approved test in Colorado

1974The test for determining when the lesser included offense rule is applicable is clearly set out in People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233 , 343 P.2d 1058 (1959) as follows: “The approved test is: ‘If the greater of two offenses includes all the legal and factual elements of the lesser, the greater includes the lesser; but if the lesser offense requires the inclusion of some necessary element not so included in the greater offense, the lesser is not necessarily included in the greater.’ Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 4, P. 752, Section 1888 . . .” Attempted robbery without aggravation cle

1974The test for determining when the lesser included offense rule is applicable is clearly set out in People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233 , 343 P.2d 1058 (1959) as follows: “The approved test is: ‘If the greater of two offenses includes all the legal and factual elements of the lesser, the greater includes the lesser; but if the lesser offense requires the inclusion of some necessary element not so included in the greater offense, the lesser is not necessarily included in the greater.’ Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 4, P. 752, Section 1888 . . .” Attempted robbery without aggravation cle

1922Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496 ; Van Wyk v. People, 45 Colo. 1 .

1910It was, therefore, as unnecessary to instruct them that a juror has no right to disbelieve the evidence as a juror while he believes it as a man, as it would have been to charge them that in becoming jurors they had not lost the capacity which they possessed as men to distinguish truth from falsehood or mistake.” We have had occasion several .times to call the attention of district attorneys and trial judges to the advisability of following an approved instruction on the subject of reasonable doubt, as approved in Minich v. The People, 8 Colo. 454 , for the reason that this is the safe practic

1922Boykin v. People, 22 Colo. 496 ; Van Wyk v. People, 45 Colo. 1 .

1910It was, therefore, as unnecessary to instruct them that a juror has no right to disbelieve the evidence as a juror while he believes it as a man, as it would have been to charge them that in becoming jurors they had not lost the capacity which they possessed as men to distinguish truth from falsehood or mistake.” We have had occasion several .times to call the attention of district attorneys and trial judges to the advisability of following an approved instruction on the subject of reasonable doubt, as approved in Minich v. The People, 8 Colo. 454 , for the reason that this is the safe practic

1989Brochner v. Western Insurance Co., 724 P.2d 1293 (Colo.1986).

1989Brochner v. Western Insurance Co., 724 P.2d 1293 (Colo.1986).

1989In Western Insurance Co. v. Brochner, 682 P.2d 1213 (Colo.App.1983) this court approved the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) which provides: "One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interest by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorneys fees and other expenditures thereby suffered in the earlier action." On certiorari, Brochner was reversed on other grounds; however, the supreme court did not reject application of the Restatement rule if,

1989In Western Insurance Co. v. Brochner, 682 P.2d 1213 (Colo.App.1983) this court approved the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 914(2) which provides: “One who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interest by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorneys fees and other expenditures thereby suffered in the earlier action.” On certiorari, Brochner was reversed on other grounds; however, the supreme court did not reject application of the Restatement rule if,

1975Specifically, in Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 , this Court approved an instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the language of the statute.

1975Specifically, in Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 , this Court approved an instruction on involuntary manslaughter in the language of the statute.

1972This court approved an instruction which stated: “ ‘The Court instructs the jury that when a killing is done unlawfully with a deadly weapon, or weapon calculated to produce and actually producing death, malice may be legitimately inferred in the absence of proof that the act was done in necessary self-defense or upon sufficient provocation or cause, and you may infer from such fact that the act was voluntary and committed with malice aforethought.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Moya v. People, 174 Colo. 435 , 484 P.2d 788 (1971).

1972This court approved an instruction which stated: “ ‘The Court instructs the jury that when a killing is done unlawfully with a deadly weapon, or weapon calculated to produce and actually producing death, malice may be legitimately inferred in the absence of proof that the act was done in necessary self-defense or upon sufficient provocation or cause, and you may infer from such fact that the act was voluntary and committed with malice aforethought.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Moya v. People, 174 Colo. 435 , 484 P.2d 788 (1971).

1970The definition of a lesser included offense was set forth in People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233 , 343 P.2d 1058 , wherein this court adopted the test devised by Wharton: “The approved test is: ‘If the greater of two offenses includes all of the legal and factual elements of the lesser, the greater includes the lesSer; but if the lesser offense requires the inclusion of some necessary element not so included in the greater offense, the lesser is not necessarily included in the greater.’ 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 752.” See also Daniels v. People, 159 Colo. 190 , 411 P.2d 316 .

1970The definition of a lesser included offense was set forth in People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233 , 343 P.2d 1058 , wherein this court adopted the test devised by Wharton: “The approved test is: ‘If the greater of two offenses includes all of the legal and factual elements of the lesser, the greater includes the lesSer; but if the lesser offense requires the inclusion of some necessary element not so included in the greater offense, the lesser is not necessarily included in the greater.’ 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure 752.” See also Daniels v. People, 159 Colo. 190 , 411 P.2d 316 .

1964In Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128 , 330 P.2d 539 , 75 A.L.R.2d 678 , this court approved the rule governing "the point of time when or the state of the prosecution at which jeopardy attaches." That rule is stated in 22 C.J.S.

1964In Markiewicz v. Black, 138 Colo. 128 , 330 P.2d 539 , 75 A.L.R.2d 678 , this court approved the rule governing "the point of time when or the state of the prosecution at which jeopardy attaches." That rule is stated in 22 C.J.S.

