public policy exception in Pennsylvania

2025Still, this public policy exception is to be understood as “exceptionally narrow.” Westmoreland, 939 A.2d at 868 (Saylor, J., concurring).

2025See, e.g., Campbell v. Department of Environmental Resources, 396 A.2d 870 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (“It is axiomatic that we will not disturb a judgment, order, or decree on appeal for harmless error.”). 13 LANTA has failed to acknowledge that our Supreme Court abandoned the core functions test in Westmoreland, 939 A.2d at 865 . 16 public policies discussed above, per the public policy exception as articulated in City of Bradford, but it would also “encourage other bad behavior from employees and third parties.” Id. at 36.

2025Regarding the public policy exception, the trial court opined that LANTA was incorrect in relying on the test articulated in City of Bradford v. Teamster Local Union No. 110, 25 A.3d 408, 414 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), as it was “superseded” by the Supreme Court’s own test in Millcreek Township School District v. Millcreek Township Educational Support Personnel Association, 210 A.3d 993, 1011 (Pa. 2019).8 Trial Court Op. at 11 n.5.

2019In order to determine whether the public policy exception is applicable, courts must: (1) identify the nature of the conduct leading up to the discipline; (2) determine if the identified conduct implicates a well-defined, dominant public policy which is “ascertained by 6 reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests[;]” and (3) determine if the arbitration award presents an unacceptable risk that the award will “undermine the implicated policy and cause the public employer to breach its lawful obligations or public duty, given the p

2026Our Supreme Court has recognized a very limited exception affording terminated employees a judge-made cause of action for wrongful termination only in the rare case where the termination violates “a clear mandate of [Pennsylvania] public policy.” McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283, 287 (2000). 7 However, terminated employees may only invoke the public policy exception if there is no available statutory remedy for the aggrieved employee.

2026Our Supreme Court has recognized a very limited exception affording terminated employees a judge-made cause of action for wrongful termination only in the rare case where the termination violates “a clear mandate of [Pennsylvania] public policy.” McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283, 287 (2000). 7 However, terminated employees may only invoke the public policy exception if there is no available statutory remedy for the aggrieved employee.

2019However, despite the Majority's recognition that the "crux of this matter lies in the proper application of *1009 the public policy exception," the Majority did not articulate a clear test for applying the public policy exception, noting only that there should be "some reasonable, calibrated, defensible relationship between the conduct violating dominant public policy and the arbitrator's response." Id. at 1121 , 1128 ; see id. at 1135-36 (McCaffery, J., concurring, joined by Baer, J.) (observing that the Majority fails "to articulate any scope or standard of review for when a PERA arbitration

2019However, despite the Majority's recognition that the "crux of this matter lies in the proper application of *1009 the public policy exception," the Majority did not articulate a clear test for applying the public policy exception, noting only that there should be "some reasonable, calibrated, defensible relationship between the conduct violating dominant public policy and the arbitrator's response." Id. at 1121 , 1128 ; see id. at 1135-36 (McCaffery, J., concurring, joined by Baer, J.) (observing that the Majority fails "to articulate any scope or standard of review for when a PERA arbitration

2025“Whether or not [a plaintiff’s] claim can succeed is irrelevant; [i]t is the existence of the remedy, not the success of the statutory claim, which determines preemption.” Jacques v. Akzo International Salt, 18 See, e.g., Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, 660 A.2d 1374, 1378 (Pa. Super. 1995) (recognizing a public policy exception where at-will employee was fired for the filing of a workers’ compensation claim); Kroen v. Bedway Security Agency, 633 A.2d 628, 633 (Pa. Super. 1993) (refusal to submit to a polygraph test); Mikhail v. Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery, 63 A.3d

2021This public policy exception applies and permits a cause of action for wrongful discharge where the employer discharges an employee for refusing to commit a crime, where the employer discharges an employee for complying with a statutorily imposed duty,2 or where the employer is specifically prohibited by statute from discharging the employee.3 Deal, 223 A.3d at 712 ; Greco, 199 A.3d at 436 ; Mikhail v. Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery, 63 A.3d 313, 317 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2024Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Immunity The principle that judges must be free to perform their judicial function without the specter of liability in a civil action has deep roots in English common law.104 A key premise of the doctrine of judicial immunity is that it exists not to shield tortfeasors, but rather to protect the public’s interest in ensuring that certain individuals in society are able to 102 Id. 103 See, e.g., Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555 (Pa. 2009) (overruling a Superior Court decision holding that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and the Equal Rights Amendment provided a

2020Outside of those categories of our legislature’s expression of public policy, a court may find a public policy exception that will sustain a wrongful termination action only if the public policy “is so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Weaver, 975 A.2d at 563 .

