approved instruction in Iowa

1912In Boyd v. Watson, 101 Iowa, 214 , the price of the land for the sale of which the agency existed was not specified, and the court approved of an instruction that in these circumstances a sale to a customer of the agent, without knowledge of that fact, would not render the principal liable, for the commission claimed was approved.

1910In Boyd v. Watson, 101 Iowa, 214 , the price of the land for the sale of which the agency existed was not specified, and the court approved of an instruction that in these circumstances a sale to a customer of the agent without knowledge of' that fact would not render the principal liable for the commission claimed was approved.

2003In fact, this court approved such an instruction in substantially the form given in this case in Campbell, 294 N.W.2d at 812 .

1994The instruction is in accordance with the holding in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1972), and reminds jurors that “[o]ne of the most important issues in this ease is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime” and that identity must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

1974A similar reference to “fair market value” is found in State v. Long, supra, 256 Iowa at 1309 , 130 N.W.2d at 666 .

1974A similar reference to “fair market value” is found in State v. Long, supra, 256 Iowa at 1309 , 130 N.W.2d at 666 .

1971“Thus, for clarity, we would define the right of access * * * as a right of ingress to and egress from land on an abutting street or highway and therefrom to the system of public roads, subject to reasonable traffic regulations and not affected by diversion of traffic or reasonable circuity of travel.” (Emphasis added.) In Snow v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 262 N.C. 169 , 136 S.E. 2d 678, 681 (1964), the court approved the principle that “an abutting owner has a right of access to the general system of streets and to the remainder of his street with all of its connections to a po

1971"Thus, for clarity, we would define the right of access * * * as a right of ingress to and egress from land on an abutting street or highway and therefrom to the system of public roads, subject to reasonable traffic regulations and not affected by diversion of traffic or reasonable circuity of travel." (Emphasis added.) In Snow v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 262 N.C. 169 , 136 S.E. 2d 678, 681 (1964), the court approved the principle that "an abutting owner has a right of access to the general system of streets and to the remainder of his street with all of its connections to a po

1968The language requested by defendant was taken from an approved instruction in State v. Moon, 241 Iowa 1232, 1235 , 44 N.W.2d 739, 740 .

1968The language requested by defendant was taken from an approved instruction in State v. Moon, 241 Iowa 1232, 1235 , 44 N.W.2d 739, 740 .

1967Theatres, Inc., 164 Wash. 557 , 3 P.2d 1003 , 7 P.2d 1119 , where plaintiffs sold sound equipment to a purchaser and the equipment was used in a theater which subsequently passed through several hands, during which time the equipment was used and payments were continued, the defendant could not later repudiate the contract after the equipment had disappeared.

1967Theatres, Inc., 164 Wash. 557 , 3 P.2d 1003 , 7 P.2d 1119 , where plaintiffs sold sound equipment to a purchaser and the equipment was used in a theater which subsequently passed through several hands, during which time the equipment was used and payments were continued, the defendant could not later repudiate the contract after the equipment had disappeared.

1957These eases are not in point, as the ordinance in question forbids any person to ‘stop, stand or park a motor vehicle’ within the prohibited area.” In Gaches v. Daw, 168 Wash. 162 , 10 P.2d 1111, 1114 , where it appeared that the defendants had stopped their car on the highway to look at a direction sign and their automobile was struck by the plaintiff, the court approved an instruction which told the jury that if they stopped the car on the paved portion of the road when it was practicable for them to drive it off the highway, they would be negligent.

1957These eases are not in point, as the ordinance in question forbids any person to ‘stop, stand or park a motor vehicle’ within the prohibited area.” In Gaches v. Daw, 168 Wash. 162 , 10 P.2d 1111, 1114 , where it appeared that the defendants had stopped their car on the highway to look at a direction sign and their automobile was struck by the plaintiff, the court approved an instruction which told the jury that if they stopped the car on the paved portion of the road when it was practicable for them to drive it off the highway, they would be negligent.

1953Co., 215 Iowa 1 , 244 N.W. 675 , 676 and quotes a portion of an approved instruction in the latter opinion to the effect that "the transfer of the certificate of registration (to the daughter) was merely prima facie evidence of ownership in the daughter".

1953Co., 215 Iowa 1 , 244 N.W. 675 , 676 and quotes a portion of an approved instruction in the latter opinion to the effect that "the transfer of the certificate of registration (to the daughter) was merely prima facie evidence of ownership in the daughter".

1951Practically the same instruction was given in Hansen v. Waugh, 237 Iowa 304 , 21 N.W.2d 762 , and in In re Estate of Eiker, 233 Iowa 315 , 6 N.W.2d 318 , but in both cases there was evidence of the mental weakness of the persons who executed the wills.

1951Practically the same instruction was given in Hansen v. Waugh, 237 Iowa 304 , 21 N.W.2d 762 , and in In re Estate of Eiker, 233 Iowa 315 , 6 N.W.2d 318 , but in both cases there was evidence of the mental weakness of the persons who executed the wills.

1951It does not mean mere spite, hatred, or ill will, but does signify that state of disposition which shows a heart that is regardless of human life. “ ‘Malice as applied to murder in the second degree does not necessarily mean spite or hatred although both of these elements may exist; but it means the doing of an act wrong in itself, without good cause or lawful excuse.’ ” See also, for an approved instruction, State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 833 , 28 N.W.2d 475 .

