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18 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1955–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Royse v. Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. of North Dakotagreen2 sentences2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc 2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc | 6 | 6 |
Kynerd v. Hulengreen2 sentences2015See Kynerd v. Hulen , 5 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1925) (use of the words “over” and “through” does not indicate an intent to convey an easement, use was descriptive); Tazian v. Cline , 686 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind. 1997) (deed does not contain any language in the granting clause limiting the use or purposes of the land and use of the phrase “over, across and through” was descriptive). 2015See Kynerd v. Hulen, 5 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1925) (use of the words “over” and “through” does not indicate an intent to convey an easement, use was descriptive); Tazian v. Cline, 686 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind.1997) (deed does not contain any language in the granting clause limiting the use or purposes of the land and use of the phrase “over, across and through” was descriptive). | 3 | 3 |
Egeland v. Continental Resources, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Egeland v. Continental Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169 , ¶ 3 n. 1, 616 N.W.2d 861 ; Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N.D. 292 , 152 N.W. 803, 807 (1915); 23 Am. 2015See Egeland v. Continental Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169 , ¶ 3 n. 1, 616 N.W.2d 861 ; Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N.D. 292 , 152 N.W. 803, 807 (1915); 23 Am. | 2 | 2 |
Tazian v. Clinegreen2 sentences2015See Kynerd v. Hulen , 5 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir. 1925) (use of the words “over” and “through” does not indicate an intent to convey an easement, use was descriptive); Tazian v. Cline , 686 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind. 1997) (deed does not contain any language in the granting clause limiting the use or purposes of the land and use of the phrase “over, across and through” was descriptive). 2015See Kynerd v. Hulen, 5 F.2d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1925) (use of the words “over” and “through” does not indicate an intent to convey an easement, use was descriptive); Tazian v. Cline, 686 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind.1997) (deed does not contain any language in the granting clause limiting the use or purposes of the land and use of the phrase “over, across and through” was descriptive). | 2 | 2 |
Marvin J. Bockelman v. MCI WorldComgreen2 sentences2015Cf. Bockelman , 403 F.3d at 532 (deed uses the term “strip of land” and does not limit the use of the land to railroad purposes, which indicate the conveyance of a fee simple absolute); Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States , 97 Fed. 2015Cf. Bockelman, 403 F.3d at 532 (deed uses the term “strip of land” and does not limit the use of the land to railroad purposes, which indicate the conveyance of a fee simple absolute); Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 324, 334-37 (2011) (deed conveyed fee simple when it conveyed land, warrants title, and contains no limitations on use of land); Union Pac. | 2 | 2 |
Hubbert v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Cf. Hubberb, 58 Fed.Cl. at 615 (use of the “right of way” language provided a means to identify the relevant property and was not intended to limit the interest conveyed). [¶ 35] The Grant, Olson, Blatt, Kline, and Trana deeds all contain the same granting clause, which conveys a piece, parcel, or tract of land and does not contain any limitations or exceptions. 2015See Hubbert v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 613, 616 (2003); Poznic, 779 N.E.2d at 1189-92 . | 2 | 2 |
Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015Cf. Bockelman , 403 F.3d at 532 (deed uses the term “strip of land” and does not limit the use of the land to railroad purposes, which indicate the conveyance of a fee simple absolute); Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States , 97 Fed. 2015Cf. Bockelman, 403 F.3d at 532 (deed uses the term “strip of land” and does not limit the use of the land to railroad purposes, which indicate the conveyance of a fee simple absolute); Whispell Foreign Cars, Inc. v. United States, 97 Fed.Cl. 324, 334-37 (2011) (deed conveyed fee simple when it conveyed land, warrants title, and contains no limitations on use of land); Union Pac. | 2 | 2 |
Harney v. Wirtzgreen2 sentences2015See Egeland v. Continental Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169 , ¶ 3 n. 1, 616 N.W.2d 861 ; Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N.D. 292 , 152 N.W. 803, 807 (1915); 23 Am. 2015See Egeland v. Continental Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169 , ¶ 3 n. 1, 616 N.W.2d 861 ; Harney v. Wirtz, 30 N.D. 292 , 152 N.W. 803, 807 (1915); 23 Am. | 2 | 2 |
