public policy exception in District of Columbia

1999Furthermore, we said in Carl , “We could not and did not hold in Adams that this was the only public policy exception, because that question was simply not presented.’ ” Id. (quoting Gray v. Citizens Bank, 602 A.2d 1096, 1098 (D.C.), vacated at 1102, opinion reinstated on denial of rehearing en banc, 609 A.2d 1143 (D.C.1992) (Schwelb, J., concurring).

1997We think Judge Schwelb, in his concurring opinion in Gray v. Citizens Bank , read Adams correctly: "We could not and did not hold in Adams that this was the only public policy exception, because that question was simply not presented." Gray, supra, 602 A.2d at 1098 (Schwelb, J., concurring).

2012The public policy exception upheld in Carl was based on a statute, D.C.Code § 1-224 (1992). 2 See id., 702 A.2d at 163 -64 & n. 6 (Terry, J., concurring).

2008In a footnote of its order, the trial court mentioned that it appeared that most courts recognizing a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, see Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C.1997) (en banc), have held that it applies to only at-will employees.

2005Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C.1998) (rejecting application of Carl as unnecessary where suit was based on statutorily banned and actionable retaliation for exercising rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act); see also McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 957 (D.C.2000) (noting and applying the court’s previous rejection of “the argument ... that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine applies to an alleged statutory violation”).

2005Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C.1998) (rejecting application of Carl as unnecessary where suit was based on statutorily banned and actionable retaliation for exercising rights under the Workers' Compensation Act); see also McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 957 (D.C.2000) (noting and applying the court's previous rejection of "the argument ... that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine applies to an alleged statutory violation").

1998In recent years, as the courts have developed the “emerging doctrinal basis for the public policy exception,” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 113 (Colo.1992), the at-will doctrine has been “undergoing considerable erosion.” Boudar v. Buenette, 106 N.M. 279 , 742 P.2d 491, 494 (1987) (en banc).

1998In recent years, as the courts have developed the "emerging doctrinal basis for the public policy exception," Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 113 (Colo.1992), the at-will doctrine has been "undergoing considerable erosion." Boudar v. Buenette, 106 N.M. 279 , 742 P.2d 491, 494 (1987) (en banc).

1999Adams held that the exception applies “when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.” Adams, supra, 597 A.2d at 34 . 6 We permitted further limited expansion of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine in Carl, supra, when we held that: “[T]he ‘very narrow exception’ created in Adams should not be read in a manner that makes it impossible to recognize any additional public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine that may warrant recognition.” 702 A.2d at 160 .

1999Adams held that the exception applies “when the sole reason for the discharge is the employee’s refusal to violate the law, as expressed in a statute or municipal regulation.” Adams, supra, 597 A.2d at 34 . 6 We permitted further limited expansion of the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine in Carl, supra, when we held that: “[T]he ‘very narrow exception’ created in Adams should not be read in a manner that makes it impossible to recognize any additional public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine that may warrant recognition.” 702 A.2d at 160 .

1997See, e.g., Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Brothers, Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 565 A.2d 285, 289 (D.C. 1989) (contemplating that a public policy exception would be "statutorily declared”). .

1997See also Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that Employer May Discharge At-Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R.4th 544 (1982 & Supp.1996). [10] See, e.g., D.C.Code § 1-224 (1992) (making it a crime to coerce or threaten a witness for testifying before the Council); §§ 36-1501 et. seq. (1997) (providing statutory right of action for wrongful discharge for employees of certain contractors). [11] Significantly, in footnote 5 to his concurring opinion, and in the first sentence of footnote 4, Judge Terry wisely leaves the door open for at least some measure of flexibility.

2018We agree with the following explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: 31 Rosella v. Long Rap, Inc., 121 A.3d 775, 779 (D.C. 2015). 23 The public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at-will does not exist . . . to protect the employee.

2018We agree with the following explanation by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: 31 Rosella v. Long Rap, Inc., 121 A.3d 775, 779 (D.C. 2015). 23 The public policy exception to the doctrine of employment at-will does not exist . . . to protect the employee.

2005Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C.1998) (rejecting application of Carl as unnecessary where suit was based on statutorily banned and actionable retaliation for exercising rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act); see also McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 957 (D.C.2000) (noting and applying the court’s previous rejection of “the argument ... that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine applies to an alleged statutory violation”).