1960Here the Court approved the standard announced in Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 , 391: “ * * * The legislative bodies in draftsmanship obviously have the same difficulty as do the judicial in Interpretation.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1959In that opinion we find the following pertinent statement of the applicable rule taken from Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L.

1959In that opinion we find the following pertinent statement of the applicable rule taken from Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 , 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1959In Hazlet, et al. v. Gaunt, et al., 126 Colo. 385 , 250 P. (2d) 188 , this court approved the rule announced in *401 Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 90 Colo. 568 , 11 P. (2d) 555 , where we find the following: “The general assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends. * * * ” In Prouty, et al. v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168 , 255 P. (2d) 755 , this court considered the question involved in the instant case.

1951In Audia v. DeAngelis, 121 Conn. 336 , 185 Atl. 78 , a boy was permitted to ride with defendant on a grocery truck and occasionally delivered packages from the truck *593 to customers.

1951In Audia v. DeAngelis, 121 Conn. 336 , 185 Atl. 78 , a boy was permitted to ride with defendant on a grocery truck and occasionally delivered packages from the truck *593 to customers.

1951In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Sutyak, 175 F. (2d) 123, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit said: “It was of some financial benefit to the defendant to process at its smelter the ore produced through the labor of its own employees, through the labor of the employees of Collins, and through the labor of those operating under a split check arrangement with Collins.” See, also, Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash. (2d) 426, 103 P. (2d) 1086 , in which the court approved the doctrine in Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86 , 77 P. (2d) 382 , wherein it was held that to take a person riding wi

1951In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Sutyak, 175 F. (2d) 123, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit said: “It was of some financial benefit to the defendant to process at its smelter the ore produced through the labor of its own employees, through the labor of the employees of Collins, and through the labor of those operating under a split check arrangement with Collins.” See, also, Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash. (2d) 426, 103 P. (2d) 1086 , in which the court approved the doctrine in Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86 , 77 P. (2d) 382 , wherein it was held that to take a person riding wi

1951In American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Sutyak, 175 F. (2d) 123, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit said: “It was of some financial benefit to the defendant to process at its smelter the ore produced through the labor of its own employees, through the labor of the employees of Collins, and through the labor of those operating under a split check arrangement with Collins.” See, also, Fuller v. Tucker, 4 Wash. (2d) 426, 103 P. (2d) 1086 , in which the court approved the doctrine in Syverson v. Berg, 194 Wash. 86 , 77 P. (2d) 382 , wherein it was held that to take a person riding wi

1947That this was the procedure here we think is established by the testimony of Hawkins and Salo.” *57 'In the case of Aquilini v. Chamblin, 94 Colo. 367, 370 , 30 P. (2d) 325 , this court approved the doctrine announced in Lenahan v. White, 79 Colo. 347 , 245 Pac. 711 , wherein it was held that: “A full attestation clause reciting compliance with all formalities of execution and signed by the witnesses * * * is prima facie evidence of the validity of the will, and that this is so although the witness’ memory is faulty or he contradicts the facts stated in the clause.” There is ample evidence in

1947That this was the procedure here we think is established by the testimony of Hawkins and Salo.” *57 'In the case of Aquilini v. Chamblin, 94 Colo. 367, 370 , 30 P. (2d) 325 , this court approved the doctrine announced in Lenahan v. White, 79 Colo. 347 , 245 Pac. 711 , wherein it was held that: “A full attestation clause reciting compliance with all formalities of execution and signed by the witnesses * * * is prima facie evidence of the validity of the will, and that this is so although the witness’ memory is faulty or he contradicts the facts stated in the clause.” There is ample evidence in

1947That this was the procedure here we think is established by the testimony of Hawkins and Salo.” *57 'In the case of Aquilini v. Chamblin, 94 Colo. 367, 370 , 30 P. (2d) 325 , this court approved the doctrine announced in Lenahan v. White, 79 Colo. 347 , 245 Pac. 711 , wherein it was held that: “A full attestation clause reciting compliance with all formalities of execution and signed by the witnesses * * * is prima facie evidence of the validity of the will, and that this is so although the witness’ memory is faulty or he contradicts the facts stated in the clause.” There is ample evidence in

1947That this was the procedure here we think is established by the testimony of Hawkins and Salo.” *57 'In the case of Aquilini v. Chamblin, 94 Colo. 367, 370 , 30 P. (2d) 325 , this court approved the doctrine announced in Lenahan v. White, 79 Colo. 347 , 245 Pac. 711 , wherein it was held that: “A full attestation clause reciting compliance with all formalities of execution and signed by the witnesses * * * is prima facie evidence of the validity of the will, and that this is so although the witness’ memory is faulty or he contradicts the facts stated in the clause.” There is ample evidence in

1924The supreme court of Michigan, in Merriman’s Appeal, 108 Mich. 454 , 66 N. W. 372 , defines delusion as: “A belief in a fact for which there is no foundation.” And in Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J.

1924The supreme court of Michigan, in Merriman’s Appeal, 108 Mich. 454 , 66 N. W. 372 , defines delusion as: “A belief in a fact for which there is no foundation.” And in Smith v. Smith, 48 N. J.