approved instruction in Washington

2017There is but one question open to them; that is, Is there sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict under the instructions of the court?"); Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 31 Wn.2d 220, 225 , 195 P.2d 638 (1948) ("It is the approved rule in this state that the parties are bound by the law laid down by the court in its instructions where, as here, 12 Ij 1 I No. 32960-7-111 II State v. Camarata the charge is approved by counsel for each party, no objections or I exceptions thereto having been made at any stage.

2017There is but one question open to them; that is, Is there sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict under the instructions of the court?"); Tonkovich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 31 Wn.2d 220, 225 , 195 P.2d 638 (1948) ("It is the approved rule in this state that the parties are bound by the law laid down by the court in its instructions where, as here, 12 Ij 1 I No. 32960-7-111 II State v. Camarata the charge is approved by counsel for each party, no objections or I exceptions thereto having been made at any stage.

2014In such case, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is to be determined by the application of the instructions . . . .[38] Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.39 "Retrial 35id at 102. 36 id 37 id 38 id at 103 (quoting Tonkovich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 31 Wn.2d 220, 225 , 195 P.2d 638 (1948)). 39 State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980). 10 No. 69614-9-1/11 following

2014In such case, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is to be determined by the application of the instructions . . . .[38] Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.39 "Retrial 35id at 102. 36 id 37 id 38 id at 103 (quoting Tonkovich v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 31 Wn.2d 220, 225 , 195 P.2d 638 (1948)). 39 State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980). 10 No. 69614-9-1/11 following

2007Nevertheless, in State v. Pacheco, 107 Wn.2d 59, 64-65 , 726 P.2d 981 (1986), we did apply a “good faith and due diligence” requirement to the former CrR 3.3(g)(2) exclusion for time spent in “ ‘[preliminary proceedings and trial on another charge.’ ” Again, in Greenwood , the court approved a requirement that prosecuting attorneys act in good faith and with due diligence in attempting to bring absent defendants to trial pursuant to former CrR 3.3(c)(1) and (4) (1994).

2007Nevertheless, in State v. Pacheco, 107 Wn.2d 59, 64-65 , 726 P.2d 981 (1986), we did apply a “good faith and due diligence” requirement to the former CrR 3.3(g)(2) exclusion for time spent in “ ‘[preliminary proceedings and trial on another charge.’ ” Again, in Greenwood , the court approved a requirement that prosecuting attorneys act in good faith and with due diligence in attempting to bring absent defendants to trial pursuant to former CrR 3.3(c)(1) and (4) (1994).

2007In State v. Anderson, 121 Wash.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993) (quoting former CrR 3.3(g)(6) (1991)), this court held that fundamental fairness requires that Washington prosecuting authorities act in good faith and with due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial in this state once it has been brought to their attention that the defendant "is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington or in a federal jail or prison" and the defendant is "subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington." And, most recently in Guay, 150 Wash.2d 288 , 76 P

2007In State v. Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993) (quoting former CrR 3.3(g)(6) (1991)), this court held that fundamental fairness requires that Washington prosecuting authorities act in good faith and with due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial in this state once it has been brought to their attention that the defendant “is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington or in a federal jail or prison” and the defendant is “subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington.” And, most recently in Guay, 150 Wn.2d 288 , we consi

2007In State v. Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993) (quoting former CrR 3.3(g)(6) (1991)), this court held that fundamental fairness requires that Washington prosecuting authorities act in good faith and with due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial in this state once it has been brought to their attention that the defendant “is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington or in a federal jail or prison” and the defendant is “subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington.” And, most recently in Guay, 150 Wn.2d 288 , we consi

2007In State v. Anderson, 121 Wn.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993) (quoting former CrR 3.3(g)(6) (1991)), this court held that fundamental fairness requires that Washington prosecuting authorities act in good faith and with due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial in this state once it has been brought to their attention that the defendant “is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington or in a federal jail or prison” and the defendant is “subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington.” And, most recently in Guay, 150 Wn.2d 288 , we consi

2006In Seibly , the court approved an instruction that, in deciding whether a married 18-year-old could consent to a vasectomy, the jury should consider his "age, intelligence, maturity, training and experience, marital status, control or the absence thereof by his parents, whether he was dependent or self-supporting and whether his general conduct was that of an adult or that of a child." Seibly, 72 Wash.2d at 19 , 431 P.2d 719 . ¶ 24 In determining, then, whether a child can legally consent to an assault, we consider the particular act, the surrounding circumstances, society's interest in the ac

