public policy exception in Arizona

1999In Wagenseller , our supreme court adopted the public policy exception to at will discharge, finding that an employer could not make continued employment hinge on whether the employee participated in a "mooning," a possible criminal offense. 147 Ariz. at 380 , 710 P.2d at 1035 . ¶ 12 In Wagner , the court extended this exception to include retaliatory firing for whistleblowing activity, because it found societal benefits in having employees expose employer activity that is illegal or that jeopardizes the health and safety of the public. 150 Ariz. at 89 , 722 P.2d at 257 .

1999In Wagenseller , our supreme court adopted the public policy exception to at will discharge, finding that an employer could not make continued employment hinge on whether the employee participated in a "mooning," a possible criminal offense. 147 Ariz. at 380 , 710 P.2d at 1035 . ¶ 12 In Wagner , the court extended this exception to include retaliatory firing for whistleblowing activity, because it found societal benefits in having employees expose employer activity that is illegal or that jeopardizes the health and safety of the public. 150 Ariz. at 89 , 722 P.2d at 257 .

1999In Wagenseller , our supreme court adopted the public policy exception to at will discharge, finding that an employer could not make continued employment hinge on whether the employee participated in a "mooning," a possible criminal offense. 147 Ariz. at 380 , 710 P.2d at 1035 . ¶ 12 In Wagner , the court extended this exception to include retaliatory firing for whistleblowing activity, because it found societal benefits in having employees expose employer activity that is illegal or that jeopardizes the health and safety of the public. 150 Ariz. at 89 , 722 P.2d at 257 .

1999In Wagenseller , our supreme court adopted the public policy exception to at will discharge, finding that an employer could not make continued employment hinge on whether the employee participated in a "mooning," a possible criminal offense. 147 Ariz. at 380 , 710 P.2d at 1035 . ¶ 12 In Wagner , the court extended this exception to include retaliatory firing for whistleblowing activity, because it found societal benefits in having employees expose employer activity that is illegal or that jeopardizes the health and safety of the public. 150 Ariz. at 89 , 722 P.2d at 257 .

1986See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184 , 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (seminal declaration of the public policy exception; employee discharged for refusal to commit perjury).

1986See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal.App.2d 184 , 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (seminal declaration of the public policy exception; employee discharged for refusal to commit perjury).

2013See In re Zukerkom, 484 B.R. 182, 193 (Bankr.9th Cir.2012) (explaining the public policy exception set forth in § 187(2) “requires something more than the law of the other state be different”); Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611 , 921 A2d 799, 805 (2007) (concluding a conflict between the law of Maryland with the law of another jurisdiction does not, alone, “render the [law of the other jurisdiction] contrary to Maryland public policy” such that the law of the other jurisdiction is “unenforceable” under Restatement (Second) § 187(2)). ¶ 24 Without citation to authority, Parkway

2013See In re Zukerkom, 484 B.R. 182, 193 (Bankr.9th Cir.2012) (explaining the public policy exception set forth in § 187(2) “requires something more than the law of the other state be different”); Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611 , 921 A2d 799, 805 (2007) (concluding a conflict between the law of Maryland with the law of another jurisdiction does not, alone, “render the [law of the other jurisdiction] contrary to Maryland public policy” such that the law of the other jurisdiction is “unenforceable” under Restatement (Second) § 187(2)). ¶ 24 Without citation to authority, Parkway

2013See In re Zukerkom, 484 B.R. 182, 193 (Bankr.9th Cir.2012) (explaining the public policy exception set forth in § 187(2) “requires something more than the law of the other state be different”); Jackson v. Pasadena Receivables, Inc., 398 Md. 611 , 921 A2d 799, 805 (2007) (concluding a conflict between the law of Maryland with the law of another jurisdiction does not, alone, “render the [law of the other jurisdiction] contrary to Maryland public policy” such that the law of the other jurisdiction is “unenforceable” under Restatement (Second) § 187(2)). ¶ 24 Without citation to authority, Parkway

2003See also Burrough, 914 F.Supp. at 312 (excluding coverage for a strict liability crime is not against public policy); Morris, 795 F.Supp. at 276 ("[N]o court appears to have invalidated, on public policy grounds, an exclusion for injuries caused by less-than-intentional conduct.”); Hooper, 571 So.2d at 1002-03 (rejecting allegations that a criminal acts exclusion contravened public policy or was unconscionable after an insured committed second degree assault with a shotgun); Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513-16 (finding no public policy violation for an exclusion where the insured was guilly of second d

2003See also Burrough, 914 F.Supp. at 312 (excluding coverage for a strict liability crime is not against public policy); Morris, 795 F.Supp. at 276 ("[N]o court appears to have invalidated, on public policy grounds, an exclusion for injuries caused by less-than-intentional conduct.”); Hooper, 571 So.2d at 1002-03 (rejecting allegations that a criminal acts exclusion contravened public policy or was unconscionable after an insured committed second degree assault with a shotgun); Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513-16 (finding no public policy violation for an exclusion where the insured was guilly of second d

2003Co. v. Manterola, 191 Ariz. 344, 348, ¶ 17 , 955 P.2d 982, 986 (App.1998) (finding that a policy exclusion barring coverage for damages arising from sexual misconduct did not violate Arizona public policy); State Farm Fire & Cas.

2003Co. v. Manterola, 191 Ariz. 344, 348, ¶ 17 , 955 P.2d 982, 986 (App.1998) (finding that a policy exclusion barring coverage for damages arising from sexual misconduct did not violate Arizona public policy); State Farm Fire & Cas.

