granting clause in Ohio

2018Here, both the granting clause—“[t]he words that transfer an interest in a deed,” Black’s Law Dictionary 816 (10th Ed.2014)—and the habendum clause—“the part of a * * * deed * * * that defines the extent of the interest being granted and any conditions affecting the grant,” id. at 825—convey the property to the railroad company without limitation.

2018Here, both the granting clause—“[t]he words that transfer an interest in a deed,” Black’s Law Dictionary 816 (10th Ed.2014)—and the habendum clause—“the part of a * * * deed * * * that defines the extent of the interest being granted and any conditions affecting the grant,” id. at 825—convey the property to the railroad company without limitation.

2020Sloan v. Lawrence Furniture Co., 29 Ohio St. 568 , 1876 WL 129 (December 1876).

1969In Sloan v. Lawrence Furnace Co., 29 Ohio St. 568 , the Supreme Court of Ohio, held: “The words ‘reserving all the minerals underlying the soil,’ in the granting clause of a deed for the conveyance of real estate, constitute, prima facie, an exception of the minerals from the operation of the grant.” (Emphasis added.) We reiterate the finding in Hardesty v. Harrison, supra ( 6 Ohio Law Abs. 445 ), wherein tliis Court of Appeals at page 446 said: “Since oil and gas are minerals and there is nothing in the language of the deed in question which shows that the parties contemplated something less

1991Burdette, May, and Schurch, supra. “Where the language employed declares a condition and imports a forfeiture, a clause of re-entry is not necessary * * *.” Copps Chapel, supra, 120 Ohio St. at 314 , 166 N.E. at 219 . “ ‘The words “so long as,” “until,” or “during the time that” usually are appropriate to create a determinable fee.

1947Such general statements which generally appear subsequent to the granting clause of a conveyance, are not considered as a condition subsequent when all of the estate was conveyed in the granting clause unless the deed contains a provision for reversion or forfeiture for violation of the condition (In re Church, 120 Oh St 309, 166 N. E. 218 ).

2023The granting clause of the lease grants to the lessee the oil and gas rights “in the formations commonly known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale, * * * other than as reserved unto Lessor below.” In the subsequent reservation clause, the lessor reserves “any and all formations between the base of the Marcellus shale to the top of the formation commonly known as Utica Shale” and reserves “all formations below the base of the Utica Shale.” (2013 and 2014 Leases). {¶137} “[C]ommon words appearing in a written instrument are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless manifest absu

2023The granting clause of the lease grants to the lessee the oil and gas rights “in the formations commonly known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale, * * * other than as reserved unto Lessor below.” In the subsequent reservation clause, the lessor reserves “any and all formations between the base of the Marcellus shale to the top of the formation commonly known as Utica Shale” and reserves “all formations below the base of the Utica Shale.” (2013 and 2014 Leases). {¶137} “[C]ommon words appearing in a written instrument are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless manifest absu

2016Id., citing Anderson v. Pryor 51 Ohio App. 35 (1935).

2012Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 135, 145 , 250 N.E.2d 269 ; Siferd v. Stambor (1966) 5 Ohio App.2d 79, 86 , 214 N.E.2d 106 ; Anderson v. Pryor (1935), 51 Ohio App.35, 37, 199 N.E. 364 .3 We would not apply this principle had appellants followed the statutory form, but, again, they did not and cannot claim its benefits.

1947In Sperry v Pond, 5 Ohio 387 , 24 Amer.

1941It is to be noted that the granting clause in Sperry v Pond, 5 Ohio 387 , was .not absolute and unqualified, as is true in the instant case; The court say in the Church case also (page 319 of the opinion): “The statement in this deed is not a condition nor limitation of the grant but a mere covenant that the property shall be used in a particular way.” It is to be remembered that the requirement for words of perpetuity in the reverter clause only attaches when there appears an unequivocal unlimited grant in the instrument which is by the reverter sought to be modified.

1897Signature by officers, etc.: Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87 [ 2 Am.

1896Signature by officers, etc.: Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87 [ 2 Am.

