public policy exception in New Jersey

2019"However, '[r]eflecting the narrowness of the public policy exception , that standard for vacation will be met only in rare circumstances.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.

2015"However, '[r]eflecting the narrowness of the public policy exception, that standard for vacation will be met only in rare circumstances.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J.

2013However, “[rjefleeting the narrowness of the public policy exception, that standard for vacation will be met only in rare circumstances.” Local 196, supra, 190 N.J. at 294 , 920 A.2d 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2013However, “[rjefleeting the narrowness of the public policy exception, that standard for vacation will be met only in rare circumstances.” Local 196, supra, 190 N.J. at 294 , 920 A.2d 88 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1994See D'Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 133 N.J. 516, 527-538 , 628 A. 2d 305 (1993); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 290-293 , 491 A. 2d 1257 (1985); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 71-72 , *186 417 A. 2d 505 (1980).

1982At issue is whether plaintiff falls within the public policy exception to the common law rule that private employees unprotected by contract are terminable at will, as recently stated in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 (1980).

1999Id. at 111, 477 A.2d 1257 . [ 135 N.J. at 364 , 640 A.2d 788 .] PIP arbitration justifies neither a public policy exception nor one based on the courts’ parens patria responsibility.

1994However, he noted that a different standard had been applied in Faherty, supra, 97 N.J. 99 , 477 A. 2d 1257 , where "special policy reasons ... may have led this Court to note that heightened judicial scrutiny may be required in reviewing arbitration awards affecting child support and custody." Perini, supra, 129 N.J. at 524 , 610 A. 2d 364 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring).

2025As to the public policy inquiry, the Court noted the "primary rational e" of the attorney-client privilege "is to encourage 'free and full disclosure of information from the client to the attorney,'" which "benefits the public, [who] 'is well served by sound legal counsel' based on full, candid, and confidential exchanges." Ibid. (quoting Fellerman v. Bradley, 99 N.J. 493, 498, 502 (1985)).

2019Id. at 482-83 .

2017Super. 248, 256 (App. Div. 2007), aff’d, 197 N.J. 36 (2008) (holding that there is a strong public policy presumption favoring determining workers' compensation coverage); Daniello v. Machise Express Co., 119 N.J.

2017Super. 20, 23-24 (Law Div. 1972), aff’d, 122 N.J.

2013For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sabato, 380 N.J.Super. 463, 471-74 , 882 A.2d 972 (App.Div.2005), we selectively exercised our appellate oversight based on this public policy exception, in setting aside a trial court’s decision reducing counsel fees incurred by a claimant in a PIP arbitration.

2013For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sabato, 380 N.J.Super. 463, 471-74 , 882 A.2d 972 (App.Div.2005), we selectively exercised our appellate oversight based on this public policy exception, in setting aside a trial court’s decision reducing counsel fees incurred by a claimant in a PIP arbitration.

2007Similarly, we have explained that “[i]n the context of public employment an arbitrator’s determinations in binding arbitration *12 are subject to pertinent statutory criteria.” Kearny PBA, supra, 81 N.J. at 217 , 405 A.2d 393 .

2007Similarly, we have explained that “[i]n the context of public employment an arbitrator’s determinations in binding arbitration *12 are subject to pertinent statutory criteria.” Kearny PBA, supra, 81 N.J. at 217 , 405 A.2d 393 .

2007Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to address the breadth of the public policy exception, id. at 150 , Chief Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, remanded the matter for entry of an order enforcing the arbitrator’s award, id. at 150-51 .

2007Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to address the breadth of the public policy exception, id. at 150 , Chief Judge Gibbons, writing for the court, remanded the matter for entry of an order enforcing the arbitrator’s award, id. at 150-51 .

2007This Court also has *294 recognized a public policy exception, observing that a court “may vacate an award if it is contrary to existing law or public policy.” Bd. of Educ. of Alpha, supra, 188 N.J. at 603, 911 A.2d 903 (quotation omitted).

2007Id. at 442-43 , 729 A. 2d 449 . [5] The time has now come to squarely address the public policy arguments being advanced here by Rutgers and earlier by other similarly-situated carriers.

2007Id. at 442-43 , 729 A. 2d 449 . [5] The time has now come to squarely address the public policy arguments being advanced here by Rutgers and earlier by other similarly-situated carriers.

2007Grace & Co., supra, holding that courts may not enforce collective bargaining agreements that are contrary to “well defined and dominant” public policy. 461 U.S. at 766 , 103 S.Ct. at 2183 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 307 .

2007Grace & Co., supra, holding that courts may not enforce collective bargaining agreements that are contrary to “well defined and dominant” public policy. 461 U.S. at 766 , 103 S.Ct. at 2183 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 307 .

2000While it was not altogether unsympathetic to plaintiff's circumstances, the Court stressed the public policy principle "that convicts may not shift the consequences of their crime to a third party" and that plaintiff at no time "even assert[ed] that she did not commit the acts which formed the basis of the matters charged." Id. at 498 .

2000The Court also affirmed the lower court's determination that since plaintiff was not exonerated, her illegal activities alone were the "sole proximate and producing causes of her indictment and conviction as a matter of law." Id.

1998In his decision he relied principally on five eases: Nevada v. Hall, supra; Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 , 92 S.Ct. 775 , 31 L.

1998In his decision he relied principally on five eases: Nevada v. Hall, supra; Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 , 92 S.Ct. 775 , 31 L.

1996Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 , 146 A. 2d 111 (1958) (noting that conflict of interest analysis regarding disqualification is necessarily factual and depends upon the circumstances of the particular case); see Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 525-26 , 626 A. 2d 406 (1993) (noting four categories of conflicts of interest, citing Michael A. Pane, Conflict of Interest: Sometimes a Confusing Maze, Part II, New Jersey Municipalities (Mar. 1980) at 8-9).

1996Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 268 , 146 A. 2d 111 (1958) (noting that conflict of interest analysis regarding disqualification is necessarily factual and depends upon the circumstances of the particular case); see Wyzykowski v. Rizas, 132 N.J. 509, 525-26 , 626 A. 2d 406 (1993) (noting four categories of conflicts of interest, citing Michael A. Pane, Conflict of Interest: Sometimes a Confusing Maze, Part II, New Jersey Municipalities (Mar. 1980) at 8-9).

1996The public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine applies when an employee is fired in retaliation for acting [in the public's best interest].... [I]f Smith were fired for performing an act consistent with public policy such as administering the town's zoning laws while acting in his capacity as mayor and a voting member of the town's board of trustees, he would have an actionable tort claim. [ Ibid. ] The distinction that the majority draws between administrative and legislative duties to distinguish Smith from the instant case, ante at 397-399 n. 2, 677 A. 2d at 170 -171 n. 2, is

1996The public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine applies when an employee is fired in retaliation for acting consistent with section 43-101____ [I]f Smith were fired for performing an act consistent with public policy such as administering the town's zoning laws while acting in his capacity as mayor and a voting member of the town’s board of trustees, he would have an actionable tort claim. [Id., 825 P.2d at 1326 .] It is clear that Smith was acting in the capacity of an administrative or executive official under the quasi-administrative duty to enforce a specific body of regulator