public policy exception in North Carolina

2022The existence of other remedies, therefore, does not render the public policy exception moot.” Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 356 , 416 S.E.2d 166, 171 (1992).

2022The existence of other remedies, therefore, does not render the public policy exception moot.” Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 356 , 416 S.E.2d 166, 171 (1992).

2011In support of its argument, Sister-2-Sister primarily relies upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329 , 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997), reh’g denied, 347 N.C. 586 , 502 S.E.2d 594 (1998), which noted three exceptions to *70 our state’s presumption of employment-at-will: (1) “parties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually[,]” (2) “federal and state statutes have created exceptions prohibiting employers from discharging employees based on impermissible considerations such as the employee’s ag

2011In support of its argument, Sister-2-Sister primarily relies upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc., 347 N.C. 329 , 493 S.E.2d 420 (1997), reh’g denied, 347 N.C. 586 , 502 S.E.2d 594 (1998), which noted three exceptions to *70 our state’s presumption of employment-at-will: (1) “parties can remove the at-will presumption by specifying a definite period of employment contractually[,]” (2) “federal and state statutes have created exceptions prohibiting employers from discharging employees based on impermissible considerations such as the employee’s ag

2014Co., Inc., 325 N.C. 172, 175 , 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989) (noting that the claim of wrongful discharge is a public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine).

2014Co., Inc., 325 N.C. 172, 175 , 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989) (noting that the claim of wrongful discharge is a public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine).

2023App. 238, 243 (2000)); see also Boudreau v. Baughman, 322 N.C. 331, 342 (1988) (“This public policy exception has generally been applied in cases such as those involving prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries, racing, gaming, and the sale of liquor.”).

2013See Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 342 , 368 S.E.2d at 858 (“This public policy exception has generally been applied in cases such as those involving prohibited marriages, wagers, lotteries, racing, gaming, and the sale of liquor.”).

2001See id, 331 N.C. at 350, 416 S.E.2d at 167 (1992) (noting Coman explicitly adopted a public policy exception to the well-entrenched employment at will doctrine), and Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C.

1996The public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is a "narrow exception." Williams v. Hillhaven Corp., 91 N.C.App. 35, 39 , 370 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1988).

2022This must be so, the Amos Court reasoned, because “[t]he availability of alternative common law and statutory remedies . . . supplements rather than hinders the ultimate goal of protecting employees who have been fired in violation of public policy.” Id. at 357 , 416 S.E.2d at 171 (emphasis added). ¶ 27 Indeed, our Supreme Court has long recognized the rule that “if a statute is remedial in nature, seeking to advance the remedy and repress the evil[,] it must be liberally construed to effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Misenheimer v. Burris, 360 N.C. 620, 623 , 637 S.E.2d 173, 175 (200

2022This must be so, the Amos Court reasoned, because “[t]he availability of alternative common law and statutory remedies . . . supplements rather than hinders the ultimate goal of protecting employees who have been fired in violation of public policy.” Id. at 357 , 416 S.E.2d at 171 (emphasis added). ¶ 27 Indeed, our Supreme Court has long recognized the rule that “if a statute is remedial in nature, seeking to advance the remedy and repress the evil[,] it must be liberally construed to effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Misenheimer v. Burris, 360 N.C. 620, 623 , 637 S.E.2d 173, 175 (200

2007Moreover, federal caselaw strongly implies that "when a party has the opportunity to see and read a pre-race exculpatory contract, the agreement is enforceable in North Carolina." Bertotti, 893 F. Supp. at 567 (interpreting this Court's holding in Johnson v. Dunlap, 53 N.C.

1998Defendant relies on Bertotti v. Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc., 893 F.Supp. 565, 566 (W.D.N.C. 1995), for the proposition that “exculpatory contracts entered in connection with motor sports events do not violate public policy because such contracts do not involve public interests.” Interpreting our decision in Johnson v. Dunlap, 53 N.C.

