15 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1915–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Second Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2019The district court may grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Id. (internal SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (01 1947A ' quotation marks omitted). 2019The district court may grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Id. (internal SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (01 1947A ' quotation marks omitted). | 5 | 7 |
Kercheval v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). 2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Bernardelli, 85 Nev. at 385 , 455 P.2d at 926 ("The granting of the motion to withdraw one's plea before sentencing is proper where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137, 141 , 848 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1993) (holding that the appellant presented a fair and just reason to withdraw her plea where she had a credible claim of innocence, the State would not be prejudiced, and only a minor amount of money was involved). 2015See Bernardelli, 85 Nev. at 385 , 455 P.2d at 926 ("The granting of the motion to withdraw one's plea before sentencing is proper where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137, 141 , 848 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1993) (holding that the appellant presented a fair and just reason to withdraw her plea where she had a credible claim of innocence, the State would not be prejudiced, and only a minor amount of money was involved). | 2 | 2 |
Devers v. Southern Universitygreen2 sentences2015Ala. 1968) (recognizing that a college may not condition admission on a waiver of constitutional rights); Devers ix S. Univ., 712 So. 2d 199, 206 (La. 2015Ala. 1968) (recognizing that a college may not condition admission on a waiver of constitutional rights); Devers ix S. Univ., 712 So. 2d 199, 206 (La. | 2 | 2 |
Morale v. Grigelgreen2 sentences2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 , 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a s 2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a st | 2 | 2 |
United States v. John Stayton and Rita Stayton, John Staytongreen2 sentences2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). 2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). | 2 | 2 |
Ruth Robinson v. The Board of Regents of Eastern Kentucky University, a Body Corporate, and Robert R. Martin, President of Eastern Kentucky Universitygreen2 sentences2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 , 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a s 2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a st | 2 | 2 |
Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Universitygreen2 sentences2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 , 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a s 2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a st | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2015While this court suggested it would be a "rare circumstance[ [" when the State could assert that a district court "has exceeded the broad boundaries of judicial discretion in allowing a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing," Lewis, 124 Nev. at 137 , 178 P.3d at 149 , it is significantly more likely that the State can demonstrate that a district court exceeded its discretion in granting a motion for a new trial, particularly given the potential injustice if the defendant obtains an acquittal following an improvidently granted new trial. 2015While this court suggested it would be a "rare circumstance[ [" when the State could assert that a district court "has exceeded the broad boundaries of judicial discretion in allowing a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing," Lewis, 124 Nev. at 137 , 178 P.3d at 149 , it is significantly more likely that the State can demonstrate that a district court exceeded its discretion in granting a motion for a new trial, particularly given the potential injustice if the defendant obtains an acquittal following an improvidently granted new trial. | 1 | 2 |
Coppermines Co. v. Cominsgreen2 sentences2021See id. at 249-50 , 645 P.2d at 974-75 (determining that the language in the deed defines and controls the scope of the water rights conveyed); see also Coppermines Co. v. Comins, 38 Nev. 359, 376 , 148 P. 349, 354 (1915) (reasoning that "[p]arties usually describe in the granting clause of a deed all that they intend to convey" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2021See id. at 249-50 , 645 P.2d at 974-75 (determining that the language in the deed defines and controls the scope of the water rights conveyed); see also Coppermines Co. v. Comins, 38 Nev. 359, 376 , 148 P. 349, 354 (1915) (reasoning that "[p]arties usually describe in the granting clause of a deed all that they intend to convey" (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Hendricks v. Perkinsgreen2 sentences2021See id. at 249-50 , 645 P.2d at 974-75 (determining that the language in the deed defines and controls the scope of the water rights conveyed); see also Coppermines Co. v. Comins, 38 Nev. 359, 376 , 148 P. 349, 354 (1915) (reasoning that "[p]arties usually describe in the granting clause of a deed all that they intend to convey" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2021See id. at 249-50 , 645 P.2d at 974-75 (determining that the language in the deed defines and controls the scope of the water rights conveyed); see also Coppermines Co. v. Comins, 38 Nev. 359, 376 , 148 P. 349, 354 (1915) (reasoning that "[p]arties usually describe in the granting clause of a deed all that they intend to convey" (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
