public policy exception in Ohio

2018While the high court grappled with the scope of the public policy exception in a number of decisions that followed Greeley , the court ultimately reaffirmed its prior precedent and held that "an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is justified where an employer has discharged his employee in contravention of a 'sufficiently clear public policy.' " Painter v. Graley , 70 Ohio St.3d 377 , 384, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994). {¶ 11} In determining whether a plaintiff could maintain a public policy claim, the Supreme Court has relied on the standard established in Collins v. Rizkana , 73 Ohio St.3d

2018While the high court grappled with the scope of the public policy exception in a number of decisions that followed Greeley , the court ultimately reaffirmed its prior precedent and held that "an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is justified where an employer has discharged his employee in contravention of a 'sufficiently clear public policy.' " Painter v. Graley , 70 Ohio St.3d 377 , 384, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994). {¶ 11} In determining whether a plaintiff could maintain a public policy claim, the Supreme Court has relied on the standard established in Collins v. Rizkana , 73 Ohio St.3d

2018While the high court grappled with the scope of the public policy exception in a number of decisions that followed Greeley , the court ultimately reaffirmed its prior precedent and held that "an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is justified where an employer has discharged his employee in contravention of a 'sufficiently clear public policy.' " Painter v. Graley , 70 Ohio St.3d 377 , 384, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994). {¶ 11} In determining whether a plaintiff could maintain a public policy claim, the Supreme Court has relied on the standard established in Collins v. Rizkana , 73 Ohio St.3d

2018While the high court grappled with the scope of the public policy exception in a number of decisions that followed Greeley , the court ultimately reaffirmed its prior precedent and held that "an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine is justified where an employer has discharged his employee in contravention of a 'sufficiently clear public policy.' " Painter v. Graley , 70 Ohio St.3d 377 , 384, 639 N.E.2d 51 (1994). {¶ 11} In determining whether a plaintiff could maintain a public policy claim, the Supreme Court has relied on the standard established in Collins v. Rizkana , 73 Ohio St.3d

2026However, Ohio recognizes a public policy exception to this doctrine “when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute.” Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234 (1990).

2025In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, 234-35 (1990), the Court recognized a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine based on a violation of a specific statute. “[A]fter Greeley, an employee terminated in violation of a statute could maintain a common-law action for damages.” Wiles at ¶ 5 . {¶ 27} Subsequent to Greeley, the Supreme Court expanded and refined the scope of the tort of wrongful discharge, holding that “a valid Greeley claim is not limited to situations where the discharge violates a statute.” Wiles at ¶ 6 .

2021Crowley at 830 , citing Sutton v. Tomco Machining, -9- Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio-2723 , 950 N.E.2d 938 (clarity element met where statute protects an employee who asserts a workers compensation claim); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997) (clarity element met when public policy is employee safety as reflected by the federal OSHA statute (29 U.S.C. 660 (c)) and related Ohio statutes). {¶ 25} Consistent, I think, with both the rationale for the public policy exception and the admonition that any employment-at-will exception should be narrowly con

2021Crowley at 830 , citing Sutton v. Tomco Machining, -9- Inc., 129 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2011-Ohio-2723 , 950 N.E.2d 938 (clarity element met where statute protects an employee who asserts a workers compensation claim); Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 677 N.E.2d 308 (1997) (clarity element met when public policy is employee safety as reflected by the federal OSHA statute (29 U.S.C. 660 (c)) and related Ohio statutes). {¶ 25} Consistent, I think, with both the rationale for the public policy exception and the admonition that any employment-at-will exception should be narrowly con

2010Kulch quotes the North Carolina Supreme Court case of Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co. (1992), 331 N.C. 348 , 416 S.E.2d 166 , in which that court held that the public-policy exception it adopted in a previous case was "not just a remedial gap-filler.

2010Kulch quotes the North Carolina Supreme Court case of Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co. (1992), 331 N.C. 348 , 416 S.E.2d 166 , in which that court held that the public-policy exception it adopted in a previous case was "not just a remedial gap-filler.

2022Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254 (1995), syllabus.

2012See Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254 , 652 N.E.2d 948 (1995), syllabus. {¶16} Schmitt’s complaint alleged that she was hired in 2002 and continued her employment with BCS and ESC until her termination, an allegation that could reasonably be construed to mean that her employment was at-will.

2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app

2007This is not to say that there may not be other public policy exceptions to the doctrine but, of course, such exceptions would be required to be of equally serious import as the violation of a statute.” Id. at 234-235 , 551 N.E.2d 981 ; see, also, Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 134 , 149-150, 677 N.E.2d 308 . {¶ 13} Two years later, in Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp. (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729 , syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[ajbsent statutory authority, there is no common-law basis in tort for a wrongful discharge claim,” a holding that app

1994This court refused to acknowledge the existence of a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under those facts, stating that Phung had “failed to state a violation of a sufficiently clear public policy to warrant creation of a cause of action” Id., Id., 23 Ohio St.3d at 102 , 23 OBR at 262, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-1117 .

