approved rule in Florida

2017Pro. 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So.2d 873 ([Fla. ]1998).

2009Pro. 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So.2d 873 (1998).

1949Likewise, in Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186 , 17 So.2d 89 , 90, we said: "This Court approved the rule that in cases where nothing is involved but the sufficiency of and the probative force of the evidence, the trial court is under no circumstances, warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury." It becomes our duty in the administration of the law to reverse the order granting a new trial, with directions to the Court below to enter a judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff below.

1949Likewise, in Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186 , 17 So.2d 89 , 90, we said: "This Court approved the rule that in cases where nothing is involved but the sufficiency and the probative force of the evidence, the trial court is, under no circumstances, warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury." Our adjudications require a reversal of the order entered below granting a new trial in the cause unless the juror Barrows was mentally incompetent to discharge the duties imposed by law on a juror.

1949Likewise, in Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186 , 17 So.2d 89 , 90, we said: "This Court approved the rule that in cases where nothing is involved but the sufficiency of and the probative force of the evidence, the trial court is under no circumstances, warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury." It becomes our duty in the administration of the law to reverse the order granting a new trial, with directions to the Court below to enter a judgment on the verdict for the plaintiff below.

1949Likewise, in Albert v. Miami Transit Co., 154 Fla. 186 , 17 So.2d 89 , 90, we said: "This Court approved the rule that in cases where nothing is involved but the sufficiency and the probative force of the evidence, the trial court is, under no circumstances, warranted in pitting his judgment against that of the jury." Our adjudications require a reversal of the order entered below granting a new trial in the cause unless the juror Barrows was mentally incompetent to discharge the duties imposed by law on a juror.

2025Under other circumstances, such an innocent and well-intended statement could result in potential prejudice.” Id.

2008At least since the 1973 decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), it has been clear that a standard instruction does not have to be given; that the trial judge always bears the responsibility of accurately instructing the jury and the ultimate goal is the “essential correctness of applicable law.” See also Young, 753 So.2d at 728 .

2008At least since the 1973 decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Bryan, 287 So.2d 73 (Fla.1973), it has been clear that a standard instruction does not have to be given; that the trial judge always bears the responsibility of accurately instructing the jury and the ultimate goal is the “essential correctness of applicable law.” See also Young, 753 So.2d at 728 .

2005The Court approved the analysis of the trial court as required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), to determine whether Lebron was eligible for the death penalty based on his degree of participation in the murders, and determined that it "correctly analyzed Lebron's relative culpability, as compared to the other known participants." Id. at 1020.

2005The Court approved the analysis of the trial court as required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), to determine whether Lebron was eligible for the death penalty based on his degree of participation in the murders, and determined that it "correctly analyzed Lebron's relative culpability, as compared to the other known participants." Id. at 1020.

2005The Court approved the analysis of the trial court as required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), to determine whether Lebron was eligible for the death penalty based on his degree of participation in the murders, and determined that it "correctly analyzed Lebron's relative culpability, as compared to the other known participants." Id. at 1020.

2005The Court approved the analysis of the trial court as required by Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), to determine whether Lebron was eligible for the death penalty based on his degree of participation in the murders, and determined that it "correctly analyzed Lebron's relative culpability, as compared to the other known participants." Id. at 1020.

2003No relief is due because "[c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to prevail on a meritless issue." Teffeteller, 734 So.2d at 1020 .

2001In Rose —a case in which the defendant's first trial had ended in a mistrial which was concededly due to a hung jury—this Court approved the analysis set forth in Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 , 104 S.Ct. 3081 , 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), stating: [Rose] contends that if his motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case and at the close of all the evidence were improperly denied in the first trial, then his later trial and convictions would be barred by the double jeopardy clauses of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section

2001In Rose —a case in which the defendant's first trial had ended in a mistrial which was concededly due to a hung jury—this Court approved the analysis set forth in Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 , 104 S.Ct. 3081 , 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), stating: [Rose] contends that if his motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case and at the close of all the evidence were improperly denied in the first trial, then his later trial and convictions would be barred by the double jeopardy clauses of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section

2000State v. Burns, 661 So.2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), dismissed, 676 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1996).

2000State v. Burns, 661 So.2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), dismissed, 676 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1996).

2000As the Court stated in Downs, "appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a claim that would have been rejected on appeal .... because the trial court used the approved standard jury instructions, the error had not been preserved in the court below, and Espinosa had not yet been decided." Downs, 740 So.2d at 518 n. 18; see Thompson, 759 So.2d at 667 ; see also Darden v. State, 475 So.2d 214, 216-17 (Fla.1985) (finding appellate counsel's performance was not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in the law). *645 Finally, Rutherford claims that appellate counsel was ineffe

1997We reject this without discussion: even Reese acknowledges in his brief that subsequent to Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), this Court approved the standard HAC instruction in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834 , 114 S.Ct. 109 , 126 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

1997We reject this without discussion: even Reese acknowledges in his brief that subsequent to Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), this Court approved the standard HAC instruction in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834 , 114 S.Ct. 109 , 126 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

1997We reject this without discussion: even Reese acknowledges in his brief that subsequent to Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), this Court approved the standard HAC instruction in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834 , 114 S.Ct. 109 , 126 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

1997We reject this without discussion: even Reese acknowledges in his brief that subsequent to Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 , 112 S.Ct. 2926 , 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), this Court approved the standard HAC instruction in Hall v. State, 614 So.2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 834 , 114 S.Ct. 109 , 126 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993).

1997Id. at 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 . [10] The Court approved of the waiver in Patton .

1997Id. at 312-13 , 50 S.Ct. at 263 . [10] The Court approved of the waiver in Patton .

1997NOTES [1] This rather complex administrative process for suspension is described in greater detail in State, Dep't of Highway Safety v. DeShong, 603 So.2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). [2] There is no argument in this case that the breath test was not an approved test.