granting clause in Nebraska

1993City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626 , 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).

1993City of Gering v. Jones, 175 Neb. 626 , 122 N.W.2d 503 (1963).

1992The language of the deeds stated in the granting clause that the grantors, “being desirous of the constructon [sic] of said railroad, *683 and to aid the same by the grant herein made ... do give, grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm . . . for the purpose of constructing a railroad thereon, and for all uses and purposes connected with the construction and use of said railroad, a strip of land____” (Emphasis in original.) Bode, 197 Neb. at 490 , 249 N.W.2d at 752 .

1992The language of the deeds stated in the granting clause that the grantors, “being desirous of the constructon [sic] of said railroad, *683 and to aid the same by the grant herein made ... do give, grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm . . . for the purpose of constructing a railroad thereon, and for all uses and purposes connected with the construction and use of said railroad, a strip of land____” (Emphasis in original.) Bode, 197 Neb. at 490 , 249 N.W.2d at 752 .

1988In support of his argument he cites to Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980), in which the court recognized two situations where the due process clause would compel the granting of immunity to a defense witness.

1988The first involves a situation where the government’s decision not to grant immunity is made “with the ‘deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process.’ ” Id. at 966 .

1969In Carr v. Miller, 105 Neb. 623 , 181 N. W. 557 , the pertinent language of the deed was: “* * * does, hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the said Omaha Bridge and Terminal Railway Company, its successors and assigns, for terminal and railway purposes and uses, the following described real estate * * This court said: “We think that the words quoted amount at most only to a description of the use to which the land was to be put, or at most a covenant for the violation of which a suit for damages might be maintained. * * * We find nothing in the words, ‘for terminal and railway purpose

1969In Carr v. Miller, 105 Neb. 623 , 181 N. W. 557 , the pertinent language of the deed was: “* * * does, hereby grant, bargain, sell, and convey unto the said Omaha Bridge and Terminal Railway Company, its successors and assigns, for terminal and railway purposes and uses, the following described real estate * * This court said: “We think that the words quoted amount at most only to a description of the use to which the land was to be put, or at most a covenant for the violation of which a suit for damages might be maintained. * * * We find nothing in the words, ‘for terminal and railway purpose

1963Clark v. Continental National Bank, 88 F. Supp. 324 ; Annotation, 84 A. L.

1941The final reference to the Pegg case is in Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310 , 257 S. W. 1044 , on the proposition that a “limitation expressed in the habendum cannot destroy the fee conveyed by the granting clause.” It is noted that the Pegg case deals with the creation of an estate by the entireties.

1928In Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 599 , the granting clause, technically called “premises,” and the habendum were the same as in.the case at bar.

1928In Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587, 599 , the granting clause, technically called “premises,” and the habendum were the same as in.the case at bar.

1921In the case of George v. Pracheil, supra, the deed to the railway company, and which was decisive of the case, contained after the granting clause an express provision for reversion, as follows: “Provided that in case said railroad company do' not construct their road through said tract, or shall after construction permanently abandon the route through said tract of land, then the same shall revert to and become reinvested in the said grantors, heirs and assigns.” It is obvious from the language just quoted that the case cited could not by any possibility be held to sustain the appellees’ cont

1917This suggestion is answered in Albin v. Parmele, supra, with the suggestion: “That which the statute expressly requires shall be consistent with the general rules of law is not the construction of the instrument, but the intent of the parties. * * * It cannot be pretended that an intent to limit a remainder in fee to the heirs at law of one to whom is given the precedent freehold is inconsistent with any general rule of law.” The language of the granting clause of this deed so plainly shows an intent of the grantor to convey to the grantee a life estate with the remainder to his heirs that it

1913In Pritchard v. James, 93 Ky. 306 , the deed named “Julia James and her heirs” as the parties of the second part, and the granting clause recited that the party of the first part, “hath granted, bargained and sold unto the said Julia A. James and her heirs” the land described.

1896Rep. [Tex.], 306; Cox v. Hart, 145 U. S., 376 ; Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal., 335 ; Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev., 228 ; Harris v. Broiles, 22 S. W.

1896Rep. [Tex.], 306; Cox v. Hart, 145 U. S., 376 ; Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal., 335 ; Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev., 228 ; Harris v. Broiles, 22 S. W.

1896Rep. [Tex.], 306; Cox v. Hart, 145 U. S., 376 ; Frey v. Clifford, 44 Cal., 335 ; Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev., 228 ; Harris v. Broiles, 22 S. W.

1896Rep. [Tex.], 1007; Perry v. Scott, 109 N. Car., 374.) A deed simply describing in the granting clause all the grantor’s lands in the state, dr within a certain county or city, is not void for indefiniteness, but is a sufficient description, since it can be made certain by evidence- aliunde of what lands the grantor at the time owned. (1 Dembitz, Land Titles, sec. 6; Witt v. Harlan, 66 Tex., 660 ; Hervey v. Edens, 6 S. W.