” nor any use by the prosecutor of “‘deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the [juvenile] court. . . .’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052 .) The prosecutor explained that he was “not intending to distort the factfinding process,” but rather, when comparing father’s criminal history and major credibility issues, along with

2021Furthermore, we find nothing in the record showing the prosecutor’s “‘intemperate behavior . . . sufficiently egregious that it infect[ed] the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent [juvenile court findings] a denial of due process,’” nor any use by the prosecutor of “‘deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the [juvenile] court. . . .’” (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1052 .) The prosecutor explained that he was “not intending to distort the factfinding process,” but rather, when comparing father’s criminal history and major credibility issues, along with

2002(Concord, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 293 .) Significantly, the granting clause does not restrict the grantee to any particular use.

1996(See Concord & Bay Point Land Co. v. City of Concord (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 289, 295 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 623 ] [deed language unequivocally conveyed fee title and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible].) However, resolution of this issue does not rest on review of the granting clause alone, and we must examine the remaining provisions to determine if the original parties intended to limit the conveyance to an easement.

1991Thus, the court concluded that where limiting language is found in the granting clause for a railroad right of way, the limiting language “ordinarily operates to confine the grant to that of an easement.” (Johnson, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 433 .) In the Johnson deed, the granting clause included the phrase “for railroad purposes only.” (Id. at p. 434, italics in original.) Secondly, although the court admitted that the later grant of “tenements, hereditaments, appurtenances, etc.,” seemed to indicate the grant of a fee interest, it relied upon the principle embodied in Civil Code section 107

1991Co. (1946) 248 Ala. 463 [ 28 So.2d 209 ] (“for right of way”), which were contained in the granting clause but were “declaratory of contemplated use, and were outweighed by apt words of outright conveyance of land.” (Johnson, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 434, fn. 2 .) The “apt words” of conveyance of land were identical to the granting language found in the Machado deed. 11 Use of such terms alone is insufficient to establish an intent to convey only an easement.

1978Because the granting of a hearing automatically vacates the opinion of the Court of Appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 976(d); Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 74, fn. 2 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 545 P.2d 229 ]), we do not ordinarily discuss the reasoning of that opinion.

1978Because the granting of a hearing automatically vacates the opinion of the Court of Appeal (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 976(d); Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 74, fn. 2 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 317 , 545 P.2d 229 ]), we do not ordinarily discuss the reasoning of that opinion.