approved instruction in Oklahoma

1994Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).

1994Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 , 110 S.Ct. 1257 , 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990).

1984In Farrell , this Court approved the rule announced in Williams v. Williams, 40 F. 521 (Cir.Ct., D.) (Kans.1889): “The main question, in its broadest sense, is simply this: Can a married man give away his property, during cover-ture, for the purpose of preventing his wife from acquiring an interest therein after his death?

1978The Bloodworth case further held at 164 S.E.2d 825 -26 that this factual setting “would be an approved exception to the rule forbidding a trustee to purchase at his sale of trust property for his own benefit.” *130 See also Keyes v. Hurlbert, 43 Cal.App.2d 497 , 111 P.2d 447 (Dist.

1978The Bloodworth case further held at 164 S.E.2d 825 -26 that this factual setting “would be an approved exception to the rule forbidding a trustee to purchase at his sale of trust property for his own benefit.” *130 See also Keyes v. Hurlbert, 43 Cal.App.2d 497 , 111 P.2d 447 (Dist.

1977In addition, in Grubb v. State, Okl.Cr., 533 P.2d 988 (1975), where the defendant also cited People v. Wester, supra, as authority for a similar requested instruction, this Court approved an instruction, stating: “ ‘You are instructed that it is no defense to a charge of ESCAPE that the prisoner feared violence from third persons, and you shall not consider such evidence as a defense or in mitigation of punishment.’ ” *670 This instruction was also cited as authority in Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 556 P.2d 1060 (1976), where on facts very similar to the present case this Court found no error in t

1977In addition, in Grubb v. State, Okl.Cr., 533 P.2d 988 (1975), where the defendant also cited People v. Wester, supra, as authority for a similar requested instruction, this Court approved an instruction, stating: “ ‘You are instructed that it is no defense to a charge of ESCAPE that the prisoner feared violence from third persons, and you shall not consider such evidence as a defense or in mitigation of punishment.’ ” *670 This instruction was also cited as authority in Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 556 P.2d 1060 (1976), where on facts very similar to the present case this Court found no error in t

1977The instructions fairly and fully presented the issues involved, and as stated in Turman v. State, Okl.Cr., 522 P.2d 247 (1974): “. . .

1977In addition, in Grubb v. State, Okl.Cr., 533 P.2d 988 (1975), where the defendant also cited People v. Wester, supra, as authority for a similar requested instruction, this Court approved an instruction, stating: “ ‘You are instructed that it is no defense to a charge of ESCAPE that the prisoner feared violence from third persons, and you shall not consider such evidence as a defense or in mitigation of punishment.’ ” *670 This instruction was also cited as authority in Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 556 P.2d 1060 (1976), where on facts very similar to the present case this Court found no error in t

1975As a guide in writing instructions which comply with the Miller ■standards, one might see Hanf v. State, Okl.Cr., 536 P.2d 936 (1975), in which this Court approved the instruction as being in substantial compliance with Miller .

1969In the case of Saulsbury v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 7 , 172 P.2d 440 (1946), this Court approved an instruction almost identical to Instruction No. 7.

1969In the case of Saulsbury v. State, 83 Okl.Cr. 7 , 172 P.2d 440 (1946), this Court approved an instruction almost identical to Instruction No. 7.

1969In Mammano v. State, Okl.Cr., 333 P.2d 602 (1958), this Court approved an instruction which set forth in substance Section 745, supra, and then added: “Thereupon the burden of proof shifts to the defendant; and to discharge it he must produce evidence sufficient in quality and quantity to raise a reason *335 able doubt, either as to the degree of the homicide, or as to whether he was justifiable or excusable, failing in which a conviction for murder is warranted.” In Musgraves v. State, 48 Okl.

1969Cr. 418, 292 P. 376 , this Court stated: “In Duncan v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 217 , 144 P. 629, 630 , this court, in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus, said: ‘An assignment of error, based upon an instruction of the court bearing upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the person on trial of murder is of no avail when the jury returned a verdict finding such person guilty of manslaughter and not of murder.’ Tinney v. State, 19 Okl.Cr. 127 , 201 P. 819 .” For all of the reasons above set forth, we are of the opinion that this assignment of error is without merit.

1969Cr. 418, 292 P. 376 , this Court stated: “In Duncan v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 217 , 144 P. 629, 630 , this court, in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus, said: ‘An assignment of error, based upon an instruction of the court bearing upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the person on trial of murder is of no avail when the jury returned a verdict finding such person guilty of manslaughter and not of murder.’ Tinney v. State, 19 Okl.Cr. 127 , 201 P. 819 .” For all of the reasons above set forth, we are of the opinion that this assignment of error is without merit.

