approved instruction in Kentucky

2010The Court also approved the test itself as reasonable, noting that blood tests are “commonplace,” id. at 771 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , and have become “routine in our everyday life,” id. at 771 n. 13, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2010The Court also approved the test itself as reasonable, noting that blood tests are “commonplace,” id. at 771 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , and have become “routine in our everyday life,” id. at 771 n. 13, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2009The court approved the principle that an “ ‘Investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Id. at 884 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

2009The court approved the principle that an “ ‘Investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Id. at 884 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

2009The court approved the principle that an “ ‘Investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.’ ” Id. at 884 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)).

1985The court approved the standard enunciated in Trowel v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 530 (1977).

1971In Weaver the approved instruction imposed on the turning driver the duty “to see that there was sufficient time and space to make a left turn * * * in reasonable safety, and before turning to first see that there was sufficient space for the turn to be made in safety * * Lockridge v. Mercer, Ky., 438 S.W.2d 486 , pointed out that KRS 189.380(1) imposes a continuing duty, after an appropriate turn signal has been given, “to observe traffic conditions both fore and aft up to the time of actual turning.” Id. 438 S.W.2d 487 .

1971In Weaver the approved instruction imposed on the turning driver the duty “to see that there was sufficient time and space to make a left turn * * * in reasonable safety, and before turning to first see that there was sufficient space for the turn to be made in safety * * Lockridge v. Mercer, Ky., 438 S.W.2d 486 , pointed out that KRS 189.380(1) imposes a continuing duty, after an appropriate turn signal has been given, “to observe traffic conditions both fore and aft up to the time of actual turning.” Id. 438 S.W.2d 487 .

1971Appellee Goranflo contends that Maybrier v. Baldwin, Ky., 442 S.W.2d 585 , is authority for the proposition that Goranflo was free of negligence and entitled to a directed verdict anyway, so no prejudicial error occurred.

1967The applicable statute, KRS 189.090(3) (e), says: “All brakes shall be maintained in good working order * * In Veal v. Davis, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 593 , this Court recognized the proper rule as being that one of the conditions of exoneration from liability on account of a sudden failure of brakes is that the owner “has exercised ordinary care in checking and maintaining the braking system.” The Court approved an instruction containing the condition “and could not, by the exercise of ordinary care, have known that said brakes would not work at the time and place of the accident.” Most jurisdictions

1965It is true that in Bryan v. Battoe, 290 Ky. 47 , 160 S.W.2d 369 , this Court approved an instruction stating that it was “the duty of the respective parties not to enter the intersection on red or yellow lights.” However, the only evidence in that case was that the light had turned to yellow after one of the parties had entered the intersection, so the question of entering on a yellow light was not in issue.

1965It is true that in Bryan v. Battoe, 290 Ky. 47 , 160 S.W.2d 369 , this Court approved an instruction stating that it was “the duty of the respective parties not to enter the intersection on red or yellow lights.” However, the only evidence in that case was that the light had turned to yellow after one of the parties had entered the intersection, so the question of entering on a yellow light was not in issue.

1964In Slate v. Witt, 188 Ky. 133 ; 221 S.W. 217 , this Court approved an instruction which placed upon the operator of a vehicle being followed by another the duty to exercise ordinary care to learn of the presence of the other vehicle.

1964In Slate v. Witt, 188 Ky. 133 ; 221 S.W. 217 , this Court approved an instruction which placed upon the operator of a vehicle being followed by another the duty to exercise ordinary care to learn of the presence of the other vehicle.

1947In Smith v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 385 , 155 S. W. 1125, 1126 , the court approved an instruction which included a provision that the jury could not convict the defendant on his confession or statements to police officers, “unless such statements, if made, are corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof.” This instruction is published as Section 833, in Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1947In Smith v. Commonwealth, 153 Ky. 385 , 155 S. W. 1125, 1126 , the court approved an instruction which included a provision that the jury could not convict the defendant on his confession or statements to police officers, “unless such statements, if made, are corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof.” This instruction is published as Section 833, in Stanley’s Instructions to Juries.

