granting clause in North Carolina

2005“The granting of a challenge for cause where the juror’s fitness or unfitness is arguable is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Abraham, 338 N.C. at 343 , 451 S.E.2d at 145 .

2005“The granting of a challenge for cause where the juror’s fitness or unfitness is arguable is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Abraham, 338 N.C. at 343 , 451 S.E.2d at 145 .

2009Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948), modified Murphy’s third rule of construction and elevated the granting clause, followed by the habendum *636 clause and the warranty clause, above other language in the deed. 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948).

2009Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948), modified Murphy’s third rule of construction and elevated the granting clause, followed by the habendum *636 clause and the warranty clause, above other language in the deed. 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948).

1994State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

1994State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

1979The granting clause reads as follows: “Freddie Giles . . . has bargained and sold, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell and convey to said Maggie Giles heirs and assigns. . . .” The habendum clause, following the description, reads as follows: “TO HAVE And To Hold the aforesaid tract or parcel of land, and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said Maggie Giles and her heirs and assigns, to her only use and behoof forever.” The warranty provides that Freddie Giles covenants, “with said Maggie Giles and her heirs and assigns. . . .” Plaintiffs rely primarily on f

1979The granting clause reads as follows: “Freddie Giles . . . has bargained and sold, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell and convey to said Maggie Giles heirs and assigns. . . .” The habendum clause, following the description, reads as follows: “TO HAVE And To Hold the aforesaid tract or parcel of land, and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said Maggie Giles and her heirs and assigns, to her only use and behoof forever.” The warranty provides that Freddie Giles covenants, “with said Maggie Giles and her heirs and assigns. . . .” Plaintiffs rely primarily on f

1982The facts of this case fall squarely within the rule enunciated in Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948), that "where the entire estate in fee simple, in unmistakable terms, is given the grantee in a deed, both in the granting clause and habendum, the warranty being in harmony therewith, other clauses in the deed, repugnant to the estate and interest conveyed, will be rejected." See also Whetsell v. Jernigan, 291 N.C. 128 , 229 S.E.2d 183 (1976); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 236 N.C. 419 , 72 S.E.2d 869 (1952).

1982The facts of this case fall squarely within the rule enunciated in Artis v. Artis, 228 N.C. 754 , 761, 47 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1948), that "where the entire estate in fee simple, in unmistakable terms, is given the grantee in a deed, both in the granting clause and habendum, the warranty being in harmony therewith, other clauses in the deed, repugnant to the estate and interest conveyed, will be rejected." See also Whetsell v. Jernigan, 291 N.C. 128 , 229 S.E.2d 183 (1976); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 236 N.C. 419 , 72 S.E.2d 869 (1952).

1994State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 753 , 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993); State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 , 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

1994State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 753 , 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993); State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 , 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

2015The deed in question contained a granting clause with a metes and bounds description of a 37-acre tract of land, followed by a "Second Tract consisting *674 of a right-of-way to the above tract[.]" Id. at 411 , 197 S.E.2d at 44 .

2015The deed in question contained a granting clause with a metes and bounds description of a 37-acre tract of land, followed by a "Second Tract consisting *674 of a right-of-way to the above tract[.]" Id. at 411 , 197 S.E.2d at 44 .

1994State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 753 , 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993); State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 , 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

1994State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 753 , 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993); State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636 , 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17 , 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227 , 188 S.E.2d 289, 293 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043 , 34 L.

2005The trial court "should not assign the granting of this privilege of visitation to the discretion of the party awarded custody of the child." Id. at 551-52 , 179 S.E.2d at 849 .

2005The trial court "should not assign the granting of this privilege of visitation to the discretion of the party awarded custody of the child." Id. at 551-52 , 179 S.E.2d at 849 .

