granting clause in Kansas

1911From this point to the operative words of the granting clause expressions are used which include all the land which had been previously mentioned: “Did give . . : certificates of that date as in such case provided by law for and concerning each of the said parcels, tracts and lots.” “Did . . . assign . . . the said certificates of sale and all the interest of said county in said property.” “None of the said property has been redeemed.” “Said unredeemed real property having been advertised and notices given that it would be conveyed.” “For and in consideration of the sum of ninety-nine dollars

1891The granting clause then provides that in consideration of the taxes due and paid on “said land,” the county clerk grants, bargains and sells to Cartwright “the real property last hereinbefore described.” It is claimed that the “property last hereinbefore described” is only the south half of lot 22, and that under the decision of Spicer v. Howe, 38 Kas. 465 , it must be held that the deed was ineffectual to convey lots 28 and 30, which are in controversy.

1911In looking backward from the phrase “the real property last hereinbefore described,” to ascertain what real estate, is meant, a number of inclusive references to both tracts are immediately encountered, and when descriptions in the technical sense of the term are reached the two are given cumulatively, the purpose being to keep them separate but not to discriminate between them. ■ In the case of Cartwright v. Korman, 45 Kan. 515 , three features of the deed considered were noted as indicating that all the lots described were conveyed.

1906Preceding the granting clause, however, the lands of the.entire list are referred to collectively as “said property” and “said unredeemed real property,” and nowhere in the deed is any one tract or part of a tract singled out from the rest so as to be identified by the phrase “the real property last hereinbefore described.” The case is therefore similar to, and must be controlled by, Cartwright v. Korman, 45 Kan. 515 , 26 Pac. 48 , which is distinguished from Spicer v. Howe upon these grounds.

2016“To that end, the legislature enacted the [Kansas Healing Arts] Act and established the Board [of Healing Arts] as the administrative agency charged with administering tire Act under K.S.A. 65-2812.” Ryser, 295 Kan. at 464 .

2015It was necessary to place this paragraph in the deed in order that appellees would be protected under the general warranty clause; and appellants were entitled (in connection with, and as a part of, the ‘subject to’ clause) to assure themselves that they would receive their share of the royalty under the lease to which their mineral interest, recited in tire granting clause, entitled them.” Kokernot, 231 S.W.2d at 531 .

2001The plaintiff argues that the case at hand is similar to Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 226 Kan. 1 , 596 P.2d 446 (1979).

2001The plaintiff argues that the case at hand is similar to Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 226 Kan. 1 , 596 P.2d 446 (1979).

1999The court relied on Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29 , 340 P.2d 919 (1959), which was a “wash out” overriding royalty case where we held if the parties intended to have a covenant apply to unrelated leases subsequently acquired on the same property they would have put language in the granting clause of an overriding royalty assignment to that effect.

1999The court relied on Drilling, Inc. v. Warren, 185 Kan. 29 , 340 P.2d 919 (1959), which was a “wash out” overriding royalty case where we held if the parties intended to have a covenant apply to unrelated leases subsequently acquired on the same property they would have put language in the granting clause of an overriding royalty assignment to that effect.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1989K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 55-605 states that “notice shall state the time and place of hearing and contain such other information as will briefly and adequately disclose the matter to *175 be considered or the relief sought.” Appellants cite Day v. State Corporation Commission, 185 Kan. 165 , 341 P.2d 1028 , modified 185 Kan. 382 , 345 P.2d 651 (1959), in which we held the Commission could not unilaterally grant an exception to the rules of the B.P.O. if the B.P.O. did not allow the granting of an exception.

1987Dicta in In re Birdsong, 216 Kan. 297, 302-03 , 532 P.2d 1301 (1975), also supports this conclusion.

1987Dicta in In re Birdsong, 216 Kan. 297, 302-03 , 532 P.2d 1301 (1975), also supports this conclusion.

