approved instruction in Michigan

1997In In re McDivitt Estate, 169 Mich App 435 ; 425 NW2d 575 (1988), this Court approved a claim against an estate.

1997In In re McDivitt Estate, 169 Mich App 435 ; 425 NW2d 575 (1988), this Court approved a claim against an estate.

1978The clearest expression of this is found in People v Dyson, 56 Mich App 59, 63-64 ; 223 NW2d 364 (1974): "In Jones, supra, the approved instruction stated that in order to be guilty the defendant had to have knowledge that he was dealing with heroin and the intent to deal therewith.

1974In Jones, supra, the approved instruction stated that in order to be guilty the defendant had to have knowledge that he was dealing with heroin *64 and the intent to deal therewith.

2020In California v Prysock, for example, the Court approved a warning that the defendant had a “right to talk to a lawyer before [being] questioned.” Prysock, 453 US at 356 .

2020Miranda was satisfied because “nothing in the warnings . . . suggested any limitation on the right to the presence of appointed counsel different from the clearly conveyed rights to a lawyer in general[.]” Id. at 360-361 .

2014On appeal, although denying any knowledge of the condition, the defendant conceded that “[i]t is a rule of law that one who does not knowingly or wilfully create a nuisance, but passively permits one to exist after knowledge thereof,” can be liable after notice and reasonable opportunity to abate the nuisance.13 And this Court approved this rule when it confirmed the sufficiency of the trial court’s instruction on knowledge, which provided, “[I]f the defendant caused, or knowingly permitted, these things to be collected by its ditches and conveyed to plaintiff’s premises . . . it would be liab

2008This Court approved the instruction, however, because the “plaintiff presented evidence that it was led to believe” that the new policy merely renewed the prior one, explaining that no duty to read exists when “a policy is renewed without actual notice to the insured that the policy has been altered.” Id.

2008This Court approved the instruction, however, because the "plaintiff presented evidence that it was led to believe" that the new policy merely renewed the prior one, explaining that no duty to read exists when "a policy is renewed without actual notice to the insured that the policy has been altered." Id.

2008In Holton v A+ Ins Assoc, Inc, 255 Mich App 318, 319 ; 661 NW2d 248 (2003), this Court addressed the application of comparative fault principles in a case involving an allegation that an insurance agent negligently failed to secure the coverage requested.

2008In Holton v A+ Ins Assoc, Inc, 255 Mich App 318, 319 ; 661 NW2d 248 (2003), this Court addressed the application of comparative fault principles in a case involving an allegation that an insurance agent negligently failed to secure the coverage requested.

1983In Bank of the Commonwealth v Hulette, 82 Mich App 442, 445 ; 266 NW2d 841 (1978), a panel of this Court approved a rule set forth in 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, §§ 92-94, pp 621-622, which provides in relevant part: " 'Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed.’ ” In this case a finding by the Genesee court that the Onyx judgment was binding upon plaintiffs could be a legal defense to all of the claims advanced by plaintiffs in Lapeer.

1983In Bank of the Commonwealth v Hulette, 82 Mich App 442, 445 ; 266 NW2d 841 (1978), a panel of this Court approved a rule set forth in 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, §§ 92-94, pp 621-622, which provides in relevant part: " 'Where the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed.’ ” In this case a finding by the Genesee court that the Onyx judgment was binding upon plaintiffs could be a legal defense to all of the claims advanced by plaintiffs in Lapeer.

1981In Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 443-444 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), this Court approved the doctrine of negligent entrustment set forth in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 390, p 314: "One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.” (Empha

1981In Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 443-444 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), this Court approved the doctrine of negligent entrustment set forth in 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 390, p 314: "One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.” (Empha

1978The clearest expression of this is found in People v Dyson, 56 Mich App 59, 63-64 ; 223 NW2d 364 (1974): "In Jones, supra, the approved instruction stated that in order to be guilty the defendant had to have knowledge that he was dealing with heroin and the intent to deal therewith.

1978The clearest expression of this is found in People v Dyson, 56 Mich App 59, 63-64 ; 223 NW2d 364 (1974): "In Jones, supra, the approved instruction stated that in order to be guilty the defendant had to have knowledge that he was dealing with heroin and the intent to deal therewith.