Gawryluk v. Poyntergreen2 sentences2012See Gawryluk, 2002 ND 205, ¶ 14 , 654 N.W.2d 400 ; Miller, 1999 ND 190, ¶¶ 16-17 , 600 N.W.2d 881 . [¶ 11] The plain language of the Estate’s deed to Waldock’s predecessor in interest grants all the right, title, estate, and interest of the decedent at the time of his death. 2012See Gawryluk, 2002 ND 205, ¶ 14 , 654 N.W.2d 400 ; Miller, 1999 ND 190, ¶¶ 16-17 , 600 N.W.2d 881 . [¶ 11] The plain language of the Estate’s deed to Waldock’s predecessor in interest grants all the right, title, estate, and interest of the decedent at the time of his death. | 2 | 2 |
Corbett v. La Beregreen2 sentences2024It does not modify or limit the granting clause. 6 Id. [¶18] Like in Corbett, the granting clauses in the 1937 Assignments do not contain words of limitation. 2024Although Tank acknowledges the Corbett decision addresses similar assignment language, he attempts to distinguish the Corbett case from this case because the “royalty clauses” here also contain the additional words “as well as any lease, or leases, that may be hereafter made covering said premises.” Tank’s argument is unavailing. [¶17] In Corbett, 68 N.W.2d at 216 , this Court held the additional language in the habendum clause contained no words of limitation and did not modify or limit the granting clause. | 1 | 2 |
Mueller v. Stangelandgreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. 1999In Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), the granting clause of a deed conveyed without reserving or excepting any minerals. | 1 | 2 |
Roll v. Kellergreen2 sentences2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. 1996Our conclusion in this case is supported by the decision in Royse v. Easter Seal Society *754 for Crippled Children, 256 N.W.2d 542, 545 (N.D.1977), cited with approval in Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d at 651 , wherein this court determined that exceptions or exclusions of property should be prominently set forth in the granting clause of a deed and that anything short of this encourages practices which lend themselves readily to fraud and deception. | 1 | 2 |
Radspinner v. Charlesworthgreen1 sentence2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. | 1 | 1 |
North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefieldgreen1 sentence2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. | 1 | 1 |
BOARD OF COUNTY COMM'RS OF CHOCTAW COUNTY v. Weavergreen1 sentence1977See, Board of County Commissioners of Choctaw County v. Weaver, 426 P.2d 696 (Okl.1967); Bascom v. Maxey, 195 Okl. 259 , 157 P.2d 158 (1945), for cases holding that exceptions in the habendum clause of a warranty deed cannot be held as a reservation of any part of the title conveyed by the granting clause, but must be construed as exceptions to the covenant of warranty. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kadrmas v. Sauvageau
green
2 sentences2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 1999The granting clause provided: “excepting and reserving unto the grantors One-half ( ½) of all oil, gas, Uranium and all other minerals.” Id. at 754 . | 3 | 1999–2025 |
Miller v. Kloeckner
green
2 sentences2015Wagner , at ¶ 8. [¶ 8] While the purpose of a granting clause is to define and designate the estate conveyed, exceptions inserted in a warranty clause generally “are intended only to protect the grantor on the warranty and are not intended as a limitation on the nature of the interest conveyed by the granting clause.” Miller v. Kloeckner, 1999 ND 190, ¶ 15 , 600 N.W.2d 881 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 2015Wagner , at ¶ 8. [¶ 8] While the purpose of a granting clause is to define and designate the estate conveyed, exceptions inserted in a warranty clause generally “are intended only to protect the grantor on the warranty and are not intended as a limitation on the nature of the interest conveyed by the granting clause.” Miller v. Kloeckner, 1999 ND 190, ¶ 15 , 600 N.W.2d 881 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 2012–2015 |
Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corporation
neutral
2 sentences2015They contend the granting clause conveys an absolute interest in “land,” without exception or limitation, and the habendum and warranty clauses are equally absolute. [¶ 24] “[T]he specific language of the granting clause of the deed controls the interests the grantor purport ed to give the grantee.” Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp., 2012 ND 180, ¶ 10 , 820 N.W.2d 755 . 2015A majority of the Court stated: “[T]he specific language of the granting clause of the deed controls the interests the grantor purported to give the grantee.” Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp., 2012 ND 180, ¶ 10 , 820 N.W.2d 755 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp.