2024Because the Ohio Administrative Code at the time the Assignment was executed prohibited drilling below 4,000 feet in drilling units less than 40 acres, we find the Assignment is unambiguous and the unambiguous terms limited Appellees’ working interest in the oil and gas to a maximum depth of 4,000 feet. {¶58} We further find the trial court’s reliance on case law from the Fourth and Fifth Districts regarding the conveyance of oil and gas rights from a surface owner to an oil and gas company is inapplicable here, where the ownership of the deep rights is specifically predicated upon the conveya

2017Id. at 880 .

2016Stark No. 2015CA00038, 2015-Ohio-4475, ¶ 29 , citing Marshall.

2016Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 144 Ohio St.3d 490 , 2015-Ohio-4551 , 45 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 48 .

2016Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Buell, 144 Ohio St.3d 490 , 2015-Ohio-4551 , 45 N.E.3d 185, ¶ 48 .

2016The trial court denied the heirs’ requested relief and this Court affirmed on the following basis: It thus appears, under circumstances such as exist here, and in adhering to the principles of law pronounced by the Supreme Court of this state, a conveyance of land in fee simple, made by a donor to a municipal corporation, which contains in the granting clause of the deed (by specific reference to a subsequent clause) that such land is deeded to the municipal corporation “so long as” the land is “used * * * for the purpose of creating and maintaining a public park * * *,” does not create a dete

2012Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 135, 145 , 250 N.E.2d 269 ; Siferd v. Stambor (1966) 5 Ohio App.2d 79, 86 , 214 N.E.2d 106 ; Anderson v. Pryor (1935), 51 Ohio App.35, 37, 199 N.E. 364 .3 We would not apply this principle had appellants followed the statutory form, but, again, they did not and cannot claim its benefits.

2012Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 135, 145 , 250 N.E.2d 269 ; Siferd v. Stambor (1966) 5 Ohio App.2d 79, 86 , 214 N.E.2d 106 ; Anderson v. Pryor (1935), 51 Ohio App.35, 37, 199 N.E. 364 .3 We would not apply this principle had appellants followed the statutory form, but, again, they did not and cannot claim its benefits.

2012CITIMORTGAGE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH UNDISPUTED PROPER RULE 56(c) EVIDENCE THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO REFORMATION OF THE MORTGAGE.” {¶ 38} CitiMortgage asserts that Kimberly’s name was inadvertently omitted from the granting clause and the acknowledgment clause of the Mortgage due to scrivener’s error and mutual mistake, and that it is entitled to reform the Mortgage. {¶ 39} We initially note that this Court reviews mortgages under general principles 18 of contract law, and we presume that the parties’ intent “‘resides in the language they have chosen to employ in the agreement.’” SFJV 2005, L.L.C. v

2012CITIMORTGAGE DEMONSTRATED THROUGH UNDISPUTED PROPER RULE 56(c) EVIDENCE THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO REFORMATION OF THE MORTGAGE.” {¶ 38} CitiMortgage asserts that Kimberly’s name was inadvertently omitted from the granting clause and the acknowledgment clause of the Mortgage due to scrivener’s error and mutual mistake, and that it is entitled to reform the Mortgage. {¶ 39} We initially note that this Court reviews mortgages under general principles 18 of contract law, and we presume that the parties’ intent “‘resides in the language they have chosen to employ in the agreement.’” SFJV 2005, L.L.C. v

2012Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 135, 145 , 250 N.E.2d 269 ; Siferd v. Stambor (1966) 5 Ohio App.2d 79, 86 , 214 N.E.2d 106 ; Anderson v. Pryor (1935), 51 Ohio App.35, 37, 199 N.E. 364 .3 We would not apply this principle had appellants followed the statutory form, but, again, they did not and cannot claim its benefits.

2012Stocker & Sitler, Inc. v. Metzger (1969), 19 Ohio App. 2d 135, 145 , 250 N.E.2d 269 ; Siferd v. Stambor (1966) 5 Ohio App.2d 79, 86 , 214 N.E.2d 106 ; Anderson v. Pryor (1935), 51 Ohio App.35, 37, 199 N.E. 364 .3 We would not apply this principle had appellants followed the statutory form, but, again, they did not and cannot claim its benefits.