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

1998The public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is applicable in the following instances: “(1) the employer requires the employee to commit a crime; (2) the employer prevents the employee from complying with a statutory duty; or (3) the employer fires the employee in direct contravention of a specific statutory prohi bition.” Id. at 177 , citing Shick v. Shirey, 456 Pa. Super. 668 , 691 A.2d 511 (1997) (en banc).

1998The public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is applicable in the following instances: “(1) the employer requires the employee to commit a crime; (2) the employer prevents the employee from complying with a statutory duty; or (3) the employer fires the employee in direct contravention of a specific statutory prohi bition.” Id. at 177 , citing Shick v. Shirey, 456 Pa. Super. 668 , 691 A.2d 511 (1997) (en banc).

1995This public policy exception is narrow, Marsh v. Boyle, 366 Pa. Super. 1, 8 , 530 A.2d 491, 495 (1987), and is “closely bounded by the employer’s right to run his business as he sees fit.” Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 375 Pa. Super. 1, 14 , 543 A.2d 1148, 1155 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 524 Pa. 90 , 569 A.2d 346 (1990).

1995This public policy exception is narrow, Marsh v. Boyle, 366 Pa. Super. 1, 8 , 530 A.2d 491, 495 (1987), and is “closely bounded by the employer’s right to run his business as he sees fit.” Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 375 Pa. Super. 1, 14 , 543 A.2d 1148, 1155 (1988), rev’d on other grounds, 524 Pa. 90 , 569 A.2d 346 (1990).

2025“Whether or not [a plaintiff’s] claim can succeed is irrelevant; [i]t is the existence of the remedy, not the success of the statutory claim, which determines preemption.” Jacques v. Akzo International Salt, 18 See, e.g., Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, 660 A.2d 1374, 1378 (Pa. Super. 1995) (recognizing a public policy exception where at-will employee was fired for the filing of a workers’ compensation claim); Kroen v. Bedway Security Agency, 633 A.2d 628, 633 (Pa. Super. 1993) (refusal to submit to a polygraph test); Mikhail v. Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early Recovery, 63 A.3d

2013Id. at 1063 (citations omitted); see also Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590 , 716 A.2d 1231 (1998) (termination for filing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits is a public policy exception to the general at-will doctrine); Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa. Super. 378 , 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (termination in retaliation for employee seeking unemployment benefits is a public policy exception to the general at-will doctrine); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 225 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (termination for missing work for jury duty is a public policy exception to the general at-will doc

1988The court discussed a set of factors to be considered in analyzing the applicability of the public policy exception, analogizing an action for wrongful discharge to an action for tortious interference with contract: (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other____ Id., 281 Pa.Superior Ct. at 574, 422 A.2d at 618 .

1988The court discussed a set of factors to be considered in analyzing the applicability of the public policy exception, analogizing an action for wrongful discharge to an action for tortious interference with contract: (a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, (b) the actor’s motive, (c) the interests of the other with which the actor’s conduct interferes, (d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other____ Id., 281 Pa.Superior Ct. at 574, 422 A.2d at 618 .

1999Further, in Field v. Philadelphia Electric Company, we found that firing an employee for reporting a violation of federal nuclear regulations violated public policy; we acknowledged the importance of protecting the health and safety of the public against the dangers of radiation. 388 Pa.Super. 400 , 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (1989). 21 In each of these cases, the Court looked to pertinent statutes and case law to ascertain whether a public policy was violated as a result of the employee’s discharge. ¶ 11 Spierling urges us to adopt a public policy exception based on the strong public policy in favor

1999Further, in Field v. Philadelphia Electric Company, we found that firing an employee for reporting a violation of federal nuclear regulations violated public policy; we acknowledged the importance of protecting the health and safety of the public against the dangers of radiation. 388 Pa.Super. 400 , 565 A.2d 1170, 1180 (1989). 21 In each of these cases, the Court looked to pertinent statutes and case law to ascertain whether a public policy was violated as a result of the employee’s discharge. ¶ 11 Spierling urges us to adopt a public policy exception based on the strong public policy in favor

2020Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Tchrs., 171 A.3d 334, 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc)).6 “The burden of establishing a violation of public policy rests on the party asserting the public policy exception.” Id.

2020Dist. v. Neshaminy Fed’n of Tchrs., 171 A.3d 334, 338 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc)).6 “The burden of establishing a violation of public policy rests on the party asserting the public policy exception.” Id.

2025Ass’n (PSEA-NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999). 9 If the essence test is met, then the award can be vacated only if it satisfies the narrow public policy exception, which means that its enforcement would contravene a well-defined and dominant public policy.

2008Thus, the court abandoned it, adopting instead the public policy exception to the essence test applied in federal courts. [9] Id.

