public policy exception in Connecticut

2021In Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., [ 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986)], [our Supreme Court] recognized the inherent vagueness of the con- cept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception.

2021In Morris v. Hartford Courant Co., [ 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986)], [our Supreme Court] recognized the inherent vagueness of the con- cept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception.

2023For example, notwithstanding that contracts of employ- ment for an indefinite term, at common law, were, and remain, terminable ‘‘at will,’’ without the need for ‘‘a showing of just cause for dismissal’’; Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980); we have ‘‘sanctioned a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved impropriety ‘derived from some important violation of public policy.’ ’’ Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999), quoting Sheets v. Teddy’s Fro

2023For example, notwithstanding that contracts of employ- ment for an indefinite term, at common law, were, and remain, terminable ‘‘at will,’’ without the need for ‘‘a showing of just cause for dismissal’’; Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 474 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980); we have ‘‘sanctioned a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge in situations in which the reason for the discharge involved impropriety ‘derived from some important violation of public policy.’ ’’ Daley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 249 Conn. 766, 798 , 734 A.2d 112 (1999), quoting Sheets v. Teddy’s Fro

2010The arbitrator made a factual determination that commission [on human rights and opportunities] staff attorneys are hourly, rather than salaried employees.”); Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 51-52 , 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (Noting in the context of a public policy challenge: “Our legal system . . . ordinarily givefs] great deference ... to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators. . . . [Even in] a de novo determination by the court ... we give deference to the arbitrator’s factual determinations.” [Citations omitted.]).

2010The arbitrator made a factual determination that commission [on human rights and opportunities] staff attorneys are hourly, rather than salaried employees.”); Groton v. United Steelworkers of America, 254 Conn. 35, 51-52 , 757 A.2d 501 (2000) (Noting in the context of a public policy challenge: “Our legal system . . . ordinarily givefs] great deference ... to both the factual and legal determinations of the arbitrators. . . . [Even in] a de novo determination by the court ... we give deference to the arbitrator’s factual determinations.” [Citations omitted.]).

2023We next turn to the applicable law governing the public policy exception to the at-will employment doc- trine. ‘‘In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697 , 802 A.2d 731 (2002). ‘‘Employ- ment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 697–98.

2023We next turn to the applicable law governing the public policy exception to the at-will employment doc- trine. ‘‘In Connecticut, an employer and employee have an at-will employment relationship in the absence of a contract to the contrary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691, 697 , 802 A.2d 731 (2002). ‘‘Employ- ment at will grants both parties the right to terminate the relationship for any reason, or no reason, at any time without fear of legal liability.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 697–98.

2023In order to overcome the ‘‘inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception . . . [w]e look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581 .

2023In order to overcome the ‘‘inherent vagueness of the concept of public policy and the difficulty encountered when attempting to define precisely the contours of the public policy exception . . . [w]e look to see whether the plaintiff has . . . alleged that his discharge violated any explicit statutory or constitutional provision . . . or whether he alleged that his dismissal contravened any judicially conceived notion of public policy.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 581 .

2003"A public policy challenge to an arbitration award is rooted in the principle that the parties cannot expect conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Council 4, AFSCME , 27 Conn. App. 635 , 640 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992).

2003"A public policy challenge to an arbitration award is rooted in the principle that the parties cannot expect conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Council 4, AFSCME , 27 Conn. App. 635 , 640 , 608 A.2d 718 (1992).

2008Moreover, *170 our Supreme Court has stated that “the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zamstein v. Marv

2008Moreover, *170 our Supreme Court has stated that “the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result, and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zamstein v. Marv

2007The court concluded, on the basis of Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 159-61 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000), that the public policy exception to the general rule barring wrongful discharge claims by at-will employees is not available if the employee has an adequate statutory remedy and that the plaintiff could not sue the defendants for wrongful discharge on the basis of a public policy violation of § 46a-60 (a) (4) when he failed to take advantage of the remedy provided by the act.

2007The court concluded, on the basis of Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 252 Conn. 153, 159-61 , 745 A.2d 178 (2000), that the public policy exception to the general rule barring wrongful discharge claims by at-will employees is not available if the employee has an adequate statutory remedy and that the plaintiff could not sue the defendants for wrongful discharge on the basis of a public policy violation of § 46a-60 (a) (4) when he failed to take advantage of the remedy provided by the act.

2016See, e.g., Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36 , 43, 123 A.3d 854 (2015) (overruling Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456 , 717 A.2d 1177 [ (1998) ], in recognizing new cause of action after reconsidering five policy factors court addressed in Mendillo and simply reaching different conclusion regarding weight and balance of those factors, and stating that it "now agree[s] with the concurring and dissenting opinion in Mendillo that the public policy factors favoring recognition of [the] cause of action ... outweigh those factors disfavoring recognition"); State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 ,

2016See, e.g., Campos v. Coleman, 319 Conn. 36 , 43, 123 A.3d 854 (2015) (overruling Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456 , 717 A.2d 1177 [ (1998) ], in recognizing new cause of action after reconsidering five policy factors court addressed in Mendillo and simply reaching different conclusion regarding weight and balance of those factors, and stating that it "now agree[s] with the concurring and dissenting opinion in Mendillo that the public policy factors favoring recognition of [the] cause of action ... outweigh those factors disfavoring recognition"); State v. Salamon, 287 Conn. 509 ,

2003“In the absence of a public policy violation, there is no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Doherty v. Sullivan, 29 Conn. App. 736, 743 , 618 A.2d 56 (1992). 11 The plaintiff argues that the termination of her employment violated an important public policy on two grounds.