1946J. there are cited in substantiation thereof cases from the U. S. Supreme Court, and practically every state in the Union, including the Kentucky case of Hawes v. Orr, 10 Bush 431 , in which this court approved the rule of the text in this excerpt from that opinion: “We recognize the doctrine that the court first acquiring jurisdiction has a right to go on until it has performed its office in reference to the subject-matter in litigation, and will not allow itself to be ousted of its jurisdiction, or permit the thing in lite to be wrested from it so that it can not execute its judgment; * * *.

1939But it is further stated that “Some American cases still adhere to this rule in all its strictness, but the later English and Canadian cases, as well as the great majority-of the American decisions, distinguish between agreements for future and agreements for immediate separation, holding that agreements for separation of husband and wife are valid if made in prospect of an immediate separation, but illegal if they provide for a possible separation in the future; and it is immaterial whether they are made before or after marriage.” The statement of the correct and approved rule, as embodied in

1939But it is further stated that “Some American cases still adhere to this rule in all its strictness, but the later English and Canadian cases, as well as the great majority-of the American decisions, distinguish between agreements for future and agreements for immediate separation, holding that agreements for separation of husband and wife are valid if made in prospect of an immediate separation, but illegal if they provide for a possible separation in the future; and it is immaterial whether they are made before or after marriage.” The statement of the correct and approved rule, as embodied in

1939But it is further stated that “Some American cases still adhere to this rule in all its strictness, but the later English and Canadian cases, as well as the great majority-of the American decisions, distinguish between agreements for future and agreements for immediate separation, holding that agreements for separation of husband and wife are valid if made in prospect of an immediate separation, but illegal if they provide for a possible separation in the future; and it is immaterial whether they are made before or after marriage.” The statement of the correct and approved rule, as embodied in

1939R. 689, and Middleton v. Middleton, 207 Ky. 508 , 269 S. W. 552 .

1939R. 689, and Middleton v. Middleton, 207 Ky. 508 , 269 S. W. 552 .

1937If he bas tbis understanding and intelligence and appreciates tbe obligation to speak tbe truth, be is competent: otherwise, be is not.” By section 605 of our Civil Code of Practice, announcing tbe statutory test as to tbe competency of witnesses, it is provided that “subject to tbe exceptions and modifications contained in section 606, every person is competent to testify for himself or another, unless he be found by tbe court incapable of understanding tbe facts concerning which bis testimony is offered. ’ ’ Literally and strictly construing tbe language of tbis Code provision, it was, in tb

1937If he bas tbis understanding and intelligence and appreciates tbe obligation to speak tbe truth, be is competent: otherwise, be is not.” By section 605 of our Civil Code of Practice, announcing tbe statutory test as to tbe competency of witnesses, it is provided that “subject to tbe exceptions and modifications contained in section 606, every person is competent to testify for himself or another, unless he be found by tbe court incapable of understanding tbe facts concerning which bis testimony is offered. ’ ’ Literally and strictly construing tbe language of tbis Code provision, it was, in tb

1935Eq. 415, the court said: “Any trade or business, however lawful, which, from the place or manner in which it is carried on, materially injures the property of others, or affects their health, or renders the enjoyment of life physically uncomfortable, is a nuisance, which it is the duty of this court to restrain.” Compare also Commonwealth v. Perry, 139 Mass. 198 , 29 N. E. 656, 657 , where the court approved an instruction charging (in part) as follows: “People residing in the neighborhood of this piggery have a right to have the air free and uncontaminated by odors, • smells, and stenches off

1935Eq. 415, the court said: “Any trade or business, however lawful, which, from the place or manner in which it is carried on, materially injures the property of others, or affects their health, or renders the enjoyment of life physically uncomfortable, is a nuisance, which it is the duty of this court to restrain.” Compare also Commonwealth v. Perry, 139 Mass. 198 , 29 N. E. 656, 657 , where the court approved an instruction charging (in part) as follows: “People residing in the neighborhood of this piggery have a right to have the air free and uncontaminated by odors, • smells, and stenches off

1934On the other hand, recovery under this doctrine *323 was denied in McMillin’s Adm’r v. Bourbon Stock Yards Co., 179 Ky. 140 , 200 S. W. 328, 329 , L.

