approved instruction in North Carolina

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C., 514 .

1938Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C., 514, 515 , 172 S. E., 196 .

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940That it is prohibited under tbe general State statute, as follows: “And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege iax •upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina.” And in the repealing clause, “All laws and clauses of laws in conflict ... or providing otherwise are repealed.” In Comrs. v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 202 (204), it is written: “And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and ‘where this is free from ambiguity

1940That it is prohibited under the *Page 354 general State statute, as follows: "And no county or municipality shall levy any license or privilege tax upon the use of any motor vehicle licensed by the State of North Carolina." And in the repealing clause, "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict . . . or providing otherwise are repealed." In Comrs. v. Comrs. , 186 N.C. 202 (204), it is written: "And in determining whether there is a repugnancy, it is the approved rule here and elsewhere that the intent of the Legislature must be sought primarily in the language used, and `where this is free from

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void,” citing Trustees v. Webb, 155 N. C., 379 ; S. v. Beacham, 125 N. C., 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N. C., 591 ; 19 R.

1940And it is uniformly held that a town ordinance in violation of a valid State statute appertaining to the question is void," citing Trustees v. Webb , 155 N.C. 379 ; S. v. Beacham , 125 N.C. 652 ; Shaw v. Kennedy , 4 N.C. 591 ; 19 R.C.L., 803, and cases cited.

1938Pemberton v. Greensboro , 203 N.C. 514 , 515 , 172 S.E. 196 .

1938Pemberton v. Greensboro, 203 N. C., 514, 515 , 172 S. E., 196 .

1929The conditional sales agreement made by William Simpson distinctly says, “The conditions of this agreement are, that delivery of the car by seller to purchaser does not pass title thereto, hut hoth the car and all additions and improvements thereto, and the title thereto shall not pass by such delivery, but are and shall remain vested in and be the property of the seller and assigns (any extension or assignment of said notes shall not waive this or any other condition herein contained) until said notes, or any renewals thereof, evidencing said installments or purchase price, and all interest t

1923On the third objection it is the approved principle in this jurisdiction that a mortgage will be held to extend to and include after-acquired property “when it so states in express terms, or it clearly appears from the language used that such was its manifest intention.” Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 150 N. C., 282 ; Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C., 481 -484.

1929The conditional sales agreement made by William Simpson distinctly says, “The conditions of this agreement are, that delivery of the car by seller to purchaser does not pass title thereto, hut hoth the car and all additions and improvements thereto, and the title thereto shall not pass by such delivery, but are and shall remain vested in and be the property of the seller and assigns (any extension or assignment of said notes shall not waive this or any other condition herein contained) until said notes, or any renewals thereof, evidencing said installments or purchase price, and all interest t

1923On the third objection it is the approved principle in this jurisdiction that a mortgage will be held to extend to and include after-acquired property “when it so states in express terms, or it clearly appears from the language used that such was its manifest intention.” Lumber Co. v. Lumber Co., 150 N. C., 282 ; Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C., 481 -484.

1924In Ainsley v. Lumber Co. , 165 N.C. 122 , the Court approved the doctrine that the employer's duty with respect to providing for his employees such machinery, implements and appliances as are known, approved and in general use, while peremptory in its terms and effect, is in addition to the more general one of supplying such as are reasonably safe and suitable, and that both are included in the general obligation resting on the employer to exercise the care of a prudent man in looking after the safety of his employees.

1924In Ainsley v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C., 122 , the Court approved the doctrine that the employer’s duty with respect to providing for his employees such machinery, implements and appliances as are known, approved and in general use, while peremptory in its terms and effect, is in addition to the more general one of supplying such as are reasonably safe and suitable, and that both are included in the general obligation resting on the employer to exercise the care of a prudent man in looking after the safety of 'his employees.

1916In Heavener's case , 141 N.C. 245 , the Court approved an instruction that "If the jury should further find from the evidence that if there had been a proper light on the engine, or if the bell had been ringing, the intestate would have had notice of the approaching train in time to escape the danger, and if the plaintiff by reason of not having such notice or warning was injured, then such failure to have the headlight or other proper signal was continuing negligence and would be the proximate cause of the injury," and this was affirmed in Shepherd v. R.

1913R., 141 N. C., 245 , the Court approved an instruction that if the defendant “was running its train through the corporate limits of the town of Concord, and the track whereon the train was running was much used by the public, both in crossing the track and walking on it, and the jury should further find that on the night alleged it was running its train at a rapid rate without any headlight or other proper signal, and while so running ran over and killed the intestate; and if the jury should further find from the evidence that if there had been a proper light on the engine, or if the bell had

1894Coal Co. v. McMillan , 49 Md. 549 .

1894Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md., 549 .

1987In determining whether the plain error rule should apply in this case, we have considered State v. Rynolds, 307 N.C. 184 , 297 S.E. 2d 532 (1982), in which this Court approved an instruction virtually identical to the questioned instruction in this case.