2005Freas v. Archer Servs., Inc., 716 A.2d 998, 1002 (D.C.1998) (rejecting application of Carl as unnecessary where suit was based on statutorily banned and actionable retaliation for exercising rights under the Workers' Compensation Act); see also McManus v. MCI Communications Corp., 748 A.2d 949, 957 (D.C.2000) (noting and applying the court's previous rejection of "the argument ... that a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine applies to an alleged statutory violation").

1997In addition, I join Judge Schwelb’s and Judge Mack’s opinions (including Judge Mack’s dissent at division in Carl v. Children’s Hospital, 657 A.2d 286 (D.C.1995)), which elaborate very ably why the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine applies more broadly than Judge TERRY would have it in Part IB. of his opinion.

1997In addition, I join Judge SCHWELB'S and Judge MACK'S opinions (including Judge MACK'S dissent at division in Carl v. Children's Hospital, 657 A.2d 286 (D.C.1995)), which elaborate very ably why the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine applies more broadly than Judge TERRY would have it in Part IB. of his opinion.

1997See my dissenting opinion (attached as APPENDIX hereto) in Carl v. Children's Hosp., 657 A.2d 286 ( Carl I ), vacated on grant of reh'g en banc, 665 A.2d 650 (D.C.1995).

1996See Carl v. Children's Hospital, 657 A.2d 286 (D.C.), vacated and reh’g granted, 665 A.2d 650 (D.C.1995) (per curiam), No. 93-CV-1476 argued en banc Oct. 12, 1995 (pending decision). *434 In Carl , this court has under advisement the question whether the public policy exception in Adams should be expanded to include the discharge of an at-will employee nurse who allegedly was dismissed after testifying at a public hearing as an expert against proposed tort reform legislation supported by her hospital employer and also providing expert testimony in medical malpractice litigation.

1995FARRELL, Associate Judge, concurring: In Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 8-9 (D.C.1993), this court recently stated: [T]he District of Columbia does not recognize the tort of wrongful or abusive discharge of an employee at will, other than by a very narrow public policy exception not applicable in this case.

1995FARRELL, Associate Judge, concurring: In Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 8-9 (D.C.1993), this court recently stated: [T]he District of Columbia does not recognize the tort of wrongful or abusive discharge of an employee at will, other than by a very narrow public policy exception not applicable in this case.

2026Servs., 635 N.W.2d 236, 238-39, 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (vacating arbitrator’s reinstatement award under the public policy exception in an “extreme and unique” case involving “protracted outrageous behavior” by a police officer who “repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to engage in sexual harassment”—including, for example, by “conducting traffic stops of young women, which resulted in neither the issuance of a citation nor a warning, apparently for the sole purpose of gathering personal information about the young women or for making personal comments to related to use-of-force inherently

2022Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal of wrongful-discharge claim because “the District’s own common law extinguishes [such a claim] when the statute giving rise to the public policy at issue contains an alternative remedy”); Jones v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 943 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2013) (“To the extent that Jones asserts a cause of action that rests on a public policy already advanced by Title VII, the DCHRA, or the District’s Whistleblower Protection Act, for example, [a public-policy exception] claim would fail.”); Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (D.D.C.

2022Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal of wrongful-discharge claim because “the District’s own common law extinguishes [such a claim] when the statute giving rise to the public policy at issue contains an alternative remedy”); Jones v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 943 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2013) (“To the extent that Jones asserts a cause of action that rests on a public policy already advanced by Title VII, the DCHRA, or the District’s Whistleblower Protection Act, for example, [a public-policy exception] claim would fail.”); Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (D.D.C.

2022Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal of wrongful-discharge claim because “the District’s own common law extinguishes [such a claim] when the statute giving rise to the public policy at issue contains an alternative remedy”); Jones v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 943 F. Supp. 2d 90, 96 (D.D.C. 2013) (“To the extent that Jones asserts a cause of action that rests on a public policy already advanced by Title VII, the DCHRA, or the District’s Whistleblower Protection Act, for example, [a public-policy exception] claim would fail.”); Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (D.D.C.

2012See Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (Skadden, Arps), 715 A.2d 873, 883-84 (D.C.1998).