1969Cr. 418, 292 P. 376 , this Court stated: “In Duncan v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 217 , 144 P. 629, 630 , this court, in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus, said: ‘An assignment of error, based upon an instruction of the court bearing upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the person on trial of murder is of no avail when the jury returned a verdict finding such person guilty of manslaughter and not of murder.’ Tinney v. State, 19 Okl.Cr. 127 , 201 P. 819 .” For all of the reasons above set forth, we are of the opinion that this assignment of error is without merit.

1969Cr. 418, 292 P. 376 , this Court stated: “In Duncan v. State, 11 Okl.Cr. 217 , 144 P. 629, 630 , this court, in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus, said: ‘An assignment of error, based upon an instruction of the court bearing upon the question of the guilt or innocence of the person on trial of murder is of no avail when the jury returned a verdict finding such person guilty of manslaughter and not of murder.’ Tinney v. State, 19 Okl.Cr. 127 , 201 P. 819 .” For all of the reasons above set forth, we are of the opinion that this assignment of error is without merit.

1963This instruction, commonly referred to as the M’Naghten Rules, 2 has been the test used in determining criminal responsibility of an accused in every decision 3 rendered by this Court with the exception of Adair v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 284 , 118 P. 416 , 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 119 and Claycomb v. State, 22 Okl.Cr. 315 , 211 P. 429 , wherein the Court instructed on “irresistible impulse”.

1963This instruction, commonly referred to as the M’Naghten Rules, 2 has been the test used in determining criminal responsibility of an accused in every decision 3 rendered by this Court with the exception of Adair v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 284 , 118 P. 416 , 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 119 and Claycomb v. State, 22 Okl.Cr. 315 , 211 P. 429 , wherein the Court instructed on “irresistible impulse”.

1963The test of criminal re *347 sponsibility for acts, which would ordinarily be criminal under the law, is: “The mental ability or capacity to •distinguish between right and wrong as applied to the particular act, and to understand the nature and probable consequences of such act, that is to say, the capacity to know right from wrong, and to know then that the particular act, alleged to have been committed, was ■wrong.” The court in giving this instruction relied upon Revard v. State, Okl.Cr., 332 P.2d 967 , wherein this Court approved an instruction couched in identical language.

1963This instruction, commonly referred to as the M’Naghten Rules, 2 has been the test used in determining criminal responsibility of an accused in every decision 3 rendered by this Court with the exception of Adair v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 284 , 118 P. 416 , 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 119 and Claycomb v. State, 22 Okl.Cr. 315 , 211 P. 429 , wherein the Court instructed on “irresistible impulse”.

1963This instruction, commonly referred to as the M’Naghten Rules, 2 has been the test used in determining criminal responsibility of an accused in every decision 3 rendered by this Court with the exception of Adair v. State, 6 Okl.Cr. 284 , 118 P. 416 , 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 119 and Claycomb v. State, 22 Okl.Cr. 315 , 211 P. 429 , wherein the Court instructed on “irresistible impulse”.

1957Again in Parkhill Trucking Co. v. Hopper, 208 Okl. 429 , 256 P.2d 810 , it was held that the son, for whose death the mother sought damages, was over twenty, years of age when killed and had been contributing to his mother’s support and had been away from home practically all of the time and assisting his mother, who was a widow, and under such facts the court had no reason to instruct the jury that from the pecuniary loss suffered by the mother in his death they should deduct the cost of his upkeep by his mother.

1957Again in Parkhill Trucking Co. v. Hopper, 208 Okl. 429 , 256 P.2d 810 , it was held that the son, for whose death the mother sought damages, was over twenty, years of age when killed and had been contributing to his mother’s support and had been away from home practically all of the time and assisting his mother, who was a widow, and under such facts the court had no reason to instruct the jury that from the pecuniary loss suffered by the mother in his death they should deduct the cost of his upkeep by his mother.

