public policy exception in South Carolina

2015Courts have invoked the public policy exception in two instances: (1) where an employer requires an employee, as a condition of continued employment, to break the law, see id., and (2) where an employer’s termination is itself illegal, see Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec.

2013“The public policy exception clearly applies in cases where either (1) the employer requires the employee to violate the law, or (2) the reason for the employee’s termination itself is a violation of criminal law.” Barron, 393 S.C. at 614 , 713 S.E.2d at 637 ; see Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225 , 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (1985) (holding the public policy exception is invoked when an employer requires an at-will employee, as a condition of retaining employment, to violate the law); Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec.

2009Appellant urges this Court to expand the public policy exception, relying on the supreme court’s 1995 decision in Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corporation, 318 S.C. 223 , 456 S.E.2d 907 (1995).

2009Appellant urges this Court to expand the public policy exception, relying on the supreme court’s 1995 decision in Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corporation, 318 S.C. 223 , 456 S.E.2d 907 (1995).

2025Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 615 , 713 S.E.2d 634, 637 (2011) ("The public policy exception does not, however, extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination.").

2025Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 615 , 713 S.E.2d 634, 637 (2011) ("The public policy exception does not, however, extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination.").

2019Co-op., Inc. , our supreme court expanded the public policy exception elucidated in Ludwick to include instances when an employee's discharge is itself a violation of the law. 309 S.C. 243 , 246, 422 S.E.2d 91 , 92-93 (1992).

2019Co-op., Inc. , our supreme court expanded the public policy exception elucidated in Ludwick to include instances when an employee's discharge is itself a violation of the law. 309 S.C. 243 , 246, 422 S.E.2d 91 , 92-93 (1992).

2015The public policy exception, however, “has not yet been extended beyond [these two situations].” McNeil, 404 S.C. at 192 , 743 S.E.2d at 846 ; see also Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243 , 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015See id.; Taghivand, 411 S.C. at 243 , 768 S.E.2d at 387 (stating the public policy exception to at-will employment applies when “an employer requires an employee, as a condition of continued employment, to break the law ” (emphasis added)).

2013"The public policy exception does not, however, extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination." Id. at 615, 713 S.E.2d at 637 ; see Epps v. Clarendon Cnty., 304 S.C. 424, 426 , 405 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1991) (declining to extend the public policy exception when the employee has an existing remedy for a discharge that allegedly violates rights other than the right to the employment itself and stating that the appellant claimed an infringement of his constitutional rights to free speech and association, for which he could seek redress in a § 1983 a

2013"The public policy exception does not, however, extend to situations where the employee has an existing statutory remedy for wrongful termination." Id. at 615, 713 S.E.2d at 637 ; see Epps v. Clarendon Cnty., 304 S.C. 424, 426 , 405 S.E.2d 386, 387 (1991) (declining to extend the public policy exception when the employee has an existing remedy for a discharge that allegedly violates rights other than the right to the employment itself and stating that the appellant claimed an infringement of his constitutional rights to free speech and association, for which he could seek redress in a § 1983 a

2015The public policy exception, however, “has not yet been extended beyond [these two situations].” McNeil, 404 S.C. at 192 , 743 S.E.2d at 846 ; see also Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243 , 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015See id.; Taghivand, 411 S.C. at 243 , 768 S.E.2d at 387 (stating the public policy exception to at-will employment applies when “an employer requires an employee, as a condition of continued employment, to break the law ” (emphasis added)).

2013See Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 318 S.C. 223, 226 , 456 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1995); Keiger v. Citgo, Coastal Petroleum, Inc., 326 S.C. 369, 373 , 482 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ct.App.1997).

2013See Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 318 S.C. 223, 226 , 456 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1995); Keiger v. Citgo, Coastal Petroleum, Inc., 326 S.C. 369, 373 , 482 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ct.App.1997).

2013In Stiles , our supreme court expanded the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine to contracts with a mere thirty-day notice provision, technically a “contract for a definite term." 335 S.C. at 225 , 516 S.E.2d at 450 .

2013In Stiles , our supreme court expanded the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine to contracts with a mere thirty-day notice provision, technically a “contract for a definite term." 335 S.C. at 225 , 516 S.E.2d at 450 .

2011Dep’t of Corrections, 340 S.C. 346 , 532 S.E.2d 259 (2000), the Court of Appeals held the public policy exception did not apply as petitioner was not asked to violate the law and the reason for her termination itself was not a violation of criminal law.

2011Dep’t of Corrections, 340 S.C. 346 , 532 S.E.2d 259 (2000), the Court of Appeals held the public policy exception did not apply as petitioner was not asked to violate the law and the reason for her termination itself was not a violation of criminal law.