2005Childs v. United States, 760 A.2d 614, 617 (D.C.2000) (citing Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532-533 , 96 S.Ct. 2771 , 49 L.Ed.2d 672 (1976)). 9 In the present case, the trial court relied on our Redmond decision, supra, and did not consider the public policy claim here asserted by Hawkins.

1998In recent years, as the courts have developed the “emerging doctrinal basis for the public policy exception,” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 113 (Colo.1992), the at-will doctrine has been “undergoing considerable erosion.” Boudar v. Buenette, 106 N.M. 279 , 742 P.2d 491, 494 (1987) (en banc).

1998In recent years, as the courts have developed the “emerging doctrinal basis for the public policy exception,” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 113 (Colo.1992), the at-will doctrine has been “undergoing considerable erosion.” Boudar v. Buenette, 106 N.M. 279 , 742 P.2d 491, 494 (1987) (en banc).

1998See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Cos., 843 F.2d 359 , 363-64 (9th Cir.1988) (applying Arizona law); Martin Marietta Corp., supra, 823 P.2d at 110-14 (Supreme Court of Colorado); Newman, supra, 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d at 1062-72 (Supreme Court of California); McGehee v. Florafax Int’l, Inc., 776 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Okl.1989) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma); Barnes v. Chase Instruments Corp., 1986 WL 6616 , 1986 Term.

1998See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359 , 363-64 (9th Cir.1988) (applying Arizona law); Martin Marietta Corp., supra, 823 P.2d at 110-14 (Supreme Court of Colorado); Newman, supra, 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d at 1062-72 (Supreme Court of California); McGehee v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 776 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Okl.1989) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma); Barnes v. Chase Instruments Corp., 1986 WL 6616 , 1986 Tenn. Lexis 3068 (Tenn. App.1986); but cf. Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Mem.

1998See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Cos., 843 F.2d 359 , 363-64 (9th Cir.1988) (applying Arizona law); Martin Marietta Corp., supra, 823 P.2d at 110-14 (Supreme Court of Colorado); Newman, supra, 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d at 1062-72 (Supreme Court of California); McGehee v. Florafax Int’l, Inc., 776 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Okl.1989) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma); Barnes v. Chase Instruments Corp., 1986 WL 6616 , 1986 Term.

1998See, e.g., Bernstein v. Aetna Life & Cas., 843 F.2d 359 , 363-64 (9th Cir.1988) (applying Arizona law); Martin Marietta Corp., supra, 823 P.2d at 110-14 (Supreme Court of Colorado); Newman, supra, 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d at 1062-72 (Supreme Court of California); McGehee v. Florafax Int'l, Inc., 776 P.2d 852, 853-54 (Okl.1989) (Supreme Court of Oklahoma); Barnes v. Chase Instruments Corp., 1986 WL 6616 , 1986 Tenn. Lexis 3068 (Tenn. App.1986); but cf. Bimbo v. Burdette Tomlin Mem.

1998See, e.g., Graff v. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C.1991). 18 If the events occurred as Ms. Washington has alleged, then an impartial trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Ms. Washington was discharged for conduct protected by a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine, and that her termination was therefore wrongful.

1998See, e.g., Graff v. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C.1991). [18] If the events occurred as Ms. Washington has alleged, then an impartial trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Ms. Washington was discharged for conduct protected by a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine, and that her termination was therefore wrongful.

1998To paraphrase the Supreme Court of California, “[e]ven if one views [Carl II] as breaking new and unexpected ground, a point we do not concede, it did so in an indisputably unsettled area.” Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal.3d 973 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d 1059, 1068 (1989). 11 By the time Guest Services discharged Ms. Washington, the “public policy” exception to the at-will doctrine had been widely applied in other jurisdictions to categories of conduct similar to that in which Ms. Washington claims to have engaged.

1998To paraphrase the Supreme Court of California, “[e]ven if one views [Carl II] as breaking new and unexpected ground, a point we do not concede, it did so in an indisputably unsettled area.” Newman v. Emerson Radio Corp., 48 Cal.3d 973 , 258 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 772 P.2d 1059, 1068 (1989). 11 By the time Guest Services discharged Ms. Washington, the “public policy” exception to the at-will doctrine had been widely applied in other jurisdictions to categories of conduct similar to that in which Ms. Washington claims to have engaged.