1987In determining whether the plain error rule should apply in this case, we have considered State v. Rynolds, 307 N.C. 184 , 297 S.E. 2d 532 (1982), in which this Court approved an instruction virtually identical to the questioned instruction in this case.

1980Simmons was subsequently relied upon in State v. Gooch, 94 N.C. 987 (1886), another case involving evidence of defendants acting together with a common purpose.

1980This Court approved the instruction, noting: “It is a well established principle, that where two agree to do an unlawful act, each is responsible for the act of the other, provided it be done in pursuance of the original understanding, or in furtherance of the common purpose.” Id. at 24-25 .

1978If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority. . . . 164 U.S. at 501 Although the instructions approved in Allen have long been recognized as acceptable, confusion has arisen because of extensions and modifications made to the originally approved charge by other courts.

1977See State v. Williams, 246 N.C. 688 , 99 S.E. 2d 919 (1957); State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374 , 174 S.E. 105 (1934); State v. West, 152 N.C. 832 , 68 S.E. 14 (1910).

1977See State v. Williams, 246 N.C. 688 , 99 S.E. 2d 919 (1957); State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374 , 174 S.E. 105 (1934); State v. West, 152 N.C. 832 , 68 S.E. 14 (1910).

1977See State v. Williams, 246 N.C. 688 , 99 S.E. 2d 919 (1957); State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374 , 174 S.E. 105 (1934); State v. West, 152 N.C. 832 , 68 S.E. 14 (1910).

1977See State v. Williams, 246 N.C. 688 , 99 S.E. 2d 919 (1957); State v. Sheffield, 206 N.C. 374 , 174 S.E. 105 (1934); State v. West, 152 N.C. 832 , 68 S.E. 14 (1910).

1976In the early case of Denby v. Hairston, 8 N.C. 315 , this Court approved an instruction that plaintiff was entitled to recover from defendant-trespasser the highest price the crops were worth.

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1972In affirming defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder the court approved an instruction that if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt “that death ensued from an attack made with the hands, or otherwise, upon an infant of tender years, you are then instructed that under such circumstances malice may be implied.” Other illustrative cases in which courts have approved the implication of malice required for second-degree murder from evidence of an attack by hands or feet alone, without use of other weapons, are: Stockton v. State, 239 Ark. 228 , 388 S.W. 2d 382 (attack upon an eigh

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1972In affirming defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder the court approved an instruction that if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt “that death ensued from an attack made with the hands, or otherwise, upon an infant of tender years, you are then instructed that under such circumstances malice may be implied.” Other illustrative cases in which courts have approved the implication of malice required for second-degree murder from evidence of an attack by hands or feet alone, without use of other weapons, are: Stockton v. State, 239 Ark. 228 , 388 S.W. 2d 382 (attack upon an eigh

1972In affirming defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder the court approved an instruction that if the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt “that death ensued from an attack made with the hands, or otherwise, upon an infant of tender years, you are then instructed that under such circumstances malice may be implied.” Other illustrative cases in which courts have approved the implication of malice required for second-degree murder from evidence of an attack by hands or feet alone, without use of other weapons, are: Stockton v. State, 239 Ark. 228 , 388 S.W. 2d 382 (attack upon an eigh

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1972App. 2d 349 , 245 N.E. 2d 319 (circumstantial evidence of an attack upon an eight-month-old infant; no evidence of any weapon); Corbin v. State, (Ind.) 234 N.E. 2d 261 , reh. den. 237 N.E. 2d 376 (father’s conviction for second-degree murder in killing of 21-month-old daughter by blows with his hand sustained by divided court; majority found sufficient evidence of malice) ; Commonweath v. Buzard, 365 Pa. 511 , 76 A. 2d 394 (attack by large, powerful man upon small, weak man who was prone and defenseless) ; Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 365 Pa. 291 , 74 A. 2d 125 (persistent attack upon victim who l

1969Satterwhite v. Burwell, 51 N.C. 92 .

1968It is with pardonable pride that we note that for over one hundred forty years the rule enunciated in State v. Roberts, supra that “a confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected” has been an approved and applied rule of this Court Thus, the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , is not new with us, but the broad and far-reaching language, which we must acknowledge as binding on us, has had such a massive impact upon criminal jurisprudence and law enforcement that we must construe and apply its language to the facts of the instant case.

1968The case of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, erects certain safeguards as to the question of “in-custody” suspects which require, in effect, that the suspect be warned: (1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him in court, (3) that he has the right to counsel, either appointed or retained, prior to and during the interrogation, and (4) that if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him prior to any questioning, if he so desires.

1968It is with pardonable pride that we note that for over one hundred forty years the rule enunciated in State v. Roberts, supra that “a confession obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected” has been an approved and applied rule of this Court Thus, the rationale of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , is not new with us, but the broad and far-reaching language, which we must acknowledge as binding on us, has had such a massive impact upon criminal jurisprudence and law enforcement that we must construe and apply its language to the facts of the instant case.