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35 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. Merrillgreen2 sentences1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. 1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. | 2 | 3 |
Long, Admr. v. Hortongreen2 sentences2000It is generally held that if there are any inconsistencies between the granting clause and the habendum clause, the granting clause will prevail because the granting clause is “the most dependable expression of the grantor’s intention” and “is considered to be the very essence of the deed.” Long v. Horton, 126 Ind.App. 651 , 133 N.E.2d 568, 570-71 (1956). 2000It is generally held that if there are any inconsistencies between the granting clause and the habendum clause, the granting clause will prevail because the granting clause is “the most dependable expression of the grantor’s intention” and “is considered to be the very essence of the deed.” Long v. Horton, 126 Ind.App. 651 , 133 N.E.2d 568, 570-71 (1956). | 1 | 2 |
Claridge v. Phelpsgreen2 sentences1996The Tazians are correct that “when the granting clause of a deed is general or indefinite respecting the estate in the lands conveyed, it may be defined, qualified, and controlled by the habendum.” Claridge v. Phelps, 105 Ind.App. 344 , 11 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1937). 1996The Tazians are correct that “when the granting clause of a deed is general or indefinite respecting the estate in the lands conveyed, it may be defined, qualified, and controlled by the habendum.” Claridge v. Phelps, 105 Ind.App. 344 , 11 N.E.2d 503, 504 (1937). | 1 | 2 |
Arnold v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Similarly, in Arnold v. State, 460 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ind.1984), the defendant argued that "he was denied due process in that the state could grant immunity to witnesses but he could not." Relying on Walters, our supreme court held that the defendant's due process argument was the same as the equal protection argument in Walters, which the court had denied. 3 Waiters concerned immunity given to a State's witness. | 1 | 1 |
Wilkins v. Younggreen2 sentences2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a 2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a | 1 | 1 |
Thornburg v. Wigginsgreen2 sentences2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a 2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a | 1 | 1 |
Simons v. Bollingergreen2 sentences2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a 2008See Simons, 154 Ind. at 87 , 56 N.E. at 25 (holding that the word “jointly” alone does not create a joint tenancy but distinguishing cases where the phrase “in joint tenancy” was used and referring to “in joint tenancy” as the “very language of the books” to create a joint tenancy); Wilken, 144 Ind. 1, 5-6 , 41 N.E. 68, 69 (1895) (holding the phrase “Samuel Gordon and Phoebe Gordon, his wife, in joint tenancy” created a joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety); Thornburg, 135 Ind. at 187 , 34 N.E. at 1002 (holding where deed contained the phrase “in joint tenancy” that “[tjhese words a | 1 | 1 |
Tazian v. Clinegreen1 sentence2002Also instructive is the use of the word "forever." While not disposi-tive, "forever" is "a temporal descriptor more consistent with the conveyance of a fee than of an easement." Tagian, 686 N.E.2d at 101 (citation omitted).. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Marsh v. Morris
neutral
2 sentences1937In support of her contention, the appellant relies almost exclusively upon a statement of our Supreme Court in the case of Marsh v. Morris (1892), 133 Ind. 548 , 33 N. E. 290 . 1937In support of her contention, the appellant relies almost exclusively upon a statement of our Supreme Court in the case of Marsh v. Morris (1892), 133 Ind. 548 , 33 N. E. 290 . | 4 | 1905–1937 |
Indiana State Police Department v. Swaggerty
green
2 sentences1991The protection of law enforcement officers in such a situation is entirely consistent with the stated purpose of the granting of immunity by the Indiana Tort Claims Act: The policy underlying the statute is to protect public officials in the performance of their duties by preventing harassment by threats of civil litigation over decisions they make within the scope of their position. [Citation omitted.] [Emphasis supplied.] Indiana State Police v. Swaggerty (1987), Ind.App., 507 N.E.2d 649, 651 , reh. denied, trans. denied. 1987The protection of law enforcement officers in such a situation is entirely consistent with the stated purpose of the granting of immunity by the Indiana Tort Claims Act: The policy underlying the statute is to protect public officials in the performance of their duties by preventing harassment by threats of civil litigation over decisions they make within the scope of their positions." 507 N.E.2d at 651-52 . | 2 | 1987–1991 |
