approved instruction in Maryland

2013When the trial court does not adhere closely to the language of the approved instruction, we must review the court’s instruction carefully to determine “whether the province of the jury has been invaded and the verdict unduly coerced.” Kelly, 270 Md. at 144 , 310 A.2d 538 .

2013When the trial court does not adhere closely to the language of the approved instruction, we must review the court’s instruction carefully to determine “whether the province of the jury has been invaded and the verdict unduly coerced.” Kelly, 270 Md. at 144 , 310 A.2d 538 .

1969The trooper, as investigating officer, qualified as an expert, Acme Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365 , 53 A. 2d 1 (1947), and, as was said in Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 38 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961), '* * * an approved test as to the admissibility of expert opinion is whether the jury can receive appreciable help from the particular witness on the subject, not whether the jury can decide the particular issue without expert help. * * The interpretation of skid and swerve marks and gouges in the road at the site of the accident and their significance in regard to where the impact took place

1969The trooper, as investigating officer, qualified as an expert, Acme Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365 , 53 A. 2d 1 (1947), and, as was said in Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 38 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961), '* * * an approved test as to the admissibility of expert opinion is whether the jury can receive appreciable help from the particular witness on the subject, not whether the jury can decide the particular issue without expert help. * * The interpretation of skid and swerve marks and gouges in the road at the site of the accident and their significance in regard to where the impact took place

1969Cf. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609 , 78 A. 2d 220 (1951).” ( 227 Md. at 321-22 , 176 A. 2d at 868-69 .) (Emphasis supplied.) In our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Officer Rogers’ expert testimony in regard to the point of impact would be of substantial assistance to the jury in determining this issue.

1969Cf. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609 , 78 A. 2d 220 (1951).” ( 227 Md. at 321-22 , 176 A. 2d at 868-69 .) (Emphasis supplied.) In our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Officer Rogers’ expert testimony in regard to the point of impact would be of substantial assistance to the jury in determining this issue.

2007Girrens, 715 P.2d at 393 .

2006As previously mentioned, the concurring opinion in Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. at 388-389 , 620 A.2d at 304 , would have required that "trial judges . . . instruct on the issue of reasonable doubt in the form suggested by Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02," and cautioned that trial judges should "resist the temptation to stray from, or embellish upon, that instruction." The concurring opinion went on to point out that the Court should adopt the "approach taken by the Court in Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 144 , 310 A.2d 538 (1973), dealing with the giving of a modified *370 All

2006As previously mentioned, the concurring opinion in Wills v. State, supra, 329 Md. at 388-389 , 620 A.2d at 304 , would have required that "trial judges . . . instruct on the issue of reasonable doubt in the form suggested by Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 2:02," and cautioned that trial judges should "resist the temptation to stray from, or embellish upon, that instruction." The concurring opinion went on to point out that the Court should adopt the "approach taken by the Court in Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 144 , 310 A.2d 538 (1973), dealing with the giving of a modified *370 All

2006One year later, Judge Cathell, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Himple v. State, supra, 101 Md.App. at 584-585 , 647 A.2d at 1243 , endorsed the approach of the concurring opinion in Wills .

2006One year later, Judge Cathell, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in Himple v. State, supra, 101 Md.App. at 584-585 , 647 A.2d at 1243 , endorsed the approach of the concurring opinion in Wills .

1993I would adopt here the approach taken by the Court in Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 144 , 310 A.2d 538 (1973), dealing with the giving of a modified Allen [v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) ] charge, and instruct trial judges that they should “closely adhere” to the approved instruction and that any departure from that language will be “subjected to careful scrutiny.” Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to state that he joins in the views stated herein. .

1993I would adopt here the approach taken by the Court in Kelly v. State, 270 Md. 139, 144 , 310 A.2d 538 (1973), dealing with the giving of a modified Allen [v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 , 17 S.Ct. 154 , 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896) ] charge, and instruct trial judges that they should “closely adhere” to the approved instruction and that any departure from that language will be “subjected to careful scrutiny.” Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to state that he joins in the views stated herein. .

1993The court also found defective a separate portion of the instruction that equated reasonable doubt with a "substantial doubt.” 901 F.2d at 889-90 .

1986Id. at 265 .

1985Paper Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 590-91 , 139 A.2d 219 (1958) this Court approved the rule that evidence of declarations of a plan, design or intention presently entertained by the declarant is, subject to the usual limitations as to remoteness in time and apparent sincerity common to all declarations of mental state, admissible when offered as evidence that the design was carried out by acts or omissions of the declarant. 2 If offered for this purpose, i.e., to show that the prosecutrix probably did go to the jail and tell McCray she intended to have the charges dropped, it again is

1985Paper Products Co. v. Judson, 215 Md. 577, 590-91 , 139 A.2d 219 (1958) this Court approved the rule that evidence of declarations of a plan, design or intention presently entertained by the declarant is, subject to the usual limitations as to remoteness in time and apparent sincerity common to all declarations of mental state, admissible when offered as evidence that the design was carried out by acts or omissions of the declarant. 2 If offered for this purpose, i.e., to show that the prosecutrix probably did go to the jail and tell McCray she intended to have the charges dropped, it again is

1982As we said in Tipton v. State, 39 Md.