1995We “decline[d] to expand” the public policy exception to these situations, noting that the exception “[had] not been extended beyond situations where the termination [was] in retaliation for an employee’s refusal to violate the law at the direction of his employer.” Id. at 497 , 413 S.E. (2d) at 18 .

1995We “decline[d] to expand” the public policy exception to these situations, noting that the exception “[had] not been extended beyond situations where the termination [was] in retaliation for an employee’s refusal to violate the law at the direction of his employer.” Id. at 497 , 413 S.E. (2d) at 18 .

2015The public policy exception, however, “has not yet been extended beyond [these two situations].” McNeil, 404 S.C. at 192 , 743 S.E.2d at 846 ; see also Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243 , 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015The public policy exception, however, “has not yet been extended beyond [these two situations].” McNeil, 404 S.C. at 192 , 743 S.E.2d at 846 ; see also Taghivand v. Rite Aid Corp., 411 S.C. 240, 243 , 768 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2015) (“While we have made clear that the exception is not limited to these situations, we have specifically recognized no others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2019Co. v. Neilsen , 165 Ind.App. 445 , 332 N.E.2d 240 , 244 (1975) ("[A] person should not be permitted to insure against harms he may intentionally and unlawfully cause others, and thereby acquire a license to engage in such activity."); see also 8 Lee R.

2019Co. v. Neilsen , 165 Ind.App. 445 , 332 N.E.2d 240 , 244 (1975) ("[A] person should not be permitted to insure against harms he may intentionally and unlawfully cause others, and thereby acquire a license to engage in such activity."); see also 8 Lee R.

2015Although Maryland’s highest court found the public policy exception to apply where an employee was fired after reporting a suspected crime, the statute it relied upon, while similar to that which exists in South Carolina, also protects those people "reporting a crime or delinquent act.” Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38 , 803 A.2d 482, 498, 500 (2002).

2015Although Maryland’s highest court found the public policy exception to apply where an employee was fired after reporting a suspected crime, the statute it relied upon, while similar to that which exists in South Carolina, also protects those people "reporting a crime or delinquent act.” Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 370 Md. 38 , 803 A.2d 482, 498, 500 (2002).

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2015See Dawkins, 306 S.C. at 392-93 , 412 S.E.2d at 408 (declining to recognize a public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule and determining application of Georgia substantive law, which required actual bodily contact with a plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s conduct in emotional distress actions, was appropriate); Nash, 375 S.C. at 42 , 650 S.E.2d at 84 (wherein this court concluded North Carolina’s shorter, six-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective or unsafe conditions of an improvement to realty, as opposed to South Carolina’s eight-year statute of repose in such

2015See Dawkins, 306 S.C. at 392-93 , 412 S.E.2d at 408 (declining to recognize a public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule and determining application of Georgia substantive law, which required actual bodily contact with a plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s conduct in emotional distress actions, was appropriate); Nash, 375 S.C. at 42 , 650 S.E.2d at 84 (wherein this court concluded North Carolina’s shorter, six-year statute of repose for actions alleging defective or unsafe conditions of an improvement to realty, as opposed to South Carolina’s eight-year statute of repose in such

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2015Essentially, Rogers appears to argue our courts should apply a public policy exception and decline to give effect to the North Carolina statute of repose in question. “[Fjoreign law may not be given effect in this State if ‘it is against good morals or natural justice ... ”’ Dawkins v. State, 306 S.C. 391, 393 , 412 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1991) (quoting Rauton v. Pullman Co., 183 S.C. 495, 508 , 191 S.E. 416, 422 (1937)). “[Ujnder the ‘public policy exception,’ the Court will not apply foreign law if it violates the public policy of South Carolina.” Boone, 345 S.C. at 14 , 546 S.E.2d at 193 .

2013“The primary source of the declaration of the public policy of the state is the General Assembly; the courts assume this prerogative only in the absence of legislative declaration.” Citizens’ Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190 , 133 S.E. 709, 713 (1925); see Barron, 393 S.C. at 617 , 713 S.E.2d at 638 (stating the determination of what constitutes public policy for purposes of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is a question of law for the courts to decide).

2013“The primary source of the declaration of the public policy of the state is the General Assembly; the courts assume this prerogative only in the absence of legislative declaration.” Citizens’ Bank v. Heyward, 135 S.C. 190 , 133 S.E. 709, 713 (1925); see Barron, 393 S.C. at 617 , 713 S.E.2d at 638 (stating the determination of what constitutes public policy for purposes of the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is a question of law for the courts to decide).