neutral
2 sentences2015They contend the granting clause conveys an absolute interest in “land,” without exception or limitation, and the habendum and warranty clauses are equally absolute. [¶ 24] “[T]he specific language of the granting clause of the deed controls the interests the grantor purport ed to give the grantee.” Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp., 2012 ND 180, ¶ 10 , 820 N.W.2d 755 . 2015A majority of the Court stated: “[T]he specific language of the granting clause of the deed controls the interests the grantor purported to give the grantee.” Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp., 2012 ND 180, ¶ 10 , 820 N.W.2d 755 . | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). 2025The Duhig rule, adopted by this Court in Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971), derived from a Texas Supreme Court case, Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Johnson v. Shield
green
2 sentences2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc 2020The Muhlbradt plaintiffs argue the court’s decision was based on the warranty deed’s unambiguous language alone. [¶15] Our decision in Johnson v. Shield, 2015 ND 200, ¶ 8 , 868 N.W.2d 368 , is instructive, recognizing “that reservations or exceptions of property interests may appear in any part of a deed, including the warranty clause,” and stating “[e]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Id. (quoting Royse v. Easter Seal Soc | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Fail
green
2 sentences2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. 2015Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7 , 751 N.W.2d 188 ; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court’s decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Poznic v. Porter County Development Corp.
green
1 sentence2015See Hubbert v. United States, 58 Fed.Cl. 613, 616 (2003); Poznic, 779 N.E.2d at 1189-92 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stracka v. Peterson
green
1 sentence1999“A special warranty deed warrants title only against claims held by, through, or under the grantor, or against encumbrances made or suffered by her, and it cannot be held to warrant title generally against all persons.” Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580 , 583 n. 6 (N.D.1985). [¶ 15] A warranty does not define the estate conveyed: The purpose of a granting clause is “to define and designate the estate conveyed.” Kynerd v. Hulen, 5 F.2d 160, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 560 , 46 S.Ct. 20 , 70 L.Ed. 411 (1925).... | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Stetson v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1983RESERVING HOWEVER, to parties of the first part a life estate in the one-third (⅛) interest hereby conveyed.” Dorothy was named in the instrument as a party of the first part and was not a stranger to the instrument, whereas the person receiving the reserved interest in Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D.1962), was not a party to the instrument. 1983RESERVING HOWEVER, to parties of the first part a life estate in the one-third (1/3) interest hereby conveyed." Dorothy was named in the instrument as a party of the first part and was not a stranger to the instrument, whereas the person receiving the reserved interest in Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685 (N.D. 1962), was not a party to the instrument. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Christman v. Emineth
green
1 sentence1977Spren-gers expressed the intent and used the appropriate words to give rise to a reservation; that is, “something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant.” Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D.1973). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bascom v. Maxey
neutral
2 sentences1977See, Board of County Commissioners of Choctaw County v. Weaver, 426 P.2d 696 (Okl.1967); Bascom v. Maxey, 195 Okl. 259 , 157 P.2d 158 (1945), for cases holding that exceptions in the habendum clause of a warranty deed cannot be held as a reservation of any part of the title conveyed by the granting clause, but must be construed as exceptions to the covenant of warranty. 1977See, Board of County Commissioners of Choctaw County v. Weaver, 426 P.2d 696 (Okl.1967); Bascom v. Maxey, 195 Okl. 259 , 157 P.2d 158 (1945), for cases holding that exceptions in the habendum clause of a warranty deed cannot be held as a reservation of any part of the title conveyed by the granting clause, but must be construed as exceptions to the covenant of warranty. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden
green
2 sentences1955In Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637 , 52 P.2d 237, 245 , decided by the Supreme Court of California in banc, it is said: “Language of a grant is to be construed most strongly against the grantor. 1955In Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 Cal.2d 637 , 52 P.2d 237, 245 , decided by the Supreme Court of California in banc, it is said: “Language of a grant is to be construed most strongly against the grantor. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.