public policy exception in Nebraska

2023Knapp v. Ruser, 297 Neb. 639 , 901 N.W.2d 31 (2017).

2017We described the exception as follows: Under the public policy exception, we will allow an employee to claim damages for wrongful discharge when - 665 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 297 Nebraska R eports KNAPP v. RUSER Cite as 297 Neb. 639 the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.

2017The dis- trict court cited Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 273 Neb. 855 , 734 N.W.2d 704 (2007), and stated that this court has recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and that under the public policy exception, an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.

2017The dis- trict court cited Trosper v. Bag ’N Save, 273 Neb. 855 , 734 N.W.2d 704 (2007), and stated that this court has recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine and that under the public policy exception, an employee may claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.

2001We first applied the public policy exception in Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 226 Neb. 899 , 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987).

2001We first applied the public policy exception in Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 226 Neb. 899 , 416 N.W.2d 510 (1987).

2003Simonsen v. Hendricks Sodding & Landscaping, 5 Neb.

2001The most recent Nebraska case to address the public policy exception is Simonsen v. Hendricks Sodding & Landscaping, 5 Neb.

1985Bank, 207 Neb. 308 , 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980), to adopt the public policy exception.

1985Bank, 207 Neb. 308 , 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980), to adopt the public policy exception.

1993However, in Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. at 742-43 , 408 N.W.2d at 268-69 , this court reaffirmed rejection of the public policy exception as a basis for recovery on an employment at-will contract: We discussed the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742 , 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985): “ ‘We recognize, however, that the “employment at will” rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge.

1993However, in Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. at 742-43 , 408 N.W.2d at 268-69 , this court reaffirmed rejection of the public policy exception as a basis for recovery on an employment at-will contract: We discussed the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742 , 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985): “ ‘We recognize, however, that the “employment at will” rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge.

1993However, in Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. at 742-43 , 408 N.W.2d at 268-69 , this court reaffirmed rejection of the public policy exception as a basis for recovery on an employment at-will contract: We discussed the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742 , 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985): “ ‘We recognize, however, that the “employment at will” rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge.

1993However, in Johnston v. Panhandle Co-op Assn., 225 Neb. at 742-43 , 408 N.W.2d at 268-69 , this court reaffirmed rejection of the public policy exception as a basis for recovery on an employment at-will contract: We discussed the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in Mueller v. Union Pacific Railroad, 220 Neb. 742 , 371 N.W.2d 732 (1985): “ ‘We recognize, however, that the “employment at will” rule is not, in some jurisdictions, an absolute bar to a claim of wrongful discharge.

2024General Summary Judgment Framework [3-5] Summary judgment is proper only when the plead- ings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 5 The party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie case by producing enough evidence 3 Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp, 317 Neb. 690 , 11 N.W.3d 371 (2024). 4 Continental Resources v. Fair, 317 Neb. 391 , 10 N.W.3d 510 (2024). 5 Ro

2024General Summary Judgment Framework [3-5] Summary judgment is proper only when the plead- ings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 5 The party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie case by producing enough evidence 3 Ronnfeldt Farms v. Arp, 317 Neb. 690 , 11 N.W.3d 371 (2024). 4 Continental Resources v. Fair, 317 Neb. 391 , 10 N.W.3d 510 (2024). 5 Ro

2024HUSKER AUTO GROUP Cite as 318 Neb. 178 In response, Husker Auto asserts that because Mathis was merely Galloway’s coworker and not her employer, as required by the NFEPA and the public policy exception, there is no valid claim, regardless of whether Mathis was acting within the scope of his employment when he entered into sales contracts on behalf of Husker Auto.

2021State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 249 , 762 N.W.2d 1, 8 (2009), disapproved on other grounds, Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185 , 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 , 121 S. Ct. 462 , 148 L.

2021State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 249 , 762 N.W.2d 1, 8 (2009), disapproved on other grounds, Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185 , 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 , 121 S. Ct. 462 , 148 L.

