approved instruction in Virginia

1824This Court approved of this instruction, saying “it was not like the case of Keel & Herbert v. Roberts, where there was an express ’'’declaration to the jury, upon the whole evidence; for, in the present case, it was a construction of papers, and the opinion confined to a single point, without any attempt to prescribe the verdict, which the jury were to find.” In Bootright v. Meggs, 4 Munf. 145 , the Court instructed the jury as to the law, arising upon a hypothetical statement of facts, in one instance; and in another, as to the law arising on an admitted fact; and this Court approved of thos

1824This Court approved of the instruction, saying c<it was not like the case of Keel & Herbert v. Roberts, where there was an ex press declaration to the jury, upon the whole evidence; for, in the present ease, it was a construction oí papers, and the opinion confined to a single point, without any attempt to prescribe the verdict, which the jury were to find.” In Boolright v. Meggs, 4 Munf. 145 , the Court instructed the jury as to the law, arising upon a hypothetical statement of facts, in one instance; and in another, as to the law arising on an admitted fact; and this Court approved of those

1824In Maddox v. Jackson, 4 Munf. 462 , an action for a malicious prosecution, the Court instructed the jury, that the warrant for arresting the plaintiff, the endorsement thereon of a magistrate committing him for trial, and a recognizance of the same date, for his appearance, furnished sufficient evidence of probable cause to induce the prosecution; and this instruction was approved by this Court, upon the ground that it was confined to the papers, and did not exclude any evidence which the plaintiff might offer, to disprove the probable cause, inferrible from the proceedings before the magistra

1824In Maddox v. Jackson, 4 Munf. 462 , an action for a .malicious prosecution, the Court, instructed the jury, that the warrant for arresting the plaintiff, the endorsement thereon of a magistrate committing him for trial, and a recognizance of the same date, for his appearance, furnished sufficient evidence of probable cause to induce the prosecution; and this instruction was approved by this Court, upon the ground that it was confined to the papers, and did not exclude any evidence which the plaintiff might offer, to disprove the probable cause, inferrible from the proceedings before the magist

1924“So, also, in Railway Co. v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463 , 43 Am.

1920“So, also, in Railway Company v. Chapman, 39 Ark. 463 , 43 Am.

1924Co. v. Carter, supra ( 91 Va. 587 , 22 S. E. 517 ), the court approved an instruction which told the jury ‘that any interference with the drainage of the plaintiff’s lands or the flow of surface water which could not be prevented by the proper and skillful construction of defendant company’s road with proper and skillfully constructed culverts, was proper to be taken into consideration by the plaintiff when the defendant company purchased its right of way from the plaintiff; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the railroad through plaintiff’s land was properly and skillfully constru

1924Co. v. Carter, supra ( 91 Va. 587 , 22 S. E. 517 ), the court approved an instruction which told the jury ‘that any interference with the drainage of the plaintiff’s lands or the flow of surface water which could not be prevented by the proper and skillful construction of defendant company’s road with proper and skillfully constructed culverts, was proper to be taken into consideration by the plaintiff when the defendant company purchased its right of way from the plaintiff; and if the jury believe from the evidence that the railroad through plaintiff’s land was properly and skillfully constru

2000In Terry v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 167 , 360 S.E.2d 880 (1987), this Court approved an instruction that told the jury it could consider the quantity, packaging, location, and use of the drugs in determining whether the defendant intended to distribute them.

2000In Terry v. Commonwealth, 5 Va.App. 167 , 360 S.E.2d 880 (1987), this Court approved an instruction that told the jury it could consider the quantity, packaging, location, and use of the drugs in determining whether the defendant intended to distribute them.

1989Again, in McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281, 286 , (1883), this Court emphasized that “if it may be reasonably inferred . . . from any . . . circumstance, that the [killer] intended merely to do some great bodily harm, such homicide will be murder in the second degree . . . but not a case of murder in the first degree.” See also Boggs v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 828, 835 , 149 S.E. 445, 447 (1929).

1969Appellants cite Burton v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 847, 852 , 94 S.E. 923, 924 , wherein this court approved an instruction to the jury “that when two persons had the same opportunity to commit the offense, and if upon the whole evidence in the case there remains a reasonable doubt as to which of the two committed it, neither of the two can be convicted”.

1969Appellants cite Burton v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 847, 852 , 94 S.E. 923, 924 , wherein this court approved an instruction to the jury “that when two persons had the same opportunity to commit the offense, and if upon the whole evidence in the case there remains a reasonable doubt as to which of the two committed it, neither of the two can be convicted”.

1964In Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22 , 160 N.E. 305 , the court approved an instruction which told the jury that if the defendant, while intoxicated, got into his automobile and manipulated the machinery for the purpose of putting it in motion, he was guilty of operating the car whether it moved or not.