1957In Fike v. Peters, 175 Okl. 334 , 52 P.2d 700, 704 , the court approved an instruction complained of which expressly advised the jury that in fixing the value of the child’s services they should consider certain elements in arriving at what the services of the deceased child would amount to and added “ ‘ * * * from this sum you will deduct the reasonable charges and up-keep of said child, such as food, clothing,, medical expenses, schooling, etc. and the value of the parents’ services while rearing said child; * * In the recent case of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okl. 93 , 227 P.2d

1957In Fike v. Peters, 175 Okl. 334 , 52 P.2d 700, 704 , the court approved an instruction complained of which expressly advised the jury that in fixing the value of the child’s services they should consider certain elements in arriving at what the services of the deceased child would amount to and added “ ‘ * * * from this sum you will deduct the reasonable charges and up-keep of said child, such as food, clothing,, medical expenses, schooling, etc. and the value of the parents’ services while rearing said child; * * In the recent case of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okl. 93 , 227 P.2d

1957In Fike v. Peters, 175 Okl. 334 , 52 P.2d 700, 704 , the court approved an instruction complained of which expressly advised the jury that in fixing the value of the child’s services they should consider certain elements in arriving at what the services of the deceased child would amount to and added “ ‘ * * * from this sum you will deduct the reasonable charges and up-keep of said child, such as food, clothing,, medical expenses, schooling, etc. and the value of the parents’ services while rearing said child; * * In the recent case of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okl. 93 , 227 P.2d

1957In Fike v. Peters, 175 Okl. 334 , 52 P.2d 700, 704 , the court approved an instruction complained of which expressly advised the jury that in fixing the value of the child’s services they should consider certain elements in arriving at what the services of the deceased child would amount to and added “ ‘ * * * from this sum you will deduct the reasonable charges and up-keep of said child, such as food, clothing,, medical expenses, schooling, etc. and the value of the parents’ services while rearing said child; * * In the recent case of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okl. 93 , 227 P.2d

1955However, in view of the fact this case must be retried, the approved instruction in Miller v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 255 , 131 P. 717 , L.R.A.1915A, 1088, on expert testimony, should be given.

1955However, in view of the fact this case must be retried, the approved instruction in Miller v. State, 9 Okl.Cr. 255 , 131 P. 717 , L.R.A.1915A, 1088, on expert testimony, should be given.

1953The defendants here urge that the case of Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Pickeral, 204 Okla. 37 , 226 P. 2d 397 , supports their contention that under the rule there announced the verdict in the instant case should be vacated and set aside as being excessive.

1953The defendants here urge that the case of Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Pickeral, 204 Okla. 37 , 226 P. 2d 397 , supports their contention that under the rule there announced the verdict in the instant case should be vacated and set aside as being excessive.

1952Co. v. Parks, Adm’r, 182 Okla. 598 , 78 P. 2d 791 , and the approved rule announced as follows: “An order overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not an appealable order, and where an appeal is taken from such an order prior to the entry of a final judgment or order in the cause, such appeal presents nothing properly reviewable by this court.” In the Parks case this court pointed out a distinction as to their finality, which exists between orders overruling a demurrer and those sustaining a demurrer to a petition.

1952Co. v. Parks, Adm’r, 182 Okla. 598 , 78 P. 2d 791 , and the approved rule announced as follows: “An order overruling a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not an appealable order, and where an appeal is taken from such an order prior to the entry of a final judgment or order in the cause, such appeal presents nothing properly reviewable by this court.” In the Parks case this court pointed out a distinction as to their finality, which exists between orders overruling a demurrer and those sustaining a demurrer to a petition.

1948Co., Ltd., v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162 , 27 S. E. (2d) 791 , where the court approved an instruction of the trial court wherein it is declared “if you find that the wind blew hard enough to blow a tree down, then that would be the same as a windstorm, if the wind was that hard.” We do not hold that the blowing down of the plum tree above referred to establishes the fact of a windstorm as a matter of law, but we do hold that fact to be competent evidence touching the force and violence of the wind and that same together with other matters herein recited were sufficient to sustain the finding of th

1948Co., Ltd., v. Lies, 70 Ga. App. 162 , 27 S. E. (2d) 791 , where the court approved an instruction of the trial court wherein it is declared “if you find that the wind blew hard enough to blow a tree down, then that would be the same as a windstorm, if the wind was that hard.” We do not hold that the blowing down of the plum tree above referred to establishes the fact of a windstorm as a matter of law, but we do hold that fact to be competent evidence touching the force and violence of the wind and that same together with other matters herein recited were sufficient to sustain the finding of th

1948In support of the second ground, to the effect the court erred in admission of opinion testimony as to the cause of the roof’s falling, there is cited Goodlett v. Williamston, 179 Okla. 238 , 65 P. 2d 472 , which announces the rule that such testimony is not admissible unless based upon facts established by the evidence, and Great American Life Ins.

1948In support of the second ground, to the effect the court erred in admission of opinion testimony as to the cause of the roof’s falling, there is cited Goodlett v. Williamston, 179 Okla. 238 , 65 P. 2d 472 , which announces the rule that such testimony is not admissible unless based upon facts established by the evidence, and Great American Life Ins.