public policy exception in New York

2021"Judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate in arbitrations pursuant to public employment collective bargaining agreements" ( id. ; see Matter of City of Buffalo [Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn., Inc.] , 150 AD3d 1641, 1643 [2017]).

2010“Judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate” where, as here, the case involves arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (Matter of New York City Tr Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 99 NY2d at 7-8; see Matter of DeMartino v New York City Dept. of Transp., 67 AD3d 479, 480 [2009]).

2020With respect to the public policy exception, "a court may vacate an arbitral award where strong and well-defined policy considerations embodied in constitutional, statutory or common law prohibit a particular matter from being decided or certain relief from being granted by an arbitrator" ( Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York , 94 NY2d at 327 ; see Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg] , 46 NY2d 623, 631 ).

2016The public policy exception applies only in “ ‘cases in which public policy considerations, embodied in statute or decisional law, prohibit, in an absolute sense, particular matters being decided or certain relief being granted by an arbitrator’ ” (id. at 7 [emphasis omitted], quoting Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], 46 NY2d 623, 631 [1979]; see Matter of Santer v Board of Educ. of E.

2026Although "the scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow" ( United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York , 1 NY3d 72, 80 [2003]), the Court concludes that public policy prohibits arbitration of so much of the respondents' grievance as alleged that the UCS violated the CBA when Judge St.

2026Although "the scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow" ( United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York , 1 NY3d 72, 80 [2003]), the Court concludes that public policy prohibits arbitration of so much of the respondents' grievance as alleged that the UCS violated the CBA when Judge St.

2023"Under the public policy exception, when otherwise applicable foreign law would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" ( Loucks v. Standard Oil Co ., 224 NY 99, 111 , 120 N.E. 198 [Cardozo, J.]), the court may refuse to enforce it." ( Cooney v. Osgood Mach ., Inc., 81 NY2d 66, 78 [1993].) "This public policy exception is reserved "for those foreign laws that are [*6]truly obnoxious" ( Cooney , 81 NY2d at 79 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 , 612 N.E.2d 277 ; see Welsbach Elec.

2023"Under the public policy exception, when otherwise applicable foreign law would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" ( Loucks v. Standard Oil Co ., 224 NY 99, 111 , 120 N.E. 198 [Cardozo, J.]), the court may refuse to enforce it." ( Cooney v. Osgood Mach ., Inc., 81 NY2d 66, 78 [1993].) "This public policy exception is reserved "for those foreign laws that are [*6]truly obnoxious" ( Cooney , 81 NY2d at 79 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 , 612 N.E.2d 277 ; see Welsbach Elec.

2023"Under the public policy exception, when otherwise applicable foreign law would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" ( Loucks v. Standard Oil Co ., 224 NY 99, 111 , 120 N.E. 198 [Cardozo, J.]), the court may refuse to enforce it." ( Cooney v. Osgood Mach ., Inc., 81 NY2d 66, 78 [1993].) "This public policy exception is reserved "for those foreign laws that are [*6]truly obnoxious" ( Cooney , 81 NY2d at 79 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 , 612 N.E.2d 277 ; see Welsbach Elec.

2023"Under the public policy exception, when otherwise applicable foreign law would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal" ( Loucks v. Standard Oil Co ., 224 NY 99, 111 , 120 N.E. 198 [Cardozo, J.]), the court may refuse to enforce it." ( Cooney v. Osgood Mach ., Inc., 81 NY2d 66, 78 [1993].) "This public policy exception is reserved "for those foreign laws that are [*6]truly obnoxious" ( Cooney , 81 NY2d at 79 , 595 N.Y.S.2d 919 , 612 N.E.2d 277 ; see Welsbach Elec.

2020With respect to the public policy exception, "a court may vacate an arbitral award where strong and well-defined policy considerations embodied in constitutional, statutory or common law prohibit a particular matter from being decided or certain relief from being granted by an arbitrator" ( Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York , 94 NY2d at 327 ; see Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg] , 46 NY2d 623, 631 ).

2017The public policy exception thus cannot be applied on this basis (compare Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d at 328 ).

2014Education Law § 3020-a (5) requires a court to review an arbitrator’s determination pursuant to CPLR 7511, which permits vacatur of an award on three narrow grounds: “it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power” (Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 1 NY3d 72, 79 [2003] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 7511 [b] [1]). “[T]he scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator’s power to resolve disputes is extremely na

2013As a result, the motion court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing officer and thus erroneously applied the narrow public policy exception to invalidate the hearing officers’ determination (s ee City School Dist. of the City of N.Y.v McGraham, 75 AD3d 445, 450 [1st Dept 2010], affd 17 NY3d 917 [2011]).