1975In Hoffman v Michigan Home & Hospital Association, 128 Mich 323, 328 ; 87 NW 265, 267 ; 54 LRA 746, 748 (1901), the Court approved an instruction given by the trial judge which stated, in pertinent part: " '[I]f you find from the testimony in this case that the plaintiff was continuously confined to his home on account of a sickness or disease covered by the terms of his policy, to the extent that he was necessarily, in good faith, there the larger portion of the time, and only went forth either from necessity for consultation with, or by direction of, his physician, Dr. Barth, in whose charge

1975In Hoffman v Michigan Home & Hospital Association, 128 Mich 323, 328 ; 87 NW 265, 267 ; 54 LRA 746, 748 (1901), the Court approved an instruction given by the trial judge which stated, in pertinent part: " '[I]f you find from the testimony in this case that the plaintiff was continuously confined to his home on account of a sickness or disease covered by the terms of his policy, to the extent that he was necessarily, in good faith, there the larger portion of the time, and only went forth either from necessity for consultation with, or by direction of, his physician, Dr. Barth, in whose charge

1975However, Hoffman was distinguished in Shirts v Phoenix Accident & Sick Benefít Association, 135 Mich 439, 443-444 ; 97 NW 966 (1904), seemingly on the basis that "the circumstances of [that] case are so different that it does not fall within the rule there [in Hoffman] stated”.

1975However, Hoffman was distinguished in Shirts v Phoenix Accident & Sick Benefít Association, 135 Mich 439, 443-444 ; 97 NW 966 (1904), seemingly on the basis that "the circumstances of [that] case are so different that it does not fall within the rule there [in Hoffman] stated”.

1968People v. Garbutt [(1868), 17 Mich 9 ]; People v. Eggleston (1915), 186 Mich 510 .” We are aware that in People v. Finley (1878), 38 Mich 482 , the Court approved an instruction similar to the one in the present case on the theory that (p 485): “Inasmuch as it must be for the jury to determine whether or no the effect of the defendant’s testimony has been overcome in their minds by adequate proof, if they think the testimony of insanity is thus overcome it is difficult to conceive *348 how they can further regard it, or how they could entertain a reasonable doubt on the case if convinced of th

1968People v. Garbutt [(1868), 17 Mich 9 ]; People v. Eggleston (1915), 186 Mich 510 .” We are aware that in People v. Finley (1878), 38 Mich 482 , the Court approved an instruction similar to the one in the present case on the theory that (p 485): “Inasmuch as it must be for the jury to determine whether or no the effect of the defendant’s testimony has been overcome in their minds by adequate proof, if they think the testimony of insanity is thus overcome it is difficult to conceive *348 how they can further regard it, or how they could entertain a reasonable doubt on the case if convinced of th

1968People v. Garbutt [(1868), 17 Mich 9 ]; People v. Eggleston (1915), 186 Mich 510 .” We are aware that in People v. Finley (1878), 38 Mich 482 , the Court approved an instruction similar to the one in the present case on the theory that (p 485): “Inasmuch as it must be for the jury to determine whether or no the effect of the defendant’s testimony has been overcome in their minds by adequate proof, if they think the testimony of insanity is thus overcome it is difficult to conceive *348 how they can further regard it, or how they could entertain a reasonable doubt on the case if convinced of th

1955In Van Der Bie v. Koots, 264 Mich 468 , defendant cited as error the permission granted a doctor to answer this question:' “A. Assuming the treatment of this boy’s arm after it was broken to have been set forth in that *711 hypothetical question, what in your opinion would that treatment result in, what would be the result of that kind of treatment ?” The Court, overruling defendant’s contention, stated (pp 471, 472): ¡ “He was not asked what did produce the result.’ That was for the jury to determine.

1955In Hull v. Detroit United Railway, 158 Mich 682 , a case decided before the De Haan and De-Groot Cases, but after the precedents upon which those cases rely, the Court approved of an instruction to the jury (p 686) based upon medical testimony to the effect that “One physician said in his judgment these injuries were due to an accident received in a streetcar.” The apparent basis of the ruling was the existence of conflicting medical testimony as to the cause of plaintiff’s condition.

1953Whether it be by lightning, such falling-branch, a dog bite, as in Ryan , or a flying pheasant, as in Levchuk v. Krug Cement Products Co., 246 Mich 589 , and as mentioned in Steffes , the injury does not arise out of the employment.

1953Whether it be by lighting, such falling branch, a dog bite, as in Ryan , or a flying pheasant, as in Levchuk v. Krug Cement Products Co., 246 Mich 589 , and as mentioned in Steffes , the injury does not *131 arise out of the employment.