2006In Seibly , the court approved an instruction that, in deciding whether a married 18-year-old could consent to a vasectomy, the jury should consider his “age, intelligence, maturity, training and experience, marital status, control or the absence thereof by his parents, whether he was dependent or self-supporting and whether his general conduct was that of an adult or that of a child.” Seibly, 72 Wn.2d at 19 n.1. ¶24 In determining, then, whether a child can legally consent to an assault, we consider the particular act, the surrounding circumstances, society’s interest in the activity, and the

1998In such case, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is to be determined by the application of the instructions...."). [3] When determining whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the added element, *903 the reviewing court inquires "`whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) ( quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (197

1998In such case, the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict is to be determined by the application of the instructions...."). [3] When determining whether there is sufficient evidence to prove the added element, *903 the reviewing court inquires "`whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wash.2d 216, 221 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) ( quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (197

2017State v. Osman, 192 Wn.

2009The third alternate definition is similar to the second: "marked by originality, resourcefulness, and cleverness in conception or execution." Id. [29] See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 928 (1992). [30] Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 . [31] See Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 ("the many reported cases examining reasonable doubt instructions illustrate the difficulties presented in drafting nonstandard instructions"). [32] See also Bennett, 161 Wash.2d at 317 , 165 P.3d 1241 ("every effort to improve or enhance the standard approved instruction necessarily

2009The third alternate definition is similar to the second: "marked by originality, resourcefulness, and cleverness in conception or execution." Id. [29] See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 928 (1992). [30] Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 . [31] See Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 ("the many reported cases examining reasonable doubt instructions illustrate the difficulties presented in drafting nonstandard instructions"). [32] See also Bennett, 161 Wash.2d at 317 , 165 P.3d 1241 ("every effort to improve or enhance the standard approved instruction necessarily

2009The third alternate definition is similar to the second: "marked by originality, resourcefulness, and cleverness in conception or execution." Id. [29] See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 928 (1992). [30] Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 . [31] See Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 ("the many reported cases examining reasonable doubt instructions illustrate the difficulties presented in drafting nonstandard instructions"). [32] See also Bennett, 161 Wash.2d at 317 , 165 P.3d 1241 ("every effort to improve or enhance the standard approved instruction necessarily

2009The third alternate definition is similar to the second: "marked by originality, resourcefulness, and cleverness in conception or execution." Id. [29] See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 928 (1992). [30] Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 . [31] See Cervantes, 87 Wash.App. at 448 , 942 P.2d 382 ("the many reported cases examining reasonable doubt instructions illustrate the difficulties presented in drafting nonstandard instructions"). [32] See also Bennett, 161 Wash.2d at 317 , 165 P.3d 1241 ("every effort to improve or enhance the standard approved instruction necessarily

2007In State v. Anderson, 121 Wash.2d 852, 864 , 855 P.2d 671 (1993) (quoting former CrR 3.3(g)(6) (1991)), this court held that fundamental fairness requires that Washington prosecuting authorities act in good faith and with due diligence in bringing a defendant to trial in this state once it has been brought to their attention that the defendant "is detained in jail or prison outside the state of Washington or in a federal jail or prison" and the defendant is "subjected to conditions of release not imposed by a court of the State of Washington." And, most recently in Guay, 150 Wash.2d 288 , 76 P

1994App. 387, 391, 777 P.2d 1072 (1989), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1038 (1990), the court approved that instruction with the admonition that the use of the negative in the phrase "not to be judged in light of any after-acquired knowledge in relation to the case . . .” created an unnecessary risk of misapplication.

1994App. 387, 391 , 777 P.2d 1072 (1989), review denied, 113 Wn.2d 1038 (1990), the court approved that instruction with the admonition that the use *247 of the negative in the phrase "not to be judged in light of any after-acquired knowledge in relation to the case ..." created an unnecessary risk of misapplication.

1991App. 509 , 513 n.5, 596 P.2d 291 (1979), the court approved an instruction which stated: "Medical testimony must establish the causal relationship between the alleged unusually strenuous emotional exertion and the December 5, 1972 stroke in terms of probability.

1987Recently the court approved an instruction defining premeditation as follows: "[T]he term 'premeditate' encompasses the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for an appreciable period of time, however long or short, but more than a mere moment in time." State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 199 , 721 P.2d 902 (1986).

1987Recently the court approved an instruction defining premeditation as follows: "[T]he term 'premeditate' encompasses the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for an appreciable period of time, however long or short, but more than a mere moment in time." State v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 199 , 721 P.2d 902 (1986).