2016“A job security provision insures that, at least for the duration of the agreement, the employee need not fear being put out of a job” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268, 275 [1976]).

2016“A job security provision insures that, at least for the duration of the agreement, the employee need not fear being put out of a job” (Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268, 275 [1976]).

2014(Sung Hwan Co., Ltd. v Rite Aid Corp., 7 NY3d 78, 82 [2006].) The public policy inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is “inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” (Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden, 15 NY2d 9, 13 [1964].) In this court’s view, the Singapore court’s incorporation of the “liberal and unsupervised” visitation terms, even if the wife never gave her written consent to those terms, does not violate the wife’s “fundamental human rights.” First, the interim judgment of divorce gave the wife a thr

2006The public policy inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is “inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense” (Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden, 15 NY2d 9, 13 [1964]).

2003In Greschler v Greschler (supra), in granting comity to a divorce obtained in the Dominican Republic, on the consent of both parties, that incorporated a separation agreement, the Court of Appeals stated (at 377): “While it is generally the rule in this State that where the basic public policy of the forum would be offended a court can refuse to recognize the validity of a foreign judgment, the public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is usually invoked only in the rare instance ‘where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where

1998The public policy exception to the doctrine of comity is usually invoked only in the rare instance “ ‘where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought’ ” (Greschler v Greschler, supra, at 377, quoting Restatement, Conflict of Laws 2d, § 117, comment c).

2023Corp ., 7 NY3d at 629, 825 N.Y.S.2d 692 , 859 N.E.2d 498 ).

2015This public policy exception is reserved “for those foreign laws that are truly obnoxious” (Cooney, 81 NY2d at 79 ; see Welsbach Elec. *369 Corp., 7 NY3d at 629).

2015According to the City, the arbitrator’s reinstatement directive reads a “job security” provision into the citywide CBA, thereby conferring a benefit upon the grievants that they did not contract for, and therefore should be seen as an impermissible intrusion into the sphere of municipal authority. “[T]he scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator’s power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow” (Matter of DeMartino v New York City Dept. of Transp., 67 AD3d 479, 480 [1st Dept 2009]).

2015Longshoreman’s Assn., AFL-CIO v New York City Dept. of Transp., 35 AD3d 211, 213 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 805 [2007]). “ ‘Judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate in arbitrations pursuant to public employment collective bargaining agreements’ ” (DeMartino, 67 AD3d at 480 ).

2014(Sung Hwan Co., Ltd. v Rite Aid Corp., 7 NY3d 78, 82 [2006].) The public policy inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is “inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” (Intercontinental Hotels Corp. [Puerto Rico] v Golden, 15 NY2d 9, 13 [1964].) In this court’s view, the Singapore court’s incorporation of the “liberal and unsupervised” visitation terms, even if the wife never gave her written consent to those terms, does not violate the wife’s “fundamental human rights.” First, the interim judgment of divorce gave the wife a thr

2012“The public policy inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is Inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense’ ” (Sung Hwan Co., Ltd. v Rite Aid Corp., 7 NY3d 78, 82 [2006]).

2013As a result, the motion court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing officer and thus erroneously applied the narrow public policy exception to invalidate the hearing officers’ determination (s ee City School Dist. of the City of N.Y.v McGraham, 75 AD3d 445, 450 [1st Dept 2010], affd 17 NY3d 917 [2011]).

2013As a result, the motion court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the hearing officer and thus erroneously applied the narrow public policy exception to invalidate the hearing officers’ determination (s ee City School Dist. of the City of N.Y.v McGraham, 75 AD3d 445, 450 [1st Dept 2010], affd 17 NY3d 917 [2011]).

2012Further, “judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate where, as here, the case involves arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement” (Matter of Jandrew [County of Cortland], 84 AD3d at 1619 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2012Further, “judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate where, as here, the case involves arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement” (Matter of Jandrew [County of Cortland], 84 AD3d at 1619 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2002In those instances, the Legislature in the Taylor Law explicitly adopted a countervailing policy “encouraging such public employers and such employee organizations to agree upon procedures for resolving disputes” (Civil Service Law § 200 [c]), as a means of promoting harmonious relations between governmental employers and their employees, and preventing labor strife endangering uninterrupted governmental operations (see Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268, 273 [1976]; Board of Educ. v Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 NY2d 122, 131