1934On the other hand, recovery under this doctrine *323 was denied in McMillin’s Adm’r v. Bourbon Stock Yards Co., 179 Ky. 140 , 200 S. W. 328, 329 , L.

1929Co., v. McCandless, 123 Ky. 121 , 93 S. W. 1041 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 563 , this court approved the principle of law announced in the case of Louisville & N. R.

1929Co., v. McCandless, 123 Ky. 121 , 93 S. W. 1041 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 563 , this court approved the principle of law announced in the case of Louisville & N. R.

1928In the recent case of Russell v. Bell, 224 Ky. 298 , 6 S. W. (2d) 236 , this court approved the doctrine announced in the case of City of Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S. W. 498 , in which case it was held that, where the charter provisions of a city provided that legislation should be enacted by an ordinance, the provision in the charter is mandatory.

1928In the recent case of Russell v. Bell, 224 Ky. 298 , 6 S. W. (2d) 236 , this court approved the doctrine announced in the case of City of Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S. W. 498 , in which case it was held that, where the charter provisions of a city provided that legislation should be enacted by an ordinance, the provision in the charter is mandatory.

1928In the recent case of Russell v. Bell, 224 Ky. 298 , 6 S. W. (2d) 236 , this court approved the doctrine announced in the case of City of Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S. W. 498 , in which case it was held that, where the charter provisions of a city provided that legislation should be enacted by an ordinance, the provision in the charter is mandatory.

1928In the recent case of Russell v. Bell, 224 Ky. 298 , 6 S. W. (2d) 236 , this court approved the doctrine announced in the case of City of Louisville v. Parsons, 150 Ky. 420 , 150 S. W. 498 , in which case it was held that, where the charter provisions of a city provided that legislation should be enacted by an ordinance, the provision in the charter is mandatory.

1928In that case Eustin was found dead on his porch with a gunshot wound in the abdomen. *630 The case of Interstate Business Men’s Accident Association v. Ford, 161 Ky. 163 , 170 S. W. 525 , was another case where the question to be determined was whether Ford came to his death as the result of external, violent, and accidental means.

1928In that case Eustin was found dead on his porch with a gunshot wound in the abdomen. *630 The case of Interstate Business Men’s Accident Association v. Ford, 161 Ky. 163 , 170 S. W. 525 , was another case where the question to be determined was whether Ford came to his death as the result of external, violent, and accidental means.

1926In Perrault v. Robinson, 29 Idaho 267 , 158 Pac.

1926In Perrault v. Robinson, 29 Idaho 267 , 158 Pac.

1923Co. v. Bonhayo, 94 Ky. 67 , the dwelling of the plaintiff was caused to give away and move from its natural position by an excavation causing the soil to slide and take from the plaintiff’s land its natural support; and in that case this court approved an instruction which told the jury the plaintiff’s land was entitled to this natural support, “And if deprived of it by the act of the defendant, the latter is liable, unless the plaintiff, or some one of the adjoining owners on the same hillside, had weakened or loosened the earth by digging, ditching or excavating for cellars, or by buildings

1923In the case of Langhorn v. Turman, 141 Ky. 809 , another excavation case, this court approved the rule laid down in L. & N. R.

1915If it is not, he makes himself individually liable for any loss sustained on account of its insolvency, or failure to fulfill its contract, entered into with persons who did not know that the company was not authorized to do business in the State, and who believe that the person assuming to act for it was its duly .authorized agent.” The court further held, that if Head & Matthews informed Vertrees, that they were not agents of the company, and had no authority to act for it, and Vertrees knew the company had no authority from the insurance department to do business in-the State, and they plac

1913In the case of McKibben v. Diltz, 138 Ky., 684 , this court approved the doctrine that whenever the instrument is ascertained to be only a. security for money it will be considered a mortgage, however artfully it may be disguised.

1912(Authorities omitted.) “In reference to such matters they should stand as does the sovereignty whose agency they are — subject to be sued only when the State, by statute, declares that they may be.” And in the late case of Allison v. Cash, 143 Ky., 679 , where appellant sought to recover damages from the County Board of Health, which had closed appellant’s store and disinfected her goods, and for taking other quarantine measures for the suppression of smallpox, this court approved the doctrine laid down in the foregoing case, and denied appellant’s right to recover.' The doctrine is recognized