2003“In the absence of a public policy violation, there is no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.” Doherty v. Sullivan, 29 Conn. App. 736, 743 , 618 A.2d 56 (1992). 11 The plaintiff argues that the termination of her employment violated an important public policy on two grounds.

2000Therefore, "absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460 , 470-71 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); see also Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 17 Conn. App. 532 , 543 , 554 A.2d 757 (1989) (where court found that, in the absence of a public policy violation, there is no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

2000Therefore, "absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460 , 470-71 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); see also Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 17 Conn. App. 532 , 543 , 554 A.2d 757 (1989) (where court found that, in the absence of a public policy violation, there is no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).

2023(Internal quotation marks omitted.) HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 287 Conn. 189, 197 , 947 A.2d 916 (2008). ‘‘The public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. New Eng- land Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 271 Conn. 127, 135 , 855 A.2d 964 (2004).

2023(Internal quotation marks omitted.) HH East Parcel, LLC v. Handy & Harman, Inc., 287 Conn. 189, 197 , 947 A.2d 916 (2008). ‘‘The public policy exception applies only when the award is clearly illegal or clearly violative of a strong public policy.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. New Eng- land Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, 271 Conn. 127, 135 , 855 A.2d 964 (2004).

2021See, e.g., State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, supra, 271 Conn. 135–36 (‘‘the public policy exception to arbitral authority [must] be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal to enforce an [arbitration award] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is [well-defined] and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup- posed public interests’’ (emphasis added; internal quo- tation marks omitted)); South Windsor v. S

2021See, e.g., State v. New England Health Care Employees Union, District 1199, AFL-CIO, supra, 271 Conn. 135–36 (‘‘the public policy exception to arbitral authority [must] be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal to enforce an [arbitration award] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is [well-defined] and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup- posed public interests’’ (emphasis added; internal quo- tation marks omitted)); South Windsor v. S

2002In Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. , 5 Conn. App. 643 , 501 A.2d 1223 (1985), the Appellate Court recognized a limitation on the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

2002In Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. , 5 Conn. App. 643 , 501 A.2d 1223 (1985), the Appellate Court recognized a limitation on the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

2025See Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6 . ‘‘[T]he public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed . . . .’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Coun- cil 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 252 Conn. 467, 475 , 747 A.2d 480 (2000). ‘‘When a party raises the issue of a public policy violation with regard to an arbitral award, a two step process is required.’’ Sandhu v. Haverson Con- struction Management, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09- 4016359-S (September 7, 2010). ‘‘First, the court deter- mines whether an expl

2025See Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6 . ‘‘[T]he public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed . . . .’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Coun- cil 4, Local 387, AFL-CIO, 252 Conn. 467, 475 , 747 A.2d 480 (2000). ‘‘When a party raises the issue of a public policy violation with regard to an arbitral award, a two step process is required.’’ Sandhu v. Haverson Con- struction Management, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09- 4016359-S (September 7, 2010). ‘‘First, the court deter- mines whether an expl

1997The Connecticut Supreme Court has stated "that the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would `anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result,' and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis of whether the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case." Zamstein v. Manasti, 240 Conn. 549 , 558 , ___ A.2d __

1997We have stated that the test for the existence of a legal duty of care entails (1) a determination of whether an ordinary person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew or should have known, would “anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result,” and (2) a determination, on the basis of a public policy analysis, of whether the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case. 5 Id., 386-87 .

2015I GENERAL PRINCIPLES Since this court first recognized the public policy exception to the general rule of deference to an arbitra- tion award made pursuant to an unrestricted submis- sion; see Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195 , 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); we have decided one half dozen cases in which an employer sought to vacate on public policy grounds an award reinstating an employee who had been termi- nated for misconduct.10 In one half of those cases, we held that reinstatement of the terminated employee vio- lated a clear public policy of the st

2015I GENERAL PRINCIPLES Since this court first recognized the public policy exception to the general rule of deference to an arbitra- tion award made pursuant to an unrestricted submis- sion; see Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 195 , 425 A.2d 1247 (1979); we have decided one half dozen cases in which an employer sought to vacate on public policy grounds an award reinstating an employee who had been termi- nated for misconduct.10 In one half of those cases, we held that reinstatement of the terminated employee vio- lated a clear public policy of the st

2010“Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of [collective bargaining agreements] is limited to situations where the contract as interpreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFL-CIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 798 , 758 A.2d 387 , cer

2008Review of an arbitration award on the basis of a public policy violation “require[s] a two-step analysis . . . .” State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663, AFLCIO, 59 Conn. App. 793, 797 , 758 A.2d 387 , cert. denied, 255 Conn. 905 , 762 A.2d 910 (2000).