approved analysis in New Jersey

2019Id. at 34-35 (citing Czachor, 82 N.J. at 405 n.4).

2009Id. at 406-07 , 413 A. 2d 593 .

2015Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010), where the parties, in "agreeing to arbitration," expressed their "understand[ing] and agree[ment] that they are waiving their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes." Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 445 .

2015Super. 515, 518 (App. Div. 2010), where the parties, in "agreeing to arbitration," expressed their "understand[ing] and agree[ment] that they are waiving their rights to maintain other available resolution processes, such as a court action or administrative proceeding, to settle their disputes." Atalese, supra, 219 N.J. at 445 .

2019Id. at 34-35 (citing Czachor, 82 N.J. at 405 n.4).

2010In State v. Davis, 363 N.J.Super. 556, 561 , 833 A. 2d 1094 (App.Div.2003) (citations omitted), applying plain error analysis and reversing defendant's conviction, we noted that "[t]he failure to give [a general identification] charge or to give an adequate charge is most often reversible error." In State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 , 865 A. 2d 660 (2005), also applying the plain error standard, the Court approved our analysis in Davis , noting, "that the State may sometimes present such overwhelming corroborative evidence that the `failure to give an identification instruction does not consti

2010In State v. Davis, 363 N.J.Super. 556, 561 , 833 A. 2d 1094 (App.Div.2003) (citations omitted), applying plain error analysis and reversing defendant's conviction, we noted that "[t]he failure to give [a general identification] charge or to give an adequate charge is most often reversible error." In State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 , 865 A. 2d 660 (2005), also applying the plain error standard, the Court approved our analysis in Davis , noting, "that the State may sometimes present such overwhelming corroborative evidence that the `failure to give an identification instruction does not consti

2010In State v. Davis, 363 N.J.Super. 556, 561 , 833 A. 2d 1094 (App.Div.2003) (citations omitted), applying plain error analysis and reversing defendant's conviction, we noted that "[t]he failure to give [a general identification] charge or to give an adequate charge is most often reversible error." In State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 , 865 A. 2d 660 (2005), also applying the plain error standard, the Court approved our analysis in Davis , noting, "that the State may sometimes present such overwhelming corroborative evidence that the `failure to give an identification instruction does not consti

2010In State v. Davis, 363 N.J.Super. 556, 561 , 833 A. 2d 1094 (App.Div.2003) (citations omitted), applying plain error analysis and reversing defendant's conviction, we noted that "[t]he failure to give [a general identification] charge or to give an adequate charge is most often reversible error." In State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326 , 865 A. 2d 660 (2005), also applying the plain error standard, the Court approved our analysis in Davis , noting, "that the State may sometimes present such overwhelming corroborative evidence that the `failure to give an identification instruction does not consti

1998The Court approved the analysis of the Grosso court, stating that that decision was "rendered after a careful and exhaustive consideration" and "must be accepted as a correct exposition of the law on [wrongful death]." Id. at 196, 33 A. 389 .

1998The Court approved the analysis of the Grosso court, stating that that decision was “rendered after a careful and exhaustive consideration” and “must be accepted as a correct exposition of the law on [wrongful death].” Id. at 196, 33 A. 389 .

1995Super. 162, 172-73 , 413 A. 2d 960 (App.Div. 1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668 , 428 A. 2d 1317 (1981) the court approved of the test in a workers compensation retaliation case, although there were other considerations there.

1995Super. 162, 172-73 , 413 A. 2d 960 (App.Div. 1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668 , 428 A. 2d 1317 (1981) the court approved of the test in a workers compensation retaliation case, although there were other considerations there.

1995Super. 162, 172-73 , 413 A. 2d 960 (App.Div. 1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668 , 428 A. 2d 1317 (1981) the court approved of the test in a workers compensation retaliation case, although there were other considerations there.

1984In Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521 (1964), the Court approved the analysis presented in Werner Machine, supra, 6 N.J.Super. 188 , and further recognized that the Legis lature had provided a bright line test in enacting the indebtedness provision.

1984In Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521 (1964), the Court approved the analysis presented in Werner Machine, supra, 6 N.J.Super. 188 , and further recognized that the Legis lature had provided a bright line test in enacting the indebtedness provision.

1984In Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521 (1964), the Court approved the analysis presented in Werner Machine, supra, 6 N.J.

1984In Kingsley v. Hawthorne Fabrics, Inc., 41 N.J. 521 (1964), the Court approved the analysis presented in Werner Machine, supra, 6 N.J.Super. 188 , and further recognized that the Legis lature had provided a bright line test in enacting the indebtedness provision.

1979In the latter case, 70 N.J. at 62 , the court approved the principle stated in State v. Hill, 44 N.J.

1979Super. 110, 112 (App.Div. *388 1957), and State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 380 (1974), that "A prosecution for any part of a single crime bars any additional prosecution or sentence for the whole crime or any other constituent element of the whole crime." Yet, in considering the issue of merger of offenses, the Supreme Court stated in State v. Best, supra, 70 N.J. at 62 , that it has "eschewed a mechanical application of the traditional `offense-defining' criteria for sameness" which are contained in the all-too-narrow `same evidence,' `same transaction,' or `lessor-included offense' tests." Cur

1965In reversing the award, it was held: "In Pilkington v. State Highway Dept., 124 N.J.L. 11 , this court approved the test as laid down by the New York Court of Appeals in Marks' Dependents v. Gray et al., 167 N.E. 181, 183 , that `If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some *418 purpose of his own.

1965In reversing the award, it was held: "In Pilkington v. State Highway Dept., 124 N.J.L. 11 , this court approved the test as laid down by the New York Court of Appeals in Marks' Dependents v. Gray et al., 167 N.E. 181, 183 , that `If the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some *418 purpose of his own.

1965Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 231 N.Y. 273 ; 131 N.E. 914 .

1965Clawson v. Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co., 231 N.Y. 273 ; 131 N.E. 914 .

1958In State v. Lax, 71 N.J.L. 386, 387 ( Sup. Ct. 1904), the court approved the rule that the possession by the defendant of stolen goods "at a time not too long after the stealing, is a circumstance for the jury to consider and weigh in connection with the other evidence [on the issue of guilt of theft]." In State v. Dunlap, 103 N.J.L. 209 ( Sup. Ct. 1927), the court sustained a conviction of larceny based largely upon the circumstantial evidence of possession of the stolen goods shortly after their theft where it might also have been argued, as does the majority here, that the evidence pointed

1949Cf. Stevens v. Essex Fells Country Club, 136 N.J.L. 656 (Sup.Ct. 1948).

1831In Lessee of Bayard v. Colefax, for lands in the district of New-Jersey, the court approved of the principle of Jackson v. Woods, 5 John. 278 , and decided accordingly, that when two or more persons holding distinct or separate possessions of the premises mentioned in the declaration in ejectment are united in the same declaration, and jointly enter into the common rule and plead, judgment may be given against them separately if their separate possessions are found by the jury.

1831In Jackson v. Sidney, 12 John. 185 the declaration contained separate demises by four lessors, and on the trial, the plaintiff offered to shew a title in each of the lessors to separate lots.