Case v. Owen
neutral
2 sentences1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. 1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. | 2 | 1915–1952 |
Doren v. Gillum
green
2 sentences1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. 1952Adams v. Merrill (1910), 45 Ind. App. 315, 319, 328 , 85 N. E. 114 , 87 N. E. 36 ; Doren v. Gillum (1894), 136 Ind. 134, 138 , 35 N. E. 1101 ; Edwards v. Beall, supra; Wilkins v. Young, supra; Case v. Owen (1894), 139 Ind. 22, 24 , 38 N. E. 395 , 47 Am. | 2 | 1915–1952 |
Lamb v. Medsker
neutral
2 sentences1922Lamb v. Medsker (1905), 35 Ind. App. 662 , 74 N. E. 1012 . 5. 1922Lamb v. Medsker (1905), 35 Ind. App. 662 , 74 N. E. 1012 . 5. | 2 | 1917–1922 |
Owen v. Williams
neutral
2 sentences1895In the case of Owen v. Williams, 114 Ind. 179 , the instrument in contest was in the form of a deed and in the granting clause, by its terras, “did convey and warrant to Williams after my decease and not before. ” This court held that the phrase “after my decease and not before” did not make the deed testamentary, but was meant and operated to show that the grantee’s use and enjoyment of the realty would not begin under the deed until after, the death of the grantor. 1893In Owen v. Williams, 114 Ind. 179, the instrument was in form a deed, and, in the granting clause, did “convey and warrant to Thomas Jefferson Williams, after my decease, and not before.”- The phrase “after my decease, and not before,” it was held, did not make the deed testamentary in its character, but operated to show that the grantee’s use and enjoyment of the lands conveyed would not begin, under such deed, until after the grantor’s death, and not before. | 2 | 1893–1895 |
Parke County v. Ropak, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023Parke City v. Ropak, Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). 14. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Ross, Inc. v. Legler
green
2 sentences1998We construe deeds in their entirety and consider this an “over-refinement of the rules of construction.” Id. at 661 , 199 N.E.2d at 349 . 1998We construe deeds in their entirety and consider this an “over-refinement of the rules of construction.” Id. at 661 , 199 N.E.2d at 349 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Enderle v. Sharman
green
2 sentences1996Id. 1996Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Ernst v. Underwriters National Assurance Co.
green
2 sentences1988Id. 178 Ind.App. at 85 , 381 N.E.2d at 902 . 1988Id. 178 Ind.App. at 85 , 381 N.E.2d at 902 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Board of Commissioners of Hendricks County v. King
green
1 sentence1987Board of Com'rs of Hendricks County v. King (1985), Ind. App., 481 N.E.2d 1327, 1330 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Walters v. State
green
1 sentence1983In Walters v. State (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 154, 157 , our Supreme Court stated: "The granting of immunity is somewhat analogous to plea-bargaining in that the State must often use such means with reluctant, but essential witnesses. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Clemons v. State
green
1 sentence1976Should this not be the case, however, we should have available the record of the waiver hearing; * * * “We add that we are well aware of the prior decision of this court (Third District) in Clemons v. State (1974), [162] Ind. App. [50], 317 N.E.2d 859, 867 , wherein it was held that the evidence was sufficient to justify waiver. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Higbee v. Rodeman
neutral
2 sentences1972Patrick’s Parish.” A case in point is Higbee v. Rodeman (1891), 129 Ind. 244 , *174 28 N. E. 442 , where it was contended on appeal, that the words “for common school purposes” in the granting clause of the warranty deed created a condition subsequent which .if breached by the township grantee would cause the grant to revert to the grantor or his successors. 1972Patrick’s Parish.” A case in point is Higbee v. Rodeman (1891), 129 Ind. 244 , *174 28 N. E. 442 , where it was contended on appeal, that the words “for common school purposes” in the granting clause of the warranty deed created a condition subsequent which .if breached by the township grantee would cause the grant to revert to the grantor or his successors. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Taylor v. Campbell
neutral
