approved rule in Tennessee

2001Later, of course, in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the "presumption of malice" instruction violated constitutional due process.

2001In fact, in that 1976 case, a panel of this court approved an instruction that use of a deadly weapon during a killing raised a presumption of malice "sufficient to sustain a charge of second degree murder unless it is rebutted by other facts and circumstances." Id. at 281 .

1976The Court approved the rule laid down in the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn.App. 686 , 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).

1976The Court approved the rule laid down in the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn.App. 686 , 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).

1945Co., 196 U. S. 217 , 25 S. Ct. 226, 228 , 49 L.

1945Co., 196 U. S. 217 , 25 S. Ct. 226, 228 , 49 L.

1945In the case of State ex rel. v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229 , 208 S. W. 607 , this Court approved the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States and text book authorities therein cited, that when pending- appeal the case has become moot, that is, when the rights in contest have expired by lapse of term or time, the appeal will be dismissed, but in State ex rel. v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30 , 281 S. W. 925 , while recognizing this general rule, an exception was noted where the constitutionality of a statute was involved.

1945In the case of State ex rel. v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229 , 208 S. W. 607 , this Court approved the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States and text book authorities therein cited, that when pending- appeal the case has become moot, that is, when the rights in contest have expired by lapse of term or time, the appeal will be dismissed, but in State ex rel. v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30 , 281 S. W. 925 , while recognizing this general rule, an exception was noted where the constitutionality of a statute was involved.

1945In the case of State ex rel. v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229 , 208 S. W. 607 , this Court approved the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States and text book authorities therein cited, that when pending- appeal the case has become moot, that is, when the rights in contest have expired by lapse of term or time, the appeal will be dismissed, but in State ex rel. v. Trotter, 153 Tenn. 30 , 281 S. W. 925 , while recognizing this general rule, an exception was noted where the constitutionality of a statute was involved.

1945In Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600 , 56 S. W. (2d) 744 , while conceding that the general rule precludes recovery over by one of two participants in a tort against the other, this Court approved an exception to this rule thus stated by the Supreme Court in Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, etc., R.

1945In Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600 , 56 S. W. (2d) 744 , while conceding that the general rule precludes recovery over by one of two participants in a tort against the other, this Court approved an exception to this rule thus stated by the Supreme Court in Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, etc., R.

1938J., says that the approved rule is that, “proper expenditures would be allowed, if a good reason was shown why application was not made to the court in advance.” And the Court of Appeals’ opinion also apparently overlooks a distinction recognized between allowances to a guardian for board and lodging of his ward and reimbursements for monies expended for clothes, books, etc. In State for Use of Hickey v. Freeman, 146 Tenn., 304 , at page 307, 241 S. W., 98 , this distinction is clearly pointed out, and it must *233 be presumed that pertinent proof was made before the Chancellor.

1906The court then proceeded: “The difficulty arising out of the fofegoing rules, when a statute like ours permits a defendant in a criminal prosecution to testify in his own behalf, has been en-' countered by the courts of last resort in many of the States., as it was in this court in State v. Clinton, 67 Mo., 380 , 29 Am.