public policy exception in Kentucky

2024In Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc., 575 S.W.3d 650 (Ky. 2019), the Kentucky Supreme Court recently summarized the scope of the public policy exception, stating as follows: Only three circumstances exist in which a discharge will be actionable as contrary to public policy: (1) when there are “explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge,” (2) when “the alleged reason for the discharge . . . was the employee’s failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment,” or (3) when “the reason for the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by w

2024Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985); Firestone Textile Co. Div., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Ky. 1983).

2025In Brockmeyer v. Dun & -4- Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Wis. 1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a narrow public policy exception to at-will employment was in the best interest of “employees, employers and the public . . . .” Id. at 840 . [A]n employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law. . . .

2025In Brockmeyer v. Dun & -4- Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 835 (Wis. 1983), the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that a narrow public policy exception to at-will employment was in the best interest of “employees, employers and the public . . . .” Id. at 840 . [A]n employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law. . . .

2020Kentucky law also provides for a narrow public policy exception: “[an] employee has a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge is contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law.” Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at 731 (quoting Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis.2d 561 , 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (1983)).

2010We recognized in Firestone that, although the “terminable-at-will” doctrine should be retained, “a narrow public policy exception should be adopted” when the firing of an employee undermined a “most important public policy.” Id.

2024In Marshall v. Montaplast of North America, Inc., 575 S.W.3d 650 (Ky. 2019), the Kentucky Supreme Court recently summarized the scope of the public policy exception, stating as follows: Only three circumstances exist in which a discharge will be actionable as contrary to public policy: (1) when there are “explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge,” (2) when “the alleged reason for the discharge . . . was the employee’s failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment,” or (3) when “the reason for the discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by w

2020“In the context of a wrongful discharge case, preemption occurs when the statutes that establish the ‘well-defined public policy’ violation which supports the wrongful discharge pleading are the same statutes that establish a statutory cause of action for, and structure the remedy for, violations of that public policy.” Hill v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 421 (Ky. 2010).

2026The ability of private parties to enter into contracts is a core value in the Commonwealth of Kentucky: “competent persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into fairly and voluntarily shall be held sacred.” Yellow Cab Co. of Ashland v. Murphy, 243 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Ky. 1951) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2021“As much as we may wish to, this Court cannot, by judicial fiat, insert that right into the statutory scheme.” Id. at 656 . 1 Supreme Court Rules. 2 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -7- The Marshall case illustrates that the Court cannot expand the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine even when they “may wish.” Under stare decisis, “precedent is presumptively binding.” Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 451 (Ky. 2016).

2015Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Ky.1985)(qouting Suchodolski v. Michi gan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692 , 316 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1982)). .

2015Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401-02 (Ky.1985)(qouting Suchodolski v. Michi gan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692 , 316 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1982)). .

2013Since Burstein , Pennsylvania’s high Court has reiterated on at least two occasions that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq., at least as amended as of 2011, did not invalidate, with respect to the MVFRL’s underinsurance provisions, “ ‘long-standing [insurance] policy exclusions (including regularly-used non-owned car, household, and territorial exclusions) rooted in ensuring the collection of reasonable premiums (with reasonableness being monitored by the Insurance Department).’ ” Williams v. GEICO, 613 Pa. 113 , 32 A.3d 1195, 1208 (201

2013Since Burstein , Pennsylvania’s high Court has reiterated on at least two occasions that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq., at least as amended as of 2011, did not invalidate, with respect to the MVFRL’s underinsurance provisions, “ ‘long-standing [insurance] policy exclusions (including regularly-used non-owned car, household, and territorial exclusions) rooted in ensuring the collection of reasonable premiums (with reasonableness being monitored by the Insurance Department).’ ” Williams v. GEICO, 613 Pa. 113 , 32 A.3d 1195, 1208 (201

2013Since Burstein , Pennsylvania’s high Court has reiterated on at least two occasions that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq., at least as amended as of 2011, did not invalidate, with respect to the MVFRL’s underinsurance provisions, “ ‘long-standing [insurance] policy exclusions (including regularly-used non-owned car, household, and territorial exclusions) rooted in ensuring the collection of reasonable premiums (with reasonableness being monitored by the Insurance Department).’ ” Williams v. GEICO, 613 Pa. 113 , 32 A.3d 1195, 1208 (201

2013Since Burstein , Pennsylvania’s high Court has reiterated on at least two occasions that Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et seq., at least as amended as of 2011, did not invalidate, with respect to the MVFRL’s underinsurance provisions, “ ‘long-standing [insurance] policy exclusions (including regularly-used non-owned car, household, and territorial exclusions) rooted in ensuring the collection of reasonable premiums (with reasonableness being monitored by the Insurance Department).’ ” Williams v. GEICO, 613 Pa. 113 , 32 A.3d 1195, 1208 (201

2012See Maggard v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 425 (Ky.App.2005).

2009"Cause" here, of course, means legal or proximate cause, which "consists of a finding of causation in fact, i.e., substantial cause, and the absence of a public policy rule of law which prohibits the imposition of liability." Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Ky.1980).

2009United Parcel Service Company, supra. "Cause" here, of course, means legal or proximate cause, which "consists of a finding of causation in fact, ie, substantial cause, and the absence of a public policy rule of law which prohibits the imposition of liability." Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Ky.1980).