1982The Court of Appeals in Montgomery stated that the approved instruction is "not the only satisfactory explanation of reasonable doubt” and declined to prescribe an instruction that would apply in every case. 292 Md. at 95 .

1977The propriety of Allen-type instructions appears to have been considered by this Court only twice previously: Leupen v. Lackey, 248 Md. 19 , 234 A. 2d 573 (1967), and Kelly v. State, supra, 270 Md. 139 .

1977The propriety of Allen-type instructions appears to have been considered by this Court only twice previously: Leupen v. Lackey, 248 Md. 19 , 234 A. 2d 573 (1967), and Kelly v. State, supra, 270 Md. 139 .

1976Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185 , 249 A. 2d 112 (1967); Baltimore Co. v. State, Use of Keenan, 232 Md. 350 , 193 A. 2d 30 (1962); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 13 (1972).

1976Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185 , 249 A. 2d 112 (1967); Baltimore Co. v. State, Use of Keenan, 232 Md. 350 , 193 A. 2d 30 (1962); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 13 (1972).

1976Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185 , 249 A. 2d 112 (1967); Baltimore Co. v. State, Use of Keenan, 232 Md. 350 , 193 A. 2d 30 (1962); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 13 (1972).

1976Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185 , 249 A. 2d 112 (1967); Baltimore Co. v. State, Use of Keenan, 232 Md. 350 , 193 A. 2d 30 (1962); Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24 , 169 A. 2d 661 (1961); 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 1923 (3rd ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 13 (1972).

1969Cf. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609 , 78 A. 2d 220 (1951).” ( 227 Md. at 321-22 , 176 A. 2d at 868-69 .) (Emphasis supplied.) In our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Officer Rogers’ expert testimony in regard to the point of impact would be of substantial assistance to the jury in determining this issue.

1969Cf. Miller v. Graff, 196 Md. 609 , 78 A. 2d 220 (1951).” ( 227 Md. at 321-22 , 176 A. 2d at 868-69 .) (Emphasis supplied.) In our opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Officer Rogers’ expert testimony in regard to the point of impact would be of substantial assistance to the jury in determining this issue.

1962The trooper, as investigating officer, qualified as an expert, Acme Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365 , 53 A. 2d 1 (1947), and, as was said in Harper v. Higgs, 225 Md. 24, 38 , 169 *322 A. 2d 661 (1961), “* * * an approved test as to the admissibility of expert opinion is whether the jury can receive appreciable help from the particular witness on the subject, not whether the jury can decide the particular issue without expert help. * * The interpretation of skid and swerve marks and gouges in the road at the site of the accident and their significance in regard to where the impact took p

1962Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft (May 4, 1962), § 251.4 (4), it is stated that “expert testimony, * * * relating to factors entering into the determination of the issue of obscenity, shall be admissible.” And cf. United States v. 4200 Copies International Journal, 134 F. Supp. 490 (D.

1961In Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 588 , we quoted 7 Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1923, and McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 11, to that effect, with approval.

1961In Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 588 , we quoted 7 Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1923, and McCormick, Evidence, Sec. 11, to that effect, with approval.

1912And in Guy v. State, 90 Md. 29 , it was held that the fact that the traverser had procured such license was admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing what his business was, or that he kept liquor for sale, or generally the question of intent.

1912In Guy v. State, 96 Md. 692 , this Court approved an instruction to the jury given by Judge Watees in which he stated that the fact that the traverser, who was indicted under this identical law, held.a government license for the sale of spirituous or fermented liquors in Bel Air, was prima facie evidence that he was engaged in the business of selling spirituous liquors in Bel Air, and certainly the evidence excepted to tends to show that this appellant had converted her home into a “place of business” for the sale of spirituous liquors.

1905The leading cases upon this doctrine are those known as the “Carriage Cases.” Among the last-mentioned cases is that of Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & Welsby, 499, a leading case, and which, in the case of Deford v. Keyser, 30 Md. 179 , is said, in the course of the exhaustive opinion of Judge Alvey in that case, to be the one “in which the present approved doctrine” in regard “to the true distinctions applicable to cases of the class” to which that and the present case belong, “was first definitely established.” This case has become familiar but the facts may be profitably recited here as affo

1902Co. v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519 , this Court approved an instruction given by the lower Court as follows : “The degree of care required of a passenger is not the highest degree of *487 care, but only the ordinary care which ordinarily prudent people are accustomed to exercise.” And in the case of Cent.