2 sentences1972The Indiana Supreme Court voiced its disagreement with this argument in the following manner: “The language used in the deed from Dunn to the township specifies the use to which the property would be put, but does not even tend to create a condition subsequent.” In Taylor v. Campbell (1912), 50 Ind. App. 515 , 98 N. E. 657 , which is of striking similarity to the case at bar, it was contended that where lands are conveyed to be used as a place of worship by a religious society, as expressly set out in the deed, a contract for the sale of the property for the purpose of re-investing the proceed 1972The Indiana Supreme Court voiced its disagreement with this argument in the following manner: “The language used in the deed from Dunn to the township specifies the use to which the property would be put, but does not even tend to create a condition subsequent.” In Taylor v. Campbell (1912), 50 Ind. App. 515 , 98 N. E. 657 , which is of striking similarity to the case at bar, it was contended that where lands are conveyed to be used as a place of worship by a religious society, as expressly set out in the deed, a contract for the sale of the property for the purpose of re-investing the proceed | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Kercheval v. United States
green
1 sentence1971The court in exercise of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.” Kereheval v. United States (1927), 274 U. S. 220, 224 . *407 *406 In the instant case, it is undoubtedly fair and just to allow appellant, Dube, to substitute a plea of not guilty for his plea *407 of guilty. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Richardson v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1967This Court has heretofore treated of a similar matter in the ease of Richardson v. Richardson (1951), 121 Ind. App. 523, p. 527 , 98 N. E. 2d 190 , and said: 2. 1967This Court has heretofore treated of a similar matter in the ease of Richardson v. Richardson (1951), 121 Ind. App. 523, p. 527 , 98 N. E. 2d 190 , and said: 2. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Finney v. Brandon
neutral
2 sentences1956Finney v. Brandon (1922), 78 Ind. App. 450 ; 135 N. E. 10 ; 16 Am. 1956Finney v. Brandon (1922), 78 Ind. App. 450 ; 135 N. E. 10 ; 16 Am. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
State v. Whitcom
green
2 sentences1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . 1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
City of Macon v. Samples
neutral
2 sentences1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . 1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . 1954In those cases where the exemption has been made to apply to indigent and disabled veterans, the legislation has been generally upheld for the reasons stated in the cases of Farley v. Watt, supra; City of Macon v. Samples (1928), 167 Ga. 150 , 145 S. E. 57 ; State v. Montgomery (1899), 92 Me. 433 , 43 A. 13 ; State v. Whitcom (1904), 122 Wis. 110 , 99 N. W. 468 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Richards v. Richards
green
2 sentences1952Richards (1915), 60 Ind. App. 34, 39 , 110 N. E. 103 , as follows: “A deed is to be construed as a whole and effect is to be given to each and every part if possible. *492 Where the intention of the parties as to the kind of estate conveyed is clearly expressed, such intention will be given effect, regardless of the technical rule that the granting clause will prevail over other portions of the deed which tend to modify or curtail the estate conveyed. 1952Richards (1915), 60 Ind. App. 34, 39 , 110 N. E. 103 , as follows: “A deed is to be construed as a whole and effect is to be given to each and every part if possible. *492 Where the intention of the parties as to the kind of estate conveyed is clearly expressed, such intention will be given effect, regardless of the technical rule that the granting clause will prevail over other portions of the deed which tend to modify or curtail the estate conveyed. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| In Re McDonald green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Prior v. Quackenbush green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Shoe v. Heckley green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| CarLee v. Ellsberry neutral | 1 | 1917–1917 |
| Edwards v. Beall green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Mulvane v. Rude green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Granger v. Granger neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Spencer v. Robbins green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| Evans v. Dunlap neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Allen v. Craft green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Chamberlain v. Runkle green | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Travellers Insurance v. Noland neutral | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Parish v. Camplin green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Cates v. Cates green | 1 | 1895–1895 |
| Hanrick v. Patrick green | 1 | 1890–1890 |
| Locke v. White neutral | 1 | 1890–1890 |
| Bryan v. Uland green | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.