1953Co., 192 Mich 549 , this Court said: “An ‘act of God’ is defined as ‘Inevitable accident without the intervention of man or the public enemy.’ 29 Cyc p 441.” In Jacobs v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 198 Mich 73 (LRA1918A, 504, 16 NCCA 535), this Court approved an instruction that “an act of God may be defined as a natural cause.” These definitions and the holdings in the cited “lightning cases” indicate no varying rule of law to be applied to injuries resulting- from different, unexpected occurrences occasioned by the moving forces of nature, one if it- be a descending bolt of lightning and anoth

1953Co., 192 Mich 549 , this Court said: "An `act of God' is defined as `Inevitable accident without the intervention of man or the public enemy.' 29 Cyc p 441." In Jacobs v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 198 Mich 73 (LRA 1918A, 504, 16 NCCA 535), this Court approved an instruction that "an act of God may be defined as a natural cause." These definitions and the holdings in the cited "lightning cases" indicate no varying rule of law to be applied to injuries resulting from different, unexpected occurrences occasioned by the moving forces of nature, one if it be a descending bolt of lightning and anothe

1953Co., 192 Mich 549 , this Court said: “An ‘act of God’ is defined as ‘Inevitable accident without the intervention of man or the public enemy.’ 29 Cyc p 441.” In Jacobs v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 198 Mich 73 (LRA1918A, 504, 16 NCCA 535), this Court approved an instruction that “an act of God may be defined as a natural cause.” These definitions and the holdings in the cited “lightning cases” indicate no varying rule of law to be applied to injuries resulting- from different, unexpected occurrences occasioned by the moving forces of nature, one if it- be a descending bolt of lightning and anoth

1953Co., 192 Mich 549 , this Court said: "An `act of God' is defined as `Inevitable accident without the intervention of man or the public enemy.' 29 Cyc p 441." In Jacobs v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows, 198 Mich 73 (LRA 1918A, 504, 16 NCCA 535), this Court approved an instruction that "an act of God may be defined as a natural cause." These definitions and the holdings in the cited "lightning cases" indicate no varying rule of law to be applied to injuries resulting from different, unexpected occurrences occasioned by the moving forces of nature, one if it be a descending bolt of lightning and anothe

1944In Barkman v. Montague, 297 Mich. 538 , this court approved this rule of law as follows: *38 “In Carr v. St.

1936In Smith v. Stewart, 245 Mich. 452 , Mr. Justice Fead, speaking for the court, said of one seeking the remedy of specific performance: “He must at least demonstrate ability, readiness, and willingness to perform.” In that opinion, also, the court approved the rule as stated in Lake Erie Land Co. v. Chilinski, 197 Mich. 214 , as follows: “Remedy by specific performance is not a remedy of right.

1936In Smith v. Stewart, 245 Mich. 452 , Mr. Justice Fead, speaking for the court, said of one seeking the remedy of specific performance: “He must at least demonstrate ability, readiness, and willingness to perform.” In that opinion, also, the court approved the rule as stated in Lake Erie Land Co. v. Chilinski, 197 Mich. 214 , as follows: “Remedy by specific performance is not a remedy of right.

1924As has been very pertinently pointed out, no rights of the parent of the child would be impaired by giving force and effect to the contract of adoption, and permitting the child to succeed to the estate of the adoptive parent as the adopted child of the latter." In a note in 16 A.L.R. 1030 , it is stated: "In several cases involving a collateral attack on the validity of an adoption, it has been held that, where an adoptive parent has obtained a decree of adoption and taken the adopted child into his home, his presumptive heirs and personal representatives, as well as himself, are estopped the

1924As has been very pertinently pointed out, no rights of the parent of the child would be impaired by giving force and effect to the contract of adoption, and permitting the child to succeed to the estate of the adoptive parent as the adopted child of the latter." In a note in 16 A.L.R. 1030 , it is stated: "In several cases involving a collateral attack on the validity of an adoption, it has been held that, where an adoptive parent has obtained a decree of adoption and taken the adopted child into his home, his presumptive heirs and personal representatives, as well as himself, are estopped the

1917The same rule as applied to life insurance was approved in Grindle v. Express Co., 67 Me. 317 ( 24 Am.

1912Steele v. Culver, 157 Mich. 344 , at page 349 ( 122 N. W. 95 , 23 L.

1912Steele v. Culver, 157 Mich. 344 , at page 349 ( 122 N. W. 95 , 23 L.