granting hearing in New York

2012Plaintiff next contends that Supreme Court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s actions after the accident on the ground of relevance. “[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or nonexistence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case” (People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351, 355 [2001]), and the determination is within the trial court’s discretion (see Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504, 508 [1967]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-101 [Farrell 11th ed]).

2012Plaintiff next contends that Supreme Court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s actions after the accident on the ground of relevance. “[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or nonexistence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case” (People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351, 355 [2001]), and the determination is within the trial court’s discretion (see Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504, 508 [1967]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-101 [Farrell 11th ed]).

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Granting defendants, as we must, “the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Macri v Smith, 23 AD3d 971, 972 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), it cannot be said that the jury’s determination is unsupported by any fair interpretation of the evidence.

2012Granting defendants, as we must, “the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Macri v Smith, 23 AD3d 971, 972 [2005] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]), it cannot be said that the jury’s determination is unsupported by any fair interpretation of the evidence.

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff herself also admitted that she believed the barn to be “pretty well maintained.” “Granting defendants, as we must, the benefit of every favorable inference reasonably drawn from the facts adduced at trial” (Johnson v Ingalls, 95 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), we are unable to conclude that “the evidence so preponderate[d] in [plaintiff’s] favor . . . that [the verdict] could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence” (Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; a

2012Plaintiff next contends that Supreme Court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s actions after the accident on the ground of relevance. “[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or nonexistence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case” (People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351, 355 [2001]), and the determination is within the trial court’s discretion (see Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504, 508 [1967]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-101 [Farrell 11th ed]).

2012Plaintiff next contends that Supreme Court erred in excluding evidence of defendant’s actions after the accident on the ground of relevance. “[E]vidence is relevant if it tends to prove the existence or nonexistence of a material fact, i.e., a fact directly at issue in the case” (People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351, 355 [2001]), and the determination is within the trial court’s discretion (see Radosh v Shipstad, 20 NY2d 504, 508 [1967]; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-101 [Farrell 11th ed]).

2003(See People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 [1st Dept 1982], lv denied 58 NY2d 784 [1982]; cf. People v Santiago, 147 Misc 2d 143, 145 [Crim Ct, NY County 1990] [‘the granting of a hearing may be properly considered a part of motion practice and thus excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (a)’].) Thus . . . the People were entitled to a reasonable adjournment to prepare for the hearing that had been ordered.” (People v Simpkins, 193 Misc 2d 148, 151-152 [2001], affd 193 Misc 2d 447 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 585 [2003].) Under this reasoning, the entire period from service of defendant’s omnibus motion thro

2001(See People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 [1st Dept], lv denied 58 NY2d 784 [1982]; cf. People v Santiago, 147 Misc 2d 143, 145 [Crim Ct, NY County 1990] [“the granting of a hearing may be properly considered a part of motion practice and thus excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (a)”].) Thus, as defendant commendably concedes, the period from August 24th through September 22nd must be excluded because the People were entitled to a reasonable adjournment to prepare for the hearing that had been ordered.

1971Nevertheless, “bare allegations not confirmed by the recorded facts and contrary to the conduct of the defendant and his attorney, are insufficient in law to warrant the granting of a hearing. * * * Due process does not require a court to accept every sworn allegation as true.” (Peo ple v. Vellucci, 13 N Y 2d 665, 666-667, quoting from People v. White, 309 N. Y. 636, 640-641 , cert. den. 352 U. S. 849 .) In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that defendant’s present assertions are conclusively refuted by unquestionable documentary proof that he was aware of his right to appeal and cou

1969The People argue in effect that “ [b] are allegations not confirmed by the recorded facts and contrary to the conduct of the defendant and his attorney, are insufficient in law to warrant the granting of a hearing ” and that “ [d]ue process does not require a court to accept every sworn allegation as true ”, especially when the District Attorney traverses the applicant’s factual allegations, citing eases such as People v. Lake (14 N Y 2d 790), People v. Scott (10 N Y 2d 380) and People v. White ( 309 N. Y. 636, 640-641 ).

2004In People v Castagna ( 196 AD2d 879, 880 [2d Dept 1993]), the defendant learned during a Huntley-Dunaway hearing that defendant was identified by a police officer in a photo array.

2003(See People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 [1st Dept 1982], lv denied 58 NY2d 784 [1982]; cf. People v Santiago, 147 Misc 2d 143, 145 [Crim Ct, NY County 1990] [‘the granting of a hearing may be properly considered a part of motion practice and thus excludable pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (a)’].) Thus . . . the People were entitled to a reasonable adjournment to prepare for the hearing that had been ordered.” (People v Simpkins, 193 Misc 2d 148, 151-152 [2001], affd 193 Misc 2d 447 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 585 [2003].) Under this reasoning, the entire period from service of defendant’s omnibus motion thro

2003The court fails to see how the speedy trial “clock” could “tick” during such a period, especially since a suppression issue is of the same character as a motion to inspect and dismiss, i.e., pendency of either motion impedes commencement of the trial (People v Simpkins, supra at 153; CPL 710.40 [3]; see, e.g., People v Lloyd, 141 AD2d 669 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 787 [1988]; compare, People v McKenna, supra at 64).

2003The court fails to see how the speedy trial “clock” could “tick” during such a period, especially since a suppression issue is of the same character as a motion to inspect and dismiss, i.e., pendency of either motion impedes commencement of the trial (People v Simpkins, supra at 153; CPL 710.40 [3]; see, e.g., People v Lloyd, 141 AD2d 669 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 787 [1988]; compare, People v McKenna, supra at 64).

2003The court fails to see how the speedy trial “clock” could “tick” during such a period, especially since a suppression issue is of the same character as a motion to inspect and dismiss, i.e., pendency of either motion impedes commencement of the trial (People v Simpkins, supra at 153; CPL 710.40 [3]; see, e.g., People v Lloyd, 141 AD2d 669 [2d Dept 1988], lv denied 73 NY2d 787 [1988]; compare, People v McKenna, supra at 64).

2001If, on the other hand, the granting clause stated that they were to take “ ‘as joint tenants with right of survivorship, among all [three] of said individuals,’ ” then a three-way joint tenancy would have been created giving the word “all” significance (Prario v Novo, supra, at 613 ; see, Tedesco v Tedesco, 269 AD2d 660 ).