2021State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 249 , 762 N.W.2d 1, 8 (2009), disapproved on other grounds, Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185 , 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 , 121 S. Ct. 462 , 148 L.

2021State v. Henderson, 277 Neb. 240, 249 , 762 N.W.2d 1, 8 (2009), disapproved on other grounds, Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185 , 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020), citing Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57 , 121 S. Ct. 462 , 148 L.

2017Cite as 296 Neb. 469 wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contra- venes public policy.31 The public policy exception is restricted to cases when a clear mandate of public policy has been vio- lated, and it should be limited to manageable and clear stan- dards.32 In determining whether a clear mandate of public pol- icy is violated, courts should inquire whether the employer’s conduct contravenes the letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme.33 In Oldfield’s amended complaint, he alleges that his ter- mination of employment violated Neb

2017Cite as 296 Neb. 469 terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without rea- son.6 However, we have recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.7 As noted above, Oldfield alleged in his amended complaint that NMC’s decision to terminate his employment violated the ADEA, the FELA, and public policy.

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2017Public Policy [11-13] Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an employee can claim damages for 29 Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999)). 30 See id. (quoting Smith v. Allen Health Systems, Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), and citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected

2017Public Policy [11-13] Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an employee can claim damages for 29 Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999)). 30 See id. (quoting Smith v. Allen Health Systems, Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), and citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected

2017Public Policy [11-13] Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an employee can claim damages for 29 Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999)). 30 See id. (quoting Smith v. Allen Health Systems, Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), and citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2017Public Policy [11-13] Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, an employee can claim damages for 29 Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1999)). 30 See id. (quoting Smith v. Allen Health Systems, Inc., 302 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2002), and citing Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2017On appeal, he claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of NMC. [5,6] On a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.8 Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence admitted at the hearing dis- close that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 We note that both parties, as well as the district court, have a

2014In his amended complaint, Coffey alleged that Planet Group terminated his employment in bad faith to avoid paying Coffey additional commissions under the Wage Act. [12-15] Unless constitutionally, statutorily, or contractu- ally prohibited, an employer, without incurring liability, may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without rea- son.18 We recognize, however, a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.19 Under the public policy excep- tion, an employee can claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.20 Th

2014In his amended complaint, Coffey alleged that Planet Group terminated his employment in bad faith to avoid paying Coffey additional commissions under the Wage Act. [12-15] Unless constitutionally, statutorily, or contractu- ally prohibited, an employer, without incurring liability, may terminate an at-will employee at any time with or without rea- son.18 We recognize, however, a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.19 Under the public policy excep- tion, an employee can claim damages for wrongful discharge when the motivation for the firing contravenes public policy.20 Th

2006See, also, Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. 2003); McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 Or.

2006The court explained that “[b]y applying the public policy exception to the situation presented here, employees would be relieved of the onerous burden of choosing between equally destructive alternatives: report and be terminated, or fail to report and be prosecuted.” Id. at 668-69 , 571 N.W.2d at 398 .

2006The court explained that “[b]y applying the public policy exception to the situation presented here, employees would be relieved of the onerous burden of choosing between equally destructive alternatives: report and be terminated, or fail to report and be prosecuted.” Id. at 668-69 , 571 N.W.2d at 398 .

2001In Tullis v. Merrill, 584 N.W.2d 236 (Iowa 1998), the Iowa Supreme Court held that an at-will employee who was terminated after seeking reimbursement of amounts withheld from his paycheck could bring an action for wrongful discharge based upon a provision of Iowa’s wage payment collection act which prohibited an employer from discharging an employee because of the employee’s assertion of a claim under the act.

1993The People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75 , 197 N.E. 537 (1935).

1993The People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75 , 197 N.E. 537 (1935).

1985Nor was the exception at issue in Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677 , 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).

1985Nor was the exception at issue in Morris v. Lutheran Medical Center, 215 Neb. 677 , 340 N.W.2d 388 (1983).