2024“Outside of those categories of our legislature’s expression of public policy, a court may find a public policy exception that will sustain a wrongful termination action only if the public policy is so obviously for or against public health, safety, morals, or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Id. (citation and quotation marks -7- J-A14027-24 omitted).

2024Under the final public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, a right of action exists if the employee’s termination is “against public health, safety, morals, or welfare” such that “that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it.” Greco, 199 A.3d at 436 .

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

1996The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine was recognized by our Supreme Court in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974), a case remarkably similar to the one at bar.

1996The public policy exception to the at-will doctrine was recognized by our Supreme Court in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171 , 319 A.2d 174 (1974), a case remarkably similar to the one at bar.

2024Fifteen years after the decision in Geary, the contours of the public policy exception became more clear in Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998), the first decision in which our Supreme Court both recognized a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of a clear mandate of public policy and held that an employee forwarded viable allegations upon which relief could be granted under that theory.

2017Subsequently, in Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590 , 716 A.2d 1231 (1998), the Supreme Court first announced a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine.

2026Stated differently, and subject to the narrow public policy exception, we may not vacate an arbitration award unless it “indisputably and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow from, the [collective bargaining agreement].” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).

2025Regarding the public policy exception, the trial court opined that LANTA was incorrect in relying on the test articulated in City of Bradford v. Teamster Local Union No. 110, 25 A.3d 408, 414 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), as it was “superseded” by the Supreme Court’s own test in Millcreek Township School District v. Millcreek Township Educational Support Personnel Association, 210 A.3d 993, 1011 (Pa. 2019).8 Trial Court Op. at 11 n.5.

2021Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education v. Association of Pennsylvania State College & University Faculty, 71 A.3d 353, 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

2019Neshaminy, 171 A.3d at 343 ; Slippery Rock, 71 A.3d at 366 .

2005Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320 , 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941). ¶ 11 Further, “[t]o state a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the employee must point to a clear public policy articulated in the constitution, in legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision.” Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation 447 Pa.Super. 575 , 670 A.2d 173, 175 (1996), appeal denied, 545 Pa. 664 , 681 A.2d 178 (1996) (citing Jacques v. Akzo International Salt, Inc., 422 Pa.Super. 419 , 619 A.2d 748 (1993)). ¶ 12 Appellant contends “that there is a clear mandate of public policy against s

2005Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320 , 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941). ¶ 11 Further, “[t]o state a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, the employee must point to a clear public policy articulated in the constitution, in legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision.” Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation 447 Pa.Super. 575 , 670 A.2d 173, 175 (1996), appeal denied, 545 Pa. 664 , 681 A.2d 178 (1996) (citing Jacques v. Akzo International Salt, Inc., 422 Pa.Super. 419 , 619 A.2d 748 (1993)). ¶ 12 Appellant contends “that there is a clear mandate of public policy against s

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

2009See McLaughlin, 561 Pa. 307 , 750 A.2d 283 (finding that an at-will employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine based solely upon alleged retaliatory termination of her employment in violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Tourville, 353 Pa.Super. 53 , 508 A.2d 1263 (holding that the discharge of an employee hospitalized for illness did not violate public policy); Martin, 354 Pa.Super. 199 , 511 A.2d 830 (finding no cause of action where an employee was discharged in retaliation for placing an advertis

2014From Geary forward the courts of the Commonwealth have repeatedly underscored that deference is owed to how an employer operates it business and addresses disruption. 6 In Davenport v. Reed, 785 A.2d 1058 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), this Court stated that “to justify the application of the public policy exception, the employee must point to a clear public policy articu lated in the constitution, statutes, regulations or judicial decisions directly applicable to the facts in the case.” Id. at 1063-64 .

2014From Geary forward the courts of the Commonwealth have repeatedly underscored that deference is owed to how an employer operates it business and addresses disruption. 6 In Davenport v. Reed, 785 A.2d 1058 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), this Court stated that “to justify the application of the public policy exception, the employee must point to a clear public policy articu lated in the constitution, statutes, regulations or judicial decisions directly applicable to the facts in the case.” Id. at 1063-64 .

2008Just after the manifestly unreasonable standard was abolished in Cheyney, in City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 447, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000), a new public policy exception was adopted, later named in Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 578 Pa. 347 , 852 A.2d 299 (2004), as the "core function" exception.

2008Just after the manifestly unreasonable standard was abolished in Cheyney, in City of Easton v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 447, 562 Pa. 438 , 756 A.2d 1107 (2000), a new public policy exception was adopted, later named in Greene County v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America, 578 Pa. 347 , 852 A.2d 299 (2004), as the "core function" exception.