public policy exception in Indiana

2020In McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., we added that the public policy exception includes a “separate but tightly defined exception to the employment at will doctrine” that protects an employee when he is discharged by an employer “for refusing to commit an illegal act for which he would be personally liable.” 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1988).

2020In McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., we added that the public policy exception includes a “separate but tightly defined exception to the employment at will doctrine” that protects an employee when he is discharged by an employer “for refusing to commit an illegal act for which he would be personally liable.” 517 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1988).

2015Indiana appellate court have “consistently refused to create a public policy exception to the employment[-]at[-]will doctrine in the absence of a statute defining public policy.” Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); see also Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind.2007) (“In Morgan Drive Away, we emphasize that the ‘employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this state’ and that ‘television or rejection of the doctrine is better left to the legislature.’ ”) (quoting Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d

1990See Hamblen v. Danners, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 926 ; Rice v. Grant County Board of Commissioners (1984), Ind., 472 N.E.2d 213 ; Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 ; Scott v. Union Tank Car Co. (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 992 ; Martin v. Platt, 179 Ind.App. 688 , 386 N.E.2d 1026 ; but cf. Lawson v. Haven Hubbard Homes, Inc. d/b/a Hamilton Grove (1990), Ind.App., 551 N.E.2d 855 . 4 Contrary to Scott Brass’ argument, in Morgan Drive Away the Supreme Court did not reject a public policy exception such as was later adopted in McClanahan .

2019Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973), wherein our Supreme Court first recognized the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine.

2009Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249 , 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), where this Court first recognized the public policy exception to the employment at will doe-trine.

2015Indiana appellate court have “consistently refused to create a public policy exception to the employment[-]at[-]will doctrine in the absence of a statute defining public policy.” Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); see also Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind.2007) (“In Morgan Drive Away, we emphasize that the ‘employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this state’ and that ‘television or rejection of the doctrine is better left to the legislature.’ ”) (quoting Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d

2006However, this case is also similar to Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d 933 (Ind.1986).

2019See Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind. 2007).

2015Indiana appellate court have “consistently refused to create a public policy exception to the employment[-]at[-]will doctrine in the absence of a statute defining public policy.” Hamblen v. Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); see also Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704, 707 (Ind.2007) (“In Morgan Drive Away, we emphasize that the ‘employment at will doctrine has steadfastly been recognized and enforced as the public policy of this state’ and that ‘television or rejection of the doctrine is better left to the legislature.’ ”) (quoting Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489 N.E.2d

2008“There are three exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, one of which is a public policy exception.” Id. (citing Coutee, 792 N.E.2d at 911 (listing the three exceptions to employment at will doctrine)).

2008“There are three exceptions to the employment at will doctrine, one of which is a public policy exception.” Id. (citing Coutee, 792 N.E.2d at 911 (listing the three exceptions to employment at will doctrine)).

1997To do so effectively, the employee must plead or assert the doctrine with particularity. [6] The employee must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to his detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel. [7] See Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.1995)(adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981)). [8] In their opposition to Westminster's transfer petition before this Court, plaintiffs do not rely on the pub

1997To do so effectively, the employee must plead or assert the doctrine with particularity. 6 The employee must assert and demonstrate that the employer made a promise to the employee; that the employee relied on that promise to his detriment; and that the promise otherwise fits within the Restatement test for promissory estoppel. 7 See Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ind.l995)(adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1) (1981)). 8 In their opposition to Westminster’s transfer petition before this Court, plaintiffs do not rely on the public po

1997See Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 , 123 n. 1 (Ind.1994) (interpreting Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3) and reasoning that "summarily affirmed" indicates "that we are declining to review certain issues, in essence a partial denial of transfer").

1997See Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d 121 , 123 n. 1 (Ind.1994) (interpreting Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3) and reasoning that "summarily affirmed" indicates "that we are declining to review certain issues, in essence a partial denial of transfer”).

2016There are three exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, but the parties discuss only the public policy exception: “we have recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine if a clear statutory expression of a right or duty is contravened.” Orr v. Westminster Village N., Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Ind.1997).

2004Second, our supreme court has "recognized a public policy exception *838 to the employment-at-will doctrine if a clear statutory expression of a right or duty is contravened." Id. at 718 .

2009In Burleson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 725 F.Supp. 1489, 1496 (S.D.Ind.1989), the court, quoting Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978), stated, " 'the policy limits restrict the amount the insurer may have to pay in the performance of the contract, not the damages that are recoverable for its breach'" This court in Plummer found that the Burleson court erroneously interpreted Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599 , 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.1976) as restrict, ing the recovery of consequential damages under a public policy a

1992Burleson, 725 F.Supp. at 1497 .

2006To justify disregard of another state's laws on public policy grounds, that state's laws "must appear to be against good morals or natural justice *380 or prejudicial to the general interests of the citizens of this State." Maroon v. State, Dep't of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (quoting Wabash R.

1986Additionally, this Court in Maroon, supre, 411 N.E.2d at 412 , specifically noted that the traditional application of the exception has been reserved for cases involving "inter alia, gambling contracts, lotteries, and marriages within prohibited limits of consanguinity." Therefore, the exception cannot be applied in the present case.

2019Discussion & Decision [9] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court: “Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of ... the non-moving parties, summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).

2009In Burleson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 725 F.Supp. 1489, 1496 (S.D.Ind.1989), the court, quoting Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978), stated, " 'the policy limits restrict the amount the insurer may have to pay in the performance of the contract, not the damages that are recoverable for its breach'" This court in Plummer found that the Burleson court erroneously interpreted Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599 , 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.1976) as restrict, ing the recovery of consequential damages under a public policy a

2009In Burleson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 725 F.Supp. 1489, 1496 (S.D.Ind.1989), the court, quoting Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978), stated, " 'the policy limits restrict the amount the insurer may have to pay in the performance of the contract, not the damages that are recoverable for its breach'" This court in Plummer found that the Burleson court erroneously interpreted Vernon Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599 , 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.1976) as restrict, ing the recovery of consequential damages under a public policy a

2006We drew a similar conclusion in Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied, where we stated, "Although the opinion of the Supreme Court in Frampton only addressed discharges in retaliation for the filing of a worker's compensation claim, the court did not hold that only employees discharged under the same circumstances could obtain relief." Additionally, the courts of this state have steadily expanded the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine created in Frampton.

2006We drew a similar conclusion in Call v. Scott Brass, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225, 1228 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied, where we stated, "Although the opinion of the Supreme Court in Frampton only addressed discharges in retaliation for the filing of a worker's compensation claim, the court did not hold that only employees discharged under the same circumstances could obtain relief." Additionally, the courts of this state have steadily expanded the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine created in Frampton .

2006We discussed the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine as discussed in Frampton and McClanahan and noted that "we [were] not convinced that a constructive retaliatory discharge fit[] within the ambit of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine" and that "were we to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to demonstrate a retaliatory discharge, we would be overly extending that which was intended by the narrowly-defined exceptions." Id. at 734-735.

2006We discussed the public policy exception to the employment at will doe-trine as discussed in Frampton and McClanakan and noted that "we [were] not convinced that a constructive retaliatory discharge fit ] within the ambit of the narrowly-drawn exceptions to the employee-at-will doctrine" and that "were we to apply the doctrine of constructive discharge to demonstrate a retaliatory discharge, we would be overly extending that which was intended by the narrowly-defined exceptions." Id. at 734-735 .