public policy exception in West Virginia

2023Va. 740 , 559 S.E.2d 713 (2001) (“When an at will employee has been discharged from his/her employment based upon his/her exercise of self-defense in response to lethal imminent danger, such right of self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy exception to the at will employment doctrine and will sustain a cause of action for wrongful discharge.”).

2019In Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 210 W.Va. 740 , 559 S.E.2d 713 (2001), this Court recognized that in certain circumstances, the right of self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine as allowed by Harless.

2019This kind of deception is to be expected with an exception that is so broadly defined.”62 Balancing the countervailing policy interests at issue here, we decline twelve employees has no statutory claim for retaliatory discharge under West Virginia Human Rights Act, discharged employee might nevertheless maintain a common law claim for retaliatory discharge against the employer.); Kanagy, 208 W.Va. 526 , 541 S.E.2d 616 (finding substantial public policy in regulations governing Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists that require all licensees to report violations of regulations to the Board); Tudo

1995In Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 169 W.Va. 72, 76 , 285 S.E.2d 679, 682 (1981), we again considered Massachusetts’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing but then noted that [in] Harless’s rationale there was a substantial public policy against fraud and applied a *244 two year statute of limitation.

2019Co., 183 W.Va. at 413 , 396 S.E.2d at 180 (reiterating that where a statute is designed to protect one specific group and not a broad societal interest, there was no substantial public policy interest in insurance agent’s allegations that he was terminated for objecting to his employer’s illegal use of client funds to finance new insurance policies) (internal citations omitted).

2019Co., 183 W.Va. at 413 , 396 S.E.2d at 180 (reiterating that where a statute is designed to protect one specific group and not a broad societal interest, there was no substantial public policy interest in insurance agent’s allegations that he was terminated for objecting to his employer’s illegal use of client funds to finance new insurance policies) (internal citations omitted).

2018Va. 2016) ("Because our resolution of the first issue raised by Mr. Littell is dispositive of the case sub judice, we need not address his remaining assignments of error[.]"); State v. Stewart , 228 W.

2018Va. 2016) (“Because our resolution of the first issue raised by Mr. Littell is dispositive of the case sub judice, we need not address his remaining assignments of error[.]”); State v. Stewart, 228 W.

2023Therefore, “[a]n employer should not be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different 9 interpretations.” Id.

2023Va. at 377 , 424 S.E.2d at 612 (“An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations.”).

2019An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations.[19] 16 Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. 321, 325 , 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 17 Syl.

2019An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations.[19] 16 Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. 321, 325 , 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 17 Syl.

2024Paul, 177 W.

2017See Paul v. Nat’l Life, 177 W.Va. 427 , 352 S.E.2d 550 (1986).

2019West Virginia’s criminal statutes reflect myriad expressions of the public policy to encourage the reporting of crimes and correction of activities harmful to our citizenry.2 In Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981), the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this very issue and expanded its common law to protect 1 Margaret C.

2016Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ill. 2009) (“A broad, general statement of policy is inadequate to justify finding an exception to the general rule of at-will employment.”). 1 See Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368, 382 , 90 S.E.2d 459, 469 (1955) (“Under the law governing the relation of master and servant, an employment unaffected by contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, may be terminated, with or without cause, at the will of either party to the contract of employment.). 9 Unquestionably, the tort of retaliatory discharge is an attempt to strike “a proper ba

2010In resolving the current case, this Court must determine whether reporting potentially criminal conduct to a private employer is a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 7 In West Virginia, it has been a long-established rule that “[w]hen a contract of employment is of indefinite duration it may be terminated at any time by either party to the contract.” Syl. pt. 2, Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368 , 90 S.E.2d 459 (1955).

2010In resolving the current case, this Court must determine whether reporting potentially criminal conduct to a private employer is a substantial public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 7 In West Virginia, it has been a long-established rule that “[w]hen a contract of employment is of indefinite duration it may be terminated at any time by either party to the contract.” Syl. pt. 2, Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368 , 90 S.E.2d 459 (1955).

1998In syllabus point 2 of Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 188 W.Va. 371 , 424 S.E.2d 606 (1992), we held that "[t]o identify the sources of public policy for purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred, we look to established precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial opinions." Numerous courts in other jurisdictions, in making a determination of whether a public policy standard has been violated, unanimously take the position that public policy has to be preexisting and germinate from constitution

1998In syllabus point 2 of Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 188 W.Va. 371 , 424 S.E.2d 606 (1992), we held that "[t]o identify the sources of public policy for purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred, we look to established precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial opinions." Numerous courts in other jurisdictions, in making a determination of whether a public policy standard has been violated, unanimously take the position that public policy has to be preexisting and germinate from constitution

2019See Paralegal, 783 F.Supp. at 232 (finding public policy against falsifying material facts and evidence from Rules 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(a), and 3.4(b)).

2019In support, he cites to a footnote in Scott Runyan Pontiac- Buick, Inc., 194 W.

2019And “[t]o qualify for the public policy exception to at-will employment, the employee must report the suspected criminal activity to the appropriate law enforcement or judicial official, not merely investigate suspected wrong- doing and discuss that investigation with co-employees or supervisors.” Id. at 496 ; see also Miller v. U.S. Foodservice, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 2d 607 (D.

2017Following Nadler, we addressed the same type of conflicts of law issue that the MLP was asked to examine here, and we set forth grounds for application of the public policy exception to the doctrine of lex loci delicti in Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 203 W.Va. 621 , 510 S.E.2d 280 (1998).

2017Following Nadler, we addressed the same type of conflicts of law issue that the MLP was asked to examine here, and we set forth grounds for application of the public policy exception to the doctrine of lex loci delicti in Mills v. Quality Supplier Trucking, Inc., 203 W.Va. 621 , 510 S.E.2d 280 (1998).

2016As the Supreme Court of Iowa observed: “Any effort to evaluate the public policy exception with generalized concepts of fairness and justice will result in an elimination of the at-will doctrine itself.” Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc., 613 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Iowa 2000).

2016Moreover, “it could unwittingly transform the public policy exception into a ‘good faith and fair dealing’ exception[.]” Id. at 283 ; see also Turner v. Mem’l Med.

2016Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 375 (Ill. 2009) (“A broad, general statement of policy is inadequate to justify finding an exception to the general rule of at-will employment.”). 1 See Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368, 382 , 90 S.E.2d 459, 469 (1955) (“Under the law governing the relation of master and servant, an employment unaffected by contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, may be terminated, with or without cause, at the will of either party to the contract of employment.). 9 Unquestionably, the tort of retaliatory discharge is an attempt to strike “a proper ba

2016Just last year, this Court stated that “a Harless-based action requires more than simply raising the [spectre] of a potentially governing law.” Frohnapfel v. ArcelorMittal USA LLC, 235 W.Va. 165, 170 , 772 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2015).

2016Just last year, this Court stated that “a Harless-based action requires more than simply raising the [spectre] of a potentially governing law.” Frohnapfel v. ArcelorMittal USA LLC, 235 W.Va. 165, 170 , 772 S.E.2d 350, 355 (2015).