2002In those instances, the Legislature in the Taylor Law explicitly adopted a countervailing policy "encouraging such public employers and such employee organizations to agree upon procedures for resolving disputes" (Civil Service Law § 200 [c]), as a means of promoting harmonious relations between governmental employers and their employees, and preventing labor strife endangering uninterrupted governmental operations ( see Matter of Board of Educ. of Yonkers City School Dist. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268, 273 [1976]; Board of Educ. v Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 NY2d 122, 13

2009In this case, however, the Supreme Court properly applied the public policy exception to the ordinary choice of law rule because (1) there were sufficient contacts between the parties, the occurrence, and New York and (2) enforcing New Jersey’s charitable immunity statute would violate the public policy of New York State (see Schultz v Boy Scouts of Am., 65 NY2d 189 , 202 [1985]) as embodied in the New York State Constitution, article I, § 16 and judicial decisions (see Rosenthal v Warren, 374 F Supp 522 [1974]; Scharfman v National Jewish Hosp. & Research Ctr., 122 AD2d 939 [1986]; Rakaric v

1987(Scharfman v National Jewish Hosp. & Research Center, 122 AD2d 939 [2d Dept 1986]; Rakaric v Croatian Cultural Club, 76 AD2d 619 [2d Dept 1980].) The latter case was one of common domicile, so there was no real choice-of-law question; the former incorporated New York’s interest in " 'protecting its own residents injured in a foreign State against unfair or anachronistic statutes of that State’ ” (supra, at 940, citing Schultz v Boy Scouts, 65 NY2d 189 ), into its choice of New York common law as the applicable law without reference either to the Neumeier rules or to the public policy exception

2025A court can, in rare circumstances, invoke the public policy exception to the enforcement of a settlement agreement when “enforcement of the judgment would result in the recognition of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” Altman v. Altman, 150 A.D.2d 304, 307 (1st Dept. 1989)(emphasis in original).

1991(Executive Bank v Tighe, 54 NY2d 330, 336 [1981].) Nor should comity be denied on the ground that it presents "one of those 'rare instance[s]’ in which the public policy exception to the doctrine of comity must be invoked because enforcement of the judgment 'would result in the recognition of a "transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense” ’ ” (Altman v Altman, supra, at 307 ), or "would conflict seriously with a compelling public policy” (Robinson v Robinson, supra, at 416; see also, Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 377 [1980]; Int

2015Longshoreman’s Assn., AFL-CIO v New York City Dept. of Transp., 35 AD3d 211, 213 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 805 [2007]). “ ‘Judicial restraint under the public policy exception is particularly appropriate in arbitrations pursuant to public employment collective bargaining agreements’ ” (DeMartino, 67 AD3d at 480 ).

2009Longshoreman’s Assn., AFL-CIO v New York City Dept. of Transp., 35 AD3d 211 [2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 805 [2007]). “[T]he scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator’s power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow” (United Fedn. of Teachers, 1 NY3d at 80).

2009"This high burden springs from an ordered sense of respect and tolerance for the adjudications of foreign Nations, [and the] parallel[ respect]. . . commanded among the States by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution" ( id., *380 citing US Const, art IV, § 1). [2] Notably, for example, in Matter of May , where we recognized as valid the marriage performed in Rhode Island between a man and his niece that could not have lawfully been entered into in New York given that, by statute, it was deemed incestuous, we nevertheless explained that the "marriage, solemnized, as

2008Moreover, as the Martinez decision correctly notes, the natural law exception “has generally been limited to marriages involving polygamy or incest or marriages ‘offensive to the public sense of morality to a degree regarded generally with abhorrence.’ ” ( 50 AD3d at 192 , quoting Matter of May, 305 NY 486, 493 [1953] [upholding out-of-state marriage between uncle and niece].) Neither party cites any precedent nor has this court found any in this jurisdiction that would warrant inclusion of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions in the very narrow public policy exception established by th

2025In light of the narrow scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power, the matter is arbitrable, especially because it concerns a public employment collective bargaining agreement ( see Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. , 1 NY3d 72, 80 [2003]; see also Selman v State of New York Dept. of Correctional Servs. , 5 AD3d 144, 144 [1st Dept 2004]).

2025In light of the narrow scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power, the matter is arbitrable, especially because it concerns a public employment collective bargaining agreement ( see Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. , 1 NY3d 72, 80 [2003]; see also Selman v State of New York Dept. of Correctional Servs. , 5 AD3d 144, 144 [1st Dept 2004]).