1964In Commonwealth v. Uski, 263 Mass. 22 , 160 N.E. 305 , the court approved an instruction which told the jury that if the defendant, while intoxicated, got into his automobile and manipulated the machinery for the purpose of putting it in motion, he was guilty of operating the car whether it moved or not.

1961In Winston v. Gordon, 115 Va. 899, 915-6 , 80 S. E. 756, 763 , decided in 1914, this court approved the rule as thus stated in Graves on Pleading, p. 16: “# # <But aq ac¿ons ex delicto are not assignable, even in equity, for it is sometimes considered against public policy, even in our day, to allow such an action to be made over to an assignee for money.

1961In Winston v. Gordon, 115 Va. 899, 915-6 , 80 S. E. 756, 763 , decided in 1914, this court approved the rule as thus stated in Graves on Pleading, p. 16: “# # <But aq ac¿ons ex delicto are not assignable, even in equity, for it is sometimes considered against public policy, even in our day, to allow such an action to be made over to an assignee for money.

1958Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401 , 44 N. E. 84 , the court upheld a by-law, authorized by New York statute, which provided for expulsion for “any proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.” In Josich v. Austrian Benevolent Society, 119 Cal. 74 , 51 P. 18 , the court approved a rule of the Society for expulsion “If any member shall be guilty of improper conduct.” In Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Association (C.

1958Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401 , 44 N. E. 84 , the court upheld a by-law, authorized by New York statute, which provided for expulsion for “any proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.” In Josich v. Austrian Benevolent Society, 119 Cal. 74 , 51 P. 18 , the court approved a rule of the Society for expulsion “If any member shall be guilty of improper conduct.” In Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Association (C.

1958Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401 , 44 N. E. 84 , the court upheld a by-law, authorized by New York statute, which provided for expulsion for “any proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.” In Josich v. Austrian Benevolent Society, 119 Cal. 74 , 51 P. 18 , the court approved a rule of the Society for expulsion “If any member shall be guilty of improper conduct.” In Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Association (C.

1958Produce Exchange, 149 N. Y. 401 , 44 N. E. 84 , the court upheld a by-law, authorized by New York statute, which provided for expulsion for “any proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.” In Josich v. Austrian Benevolent Society, 119 Cal. 74 , 51 P. 18 , the court approved a rule of the Society for expulsion “If any member shall be guilty of improper conduct.” In Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Association (C.

1946Law Review, p. 971, it is stated: “When a defendant, with rape in • mind, and with the expectation of accomplishing penetration, seizes his female victim in the customary manner in order to achieve his purpose and finds penetration impossible, because of impotency, the authorities agree that he is guilty of a real criminal attempt to rape, and his impotency has no bearing on the case except possibly negativing the specific intention to accomplish penetration.” In Commonwealth v. Shaw, 134 Mass. 221 , the court approved this instruction: “If the defendant assaulted a child with intent carnally

1946In Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557 , 125 S. E. 146 , we said: “In Johnson's Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be.” In Bristow v. Brauer, 175 Va. 118 , 7 S. E. (2d) 93 , we said: “If a condition of facts is such that the jury may deduce from them more than one inference or conclusion, the court, upon a motion to set aside their verdict

1946In Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557 , 125 S. E. 146 , we said: “In Johnson's Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be.” In Bristow v. Brauer, 175 Va. 118 , 7 S. E. (2d) 93 , we said: “If a condition of facts is such that the jury may deduce from them more than one inference or conclusion, the court, upon a motion to set aside their verdict

1946In Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557 , 125 S. E. 146 , we said: “In Johnson's Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be.” In Bristow v. Brauer, 175 Va. 118 , 7 S. E. (2d) 93 , we said: “If a condition of facts is such that the jury may deduce from them more than one inference or conclusion, the court, upon a motion to set aside their verdict

1946In Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557 , 125 S. E. 146 , we said: “In Johnson's Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot amount to proof, however great the probability may be.” In Bristow v. Brauer, 175 Va. 118 , 7 S. E. (2d) 93 , we said: “If a condition of facts is such that the jury may deduce from them more than one inference or conclusion, the court, upon a motion to set aside their verdict

1945Cas. 1917C; 155, this court approved the doctrine of an insurable interest as defined by Mr. Justice Field in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 , 26 L.

1945Cas. 1917C; 155, this court approved the doctrine of an insurable interest as defined by Mr. Justice Field in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 , 26 L.