1951It does not mean mere spite, hatred, or ill will, but does signify that state of disposition which shows a heart that is regardless of human life. “ ‘Malice as applied to murder in the second degree does not necessarily mean spite or hatred although both of these elements may exist; but it means the doing of an act wrong in itself, without good cause or lawful excuse.’ ” See also, for an approved instruction, State v. Hofer, 238 Iowa 820, 833 , 28 N.W.2d 475 .

1951Practically the same instruction was given in Hansen v. Waugh, 237 Iowa 304 , 21 N.W.2d 762 , and in In re Estate of Eiker, 233 Iowa 315 , 6 N.W.2d 318 , but in both cases there was evidence of the mental weakness of the persons who executed the wills.

1951Practically the same instruction was given in Hansen v. Waugh, 237 Iowa 304 , 21 N.W.2d 762 , and in In re Estate of Eiker, 233 Iowa 315 , 6 N.W.2d 318 , but in both cases there was evidence of the mental weakness of the persons who executed the wills.

1945See, also, In re Estate of Workman, 174 Iowa 222 , 156 N. W. 438 ; In re Will of Bever, supra; Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa 1 , 109 N. W. 1014 . *970 As tbe instruction criticized was in harmony with our decisions we hold that the trial court did not err in giving it.

1945See, also, In re Estate of Workman, 174 Iowa 222 , 156 N. W. 438 ; In re Will of Bever, supra; Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 133 Iowa 1 , 109 N. W. 1014 . *970 As tbe instruction criticized was in harmony with our decisions we hold that the trial court did not err in giving it.

1943As stated in Emery v. Midwest Amusement & Realty Co. (operating a moving-picture show), 125 Neb. 54, 58 , 248 N. W. 804 , 805: “So, too, the approved rule appears to be: ‘Ordinary or reasonable care on the part of a proprietor of a theater or moving-picture theater to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition requires the exercise of reasonable care in lighting the aisles, stairways, etc.; and this is such lighting as an ordinarily prudent person would have furnished under the same or similar circumstances, that is to say, taking into consideration the purpose for which the theater was

1943As stated in Emery v. Midwest Amusement & Realty Co. (operating a moving-picture show), 125 Neb. 54, 58 , 248 N. W. 804 , 805: “So, too, the approved rule appears to be: ‘Ordinary or reasonable care on the part of a proprietor of a theater or moving-picture theater to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition requires the exercise of reasonable care in lighting the aisles, stairways, etc.; and this is such lighting as an ordinarily prudent person would have furnished under the same or similar circumstances, that is to say, taking into consideration the purpose for which the theater was

1943J., Theaters and Shows, 869, section 56.) Decisions sustaining the above-stated rule and holding the operators of moving-picture theaters to the duty of reasonable, ordinary care in properly lighting all parts of the theater to which the patrons are invited, and maintaining seats, aisles, stairways, and equipment in a reasonably safe and suitable condition for their patrons, and allowing recovery for the breach of this duty, are: Farris v. Interstate Circuit, supra, 5 Cir., Tex., 116 F. 2d 409, 411 (seat on platform elevated four to six inches); Central Amusement Co. v. Van Nostran, 85 Ind. Ap

1943J., Theaters and Shows, 869, section 56.) Decisions sustaining the above-stated rule and holding the operators of moving-picture theaters to the duty of reasonable, ordinary care in properly lighting all parts of the theater to which the patrons are invited, and maintaining seats, aisles, stairways, and equipment in a reasonably safe and suitable condition for their patrons, and allowing recovery for the breach of this duty, are: Farris v. Interstate Circuit, supra, 5 Cir., Tex., 116 F. 2d 409, 411 (seat on platform elevated four to six inches); Central Amusement Co. v. Van Nostran, 85 Ind. Ap

1943J., Theaters and Shows, 869, section 56.) Decisions sustaining the above-stated rule and holding the operators of moving-picture theaters to the duty of reasonable, ordinary care in properly lighting all parts of the theater to which the patrons are invited, and maintaining seats, aisles, stairways, and equipment in a reasonably safe and suitable condition for their patrons, and allowing recovery for the breach of this duty, are: Farris v. Interstate Circuit, supra, 5 Cir., Tex., 116 F. 2d 409, 411 (seat on platform elevated four to six inches); Central Amusement Co. v. Van Nostran, 85 Ind. Ap

1939In the case of Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 118 Iowa 337, 341 , 92 N. W. 58, 60 , this court states: ‘ ‘ It is a settled doctrine that the principal is bound not only by acts of his agent within the express limit of Ms instructions, but is also bound to the extent of the apparent authority conferred upon such agent.” In that case, a landlord sought to enforce his lien against the purchaser of grain from the tenant.

1939In the case of Fishbaugh v. Spunaugle, 118 Iowa 337, 341 , 92 N. W. 58, 60 , this court states: ‘ ‘ It is a settled doctrine that the principal is bound not only by acts of his agent within the express limit of Ms instructions, but is also bound to the extent of the apparent authority conferred upon such agent.” In that case, a landlord sought to enforce his lien against the purchaser of grain from the tenant.

1939This case was cited with approval in the case of Strasberger v. Farmers Elevator Co., 184 Iowa 66, 69 , 167 N. W. 184 , wherein this court approved an instruction which advised the jury that, in an action to enforce a landlord’s lien against the purchaser of hogs sold by the tenant, upon which the landlord had a lien, if the agent for the landlord knew of or consented to the selling of the hogs, or if, after the hogs were sold and before they were paid for, he made no objection thereto and failed to notify the purchaser of the landlord’s lien, then the landlord would be estopped from demanding