1999Previous decisions of this State’s appellate courts have recognized claims for wrongful termination based upon the public policy exception when an employee alleges termination based upon political affiliation, see Vereen v. Holden, 121 N.C.

1999App. 779, 784 , 468 S.E.2d 471, 474-75 (1996), refusal to violate the United States Department of Transportation’s regulations restricting the driving time of truck drivers, see Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175-76 , 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989), refusal to testify untruthfully or incompletely in a court action, see Sides, 74 N.C.

2022Boudreau, 322 N.C. at 341–42 (citations omitted); see also Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 579 (1931) (“To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right of action which accrued under the law of another State, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is against good morals or natural justice, or that for some other such reason the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the general interests of our own citizens.” (citation omitted)). 45.

1988Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574 , 158 S.E. 101 .

2018App. at 416 , 705 S.E.2d at 407 (noting that “[c]ertain kinds of evidence may be such that the public policy factors in favor of confidentiality outweigh the public policy factors supporting free access of the public to public records and proceedings,” including “trade secret” information) (citing G.S. § 66-156).

2012Certain kinds of evidence may be such that the public policy factors in favor of confidentiality outweigh the public policy factors supporting free access of the public to public records and proceedings.” France, 209 N.C.

2014“An activity falls within the public policy exception when the activity is extensively regulated to protect the public from danger, and it would violate public policy to allow those engaged in such an activity to ‘absolve themselves from the duty to use reasonable care.’” Fortson, 131 N.C.

2007App. 635, 637 , 508 S.E.2d 549, 551 (1998) ("An activity falls within the public policy exception when the activity is extensively regulated to protect the public from danger[.]" ).

2013However, “[ujnder the rationale of [Supreme Court precedent] something more than a mere statutory violation is required to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception.” Garner, 350 N.C. at 571 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[A] degree of intent or wilfulness on the part of the employer [is required].” Id. at 572 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[T]he termination itself must be motivated by an unlawful reason or puipose that is against public policy.” Id.

2013However, “[ujnder the rationale of [Supreme Court precedent] something more than a mere statutory violation is required to sustain a claim of wrongful discharge under the public-policy exception.” Garner, 350 N.C. at 571 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[A] degree of intent or wilfulness on the part of the employer [is required].” Id. at 572 , 515 S.E.2d at 441 . “[T]he termination itself must be motivated by an unlawful reason or puipose that is against public policy.” Id.

2015In re Clifton, 441 B.R. 44, 48 (Bankr.

2015Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). {13} Plaintiffs’ action satisfies the requirements of both tests.

2009See N.C.G.S. § 63-20 (2007); Mann, 261 N.C. at 341 , 134 S.E.2d at 628-29 (1964).

2009See N.C.G.S. § 63-20 (2007); Mann, 261 N.C. at 341 , 134 S.E.2d at 628-29 (1964).

2004See id. ; see also, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 250 , 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988); Smith, 241 Cal.Rptr. at 920 ; Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 17 Conn.App. 532, 540 , 554 A.2d 757, 761 (1989); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000); Beye, 59 Md.App. at 653 , 477 A.2d at 1203 ; Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Mo.Ct.App.1998); Barker v. State Ins.

2004See id. ; see also, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 250 , 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988); Smith, 241 Cal.Rptr. at 920 ; Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 17 Conn.App. 532, 540 , 554 A.2d 757, 761 (1989); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000); Beye, 59 Md.App. at 653 , 477 A.2d at 1203 ; Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Mo.Ct.App.1998); Barker v. State Ins.

2004See id. ; see also, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 250 , 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (1988); Smith, 241 Cal.Rptr. at 920 ; Seery v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 17 Conn.App. 532, 540 , 554 A.2d 757, 761 (1989); Balmer v. Hawkeye Steel, 604 N.W.2d 639, 643 (Iowa 2000); Beye, 59 Md.App. at 653 , 477 A.2d at 1203 ; Bell v. Dynamite Foods, 969 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Mo.Ct.App.1998); Barker v. State Ins.