public policy exception in Minnesota

2019Corp. , 408 N.W.2d 569 , 572-73 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing a public-policy exception to Minnesota's employment-at-will rule). *409 There is nothing in Minnesota Statutes chapter 504B whereby the Legislature constrained the judiciary from exercising our responsibility to develop the common law of landlord-tenant relationships.

2014We have recognized that the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule permits an employee to “bring an action for wrongful discharge if that em ployee is discharged for refusing to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law.” Id.

2002Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn.App.1986), aff'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.1987). *278 In their argument that a public policy requirement is embodied in the whistleblower statute, the respondents suggest that it is "naïve" to conclude that "all laws and regulations" should create whistleblower liability.

1998In Minnesota, our court of appeals approved the public policy exception to at-will employment in Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588, 592 (Minn.App.1986), aff 'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn.1987).

2019We have considered a request to vacate an arbitration award under the public-policy exception only once, in State Auditor , and we declined to vacate the arbitration award under the exception in that case. 1 504 N.W.2d at 758 .

2015In conclusion, we note that the public-policy exception is narrowly defined and that there is not “a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against public policy.” State Auditor, 504 N.W.2d at 756 .

2018See Brooklyn Center , 635 N.W.2d 236 (applying the public-policy exception to vacate an arbitration award that reinstated a Minnesota Police Officer for the first time).

2015The absence of a well-defined and dominant public policy distinguishes this case from Brooklyn Ctr., where this court reversed a district court’s order confirming an arbitrator’s award and remanded with instructions to vacate the award based on the public-policy exception. 635 N.W.2d at 244 .

2002A wrongful discharge claim sounds in tort. 13 We recognized in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887-88 (Minn.1986), that a suit for wrongful discharge could sound in tort, and we referred to wrongful discharge as a tort action in Graham v. Special School District No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 115, 120 (Minn.1991). 14 In fact, many states have characterized an action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will as a tort. 15 As noted earlier, retaliatory discharge is one type of wrongful discharge.

1987See Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 893 (Kelley, J., dissenting).

1993Medcenters, 430 N.W.2d at 673 .

1993Medcenters, 430 N.W.2d at 673.

2016Our conclusion is reinforced by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452 (Minn. 2006), considering whether the Minnesota Whistleblower Act abrogated the public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

2016Our conclusion is reinforced by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452 (Minn.2006), considering whether the Minnesota Whistleblower Act abrogated the public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

2017We “decline[d] to expand the public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule,” explaining that “the Legislature has already delineated the consequences” for a statutory violation, including “an extensive scheme of administrative and criminal penalties.” Id. at 15S. 1 Contrary to Dukowitz, the majority usurps the policymaking role of the Legislature by rewriting Minn. Stat. § 177.24 to prohibit an employer from terminating an employee for refusing to share tips.

2015The supreme court has “recognized a narrow public-policy exception to the employment-at-will rule,” under which “‘[a]n employee may bring an action for wrongful discharge if that employee is discharged for refusing to participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursuant to law.’” Id. (quoting Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref.

1987Even though they concluded that punitive damages were appropriate for this cause of action, several courts have declined to impose them in the case in which they recognized the public policy exception because “the employer [in this case] could not have anticipated beforehand that the claim would even be actionable.” Vigil v. Arzola, 102 N.M. 682, 690 , 699 P.2d 613, 621 (App.1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220-21 , 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975).

1987Even though they concluded that punitive damages were appropriate for this cause of action, several courts have declined to impose them in the case in which they recognized the public policy exception because “the employer [in this case] could not have anticipated beforehand that the claim would even be actionable.” Vigil v. Arzola, 102 N.M. 682, 690 , 699 P.2d 613, 621 (App.1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220-21 , 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975).

1987Even though they concluded that punitive damages were appropriate for this cause of action, several courts have declined to impose them in the case in which they recognized the public policy exception because “the employer [in this case] could not have anticipated beforehand that the claim would even be actionable.” Vigil v. Arzola, 102 N.M. 682, 690 , 699 P.2d 613, 621 (App.1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220-21 , 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975).