1942The court approved the rule laid down in Corvin v. Commonwealth, supra, and said that if the wife never acquired a domicile in Nevada and if she obtained a divorce there through misrepresentations and fraud, then her divorce “is not binding upon the courts of this State and may be treated as void.” The court then went on to say where the burden of proof lay but refused to discuss the evidence and. declined to invalidate the Nevada decree upon the ground that the husband was guilty of laches and said that “the rule which requires a defaulted party to act promptly for the protection of his right

1942The court approved the rule laid down in Corvin v. Commonwealth, supra, and said that if the wife never acquired a domicile in Nevada and if she obtained a divorce there through misrepresentations and fraud, then her divorce “is not binding upon the courts of this State and may be treated as void.” The court then went on to say where the burden of proof lay but refused to discuss the evidence and. declined to invalidate the Nevada decree upon the ground that the husband was guilty of laches and said that “the rule which requires a defaulted party to act promptly for the protection of his right

1935Insanity is easily feigned and hard to be disproved, and public safety requires that it should not be established by less than satisfactory evidence." In Longley's Case, 99 Va. 807, 812 , 37 S.E. 339, 341 , where the charge was murder and the defense was insanity, the court approved this instruction: "The court further instructs the jury that the law presumes the accused to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there is upon the minds of the jury any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, the law makes it their duty to acquit him, and that mere suspicio

1935Insanity is easily feigned and hard to be disproved, and public safety requires that it should not be established by less than satisfactory evidence." In Longley's Case, 99 Va. 807, 812 , 37 S.E. 339, 341 , where the charge was murder and the defense was insanity, the court approved this instruction: "The court further instructs the jury that the law presumes the accused to be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there is upon the minds of the jury any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, the law makes it their duty to acquit him, and that mere suspicio

1927In Noel & Co. v. Schuur, 140 Tenn. 245 , 204 S. W. 632 , the court approved the following instruction: “If the bailor, Schuur, shows by a preponderance of all the evidence that the goods were in good condition at the time they were delivered at the cold storage warehouse, but that when they were returned or withdrawn they were in a damaged condition from any cause not in herent in the goods themselves, at the time they were delivered to Noel & Co., then the bailor has made out a prima facie case, that is, a case sufficient for recovering unless rebutted or explained away by other evidence.

1927In Holt Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Arthur Jordan Co., 25 Ind. App. 314 , 57 N. E. 575 , the court approved an instruction which told the jury that the burden was upon the bailor to prove negligence, but that when he proved that he had delivered goods to the bailee in good condition and that the same were redelivered in a damaged condition, produced by a cause not inherent in the goods themselves, the bailor had made a prima facie case and east upon the bailee the burden of accounting for the injury in some manner consistent with the exercise of due care.

1927In Holt Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Arthur Jordan Co., 25 Ind. App. 314 , 57 N. E. 575 , the court approved an instruction which told the jury that the burden was upon the bailor to prove negligence, but that when he proved that he had delivered goods to the bailee in good condition and that the same were redelivered in a damaged condition, produced by a cause not inherent in the goods themselves, the bailor had made a prima facie case and east upon the bailee the burden of accounting for the injury in some manner consistent with the exercise of due care.

1924In Burton & Conquest v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 899 , 62 S. E. 376, 379 , Judge Keith, considering the evidence and speaking for the court, says: “Where a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the jury cannot arbitrarily adopt the interpretation which incriminates him.” In Johnson’s Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence ca

1924In Burton & Conquest v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 892, 899 , 62 S. E. 376, 379 , Judge Keith, considering the evidence and speaking for the court, says: “Where a fact is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the jury cannot arbitrarily adopt the interpretation which incriminates him.” In Johnson’s Case, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796-817, this court approved the doctrine that where the evidence leaves it indefinite which of several hypotheses is true, or establishes only some finite probability in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence ca

1915To add to this definition, that the testator must “hold them in his mind a sufficient length of time to observe their obvious relations to each other and to be able to form some rational judgment in relation to them,” does not, as is argued for appellants here, enlarge the definition given or require—certainly not in this case— “a higher degree of understanding and design than the recent expressions of our courts have prescribed.” In Tucker v. Sandidge, 85 Va. 554 , 8 S. E. 654 , the court approved the rule that, in order to possess testamentary capacity, the testator must “undoubtedly retain

1908On the question of the quantum of proof of testator’s sanity, the court approved an instruction, that it must be established by “a preponderance of testimony” rather than by “clear proof.” In the leading case of Riddle v. Johnson's Ex'or, 26 Gratt. 152 (a suit in equity to set aside a bequest to testator’s attorney who wrote the will), the court, upon a review of the authorities in this country and in England, at page 177, quotes with approval the rule laid down by Baron Barke, in Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curt.

1905In the last named case, the opinion says: “It may now be considered the approved doctrine that an action for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit may be maintained whenever, by virtue of any order or writ issued in the' malicious suit, the defendant in that suit has been deprived of his personal liberty, or of the possession, use or enjoyment of property of value.” In Hay v. Younglove, 7 B.