2008Based on the information from voir dire, the Court does not find this witness's knowledge and education and experience rises to the level to testify relative to the things that are being sought relative to this, his decision as an expert witness, so the Court sustains the motion to exclude this witness's testimony." Id. at 3-4. {¶ 26} "It has been held that an expert witness is not required to be the best witness on any particular subject. * * * [I]t is also true that a witness may be qualified to testify as an expert on one subject but may not be qualified to testify as an expert on another r

2006"The same facts were used to convict Yarbrough of stealing the Blazer and of receiving the Blazer as stolen property. * * * Thus, convicting and sentencing Yarbrough both for receiving the stolen Blazer and for theft of the Blazer violated R.C. 2941.25(A)." State v. Yarbrough , 104 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2004-Ohio-6087 , at ¶ 99-102 . {¶ 7} Accordingly, the evidence relied upon by appellant supports at a minimum the granting of a hearing on his petition to determine the validity of the statements made in his affidavit.

2005Wray v. Wymer (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 122, 131 , 601 N.E.2d 503 . (¶ 16} The Ohio Supreme Court has framed the question as follows: if the conveying instrument refers to “land,” a fee is thereby conveyed; if the granting clause refers only to a “right,” then it conveys only an easement.

2005Wray v. Wymer (1991), 77 Ohio App.3d 122, 131 , 601 N.E.2d 503 . (¶ 16} The Ohio Supreme Court has framed the question as follows: if the conveying instrument refers to “land,” a fee is thereby conveyed; if the granting clause refers only to a “right,” then it conveys only an easement.

2002As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S . (1996), 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1663 , ". . . as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." The very limited issue raised in appellant's motion to suppress and this assignment of error is whether the granting of immunity given pursuant to Garrity v. State of New Jersey (1967), 385 U.S. 493 , extends to false statements given during a police internal affairs department interview.

2002As the United States Supreme Court held in Ornelas v. U.S . (1996), 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1663 , ". . . as a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." The very limited issue raised in appellant's motion to suppress and this assignment of error is whether the granting of immunity given pursuant to Garrity v. State of New Jersey (1967), 385 U.S. 493 , extends to false statements given during a police internal affairs department interview.

2001Union Bank Co. v. Brumbaugh (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 202 .

2001The incentive to these private landowners was the granting of immunity in the event that the recreational user was injured on their property. (( ( * * * “ ‘This court would be remiss in failing to note that R.C. 1533.181 is found in Title 15 of the Revised Code which is entitled “Conservation of Natural Re sources.” Chapter 1533 is entitled “Hunting; Fishing,” and the entire chapter is devoted to rural areas and the protection of wildlife.’ (Emphasis sic.) Loyer v. Buchholz (July 17, 1987), Erie App. No. E-87-5, unreported, at 4, 1987 WL 14231 , affirmed (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 65 , 526 N.E.2d 3

2001The incentive to these private landowners was the granting of immunity in the event that the recreational user was injured on their property. (( ( * * * “ ‘This court would be remiss in failing to note that R.C. 1533.181 is found in Title 15 of the Revised Code which is entitled “Conservation of Natural Re sources.” Chapter 1533 is entitled “Hunting; Fishing,” and the entire chapter is devoted to rural areas and the protection of wildlife.’ (Emphasis sic.) Loyer v. Buchholz (July 17, 1987), Erie App. No. E-87-5, unreported, at 4, 1987 WL 14231 , affirmed (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 65 , 526 N.E.2d 3

2000When construing a deed, a court must examine the language contained within the deed, "`the question being not what the parties meant to say, but the meaning of what they did say, as courts can not put words into an instrument which the parties themselves failed to do.'" Meadows v. Meadows (June 20, 1997), Scioto App. No. 96 CA 2436 (quoting Larwill v. Farrelly (1918), 8 Ohio App. 356 , 360 ). "[When] the granting clause conveys all the described real estate and contains no words of condition or forfeiture, there is no reverter clause or provision for a right of re-entry, and the only words of