1985Co., 189 Kan. at 126-36 , is not on all fours in that it involved other language in the instrument and is otherwise factually distinguishable, I find the following from that case apropos to the case before us and supportive of the result I believe we should reach: "[T]he defendant executed and delivered its special warranty deed to plaintiffs conveying the real estate in fee simple subject to ... [a] reservation, in the granting clause, which reads: *161 "`... reserving ... an undivided [fractional] interest in and to all oil, gas or other minerals . .. in or under the said land....

1985Co., 189 Kan. at 126-36 , is not on all fours in that it involved other language in the instrument and is otherwise factually distinguishable, I find the following from that case apropos to the case before us and supportive of the result I believe we should reach: “[T]he defendant executed and delivered its special warranty deed to plaintiffs conveying the real estate in fee simple subject to . . . [a] reservation, in the granting clause, which reads: “ \ . . reserving ... an undivided [fractional] interest in and to all oil, gas or other minerals ... in or under the said land ....

1981(Hickey v. Dirks, supra, p. 330)” 170 Kan. at 423-424 .

1971If the leased premises are now or hereafter owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, may be developed and operated as an entirety, and the royalties shall be paid to each separate owner in the proportion that the acreage owned by him bears to the entire leased area. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The validity of an entirety clause in an oil and gas lease was upheld and its effect discussed in Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 179 Kan. 84 , 292 P. 2d 1107 .

1971If the leased premises are now or hereafter owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, may be developed and operated as an entirety, and the royalties shall be paid to each separate owner in the proportion that the acreage owned by him bears to the entire leased area. . . .” (Emphasis added.) The validity of an entirety clause in an oil and gas lease was upheld and its effect discussed in Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 179 Kan. 84 , 292 P. 2d 1107 .

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1938Nor are such cases as Chamberlain v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 341 , 191 Pac. 261 , In re Irish, 122 Kan. 33 , 250 Pac. 1056 , or Hair v. City of Humboldt, 133 Kan. 67 , 299 Pac. 268 , pertaining to unreasonable discrimination, in point.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1920(Palmer v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712 , 57 Pac. 947 ; Abbott v. Perkins, 90 Kan. 45 , 132 Pac. 1177 ; Markham v. Waterman, 105 Kan. 93 , 181 Pac. 621 .) The children named in the clause are the children named as grantees, and the heirs spoken of in the instrument are not the heirs of the plaintiff but the heirs of the children.

1913It was held in Vawter v. Newman, 74 Kan. 290 , 86 Pac. 135 , that the intention of the grantor or donor should be determined from the in strument and from the relationship of the parties and the apparent purpose sought to be accomplished.

1913It was held in Vawter v. Newman, 74 Kan. 290 , 86 Pac. 135 , that the intention of the grantor or donor should be determined from the in strument and from the relationship of the parties and the apparent purpose sought to be accomplished.

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3

1911But we prefer the view expressed by Mr. Justice Brown, in Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C. 394 : “But this doctrine, which regarded the granting clause and the habendum and the tenendum as separate and independent portions of the same instrument, each with its especial function, is becoming obsolete in this country, and a more liberal and enlightened rule of construction obtains, which looks at the whole instrument without reference to formal divisions, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties, and does not permit • antiquated technicalities to override the plainly expressed intention

1911Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan. 381, 390 .” (Downer v. Schmidt, 85 Kan. 513, 514 , 117 Pac. 1013 .) While a deed which shows on its face that the purchaser paid into the county treasury less than the law requires is void (Douglass v. Lowell, 60 Kan. 239 , 56 Pac. 13 ; Manker v. Peck, 71 Kan. 865 , 81 Pac. 171 ; Wilks v. De Hart, 78 Kan. 217 , 95 Pac. 836 ), still a deed which shows that it was actually executed for the proper and lawful consideration is not avoided by the mere understatement thereof in a recital found in the granting clause (Bowman, et al., v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311 ; Mack v. Price, 3