1987Even though they concluded that punitive damages were appropriate for this cause of action, several courts have declined to impose them in the case in which they recognized the public policy exception because “the employer [in this case] could not have anticipated beforehand that the claim would even be actionable.” Vigil v. Arzola, 102 N.M. 682, 690 , 699 P.2d 613, 621 (App.1983), rev’d in part on other grounds, 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 (1984); see Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220-21 , 536 P.2d 512, 517 (1975).

2024See Bogen, 261 N.W.2d at 609 ; Kinkead, 57 N.W.2d at 631 .

2014Grp., 981 P.2d 321, 323 (Okla.1999) (recognizing that a public-policy exception to at-will employment is available only when “there is no adequate, statutorily-expressed remedy”).

2014See In re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313, 323 (Minn.2010) (noting that the Legislature's action in one statute but inaction in another shows that the Legislature "knows how” to accomplish a particular objective if it wishes to do so).

2014See generally Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 19 Cal.4th 66 , 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1998) (observing that “public policy as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan B.

2014See generally Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 19 Cal.4th 66 , 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1998) (observing that “public policy as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan B.

2014See, e.g., Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc., 105 Ill.2d 158 , 85 Ill.Dec. 336 , 473 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1984); Frampton v. Cent.

2014See, e.g., Darnell v. Impact Indus., Inc., 105 Ill.2d 158 , 85 Ill.Dec. 336 , 473 N.E.2d 935, 937 (1984); Frampton v. Cent.

2014For example, in Spann v. State, we held that, after conviction, a defendant may not waive the right to appeal in exchange for a shorter sentence. 704 N.W.2d 486, 494-95 (Minn.2005).

2013See MAPE, 504 N.W.2d at 756-58 (Minn.1993) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of narrow exception and finding no public policy basis for vacating arbitration award reinstating employee who embezzled from state); Hunter, 575 N.W.2d at 856-57 (noting that “Minnesota courts have not formally adopted the public policy exception” and finding no public policy basis for vacating arbitration award allegedly preempted by ERISA).

2013See MAPE, 504 N.W.2d at 756-58 (Minn.1993) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of narrow exception and finding no public policy basis for vacating arbitration award reinstating employee who embezzled from state); Hunter, 575 N.W.2d at 856-57 (noting that “Minnesota courts have not formally adopted the public policy exception” and finding no public policy basis for vacating arbitration award allegedly preempted by ERISA).

2008See Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women's Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn.2002) ("reject[ing] the importation of a public policy requirement into the whistleblower statute and hold[ing] that the protections of section 181.932, subd. 1(a), are not limited to reports that implicate public policy").

2008See Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Ctr., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 270, 277 (Minn.2002) (“rejecting] the importation of a public policy requirement into the whistleblower statute and holding] that the protections of section 181.932, subd. 1(a), are not limited to reports that implicate public policy”).

2005See Nat’l Hydro Sys., 529 N.W.2d at 694 .

2002When we interpret a statute, we must "ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000); Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn.2001).

2002When we interpret a statute, we must “ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000); Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Minn.2001).

2002Although the case was not brought under the whistleblower statute, the court of appeals cited the statute and concluded that the public policy exception to at-will employment protects the general public and that "[t]he public does not have an interest in a business's internal management problems." Vonch, 439 N.W.2d at 407-08 .

2002Although the case was not brought under the whistleblower statute, the court of appeals cited the statute and concluded that the public policy exception to at-will employment protects the general public and that “[t]he public does not have an interest in a business’s internal management problems.” Vonch, 439 N.W.2d at 407-08 .

2002A wrongful discharge claim sounds in tort. 13 We recognized in Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887-88 (Minn.1986), that a suit for wrongful discharge could sound in tort, and we referred to wrongful discharge as a tort action in Graham v. Special School District No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 115, 120 (Minn.1991). 14 In fact, many states have characterized an action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at will as a tort. 15 As noted earlier, retaliatory discharge is one type of wrongful discharge.