1922But this doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the hahendum and tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grantor, and does not regard as very material the part of the deed in which such intention is m

1922But this doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the habendum and tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention of the grantor, and does not regard as very material the part of the deed in which such intention is m

1980See also McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480 , 101 S.E. 2d 330 (1958), and Pilley v. Smith, 230 N.C. 62 , 51 S.E. 2d 923 (1949). 3 Defendants Howland and Dawson contend that this case is controlled by the principle of law restated in Lackey v. Hamlet City Board of Education, 258 N.C. 460, 462 , 128 S.E. 2d 806 (1963), as follows: In the interpretation of a deed, the intention of the grantor or grantors must be gathered from the whole instrument and every part thereof given effect, unless it contains conflicting provisions which are irreconcilable- or a provision which is contrary to public policy

1980See also McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480 , 101 S.E. 2d 330 (1958), and Pilley v. Smith, 230 N.C. 62 , 51 S.E. 2d 923 (1949). 3 Defendants Howland and Dawson contend that this case is controlled by the principle of law restated in Lackey v. Hamlet City Board of Education, 258 N.C. 460, 462 , 128 S.E. 2d 806 (1963), as follows: In the interpretation of a deed, the intention of the grantor or grantors must be gathered from the whole instrument and every part thereof given effect, unless it contains conflicting provisions which are irreconcilable- or a provision which is contrary to public policy

1979In so doing the Court reaffirmed the *283 settled rules that “the granting clause is the very essence of the contract”, Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. at 632, 18 S.E. 2d at 160 ; the granting clause designates the grantee and the thing granted; the office of the habendum is “to lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify the estate granted . . . but not to contradict or be repugnant to the estate granted . . .” 220 N.C. at 632, 18 S.E. 2d at 159 .

1979In so doing the Court reaffirmed the *283 settled rules that “the granting clause is the very essence of the contract”, Bryant v. Shields, 220 N.C. at 632, 18 S.E. 2d at 160 ; the granting clause designates the grantee and the thing granted; the office of the habendum is “to lessen, enlarge, explain, or qualify the estate granted . . . but not to contradict or be repugnant to the estate granted . . .” 220 N.C. at 632, 18 S.E. 2d at 159 .

1998Prospective jurors with reservations about capital punishment must be able to “ ‘state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their beliefs in deference to the rule of law.’ ” State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43 , 430 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 , 90 L.

1998Prospective jurors with reservations about capital punishment must be able to “ ‘state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their beliefs in deference to the rule of law.’ ” State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43 , 430 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 , 90 L.

1986The granting clause of the deed in the McCotter case recited that “ ‘said parties of the first part . . . have given, granted, bargained and sold and by these presents do hereby give, grant, bargain and sell unto the party of the second part, its successors and assigns, a tract or parcel of land 100 feet in width ....’” Id. at 482 , 101 S.E. 2d at 332 .

1980See also McCotter v. Barnes, 247 N.C. 480 , 101 S.E. 2d 330 (1958), and Pilley v. Smith, 230 N.C. 62 , 51 S.E. 2d 923 (1949). 3 Defendants Howland and Dawson contend that this case is controlled by the principle of law restated in Lackey v. Hamlet City Board of Education, 258 N.C. 460, 462 , 128 S.E. 2d 806 (1963), as follows: In the interpretation of a deed, the intention of the grantor or grantors must be gathered from the whole instrument and every part thereof given effect, unless it contains conflicting provisions which are irreconcilable- or a provision which is contrary to public policy

1963Plaintiffs base this contention upon Oxendine v. Lewis, 252 N.C. 669 , 114 S.E. 2d 706 , assenting in their brief that “the Oxendine Case is determinative of the controversy herein.” The rule applied .in Oxendine v. Lewis, supra, and in decisions cited therein, is stated by Parker, J., a© follows: “We have repeatedly held that when the granting clause, the habendum, and .the warranty in a deed are clear and unambiguous and fully sufficient to- pass immediately a fee simple estate to- the grantee or grantees, that a paragraph inserted between the description and the habendum, -in which the- gra

1963Plaintiffs base this contention upon Oxendine v. Lewis, 252 N.C. 669 , 114 S.E. 2d 706 , assenting in their brief that “the Oxendine Case is determinative of the controversy herein.” The rule applied .in Oxendine v. Lewis, supra, and in decisions cited therein, is stated by Parker, J., a© follows: “We have repeatedly held that when the granting clause, the habendum, and .the warranty in a deed are clear and unambiguous and fully sufficient to- pass immediately a fee simple estate to- the grantee or grantees, that a paragraph inserted between the description and the habendum, -in which the- gra