McCabe v. Stategreen2 sentences1998NRS 178.572 permits the court to grant a witness immunity “on motion of the state.” See also McCabe v. State, 98 Nev. 604, 606 , 655 P.2d 536, 537 (1982) (“The granting of immunity is traditionally a function of the prosecution”). 1998NRS 178.572 permits the court to grant a witness immunity “on motion of the state.” See also McCabe v. State, 98 Nev. 604, 606 , 655 P.2d 536, 537 (1982) (“The granting of immunity is traditionally a function of the prosecution”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
John A. Gearhart v. United States
green
2 sentences2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). 2015Around the time that the statute was enacted, federal courts interpreting Rule 32(d) allowed a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea 'if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just." Gearhart, 272 F.2d at 502 (quoting Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927)); see also United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969) ("In weighing motions for withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing, the test to be applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice."). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
St. John Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education
green
2 sentences2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 , 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a s 2015Mich. 1975); see Robinson, 475 F.2d at 709 ("[T]he state, in operating a public system of higher education, cannot condition attendance at one of its schools on the student's renunciation of his constitutional rights."); Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 156 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 4 (0) I94Th meto, (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that a tax-supported college "cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process"); Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp, 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976) (stating that a school could not condition a st | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Buckley v. State
green
2 sentences1986Buckley v. State, 95 Nev. 602 , 600 P.2d 227 (1979). 1986Buckley v. State, 95 Nev. 602 , 600 P.2d 227 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Buchanan
green
1 sentence1982State v. Matson, 587 P.2d 540 (Wash.App. 1970); State v. Ramsey, 576 P.2d 572 (Idaho 1978); and State v. Buchanan, 518 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Matson
green
1 sentence1982State v. Matson, 587 P.2d 540 (Wash.App. 1970); State v. Ramsey, 576 P.2d 572 (Idaho 1978); and State v. Buchanan, 518 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Ramsey
green
1 sentence1982State v. Matson, 587 P.2d 540 (Wash.App. 1970); State v. Ramsey, 576 P.2d 572 (Idaho 1978); and State v. Buchanan, 518 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United States v. Paglia
green
1 sentence1969The granting of the motion to withdraw one’s plea before sentencing is proper where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems “fair and just.” Gearhart v. United States, supra. It is even held in Woodring v. United States, 248 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1957): “The question of a defendant’s guilt or innocence is not an issue on a motion under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty. ...” (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Herman Huston Woodring v. United States
green
1 sentence1969The granting of the motion to withdraw one’s plea before sentencing is proper where for any substantial reason the granting of the privilege seems “fair and just.” Gearhart v. United States, supra. It is even held in Woodring v. United States, 248 F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1957): “The question of a defendant’s guilt or innocence is not an issue on a motion under Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty. ...” (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Paroni v. Ellison
neutral
2 sentences1915And no court should hold that a party by his deed has conveyed more than is described or referred to in the granting clause, unless forced to that conclusion by language in other portions of the deed which clearly and beyond all reasonable doubt shows an intent on the part of the grantor to part with more property than was described in the granting clause.” This case must be distinguished from the case of Paroni v. Ellison, 14 Nev. 60 , for, while the description in the deed involved in the case under consideration was somewhat similar to that involved in the Paroni-Ellison case, in that case 1915And no court should hold that a party by his deed has conveyed more than is described or referred to in the granting clause, unless forced to that conclusion by language in other portions of the deed which clearly and beyond all reasonable doubt shows an intent on the part of the grantor to part with more property than was described in the granting clause.” This case must be distinguished from the case of Paroni v. Ellison, 14 Nev. 60 , for, while the description in the deed involved in the case under consideration was somewhat similar to that involved in the Paroni-Ellison case, in that case | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.