1994This court refused to acknowledge the existence of a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine under those facts, stating that Phung had “failed to state a violation of a sufficiently clear public policy to warrant creation of a cause of action” Id., Id., 23 Ohio St.3d at 102 , 23 OBR at 262, 491 N.E.2d at 1116-1117 .

2020Accordingly, contracts which bring about results which the law seeks to prevent are unenforceable as against public policy.’ ” Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 150 , 2004-Ohio-829 , 809 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 64 , quoting Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Contracts, Section 94, at 528 (1980). * * * Our duty is to determine when the public-policy exception must be recognized, but it is the “legislative branch [that] is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.’ ” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468 , 2007-Ohio- 6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21 , quoting State ex rel.

2020Accordingly, contracts which bring about results which the law seeks to prevent are unenforceable as against public policy.’ ” Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 157 Ohio App.3d 150 , 2004-Ohio-829 , 809 N.E.2d 1161, ¶ 64 , quoting Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Contracts, Section 94, at 528 (1980). * * * Our duty is to determine when the public-policy exception must be recognized, but it is the “legislative branch [that] is ‘the ultimate arbiter of public policy.’ ” Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468 , 2007-Ohio- 6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 21 , quoting State ex rel.

2010Under the jeopardy element, we must determine whether the absence of a public-policy claim “would seriously compromise the Act’s statutory objectives.” Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14 (referring to the Family Medical Leave Act).

2007III {¶ 40} The second issue in this case is whether Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , precludes a public- policy claim premised on Coolidge because the statute adequately protects the public interest at issue.

2010Under the jeopardy element, we must determine whether the absence of a public-policy claim “would seriously compromise the Act’s statutory objectives.” Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , at ¶ 14 (referring to the Family Medical Leave Act).

2007III {¶ 40} The second issue in this case is whether Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 96 Ohio St.3d 240 , 2002-Ohio-3994 , 773 N.E.2d 526 , precludes a public- policy claim premised on Coolidge because the statute adequately protects the public interest at issue.

2011No. 85692, 2005-Ohio-5136, at ¶11 (“[C]ontrary to Brooks’ suggestion, Coolidge does not create a public policy exception for absenteeism to at-will employment situations * * * but, rather, expanded the type of action that constitutes retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 to include termination for absenteeism while on TTD.”).

2007No. 85692, 2005-Ohio-5136 (holding Coolidge expanded the type of action that constitutes retaliation under R.C. 4123.90 to include termination for absenteeism while on TTD).

1998See Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law (1998) Judge Mark P. Painter, Section 13.6; State v. Boysaw (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 173 , 532 N.E.2d 154 ; State v. Kavlich (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 240 , 515 N.E.2d 652 ; State v. Tu (1984), 17 Ohio App.3d 159 , 17 OBR 291, 478 N.E.2d 830 ; State v. Dress, supra. The Ohio Supreme Court ended judicial interpretation of the statute with State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 .

1992Accord In re Estate of Wallace, supra; see, also, State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 (courts may not create a public policy exception to the physician-patient privilege); Storey, supra (Peggy Bryant, J., dissenting) (Floyd does not apply to a question of privilege under Civ.R. 26 because Civ.R. 26 lacks a provision comparable to Civ.R. 16 on waiver).

1998See Ohio Driving Under the Influence Law (1998) Judge Mark P. Painter, Section 13.6; State v. Boysaw (1987), 40 Ohio App.3d 173 , 532 N.E.2d 154 ; State v. Kavlich (1986), 33 Ohio App.3d 240 , 515 N.E.2d 652 ; State v. Tu (1984), 17 Ohio App.3d 159 , 17 OBR 291, 478 N.E.2d 830 ; State v. Dress, supra. The Ohio Supreme Court ended judicial interpretation of the statute with State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 .

1992Accord In re Estate of Wallace, supra; see, also, State v. Smorgala (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 222 , 553 N.E.2d 672 (courts may not create a public policy exception to the physician-patient privilege); Storey, supra (Peggy Bryant, J., dissenting) (Floyd does not apply to a question of privilege under Civ.R. 26 because Civ.R. 26 lacks a provision comparable to Civ.R. 16 on waiver).

2011See, e.g., Klopfenstein v. NK Parts Industries, Inc., 171 Ohio App.3d 286 , 2007-Ohio-1916 .

2011See, e.g., Klopfenstein v. NK Parts Industries, Inc., 171 Ohio App.3d 286 , 2007-Ohio-1916 .

2007See, e.g., Kusens v. Pascal Co., Inc. (C.A.6, 2006), 448 F.3d 349, 365-366 ; Welty v. Honda of Am.

2007Kusens v. Pascal Co. (C.A.6, 2006), 448 F.3d 349, 365 ; Jakischa v. Cent.