2003See also Burrough, 914 F.Supp. at 312 (excluding coverage for a strict liability crime is not against public policy); Morris, 795 F.Supp. at 276 ("[N]o court appears to have invalidated, on public policy grounds, an exclusion for injuries caused by less-than-intentional conduct.”); Hooper, 571 So.2d at 1002-03 (rejecting allegations that a criminal acts exclusion contravened public policy or was unconscionable after an insured committed second degree assault with a shotgun); Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513-16 (finding no public policy violation for an exclusion where the insured was guilly of second d

2003See also Burrough, 914 F.Supp. at 312 (excluding coverage for a strict liability crime is not against public policy); Morris, 795 F.Supp. at 276 ("[N]o court appears to have invalidated, on public policy grounds, an exclusion for injuries caused by less-than-intentional conduct.”); Hooper, 571 So.2d at 1002-03 (rejecting allegations that a criminal acts exclusion contravened public policy or was unconscionable after an insured committed second degree assault with a shotgun); Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513-16 (finding no public policy violation for an exclusion where the insured was guilly of second d

2003See also Burrough, 914 F.Supp. at 312 (excluding coverage for a strict liability crime is not against public policy); Morris, 795 F.Supp. at 276 ("[N]o court appears to have invalidated, on public policy grounds, an exclusion for injuries caused by less-than-intentional conduct.”); Hooper, 571 So.2d at 1002-03 (rejecting allegations that a criminal acts exclusion contravened public policy or was unconscionable after an insured committed second degree assault with a shotgun); Juniel, 931 P.2d at 513-16 (finding no public policy violation for an exclusion where the insured was guilly of second d

2001See Bott, 908 P.2d at 913 .

2000See also Norman v. Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc., 156 Ariz. 425, 428-29 , 752 P.2d 514, 517-18 (App.1988)(holding that the discharge of an employee from a non-profit corporation allegedly resulting from a director’s breach of fiduciary duties was not within the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule). 3 .

2000See also Norman v. Recreation Ctrs. of Sun City, Inc., 156 Ariz. 425, 428-29 , 752 P.2d 514, 517-18 (App.1988)(holding that the discharge of an employee from a non-profit corporation allegedly resulting from a director’s breach of fiduciary duties was not within the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule). 3 .

1999See e.g., Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F.Supp. 183, 186-87 (E.D.Pa.1995) (narrowly interpreting public policy exception, father could fire son for refusing to divorce wife of whom father disapproved despite general statutory policy of family preservation); Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 58 Cal.App.4th 938 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 (1997) (statute requiring accommodation of employee's drug rehabilitation did not express a substantial and fundamental public policy to preclude termination for enrollment in rehabilitation program). ¶ 11 At the heart of the public policy exception to an employer's right

1999See e.g., Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F.Supp. 183, 186-87 (E.D.Pa.1995) (narrowly interpreting public policy exception, father could fire son for refusing to divorce wife of whom father disapproved despite general statutory policy of family preservation); Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, 58 Cal.App.4th 938 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 (1997) (statute requiring accommodation of employee’s drug rehabilitation did not express a substantial and fundamental public policy to preclude termination for enrollment in rehabilitation program). ¶ 11 At the heart of the public policy exception to an employer’s right

1985We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that "[t]here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, than the enforcement of a State's criminal code." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d at 132 , 52 Ill.Dec. at 16, 421 N.E.2d at 879 (citations omitted).

1985We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that "[t]here is no public policy more basic, nothing more implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, than the enforcement of a State's criminal code." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d at 132 , 52 Ill.Dec. at 16, 421 N.E.2d at 879 (citations omitted).

1985See Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App.2d 322 , 202 P.2d 1059 (1949) (statute prohibiting discharge for serving as an election officer).

1985See Kouff v. Bethlehem-Alameda Shipyard, 90 Cal. App.2d 322 , 202 P.2d 1059 (1949) (statute prohibiting discharge for serving as an election officer).

1985Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 146 Ariz. 215 at 216 , 704 P.2d 1360 at 1361 (App. 1985).

1985Vermillion v. AAA Pro Moving & Storage, 146 Ariz. 215 at 216 , 704 P.2d 1360 at 1361 (App. 1985).

1985The court concluded that termination "motivated by bad faith or malice or based on *377 retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133 , 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). [3] Although no other court has gone this far, a majority of the states have now either recognized a cause of action based on the public policy exception or have indicated their willingness to consider it, given appropriate facts. [4] The key to an employee's claim in all of these cases is the proper

1985The court concluded that termination "motivated by bad faith or malice or based on *377 retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133 , 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974). [3] Although no other court has gone this far, a majority of the states have now either recognized a cause of action based on the public policy exception or have indicated their willingness to consider it, given appropriate facts. [4] The key to an employee's claim in all of these cases is the proper

1984We agree with the New Jersey court when it wrote in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J.Super. 335, 342 , 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979), rev’d 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980), that the public policy exception to the rule that employees terminable at will can be fired for any or for no reason should be “tightly circumscribed so as to apply only in cases involving truly significant matters of clear and well-defined public policy____” What is most significant to us, however, is that the appellant was never required to participate in any objectionable conduct.

1984We agree with the New Jersey court when it wrote in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J.Super. 335, 342 , 399 A.2d 1023, 1026 (1979), rev’d 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980), that the public policy exception to the rule that employees terminable at will can be fired for any or for no reason should be “tightly circumscribed so as to apply only in cases involving truly significant matters of clear and well-defined public policy____” What is most significant to us, however, is that the appellant was never required to participate in any objectionable conduct.