1986Employees Ass'n v. Community College Dist. 9, 31 Wn.

1986Employees Ass'n v. Community College Dist. 9, 31 Wn.

1978In Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 70 Wn.2d 153, 422 P.2d 496 (1967), the court approved the rule of law as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 286, 288 (1958).

1978In Kadiak Fisheries Co. v. Murphy Diesel Co., 70 Wn.2d 153, 422 P.2d 496 (1967), the court approved the rule of law as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 286, 288 (1958).

1976Bellingham v. Duffy, 104 Wash. 426 , 176 P. 670 (1918), the court approved an instruction which asked the jury to disregard the increase in property value occasioned by the proposed construction of an army post on the land.

1976See also Enoch v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 6 Wash. 393 , 33 P. 966 (1893); State v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 69 Wn.2d 24 , 416 P.2d 675 (1966).

1976See also Enoch v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 6 Wash. 393 , 33 P. 966 (1893); State v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 69 Wn.2d 24 , 416 P.2d 675 (1966).

1976Bellingham v. Duffy, 104 Wash. 426 , 176 P. 670 (1918), the court approved an instruction which asked the jury to disregard the increase in property value occasioned by the proposed construction of an army post on the land.

1970The trial court, in the case at bar, applied the approved test of obscenity given in Roth , restated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 , 16 L.Ed.2d 1 , 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966), and incorporated into Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 , 18 L.Ed.2d 515 , 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967), which requires a coalescence of three elements: (1) the dominant theme when taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, (2) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representati

1970The trial court, in the case at bar, applied the approved test of obscenity given in Roth , restated in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 , 16 L.Ed.2d 1 , 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966), and incorporated into Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 , 18 L.Ed.2d 515 , 87 S.Ct. 1414 (1967), which requires a coalescence of three elements: (1) the dominant theme when taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, (2) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representati

1970The trial court, in the case at bar, applied the approved test of obscenity given in Roth , restated in A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 , 16 L.

1970The trial court, in the case at bar, applied the approved test of obscenity given in Roth , restated in A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 , 16 L.

1970Pursuant to the mandate of Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 , 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964), I have independently examined Cox's magazines and films in a review of the trial court's fact finding.

1970Pursuant to the mandate of Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 , 12 L.Ed.2d 793 , 84 S.Ct. 1676 (1964), I have independently examined Cox's magazines and films in a review of the trial court's fact finding.

1970In State v. Hinkley, 52 Wn.2d 415 , 325 P.2d 889 (1958), amplifying the term abet, we said, at page 418: Although the word "aid" does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent, the word "abet" includes knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator, as well as counsel and encouragement in the crime. and approved the instruction that: To abet another in the commission of a crime implies a consciousness of guilt in instigating, encouraging, promoting or aiding in the commission of such criminal offense." It would be a dangerous precedent indeed to hold that mere communications to the

1970In State v. Hinkley, 52 Wn.2d 415 , 325 P.2d 889 (1958), amplifying the term abet, we said, at page 418: Although the word "aid" does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent, the word "abet" includes knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator, as well as counsel and encouragement in the crime. and approved the instruction that: To abet another in the commission of a crime implies a consciousness of guilt in instigating, encouraging, promoting or aiding in the commission of such criminal offense." It would be a dangerous precedent indeed to hold that mere communications to the

1962Jackson v. Seattle, 15 Wn. (2d) 505, 131 P. (2d) 172 (1942).

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smothers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 .” Other cases are collected in the margin. 11 Instruction No. II 12 was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that such circumstances are to be considered in determining

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smathers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 ." Other cases are collected in the margin. [11] Instruction No. 11 [12] was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that *741 such circumstances are to be considered in det

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smothers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 .” Other cases are collected in the margin. 11 Instruction No. II 12 was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that such circumstances are to be considered in determining

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smothers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 .” Other cases are collected in the margin. 11 Instruction No. II 12 was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that such circumstances are to be considered in determining

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smothers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 .” Other cases are collected in the margin. 11 Instruction No. II 12 was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that such circumstances are to be considered in determining

1961State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171 , 203 Pac. 390 ; State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455 , 209 Pac. 837 ; State v. Smathers, 121 Wash. 472 , 209 Pac. 839 ." Other cases are collected in the margin. [11] Instruction No. 11 [12] was clearly erroneous because it told the jury without reservation that a confession was not rendered involuntary because the accused was not reminded that he was under arrest, that he was not obliged to reply, that his answer would be used against him, nor that he was entitled to be represented by counsel; while the law is that *741 such circumstances are to be considered in det